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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction* 
 
 
1.1. Subject 
 
In addressing the purpose of the nation State, political philosophers often refer to the ‘supreme good’,1 the 
‘general good’,2 ‘the common good’,3 or the ‘common essence’4 of its citizens. At first sight, these terms seem 
to share common ground, but, in fact, may be understood differently by political philosophers. Their 
understanding seems to correlate with the functions they attribute to the State. Some (liberal) philosophers, 
such as John Locke and Adam Smith, focus on individual citizens. In their view, the State should merely 
facilitate individual citizens in their strivings for private (economic) interests, as this would serve the general 
interest.5 To them, the term common good and related terms refer to what is common to each citizen, that is, 
the individual well-being. In this theory, the function of the State should be limited to protecting the life, 
freedom and property of each citizen. Other philosophers, such as Karl Marx, focus on the multitude of citizens 
where the term common good and related terms refer to what is common to the whole people, that is, their 
collective well-being.6 In their view, the State should have a far greater power over its citizens and be much 
more involved in public and private life, as is necessary to achieve the common good. 
 
Either way, the nation State needs resources to strive for the supreme good, the general good, the common 
good, or the common essence. Traditionally, States collect taxes, issue government bonds, sell available 
natural resources, etc., to fund public expenditure. More recently, an increasing number of States have entered 
the market looking to invest resources in domestic and, even more so, foreign assets. They do so to achieve 
financial objectives, serve a variety of macroeconomic purposes and, as some would argue, to contribute to 
the common good. Their investments are, more often than not, structured through special purpose investment 
funds or arrangements, known as sovereign wealth funds (‘SWFs’), or investment entities owned by SWFs, 
known as sovereign wealth enterprises (‘SWEs’). The total value of assets under the management of SWFs and 
SWEs – together referred to as ‘sovereign wealth investors’ in this study – is currently estimated at US$ 7,6 
                                                             
* Materials have been included up to 17 December 2017. 
1 Aristotle, Politics, trans. H. Rackman, in Aristotle: in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. XXI, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 3: “Every state is as we see a sort of partnership, and every partnership is formed with 
a view to some good (since all the actions of all mankind are done with a view to what they think to be good). It is 
therefore evident that, while all partnerships aim at some good, the partnership that is the most supreme of all and includes 
all the others does so most of all, and aims at the most supreme of all goods; and this is the partnership entitled the state, 
the political association.” Underline added. 
2 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. P. Laslett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 305: “For 
Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, 
and prescribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law. (…) [T]he end of Law is not to abolish or 
restrain, but to preserve and to enlarge Freedom (…).” Underline added. 
3 Cicero, De Re Publica, De Legibus, trans. C. Keyes, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 65: 
“Well, then, a commonwealth is the property of a people. But a people is not any collection of human beings brought 
together in any sort of way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement with respect to 
justice and a partnership for the common good.” Underline added. 
4 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”, ed. D. McLellan, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p. 47. 
5 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (1759, 1799, 6th edn.), ed. D. Rapheal & A. Macfie, (Glasgow Edition, 
Vol. I), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), IV, I, 11, pp. 185-186. 
6 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”, ed. D. McLellan, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977). 
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trillion (February 2018), which is an increase from US$ 5,8 trillion as in March 2012 and US$ 3,9 trillion as in 
March 2008.7 This development of States acting as investors, managing the wealth of a nation, and competing 
in the marketplace with other (private) investors, raises many interesting questions in various fields. This 
study is concerned with international tax aspects of sovereign wealth investors. 
 
1.2. Focus and purpose 
 
SWFs and their ‘local’ SWEs8 are generally not taxed in the State in which they have been set-up (i.e. generally 
no taxation in their home State). However, in a cross-border context, income (including capital gains) from 
investments of such sovereign wealth investors may be taxed in the investment recipient State (“the source 
State”). The more tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor pays in a source State, the smaller the return and 
revenue available to its home State. Therefore, this study will primarily focus on a source State perspective, 
but that does not mean that the tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors in their home State cannot be 
relevant for the international tax analysis of such investors, from a source State perspective. Thus, the home 
State tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors will also be looked at. The reasons for concentrating on 
sovereign wealth investors will be explained below. 
 
In recent years, sovereign wealth investors have established themselves as an important class of investors 
and will continue to be so.9 They are widely regarded as a separate group of investors in various fields of law, 
including international investment law10 and international tax law,11 by academics and policymakers. 
Addressing sovereign wealth investors separately from other investor groups can essentially be traced back 
to the following developments and distinctive features. First, sovereign wealth investors own and invest 
extreme amounts of money, and their investment activity increases rapidly. They have increased in both 
number and size and will continue to look for cross-border investment opportunities in the years to come. 
Second, sovereign wealth investors are owned, controlled and funded by States. This link has not only raised 
political and security concerns in source States,12 but also raises questions as to the scope of the international 
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. Based on this doctrine, a foreign State, and its entities, can be held 
immune from the jurisdiction or enforcement power of a source State. A number of source States also apply 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity to taxation.13 By its nature, this doctrine cannot apply to other investor 
groups. In addition, the fact that sovereign wealth investors are owned, controlled and funded by States, 
means that the home State tax treatment of such investors is based on a different rationale,14 compared to the 
tax treatment accorded by home States to other groups of resident investors, such as pension funds and 
                                                             
7 SWF Institute, Sovereign Wealth Fund Market Size, available at <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-
rankings/> 
8 A ‘local’ SWE of an SWF is an SWE which has been established in the same State as the SWF which owns the SWE.  
9 A. Sandor, “Leveraging International Law to Incentivize Value-Added Shareholding: Why Foreign Sovereign Wealth 
Funds Still Matter and How They Can Improve Shareholder Governance” (2015) 46 Georgetown Journal of International 
Law 948, pp. 948-950.  
10 For example, F. Bassan (ed.), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
11 For example, Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 33 & p. 76; Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United 
States (June, 2008), available at: <http://www.jct.gov/x-49-08.pdf>; M. Kandev, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are They 
Welcome in Canada?” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 649; J. Bird-Pollan, “The Unjustified Subsidy: 
Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of Corporate & 
Financial Law 987; R. Snoeij, “Sovereign Immunity and Source State Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is It Time to 
Re-Evaluate?” (2016) 8 World Tax Journal 225. 
12 A. De Luca, “The EU and Member States: FDI, portfolio investments, golden powers and SWFs”, Chapter 7 in: F. 
Bassan (ed.), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015). 
13 The application of the sovereign immunity principle in tax matters will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
14 Discussed in Section 2.10. 
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collective investment vehicles (‘CIVs’).15 A third reason for addressing sovereign wealth investors separately, 
may be found in a recent investment trend concerning this group of investors. Whereas sovereign wealth 
investors traditionally invested as passive investors, for example in listed shares or government bonds 
(portfolio investments), they are increasingly operating as active investors by making long-term investments, 
for example in real estate, infrastructure and private companies (direct investments).16 This move from 
traditional asset classes to alternative (less liquid) assets is, to a large extent, driven by the current economic 
environment of low interest rates and slow economic growth.17 
 
Given the increasing significance of sovereign wealth investors, and taking into account their distinctive 
features, there has been surprisingly little research on sovereign wealth investors in a tax policy context. Most 
of the existing research focused on source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors from the perspective 
of a particular State, notably Australia,18 Canada,19 Singapore20 and the U.S.,21 but not from any Member State 
of the European Union (‘EU Member State’). Of wider relevance are the 2009 proposals of the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs on tax treaty residency of SWFs,22 as reflected in the 2010 update of the OECD 
Commentary, and other tax research, focusing on specific tax topics in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors, such as sovereign immunity (Snoeij, 2016),23 sovereign immunity in the context of tax treaties 
(Joseph, 2015),24 and jurisdictional taxing rights of sovereign wealth investors (Joseph, 2015)25. This study 
provides the first comprehensive academic work on foreign sovereign wealth investors in a tax policy context, 
and focuses on income tax. Its relevance is not limited to a particular source State, nor is it limited to a specific 
tax topic. 
 
Given the increasing significance of sovereign wealth investors and taking into account their distinctive 
features, source States may wish to introduce new tax policy, or evaluate or reconsider their existing tax 
                                                             
15 See in more detail, Section 3.2. 
16 M. Castelli & F. Scacciavillani, “SWFs and State investments: A preliminary general overview”, Chapter 1 in: F. Bassan 
(ed.), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2015), pp. 20-22; PwC, Sovereign Investors 2020: A growing force (April, 2016). In January 2015, one of 
China’s SWFs even established a separate investment vehicle for making direct investments.  
17 Ibid. 
18 S-A. Joseph, M. Walpole & R. Deutsch, “Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Suggested Approach” (2015) 10 
Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 119, available at: <https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/About-
Site/Schools-Site/Taxation-Business-Law-
Site/Journal%20of%20The%20Australasian%20Tax%20Teachers%20Associati/JATTA-2015_all_articles.pdf>. 
19 M. Kandev, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are They Welcome in Canada?” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 
649. 
20 S-A. Joseph, “Taxing Sovereign Wealth Funds Mark II: Looking to Singapore for inspiration”, Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association Conference Papers, 2016, available at: <https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/About-Site/Schools-
Site/Taxation-Business-Law-Site/Documents/Joseph_ATTA-2016-Sally-Joseph.pdf>. 
21 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08; M. Melone, “Should the United States Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?” (2008) 
26 Boston University International Law Journal, pp. 143 et seq.; V. Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth 
Funds” (2009) 84 NYU Law Review 440; V. Fleischer, “Should We Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?” (2008) 118 Yale Law 
Journal Pocket Part 93; M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage 
Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703; J. Bird-Pollan, 
“The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2012) 17 Fordham 
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 987. 
22 OECD (2009), Discussion Draft on the Application of Tax Treaties to State-Owned Entities, Including Sovereign Wealth 
Funds. 
23 R. Snoeij, “Sovereign Immunity and Source State Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is It Time to Re-Evaluate?” 
(2016) 8 World Tax Journal 225. 
24 S-A. Joseph, “Do Tax Treaties Embody Sovereign Immunity? – An Assessment with Regard to Sovereign Wealth 
Funds” (2015) 69 Bulletin for International Taxation 637. 
25 S-A. Joseph, “Jurisdictional Taxing Rights of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2016) 70 Bulletin for International Taxation 
146. 
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policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors. The purpose of this study is to assist source States in doing 
so, by developing a conceptual framework.  
 
1.3. Approach and further scoping 
 
This study will use two main ingredients to develop the conceptual framework: (i) international tax policy 
principles and objectives, and (ii) international law. 
 
Basic principles and objectives often underlie a State’s international tax policy and its international tax rules 
design. A State’s international tax policy choices, and the underlying basic principles and objectives, may 
depend on various factors – such as the size and nature of its economy, public interests, societal values, as 
well as tax policy choices of other States – and may change over time. International tax policy principles and 
objectives can serve as a useful and important starting point for source States when introducing new tax 
policy or reconsidering existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors. This study identifies as 
today’s three main ‘substantive’ attributes26 of international tax policy: (i) neutrality (efficiency), (ii) equity 
(fairness), and (iii) international attractiveness. It will discuss and present the key theoretical implications of 
these policy principles and objectives for the design of international tax rules, focusing on foreign sovereign 
wealth investors. This presentation will then be used to measure approaches to source taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors by their neutrality, equity and international attractiveness. Before being able to do 
so, it is necessary to consider the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors by source States, and how 
such taxation compares to the taxation of other investor groups, such as collective investment vehicles and 
pension funds. This comparison puts things into perspective and is relevant for the international law analysis, 
the second main ingredient. 
 
International law may impact the ability of source States to achieve tax policy objectives. Because of the 
obligations it can impose on a source State in the field of taxation, international law could restrict or limit, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a source State’s sovereign power (i.e. its ability) to implement (or promote) a tax 
policy principle. So, this study will examine and, sometimes, explore its possible impact on source States’ 
ability to achieve tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors.27 With respect to the 
international law analyses, this study will consider the (possible) impact of: (1) the sovereign immunity 
principle, (2) tax treaties, and (3) European law.  
 
Tax treaties form a part of ‘traditional’ public international law, which governs the relations between 
sovereign States.28 In the field of international taxation, relations between sovereign States may also be 
                                                             
26 ‘Substantive’ tax policy principles should be distinguished from ‘procedural’ tax policy principles. See in more detail 
Section 3.3. 
27 In addition, constitutional restrictions on the ability to achieve tax policy objectives may apply in some source States.  
28 In a traditional sense, public international law used to be defined as the body of law governing the relations between 
States. Under this traditional definition, only States were regarded as the subjects of public international law, i.e. only 
States were considered to have rights and/or obligations under public international law. Although public international law 
could also be concerned with others than States, such as individuals, they were merely seen as objects of international law, 
in that the burden and/or benefit international law had on/for these objects was passed on through the State. Modern public 
international law has been defined as the body of law that is concerned “with the conduct of states and of international 
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or 
juridical.” Under the modern definition of public international law, States remain the primary subjects of public 
international law, but no longer are they the only ones. Individuals and international organizations are now generally 
regarded as other examples of subjects of public international law. See P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International Law, 7th edn., (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 1; Oppenheim’s International Law (ed. by R. Jennings & A. 
Watts), Vol. I, 9th edn., (London: Longman, 1992), p. 4 & pp. 16 et seq. 
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governed by public international law other than (tax) treaties.29 The OECD Commentary notes that some 
States apply the so-called sovereign immunity principle in tax matters.30 According to this principle of 
customary international law, one sovereign State is, as a general rule, immune from the jurisdiction and 
enforcement power of another sovereign State. Some source States grant other States immunity from their 
taxing power based on the international law concept of sovereign immunity. This study will examine what 
impact the sovereign immunity principle could have on the ability of source States to achieve tax policy 
objectives in relation foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
Tax treaties govern relations between States, in that these international instruments allocate taxing rights 
between States, which may allow one State and prevent another from taxing the same income. Like non-tax 
treaties, tax treaties are generally based on (some form of) reciprocity. Many bilateral tax treaties are based 
on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (‘OECD MTC’), or the UN Model Double Taxation 
Convention between Developed and Developing countries (‘UN MTC’). Both models apply to persons who are 
‘liable to tax’, but also to the State itself and its political subdivisions and local authorities. With respect to tax 
treaties, and their application to foreign sovereign wealth investors, this study will primarily focus on the 
OECD and UN MTC, although specific bilateral tax treaties will also be referred to.  
 
From a source State perspective, the European law analysis will only be relevant to the EU Member States 
and (other) members to the Agreement on the European Economic Area31 (‘EEA Agreement’). This study will 
consider primary European law, notably the fundamental freedoms and State aid rules included in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and the EEA Agreement, which can all apply in (direct) tax 
matters. An important reason for including the EEA Agreement is that Norway, a member to this agreement, 
hosts currently the largest sovereign wealth investor in the world in terms of assets under management (US$ 
1,032 billion as on February 2018).32 As regards the fundamental freedoms, it is noted that the freedom of 
capital movement, rather than the freedom of establishment, potentially has the most relevance in relation to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. The first reason for this is that, although sovereign wealth investors 
increasingly operate as long-term, active investors, they are still predominantly (passive) portfolio investors 
(to which the free movement of capital has the most relevance). The second reason is that most sovereign 
wealth investors reside outside the European Union (‘EU’). Importantly, the personal and territorial scope of 
the free movement of capital in the TFEU is not limited to EU Member States; it has universal personal and 
territorial scope. As a result, the free movement of capital in the TFEU, as opposed to its counterpart in the 
EEA Agreement, may be relevant in relation to sovereign wealth investors from so-called third countries. 
Nevertheless, because sovereign wealth investors are increasingly operating as active investors, and may 
reside inside EU Member States and (other) members to the EEA Agreement, the freedom of establishment 
will be considered as well. The freedom to provide services is in principle not relevant, because the activities 
of foreign sovereign wealth investors should already be covered by another freedom, and the activities are 
                                                             
29 As regards the relationship between treaties and domestic law, a distinction can be made between monist systems and 
dualist systems. Under a ‘pure’ monistic system, (tax) treaties become a part of domestic law when they are ratified; they 
do not need to be transformed into domestic law, so that treaty provisions can be directly invoked by individuals and 
entities, and be directly applied by national courts. On the other hand, under a ‘pure’ dualistic system, (tax) treaties must 
be transformed into domestic law by legislative steps before they become a part of the domestic legal order. However, in 
practice, many constitutions contain both monistic and dualistic features. For example, in some States some treaties need 
to be implemented into domestic law, while other treaties do not. As regards the relationship between customary 
international law and domestic law, it is noted that, even in many dualist States, customary international law has domestic 
legal force, or it is applied by courts directly. See L. Wildhaber & S. Breitenmoser, “The Relationship between Customary 
International Law and Municipal Law in Western European Countries” (1988) 48 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht 163; D. Sloss, “Domestic Application of Treaties” (2011), available at: 
<http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/635>. 
30 Para. 52 of the Commentary on Art. 1 of the OECD MTC. 
31 Agreement on the European Economic Area, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 37, L 1, 3 January 1994, p. 3. 
32 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
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normally not provided for remuneration.33 As regards the State aid rules, the analysis will be a first general 
analysis in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, aimed at identifying potential issues in this 
complex and rapidly developing area of European law. This study will, furthermore, consider the implications 
of secondary EU law, notably the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive, which can in 
principle only apply to EU based sovereign wealth investors.  
 
Although the non-discrimination provisions in human rights conventions, most notably the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (better known as the European Convention on 
Human Rights (‘ECHR 1950’)) and the United Nations (‘UN’) International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966)(‘ICCPR 1966’) should also apply to taxation,34 these provisions currently appear to have rather 
limited relevance in relation to non-resident taxpayers, including foreign sovereign wealth investors. First, 
these non-discrimination provisions do not normally seem to be concerned with differences in treatment on 
the basis of residence.35 Second, even if these non-discrimination provisions would be concerned with 
differences in treatment on the basis of residence, in the field of taxation, party states, “enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a 
different treatment”.36 In tax matters, this wide margin of appreciation means that it would normally be easy 
for party states to justify differences in treatment (i) between resident and non-resident investors,37 and (ii) 
among and between non-resident investors (i.e. no most-favoured nation treatment)38. Therefore, the non-
                                                             
33 Art. 57 TFEU. 
34 According to the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’), Art. 14 of the ECHR 1950 (in conjunction with Art. 1 
First Protocol; protection of property) also applies to taxation (see ECtHR, 23 October 1990, No. 17/1989/177/233 
(Darby), Para. 30). Although the UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), the body monitoring the implementation of the 
ICCPR 1966, has not explicitly held that Art. 26 ICCPR 1966 applies to taxation, support for a confirmative view can be 
found in Broeks, regarding social security, in which the HRC considered that “[a]lthough article 26 requires that legislation 
should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided 
for by legislation. Thus, it does not, for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for social security. 
However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State’s power, then such legislation must comply with 
article 26” (see HRC, 9 April 1987, No. 172/1984 (Broeks), Para. 12.4). Although Art. 14 of the ECHR 1950 and Art. 26 
of the ICCPR 1966 list similar grounds of discrimination, such as sex, race, colour, language and birth, the first non-
discrimination provision is limited to the rights and freedoms secured by the ECHR as such, whereas the second provision 
is more general in character. The optional Twelfth Protocol to the ECHR 1950 provides for a more general prohibition of 
discrimination, which is much more in line with Art. 26 of the ICCPR 1966; however, many ECHR party states currently 
have not ratified the Twelfth Protocol. This fact should have no significant impact, though, since all ECHR party states are 
also party to the ICCPR 1966 and have accepted Art. 26 ICCPR 1966. 
35 In this respect, the ECtHR has held that the non-discrimination provision of the ECHR 1950 is only concerned with 
differences “having as their basis or reason a personal characteristic (“status”) by which persons or a group of persons are 
distinguishable from each other” (see ECtHR, 13 September 2005, No. 42639/04 (Victor Jones against the UK), Para. 5). 
The decision of the UN HRC, the body monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR 1966, in De Vos seems to point in the 
same direction (see HRC, 25 July 2005, No. 1192/2003; see also HRC, 30 March 1989, No. 273/1988 (B. d. B. et al. v. The 
Netherlands), Para. 6.7). In the author’s view, it can be argued that “residence” as such is not a personal characteristic in 
the same way that, for example, sex, race, colour, language and birth are personal characteristics. Therefore, foreign 
sovereign wealth investors would not normally be comparable to resident investors. See also, in more general terms, P. 
Baker, “Taxation and the European Convention on Human Rights (2000) 4 British Tax Review, pp. 211-377. 
36 Regarding Art. 14 of the ECHR, see ECtHR, 22 June 1999, No. 46757/99 (Della Ciaja et al. against Italy). The 
limitedly available domestic case law suggests that a wide margin of appreciation should also apply in the context of Art. 
26 ICCPR (see, e.g., Dutch Supreme Court, 22 November 2013, No. 13/016222, BNB 2014/30; Dutch Supreme Court, 2 
March 2007, No. 42.144, BNB 2007/240). See also R. Attard, “Discriminatory Taxation and the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Chapter 9 in: D. Weber & P. Pistone (eds.) Non-Discrimination in Tax Treaties: Selected Issues from a 
Global Perspective, IBFD 2016, Online Books IBFD, Section 9.6.3. 
37 P. Baker, “Taxation and the European Convention on Human Rights (2000) 4 British Tax Review, pp. 211-377. 
38 According to the Dutch Court of Appeal, Art. 26 ICCPR 1966 is, in any case, not concerned with differences in 
treatment between non-resident taxpayers resulting from different bilateral tax treaties (see Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch, 
12 May 2000, No. 97/0437, BNB 2001/426).   
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discrimination provisions in human rights conventions currently appear to have rather limited relevance for 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
The same conclusion applies to bilateral investment treaties (‘BITs’).39 In general, the non-discrimination 
provision in BITs comprises at least one of the following two standards: (i) the national treatment (‘NT’) 
standard; requiring the source State to accord to non-resident investors treatment which is no less favourable 
than that accorded to domestic investors in the same or similar circumstances, and (ii) the most-favoured-
nation (‘MFN’) standard; requiring the source State to treat non-resident investors no less favourably than 
investors from any third country (in similar circumstances). However, the overwhelming majority of BITs 
contain full or limited carve-outs with respect to direct taxes.40 The most common practice is to exclude MFN 
standards with respect to tax benefits accorded to domestic investors or third country investors on the basis 
of bilateral tax treaties or other international tax arrangements, such as European tax directives.41 Such carve-
outs also very regularly apply to the NT standard.42 Several more recent BITs even contain a general exception 
to taxation, thus also in respect of tax benefits accorded to domestic investors or third country investors on 
the basis of domestic legislation of the source State.43 BITs may have implications for source State taxation of 
non-residents, including foreign sovereign wealth investors, in individual cases where the NT standard 
applies in tax matters, but even then it may still be unclear whether non-resident taxpayers are in the same or 
similar circumstances as resident taxpayers. Overall, the implications of BITs for direct taxation of non-
residents, including foreign sovereign wealth investors, appear to be rather limited as well.44 
 
For the above-mentioned reasons, human rights conventions and BITs will not be further considered in this 
study, although they may have an impact in very specific situations. 
 
The approach of measuring a source State’s tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors against the 
three main ‘substantive’ attributes of international tax policy (i.e. (i) neutrality, (ii) equity, and (iii) 
international attractiveness), and examining the possible impact international law could have on achieving tax 
policy objectives based on these attributes, will produce the conceptual framework.  
 
1.4. Outline of the study 
 
The central question in this study is as follows:  
 
What impact, if any, does international law have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax 
policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? 
 
This question will be answered by discussing the following five sub-questions: 
 
1. Who are sovereign wealth investors, why do they exist, what do they do, what (legal) forms can they 
take, and what is their home State tax status?  
 
                                                             
39 A. Kardachaki, “Tax Aspects of International Non-Tax Agreements” (2012-2013), IFA Research Paper. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking (UN, 
2007), pp. 42-43 & pp. 81-83, available at <http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf>.     
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. See, e.g., the Dutch Model BIT (2004). 
43 Ibid. 
44 C. Hoyos Jiménez, “Non-Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality in IIAs: A Latin American Tax Perspective”, 
Chapter 2 in: D. Weber & P. Pistone (eds.) Non-Discrimination in Tax Treaties: Selected Issues from a Global 
Perspective, IBFD 2016, Online Books IBFD, Section 2.5. 
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The first sub-question will be discussed in Chapter 2. The purpose of this chapter is to come to a working 
definition of SWFs and SWEs that will be used throughout this study, as well as for the reader to get a better 
understanding of sovereign wealth investors. Chapter 2 is based on information derived from a variety of 
organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the 
International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’), the U.S. Department of Treasury, an international working group of 
SWFs and the SWF Institute, as well as information derived from literature and information made available by 
sovereign wealth investors themselves.  
 
2. How do source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors (in comparison to other investor 
groups), and how does such taxation relate to generally accepted attributes of international tax 
policy?  
 
The second sub-question will be discussed in Chapter 3. The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss tax 
policy considerations and to measure source States’ tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors 
against generally accepted attributes of international tax policy. Chapter 3 will first consider the approaches 
of source States to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, and how they are treated in comparison to 
other investors. Based on a review of State practice and literature, Chapter 3 will then identify as today’s three 
main ‘substantive’ attributes of international tax policy: (i) neutrality (efficiency), (ii) equity (fairness), and 
(iii) international attractiveness. This will be followed by a discussion and presentation of the main 
theoretical implications of these policy principles and objectives for the design of international tax rules, 
which will enable to measure approaches to source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors by their 
neutrality, equity and international attractiveness.  
 
3. What impact, if any, does the sovereign immunity principle have on source States’ ability to achieve 
tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors?  
 
The third sub-question will be examined in Chapter 4. This chapter will deal with the sovereign immunity 
principle and will focus on four areas in which the sovereign immunity principle can manifest itself: (1) 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of a State in civil proceedings, (2) immunity from taxation, (3) 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of a State in tax proceedings, and (4) immunity from measures of 
constraint (enforcement power). The analysis in Chapter 4 is primarily based on multilateral instruments, 
such as the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (2004) (‘UNCSI 
2004’), the preparatory work of the International Law Commission (‘ILC’) and national practice of States, 
including (tax) legislation, (tax) cases and administrative (tax) practice of States in the field of sovereign 
immunity.   
 
4. What impact, if any, do tax treaties (in particular those based on the OECD and UN Model) have on 
source States’ ability to achieve tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors?  
 
The fourth sub-question will be discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter will focus on OECD and UN MTC based 
treaties, in particular on the resident article (Art. 4), the dividend and interest article (Arts. 10 and 11), the 
capital gains article (Art. 13) and the non-discrimination article (Art. 24). Chapter 5 is based on an analysis of 
the Commentaries on both models, case law, literature and other publicly available information. 
 
5. What impact, if any, does European law have on source States’ ability to achieve tax policy objectives 
in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? 
 
The fifth, and final, sub-question will be discussed in Chapter 6. Chapter 6 will consider primary European 
law, notably the fundamental freedoms and State aid rules included in the TFEU and the EEA Agreement, as 
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well as secondary EU law, notably the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive. As 
explained, with respect to the fundamental freedoms, the focus will be on the freedom of capital movement 
and the freedom of establishment. The comparability analysis applied to foreign sovereign wealth investors, 
which is relevant under the fundamental freedoms as well as the State aid rules, lies at the heart of this 
chapter. Are foreign sovereign wealth investors objectively comparable to other investors, if any at all? It is 
also examined whether existing justification grounds should apply any differently in relation to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. It will then provide a first general analysis of the application of the State aid rules 
in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, aimed at identifying potential issues in this complex and 
rapidly developing area of European law. Finally, Chapter 6 will consider the implications of secondary EU 
law, notably the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive, which can in principle only 
apply to EU based sovereign wealth investors. Chapter 6 builds on existing European case law and connects 
with other fields, such as sovereign immunity.  
 
Chapters 3 to 6 together constitute the conceptual framework. In Chapter 7, the framework will be applied to 
the Netherlands, as an illustration. By giving an overview of selected tax treaties concluded between the 
Netherlands and States that are home to sovereign wealth investors, the Appendix provides relevant 
background information for the analysis in Chapter 7. The Netherlands has been selected for several reasons. 
First, the primacy of Dutch international tax policy in relation to sovereign wealth investors is international 
attractiveness. This policy has found its way into Dutch tax treaties; the Netherlands has concluded several tax 
treaties containing favourable provisions for sovereign wealth investors. Second, the Netherlands is an OECD 
Member State, as well as an EU Member State, which means that the international law analysis will have to be 
considered in full. Third, the application of the framework requires in-depth knowledge of a tax system and a 
certain level of information. The author is familiar with Dutch tax law, whereas political decision-making in 
the Netherlands happens in a transparent way, and tax policy information, legislative information and other 
relevant information is publicly available.  
 
Chapter 8 will provide a summary and set out the main conclusions of this study.  
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Chapter 2 
 
  Sovereign Wealth Investors 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
With the value of assets under management estimated as high as US$ 7.6 trillion (February 2018),45 sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) and their sovereign wealth enterprises (SWEs) (i.e. together, sovereign wealth 
investors) are among the important players in the international financial markets. Sovereign wealth investors 
have been around for decades, but their rapid increase in both number and size since 200046 (due to the 
commodity boom and the rise of the emerging markets), and their billion dollar investments in troubled 
companies during the beginning of the (most recent) credit crisis,47 has attracted growing and wide attention. 
Sovereign wealth investors can typically be found in emerging and developing countries that have shifted 
from net foreign debt to net foreign asset positions.48 Who are SWFs and SWEs, and what particularities make 
them a topic of much debate?  
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Its first purpose is to come to a working definition of SWFs and SWEs, 
to use throughout this study. The second purpose is to get a better understanding of these sovereign wealth 
investors. Who are they? Why do they exist? What do they do? What (legal) forms do they take? How can their 
governance structure look like? What is their home State tax status? As SWEs are merely a component of some 
SWFs, this chapter will mainly focus on SWFs.49 
 
2.2. The Santiago Principles 
 
2.2.1 What are the Santiago Principles? 
 
In October 2008, at its third meeting in Santiago, Chile, the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (‘IWG’) agreed on a voluntary set of Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (‘GAPPs’) for SWFs 
(but not for SWEs), known as the ‘Santiago Principles’.50 The IWG was initiated by the IMF and established 
during a meeting held at the headquarters of the IMF in Washington D.C. from 30 April – 1 May 200851 
between representatives of twenty-six IMF member countries with SWFs,52 investment recipient States, the 
                                                             
45 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/>  
46 J. Santiso, “Sovereign Development Funds: Key financial actors of the shifting wealth of nations” (2008), OECD 
Emerging Markets Network Working Paper, p. 7, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dev/41944381.pdf>. This includes 
the establishment of (a) (relatively large in size) SWF(s) by China (in 2007) and Russia (in 2008). See also M. Maslakovic, 
“Sovereign Wealth Funds 2010” (2010) International Financial Services London Research, p. 2; African Development 
Bank, “The boom in African Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2013), available at: <http://www.afdb.org>. 
47 M. Maslakovic, “Sovereign Wealth Funds 2010” (2010) International Financial Services London Research, p. 2. 
48 J. Santiso, “Sovereign Development Funds: Key financial actors of the shifting wealth of nations” (2008), OECD 
Emerging Markets Network Working Paper, p. 4 & p. 11. 
49 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/sovereign-wealth-enterprise-swe/>  
50 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), available at: 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/iwg_santiago_principles_oct2008_en.pdf>. 
51 “International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds is Established to Facilitate Work on Voluntary Principles” 
(May, 2008), Press Release No. 08/97. 
52 The twenty-six IMF member countries were: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Canada, Chile, China, 
Equatorial Guinea, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, South Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, 
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OECD, and the EC. The Santiago Principles are a response to concerns raised by investment recipient States 
about investment objectives of SWFs. It was argued that SWFs, being State-owned investment funds, might 
(also) pursue political objectives rather than purely economic and financial ones.53 According to the IWG, the 
Santiago Principles should take away this concern: 
  
“Publication of the GAPP should help improve understanding of SWFs as economically and financially 
oriented entities in both the home and recipient countries. This understanding aims to contribute to 
the stability of the global financial system, reduce protectionist pressures, and help maintain an open 
and stable investment climate.”54 
 
The GAPPs, twenty-four in total, are broadly divided into the following parts: (i) the legal framework of SWFs, 
their objectives and macroeconomic linkages, (ii) the institutional framework of SWFs and their governance 
structure, and (iii) the investment and risk management framework of SWFs. The Santiago Principles as such 
do not deal with tax.  
 
2.2.2 International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
The IWG was only established to draft the Santiago principles and has been replaced by the International 
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (‘IFSWFs’), a voluntary group of SWFs. The IWG recognized that the 
Santiago Principles could benefit from a continuing exchange of ideas and views among SWFs themselves and 
with others,55 and, therefore, agreed to explore the possibilities of establishing a standing group of SWFs.56 On 
6 April 2009, the IWG reached consensus in Kuwait City to establish the IFSWFs.57 IFSWFs’ purpose is to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Russia, Singapore, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S., with Oman, Saudi Arabia 
and Vietnam as permanent observers. 
53 The OECD’s Investment Committee Report, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies” (4 April 2008), 
p. 4 more specifically states that SWFs: “(…) can raise concerns with respect to foreign government control or access to 
defence related technologies -- for example, that such investments could provide a channel for the acquisition of dual-use 
technologies for military purposes by the acquiring country or for denying technology or other assets critical for national 
defence to the recipient government itself, or for aiding the intelligence capabilities of a foreign country that is hostile to 
the host country.” See also Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Investment in the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, p. 1 & p. 30; D. Markheim, “Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: New Voluntary Principles a Step in the Right Direction” (2008), The Heritage Foundation, WebMemo No. 2175, p. 
1; OECD, “Foreign Government-Controlled Investors and Recipient Country Investment Policy: A Scoping Paper” (2009), 
p. 6, available at: <https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/42022469.pdf>. 
54 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), p. 4. 
55 Ibid., p. 6. 
56 Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund (2008), Para. 8. 
57 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, ““Kuwait Declaration”: Establishment of the International 
Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (April, 2009). Its current members are: Fundo Soberano de Angola, The Future Fund 
(Australia), State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, The Future Generations Reserve Fund (Bahrain), The Pula Fund 
(Botswana), Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund (Canada), Economic and Social Stabilization, and Pension Reserve 
Funds (Chile), China Investment Corporation, Fund for Future Generations (Equatorial Guinea), National Development 
Fund of Iran, Ireland Strategic Investment Fund, JSC National Investment Corporation of the National Bank of 
Kazakhstan, JSC Samruk-Kazyna (Kazakhstan), Korea Investment Corporation, Kuwait Investment Authority, Libyan 
Investment Authority, Khazanah Nasional Berhad (Malaysia), Budgetary Income Stabilization Fund (Mexico), New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund, Government Pension Fund Global (Norway), State General Reserve Fund (Oman), 
Palestine Investment Fund, Fondo de Ahorro de Panamá, Qatar Investment Authority, Russian Direct Investment Fund, 
Agaciro Development Fund (Rwanda), Government of Singapore Investment Corporation Pte. Ltd. and Temasek Holdings 
(Private) Limited (Singapore), Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund, The Heritage and Stabilization Fund (Trinidad & 
Tobago), Turkiye Wealth Fund (Turkey), Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (United Arab Emirates) and Alaska Permanent 
Fund Corporation (the U.S.). 
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“meet, exchange views on issues of common interest, and facilitate an understanding of the Santiago 
Principles and SWF activities.”58 
 
2.3. Definitions and classification of SWFs 
 
2.3.1 Introduction59 
  
Although the roots of the oldest SWF, today known as the Kuwait Investment Authority (‘KIA’), traces back to 
1953,60 the term SWF was introduced only as recently as 2005.61 It has been said that no universally agreed 
definition of SWFs exists.62 The term SWF can have a different meaning to different persons. Illustrative in this 
respect is an exchange between Henry Paulson, United States (‘U.S.’) Treasury Secretary, and the Prime 
Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, during a meeting in Russia in 2008. Paulson told Putin he had had a 
productive discussion with the Russian Finance Minister about Russia’s SWF, to which Putin replied, “[s]ince 
we do not have a sovereign wealth fund yet, you are confusing us with someone else.” Paulson responded by 
saying “[w]e can discuss what you have called the ‘various funds’ but we very much welcome your 
investment.”63 
Numerous attempts have been made to define and classify SWFs, some of which are discussed below. 
Classification of SWFs can be helpful in, for example, determining an SWF’s risk profile and (interrelated to 
this) the composition of its portfolio. 
 
2.3.2 U.S. Department of Treasury 
 
2.3.2.1 Definition 
 
In June 2007, the U.S. Department of Treasury described an SWF as:  
 
“(…) a government investment vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which 
manages those assets separately from the official reserves of the monetary authorities (the Central 
Bank and reserve-related functions of the Finance Ministry). SWF managers typically have a higher 
risk tolerance and higher expected return than traditional official reserve managers.”64 
 
                                                             
58 Ibid. 
59 Some of the definitions discussed in this chapter refer to the government (or Ministry of Finance) as owner of the SWFs. 
This is not always correct from a legal perspective, since governments (or Ministry of Finance) do not always have legal 
personality, in which case the State is the owner in a legal sense. Nevertheless, the terms State and government (as 
representative of the State) are used interchangeably.  
60 R. Kimmitt, “Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World Economy” (2008) 87 
Foreign Affairs 119. 
61 The term SWF was introduced by Rozanov. A. Rozanov, “Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?” (2005) 15 Central 
Banking Journal 52.  
62 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, p. 22; R. Beck & M. Fidora, “The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on 
Global Financial Markets” (2008), ECB Occasional Paper No. 91, p. 6, available at: 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp91.pdf>; A. Monk, “Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: 
Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance” (2009) 14 New Political Economy 451, p. 454. 
63 Derived from A. Monk, “Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance” (2009) 14 
New Political Economy 451, p. 454.  
64 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, Semiannual Report on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies (June 2007), Appendix 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
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2.3.2.2 Classification 
 
In classifying SWFs, the U.S. Department of Treasury distinguished between SWFs by reference to the source 
of funding.65 Under this approach, SWFs are grouped into commodity funds and non-commodity funds. The 
first group of funds are established through transfers of receipts resulting from (taxes on) commodity 
export(er)s (e.g. Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (‘GPFG’) and various Middle Eastern SWFs), 
whilst the second group of funds are typically established through transfers of foreign exchange reserves 
generated by trade surpluses (most prominently, the China Investment Corporation).  
 
2.3.3 State Street66 
 
2.3.3.1 Definition 
 
As an alternative to the previous definition, State Street (in 2008) defined SWFs by exclusion. According to 
State Street, SWFs are: 
 
“(…) sovereign-owned asset pools that are neither traditional public pension funds nor traditional 
reserve assets supporting national currencies.”67  
 
Under this definition, foreign exchange reserves held by the monetary authorities/central banks for 
traditional balance of payments and/or monetary policy purposes cannot be viewed as SWFs. This is different 
to the extent foreign exchange reserves exceed an amount that is reasonably required for such purposes.68  
 
2.3.3.2 Classification 
 
In classifying SWFs, State Street distinguishes between SWFs by reference to their liability.69 Under this 
approach, four types of SWFs are distinguished: 
 
1. Contingent liability funds  
Contingent liability funds are stabilization funds set up by commodity-rich countries to cover for 
liabilities that may arise from fluctuations of commodity prices. 
 
2. Fixed liability funds 
Fixed liability funds are established to meet a country’s future liabilities that will crystallize in, for 
example, twenty to thirty years’ time. The liability relates to a projected shortfall in the public pension 
system.  
 
                                                             
65 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, Semiannual Report on International Economic and 
Exchange Rate Policies (June 2007), Appendix 3: Sovereign Wealth Funds. Similarly, see R. Kimmitt, “Public Footprints 
in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World Economy” (2008) 87 Foreign Affairs 119, p. 120. See also R. 
Gilson & C. Milhaupt, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New 
Mercantilism” (2008) 60 Stanford Law Review 1345, pp. 1354-1355; H. Reisen, “How to Spend It: Commodity and Non-
Commodity Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2008), OECD Development Centre Policy Brief No. 38. 
66 State Street is the second oldest financial services institution in the U.S. and offers custodian and asset management 
services, investment management services and investment research and trading services. 
67 J. Nugée, “The Growing Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds”, Chapter 2 in: State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Assessing the Impact (2008), Vol. III, Issue 2, p. 5.  
68 Ibid. 
69 A. Rozanov, “A Liability-Based Approach to Sovereign Wealth”, Chapter 3 in: State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Assessing the Impact (2008), Vol. III, Issue 2, pp. 17-18. 
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3. Mixed liability funds 
Mixed liability funds have, on the one hand, a fixed obligation to make payments into the budget (i.e. 
fixed liability), whilst, on the other hand, these funds have no fixed termination date (i.e. they exist in 
perpetuity). 
 
4. Open-ended liability funds 
Unlike contingent liability funds, fixed liability funds and mixed liability funds, open-ended liability 
funds have no readily identifiable or contractually defined liabilities.  
 
2.3.4 The IWG and the IMF 
 
2.3.4.1 Definition 
 
The (descriptive) definition provided by the IWG, which was also adopted in the 2010 update of the OECD 
MTC Commentary,70 reads as follows: 
 
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which 
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.” 
 
According to the IWG, the funding of SWFs with receipts resulting from commodity exports, on the one hand, 
and the funding of SWFs with balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the 
proceeds of privatizations and fiscal surpluses (together referred to as ‘excess reserves’), on the other hand, 
reflects the distinction between the traditional and the more recent background to the creation of SWFs.71  
 
The IWG discusses three key elements that, in their common view, define an SWF:72 
 
i. Ownership: the ownership of the fund or arrangement is in the hands of the general government, 
which encompasses both the central government and governments at the sub-national level. From a 
legal perspective, the fund or arrangement can be owned by the State, its government (as a 
representative of the State) or the Ministry of Finance (as a direct representative of the government), 
while it is also possible that the arrangement is owned by a central bank. 
 
ii. Investments: investments by the fund or arrangement include investments in foreign financial assets. 
Funds or arrangements that invest in domestic assets only, cannot be regarded as SWFs. 
 
iii. Purposes and objectives: the fund or arrangement has been established for macroeconomic purposes 
and pursues financial objectives. As the liabilities of the fund or arrangement are only broadly 
defined, SWFs are allowed to apply a wide range of investment strategies. In this respect, assets solely 
held by central banks for traditional balance of payments purposes/monetary policy purposes, cannot 
be viewed as SWFs, as SWFs serve a different purpose. Assets held by central banks for other 
purposes than traditional balance of payments /monetary policy purposes, can constitute an SWF. 
                                                             
70 Para. 8.5 of the Commentary on Art. 4 of the OECD MTC. 
71 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), Part III, Appendix I. Defining Sovereign Wealth Funds, p. 27. 
72 Ibid. 
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In the view of the IWG, its definition further excludes (i) operations of State-owned enterprises (‘SOEs’) in the 
traditional sense,73 (ii) government-employee pension funds, and (iii) assets managed for the benefit of 
individuals.  
 
2.3.4.2 Classification 
 
In classifying SWFs, the IMF distinguishes between SWFs by reference to their objective. On that basis, five 
types of SWFs are distinguished:74  
 
1. Stabilization funds  
The primary objective of stabilization funds is to guard the budget and economy against the volatility 
of commodity prices and the (often highly) discontinuity of commodity quantities.75 Hence, these 
funds are typically commodity funded. As stabilization funds typically have a short-term or uncertain 
investment horizon, their portfolio intends to be dominated by cash and fixed income assets,76 such as 
government securities.77  
 
2. Savings funds 
The primary objective of savings funds is to share wealth across generations by converting non-
renewable assets (e.g. oil or proceeds of privatizations) into a diversified portfolio of international 
(financial) assets from which future income streams can be derived. Investment income from non-
renewable assets abroad also mitigates the effects of the so-called Dutch disease.78 As savings funds 
typically have a long-term investment horizon, their assets are more likely to consist of equity assets79 
and alternative assets, such as real estate and infrastructure. 
                                                             
73 See the definition of SOEs as used by the OECD in “Foreign Government-Controlled Investors and Recipient Country 
Investment Policy: A Scoping Paper” (2009), p. 6, which reads as follows: “[t]he term “SOEs” refers to enterprises where 
the state has significant control, through full, majority, or significant minority ownership. State-Owned Enterprises are 
often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, transport and telecommunication, whose 
performance is of great importance to broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sector. The 
rationale for state ownership of commercial enterprises has varied among countries and industries and has typically 
comprised a mix of social, economic and strategic interests.”  
74 International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Market Turbulence: Causes, Consequences, 
and Policies (October, 2007), Annex 1, pp. 46-47; International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Policy 
Development and Review Departments, “Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda” (29 February 2008), p. 5. 
75 U. Das, Y. Lu, C. Mulder & A. Sy, “Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy and Operational Considerations” 
(2009), IMF Working Paper No. 09/179, p. 9, available at: 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Setting-Up-a-Sovereign-Wealth-Fund-Some-Policy-and-
Operational-Considerations-23205>. 
76 P. Kunzel, Y. Lu, I. Petrova & J. Pihlman, “Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Shifting Paradigm” 
(2011), IMF Working Paper No. 11/19, p. 7, available at: 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Investment-Objectives-of-Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-A-
Shifting-Paradigm-24598>. 
77 A. Al-Hassan et al., “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and Investment Management” (2013), 
IMF Working Paper No. 13/231, p. 5, available at: 
<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Sovereign-Wealth-Funds-Aspects-of-Governance-
Structures-and-Investment-Management-41046>. 
78 “Dutch disease” refers to the situation where the increased supply of foreign currency or an increased domestic 
aggregated demand due to, for example, a boom in the commodity sector, results in an appreciation in the real exchange 
rate. In such cases, a country’s export competitiveness is weakened, which may affect long-term growth. This phenomenon 
occurred in the Netherlands when large natural gas deposits were discovered in the North Sea in the 1960’s. These 
potential effects can be mitigated by investing in foreign currency denominated (financial) assets. C. Ebrahim-zadeh, 
“Dutch Disease: Too much wealth managed unwisely” (2003) 40 Finance & Development, International Monetary Fund, 
available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/ebra.htm>.  
79 P. Kunzel, Y. Lu, I. Petrova, & J. Pihlman, “Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Shifting Paradigm” 
(2011), IMF Working Paper No. 11/19, who write on p. 5 that: “[t]he traditional [strategic asset allocation] literature 
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3. Reserve investment corporations 
Reserve investment corporations aim to increase returns on reserve assets.80 As reserve investment 
corporations can be called upon in case of balance of payment deficits, a certain portion of its portfolio 
will be held in liquid assets.81 
 
4. Development funds 
Development funds typically aim at funding “(…) socio-economic projects or promote industrial 
policies that might raise a country’s potential output growth”.82 
 
5. Contingent pension reserve funds 
Contingent pension reserve funds aim to provide for the government’s contingent unspecified future 
pension liabilities. These higher liabilities are often the result of pay-as-you-go pension plans.83 
Importantly, contingent pension reserve funds are not funded by individual pension contributions. 
 
In relation to public pension reserve funds, a distinction is (sometimes) made between social security 
reserve funds (‘SSRFs’), which are set up as part of the overall social security system, and sovereign 
pension reserve funds (‘SPRFs’), which are directly established and owned by the government apart 
from the social security system.84 SSRFs are most likely regarded as the type of government-employee 
pension funds that should not qualify as SWFs according to the definition of the IWG. Because SSRFs 
are predominantly funded by mandatory individual (related) contributions over current payouts in 
return for individual entitlements, it can be argued that such pension funds are beneficially owned by 
individuals and serve individual economic purposes, rather than macroeconomic purposes. On the 
other hand, SPRFs are most likely regarded as SWFs according to the definition of the IWG, because 
they are set up and funded by government-owned funds to cover for expected future deficits of the 
social security system as a result of an ageing population. Different from SSRFs, individuals have no 
specified entitlement to payments from SPRFs. Examples of SPRFs are Australia’s Future Fund85 and 
the New Zealand Superannuation Fund86.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
suggests that, on longer horizons, equities are less volatile than short-term instruments because of the reinvestment risks 
associated with short-term investments. In addition, historical data suggest a fairly consistent equity return premium over 
longer horizons. Hence, a larger share in equities for investors with long investment horizons is appropriate.” 
80 The IMF defines reserve assets as: “[…] those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary 
authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for intervention in exchange markets to affect the currency 
exchange rate, and for other related purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and 
serving as a basis for foreign borrowing). Reserve assets must be foreign currency assets and assets that actually exist.” 
See International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Management, 6th edn., 
(Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009), Chapter 6, p. 111.  
81 P. Kunzel, Y. Lu, I. Petrova & J. Pihlman, “Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Shifting Paradigm” 
(2011), IMF Working Paper 11/19, p. 3. 
82 International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Capital Markets Policy Development and Review Departments, “Sovereign 
Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda” (29 February 2008), p. 5. 
83 Pay-as-you-go pension schemes are unfunded pension arrangements meaning that pension payments are funded by the 
employer or another sponsor as and when they are paid (i.e. paid on a current disbursement basis).  
84 A. Blundell-Wignall, Y. Hu & J. Yermo, “Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund Issue” (2008), OECD Working Papers 
on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 14, pp. 4-5, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-
pensions/40345767.pdf>; J. Yermo, “Governance and Investment of Public Pension Reserve Funds in Selected OECD 
Countries” (2008), OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 15, p. 3 & p. 5, available at: 
<http://www.oecd.org/finance/private-pensions/40194872.pdf>. 
85 <http://www.futurefund.gov.au/about-us> 
86 <https://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/nz-super-fund-explained/purpose-and-mandate> 
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These objectives of SWFs can be multiple, overlapping or changing over time. For instance, SWFs that have 
originally been established for short-term stabilization purposes, may also pursue medium- to long-term 
savings objectives, due to an (ever) increasing amount of accumulated reserves.  
 
2.3.5 Other attempts 
 
In literature as well, attempts have been made to define SWFs. For instance, in December 2009, Monk 
suggested an alternative definition of SWFs on the basis of three commonalities this author identifies among 
SWFs:87 
 
i. Ownership: ownership and, to a varying degree, (direct or indirect) control of the fund lies with the 
government, which includes both central and sub-national government. 
 
ii. Liabilities: in the view of this author, SWFs can have intra-governmental liabilities only (i.e. SWFs can 
only owe money to other arms of the same government, such as the Ministry of Finance). As SWFs 
have no external creditors, the entitlement to their assets rests with the government only. 
 
iii. Beneficiary: the beneficiary of a SWF is “(…) either the government itself, the country’s citizenry in 
abstract, the tax payer generally or is simply left unidentified.”88 This means that management of 
SWFs is based on the interest and objectives of the government only.  
 
These three commonalities bring Monk to the following definition:  
 
“SWFs are government-owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds that have no 
outside beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or the citizenry in abstract) and that invest 
their assets, either in the short or long term, according to the interests and objectives of the sovereign 
sponsor.” 
 
2.3.6 Analysis and working definition of SWFs 
 
SWFs are in many ways not a homogeneous group. In fact, SWFs “differ in size, age, structure, funding sources, 
governance, policy objectives, risk/return profiles, investment horizons, eligible asset classes, and 
instruments, not to mention levels of transparency and accessibility.”89 These differences have arguably 
contributed to the absence of a uniform definition of SWFs. In a research published in January 2014, nineteen 
different definitions of SWFs were examined from which eleven different criteria were identified.90 Only two 
out of the eleven criteria identified were recognized by all nineteen definitions examined; being that SWFs are 
investment vehicles and that they are government-owned.91 It is important to keep in mind that definitions of 
SWFs have been construed for different (home State and investment recipient State) purposes, such as 
investment law purposes, regulatory purposes, public finance purposes and governance purposes.  
                                                             
87 A. Monk, “Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance” (2009) 14 New Political 
Economy 451, p. 456. 
88 Ibid. 
89 A. Rozanov, “A Liability-Based Approach to Sovereign Wealth”, Chapter 3 in: State Street, Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
Assessing the Impact (2008), Vol. III, Issue 2, p. 15. 
90 J. Capapé & T. Blanco, “More Layers Than an Onion: Looking for a Definition of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2014), 
ESADEgeo Working Paper 21. The eleven criteria identified were: (1) State-ownership, (2) investment fund, (3) 
international asset portfolio, (4) absence of explicit pension liabilities, (5) reference to the source of funding, (6) above 
risk-free rate investors, (7) long-term investors, (8) existence of a defined purpose, (9) explicit financial objective, (10) 
controlled/owned by a sovereign authority, and (11) independent (legal) structures.  
91 Ibid., p. 9. 
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This study is concerned with entities and/or arrangements that fit the definition of SWFs as formulated by the 
IWG. One important reason for adopting this definition is that it has been produced by an international 
working group (the IWG) comprised of twenty-six IMF member states working on GAPPs for SWFs, with the 
support of twelve investment recipient countries, the EC, the OECD and the World Bank, and that it serves 
multiple (home State and investment recipient State) purposes. It has been argued that this definition of SWFs 
has now become the ‘consensus’ definition.92 Another important reason for adopting this definition is that it 
has been reflected in the 2010 update of the OECD Commentary. As explained in the introduction to this 
study, an important part of this study relates to the OECD MTC.  
 
For the sake of convenience, the IWG definition is cited again: 
 
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which 
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.” 
 
The third reason for using the IWG definition is that this definition and the IWG’s explanation of this definition 
captures the author’s understanding of the common characteristics which together distinguish these funds or 
arrangements from State/government-owned enterprises, State/government-owned pension funds, and 
assets managed for the benefits of individuals other than the population in general. The distinctive features, 
which together make them an interesting subject of study, are that the funds or arrangements are: (i) 
controlled and directly or indirectly owned by the State/government/Ministry for Finance, depending on 
their legal set-up, (ii) used to invest in foreign assets to achieve financial objectives, and (iii) have as a 
macroeconomic purpose to preserve and accumulate the wealth of a nation. This means that 
State/government-owned enterprises, State/government-owned pension funds that qualify as SSRFs, and 
assets managed for the benefit of individuals, are excluded from the definition of SWF:  
 
- State/government-owned enterprises do not fit the IWG definition of SWFs, because they do not 
represent an investment arm of the State/government/Ministry for Finance, and because their 
purpose is not always to preserve and accumulate the wealth of a nation.  
 
- State/government-owned pension funds that qualify as SSRFs should not fit the IWG definition, 
because it can be argued that such pension funds are beneficially owned by individuals and serve 
individual economic purposes, rather than macroeconomic purposes.  
 
- Assets managed for the benefit of individuals, such as members of the royal family, are excluded from 
the IWG definition of SWFs, because they do not serve to build up the wealth of a nation as a whole.  
 
Central banks could fit the IWG definition of SWFs, but the IWG has explained that assets used for traditional 
balance of payments purposes/monetary policy purposes, are not regarded as constituting an SWF. However, 
reserve assets managed by central banks and not used in exercising the (traditional) central bank functions, 
can form an SWF according to the definition of the IWG. According to the IWG, (traditional) central bank 
functions serve a different purpose than SWFs, without elaborating on the difference between the two. Central 
                                                             
92 A. Rozanov, “Definitional Challenges of Dealing with Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2011) 1 Asian Journal of 
International Law 249, p. 256. 
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banks exercise control over key aspects of the financial system.93 They manage foreign exchange reserves 
with a view to meet balance of payments needs and deal with issues such as inflation, exchange rates and 
maintaining financial stability.94 Although central banks clearly serve macroeconomic purposes, they do not 
necessarily represent an investment arm of the State.       
 
2.4. Governance structure of SWFs 
 
According to the explanation and commentary on GAPP 6 of the Santiago Principles, the governance structure 
of SWFs should be set out in its legal framework and a clear distinction between oversight, decision-making 
and operational responsibilities should be ensured. To that end, the governance structure should clearly 
distinguish: (i) an owner, (ii) one or more governing bodies, and (iii) operational management. However, in 
practice the governance of SWFs is not always structured along the lines prescribed by the GAPPs. 
 
2.4.1 Owner 
 
The owner refers to the State/government as the legal and/or beneficial owner of SWFs established as 
separate legal entities, or of assets constituting SWFs. According to GAPP 7, the owner’s responsibilities 
should determine the SWF’s broad objectives, exercise its oversight over the SWF’s operations and appoints 
the members of the governing body/ies.  
 
2.4.2 Governing body/ies 
 
According to the explanation and commentary on GAPP 8, the governing body/ies should determine the 
policy and investment strategies in accordance with the SWF’s objective(s). The governing body/ies should 
ultimately be responsible for the performance of the SWF. Furthermore, the governing body/ies may have 
inter alia the responsibility to appoint and remove management. 
There can be several governing bodies, and they can take a number of forms, such as a unit in the 
Ministry for Finance, a board of directors or trustees, a committee or commission or the governing body/ies of 
the central bank.95 It follows from an IMF survey that appointments to the governing body/ies are often made 
by the Minister for Finance or another government official, the appointments are often for a period of five 
years or more, whilst almost two-third of the respondents indicated that officials represent a minority in the 
governing body or that there is no government representation at all.96 
 
2.4.3 Operational management 
 
Operational management of SWFs should be responsible for day-to-day operations. In this respect, 
management should be the one that makes investment decisions, but should also appoint and remove staff. All 
this can be subject to direction from the governing body/ies. Many SWFs indicate they make use of external 
                                                             
93 For a definition of central bank, see International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and International Investment 
Position Management, 6th edn., (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009), Chapter 4, p. 62: “[t]he central 
bank is the financial institution (or institutions) that exercises control over key aspects of the financial system. It carries out 
such activities as issuing currency, managing international reserves, transacting with the IMF, and providing credit to 
deposit-taking corporations.” 
94 J. Aizenman & R. Glick, “Assets Class Diversification and Delegation of Responsibilities between Central Banks and 
Sovereign Wealth Funds” (September, 2010), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper 2010-20, p. 2.   
95 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), Part II, GAPP 8, Explanation and commentary, p. 16. 
96 C. Hammer, P. Kunzel & I. Petrova, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Current Institutional and Operational Practices” (2008), 
IMF Working Paper No. 08/254, pp. 8-9, available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08254.pdf>. 
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asset managers.97 Some SWFs have even assigned most or all of their assets to such managers. External asset 
managers are used when in-house management of assets would be too expensive, or when SWFs lack the 
knowledge to manage the assets themselves. 
 
2.5. SWFs by region 
 
In several ways, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa (´MENA´), are the most prominent regions in 
relation to SWFs. In terms of numbers of SWFs, each region accounted for about 25% in 2013, while 45% of 
total assets under management is held by Asia based SWFs, mainly China and Singapore, and 28% of total 
assets is managed by MENA based SWFs, mainly the Gulf States (2013 figures).98 Europe based SWFs, 
although very limited in numbers, account for 20% of total assets under management, but this is largely due 
to Norway’s SWF, the Government Pension Fund Global, currently the largest in the world with estimated 
assets under management of US$ 999 billion (October 2017).99 
 
2.6. Definition of SWEs 
 
SWEs are investment vehicles wholly-owned and controlled by an SWF.100 CIC International Co., Ltd., CIC 
International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd., CIC Capital Corporation and Central Huijin Investment Ltd. are examples 
of SWEs of CIC, one of China’s SWFs. SWFs that set-up SWEs do so for a variety of reasons. SWFs can have a 
strict investment mandate and using SWEs, which may have a different investment mandate, can offer them 
the flexibility to invest in assets they would otherwise not be allowed to invest in.101 Another important 
reason for setting-up SWEs is that it makes it difficult to track the investments, activities and tactics of SWFs, 
which can help to avoid the public spotlight.102 It can also avoid being categorized as SWF (e.g. for investment 
regulation purposes). Yet another reason can be tax driven.103 SWEs can be established abroad in jurisdictions 
that provide tax benefits to an SWE that would not have been available had the SWF invested directly. 
Further, SWEs may be used to centralize investment activities focusing on specific assets classes, such as real 
estate or government bonds, or focusing on an industry, such as oil & gas, or region, such as Europe.    
 
2.7. Investment trend 
 
Whereas sovereign wealth investors have traditionally invested as passive investors, e.g. in listed shares or 
government bonds (portfolio investments), they are increasingly operating as long-term, active investors by 
investing large sums, e.g. in real estate, infrastructure and private companies (direct investments).104 One 
example is CIC, one of China’s SWFs, which established CIC Capital Corporation in January 2015 for making 
direct investments.105 Another example is Temasek, one of Singapore’s SWFs, which owns controlling 
interests in listed and non-listed companies.106 This move from traditional asset classes to alternative (less 
                                                             
97 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
98 The 2014 Preqin Sovereign Wealth Fund Review, p. 13. 
99 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
100 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/statistics-research/sovereign-wealth-enterprise-swe/>  
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 M. Castelli & F. Scacciavillani, “SWFs and State investments: A preliminary general overview”, Chapter 1 in: F. 
Bassan (ed.), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 20-22; PwC, Sovereign Investors 2020: A growing force (April, 2016).  
105 See Section 2.9.4.3. 
106 See Section 2.9.2.3. 
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liquid) assets is, to a large extent, driven by the current economic environment of low interest rates and slow 
economic growth.107 
 
2.8. Legal framework of sovereign wealth investors 
 
2.8.1 SWFs 
 
The legal basis and form of SWFs generally follows one of the following three approaches.108  
 
(1) Under the first approach, SWFs are constituted by a pool of assets (arrangement) without a separate 
legal personality. The legal ownership of the pool of assets rests directly with the 
State/government109 or central bank,110 while the pool of assets is typically governed by specific 
legislation. Examples include the Botswana Pula Fund and the Norway Government Pension Fund 
Global. 
 
(2) Under the second approach, SWFs are established under public law as legal entities distinct from the 
State/government or central bank, with full capacity to act. They are the legal owner of the 
investment assets and governed by a specific constitutive law. Examples include the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority (‘ADIA’), Kuwait’s KIA and the Qatar Investment Authority.  
 
(3) Under the third approach, SWFs are established as State/government-owned corporations with a 
separate legal personality. They are the legal owner of the investment assets and typically governed 
by general company law, although specific laws can (also) apply. Examples include China’s CIC, the 
Korea Investment Corporation and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited.  
 
2.8.2 SWEs 
 
SWEs often have a separate legal identity (derived from public law or company law), but they may also be 
organized as (legal) entities without a separate legal personality, such as limited partnerships. 
 
2.8.3 SWFs and SWEs combined 
 
Thus, based on Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2, together sovereign wealth investors (i.e. SWFs and SWEs combined) 
can be divided as follows according to their legal form: 
 
(i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State (which includes a pool 
of assets forming a unit within a central bank that has no separate legal personality); 
                                                             
107 M. Castelli & F. Scacciavillani, “SWFs and State investments: A preliminary general overview”, Chapter 1 in: F. 
Bassan (ed.), Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015), pp. 20-22; PwC, Sovereign Investors 2020: A growing force (April, 2016). 
108 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and 
Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), Part II, GAPP 1, Explanation and commentary, p. 11.  
109 When SWFs have been constituted by a pool of assets within a State, government or Ministry for Finance, the legal 
owner of the assets often mandates asset management to an asset manager, such as the central bank (in the case of 
Norway’s GPFG), a separate fund management entity owned by the government (such as Singapore’s GIC Pte. Ltd.) or to 
an external asset manager. See A. Al-Hassan et al., “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Aspects of Governance Structures and 
Investment Management” (2013), IMF Working Paper No. 13/231, p. 5. 
110 Central banks can take a number of legal forms. In some States the central bank is established as a separate legal entity, 
in others it forms a part of the State. See H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd edn., (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 465. 
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(ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the State 
itself (comprising SWFs and SWEs established as a separate legal entity under public law or 
company law, as well as SWFs constituted by a pool of assets within a central bank that has a 
separate legal personality); 
 
(iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, such 
as limited partnerships (comprising SWEs organized in such manner).     
 
This distinction between sovereign wealth investors according to their legal form is relevant for other parts of 
this study, such as Chapter 5 (regarding the application of tax treaties) and Chapter 6 (regarding the personal 
scope of the freedom of capital movement in the EEA Agreement and the freedom of establishment). 
 
2.9. Selected examples of sovereign wealth investors 
 
This section provides an overview of four selected SWFs: Norway’s GPFG, Singapore’s Temasek, Abu Dhabi’s 
ADIA, and China’s CIC. It discusses: (i) their objective(s), (ii) the legal form they take and their governance 
model, and (iii) the way they are funded and the assets they invest in. These four SWFs have been selected 
because they are rather well-known, they represent a good mixture in terms of objectives, legal form and 
activities, and because sufficient information is available about them.     
 
2.9.1 Government Pension Fund Global (Norway) 
 
2.9.1.1 Incorporation & objective(s) 
 
In 1990, the Norwegian Parliament established the Government Petroleum Fund to facilitate the long-term 
management of its revenue from oil production.111 In 2006, the Government Petroleum Fund was renamed 
into GPFG to underline the fund’s (additional) role of financing the expected increase in future public pension 
costs.112 Despite its name, the fund is not faced with formal pension liabilities to date. 
 
2.9.1.2 Legal form & governance 
 
In accordance with the Government Pension Fund Act (no. 123 of 21 December 2005), GPFG has been placed 
with Norway’s central bank, Norges Bank, in the form of a Norwegian krone deposit. Hence, Norway’s SWF is 
constituted by a pool of assets (arrangements). The legal ownership of the assets constituting GPFG is in the 
hands of the Ministry for Finance (as a representative of the Norwegian State).113 The primary responsibility 
for the management of GPFG rests with the Ministry of Finance,114 but the operational management has been 
mandated to Norges Bank.115 Confusingly, the mandate to Norges Bank states that the capital of GPFG shall be 
invested by the Norges Bank in financial instruments, real estate and cash deposits denominated in foreign 
                                                             
111 <http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/about-the-fund/> 
112 Ibid.  
113 Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Management of the Government Pension Fund in 2012, Meld. St. 27 (2012–2013) 
Report to the Storting (white paper), p. 16; International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), Part III, Appendix III. 
Background Information on IWG Member Countries’ SWFs, p. 41. 
114 See Sec. 2 of the Government Pension Fund Act (no. 123 of 21 December 2005) available at: 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/9d68c55c272c41e99f0bf45d24397d8c/governmentpensionfundact.pdf>. 
115 Management mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global, applicable as from 1 January 2011, available at: 
<https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fin/statens-pensjonsfond/gpfg-management-mandate-14-april-2015.pdf>. 
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currency in its own name.116 The legal relationship between the Norwegian State, the Ministry for Finance and 
Norges Bank with respect to (the assets of) GPFG, is therefore not entirely clear. 
In its turn, the executive board of Norges Bank has issued an investment mandate to the chief 
executive officer of the Norges Bank Investment Management (‘NBIM’).117 NBIM is allowed to make use of 
external (investment) managers,118 which it does in practice.      
 
2.9.1.3 Funding & portfolio 
 
GPFG is funded by net cash flow from petroleum activities, the net results of financial transactions relating to 
petroleum activities, and returns on its investments.119 Its portfolio consists of financial instruments, real 
estate, and cash deposits denominated in foreign currency. 
 
2.9.2 Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited 
 
2.9.2.1 Incorporation & objective(s) 
 
Temasek Holdings (Private) Limited was incorporated on 25 June 1974 under the Singapore Companies Act 
as a private company with the purpose of holding and managing investments, and assets formerly held by the 
Singapore Government.120 This way the government could focus on matters other than investing of 
government money.121 
 
2.9.2.2 Legal form & governance 
 
Temasek (sea town) is a private company owned by the Singapore Government through the Minister for 
Finance.122  
Temasek is subject to the Singapore Companies Act, and all other laws and regulations applicable to 
companies incorporated under Singaporean law. Board members are appointed, removed or renewed by its 
sole shareholder, subject to the approval of the President of Singapore. The board of directors, consisting off a 
majority of ‘independent private sector business leaders’, makes investment, divestment and other business 
decisions, and provides guidance and policy directions to Temasek’s management.    
Although Temasek owns and manages assets on a commercial basis independently from the President 
and Singapore Government,123 the Singapore Constitution requires the prior approval of the President of 
Singapore before Temasek can use its past reserves. Past reserves are those reserves that have been 
accumulated before the current government took office. In line with its custodial role of safeguarding 
Singapore’s past reserves, the President is not involved in directing the investment, divestment and other 
business decisions of Temasek. 
 
                                                             
116 Sec. 1-2(1) of the Management mandate for the Government Pension Fund Global. 
117 Available at: <https://www.nbim.no/contentassets/43615da4359c4a47a60ee55e03511589/nbim-ceo-investment-
mandate.pdf>. 
118 Ibid., Sec. 1.5. 
119 Sec. 3 of the Government Pension Fund Act (no. 123 of 21 December 2005). 
120 Temasek Review 2011 (Building for tomorrow), p. 42, available at: 
<http://www.temasek.com.sg/Documents/userfiles/files/TR11%20Media%20Conference%20Presentation%20Slides.pdf>. 
121 Temasek Review 2004 (Investing in value), p. 34, available at: 
<http://www.temasek.com.sg/documents/report/downloads/20111110165633/TR04_Secured.pdf>. 
122 Temasek Review 2011 (Building for tomorrow), p. 42. Under the Singapore Minister for Finance (Incorporation) Act 
(Chapter 183), the Minister for Finance is a body corporate.  
123 Ibid. 
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2.9.2.3 Funding & portfolio 
 
Temasek is financed through proceeds from its investments in portfolio companies and borrowings on the 
market. Its portfolio is to a large extent equity based, with controlling and non-controlling interests in listed 
and non-listed companies.124 Temasek is not represented on the board of its investments, but it exercises its 
shareholder rights to protect its own financial interests.125 It does, however, engage with the boards and 
management to share its perspectives and it does ‘look to their boards to drive strategy, and their 
management to manage day-to-day operations’.126 Temasek considers itself an active investor.127 Its assets 
under management are estimated at US$ 197 billion (October 2017).128 
 
2.9.3 Abu Dhabi Investment Authority  
 
2.9.3.1 Incorporation & objective(s) 
 
ADIA was established in 1976 as an investment institution with the purpose “to invest funds on behalf of the 
Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, to make available the necessary financial resources to secure and 
maintain the future welfare of the Emirate.”129  
 
2.9.3.2 Legal form & governance 
 
ADIA is a public institution with an independent legal identity that is wholly-owned by the Government of the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi.130 ADIA operates independently from, and without reference to, the Government of the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi.131 ADIA’s constitutive document, Law No. (5), provides for a separation of involvement 
and responsibilities between the owner (the government), the governing entity (the board of directors) and 
operational management.132 Its board of directors, appointed by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi, is responsible for the 
implementation of ADIA’s strategy, monitoring ADIA’s financial performance and overseeing the activities of 
ADIA’s management.133 ADIA’s managing director, who is one of the board members, is responsible for the 
fund’s investment activities and legally represents ADIA in its external affairs.134 The managing director is 
assisted by an Investment Committee, which, in its turn, is assisted by several advisory committees and 
departments.135 Furthermore, ADIA uses external managers.136 
 
2.9.3.3 Funding & portfolio 
 
ADIA is funded with government money derived from the government’s natural resources.137 Its portfolio 
consists, amongst others, of investments in (developed and emerging market) equities, government bonds, 
                                                             
124 Temasek Review 2016 (Generational Investing), p. 88, available at: 
<http://www.temasek.com.sg/documents/download/downloads/20160706235822/TR2016_Singles.pdf> 
125 Temasek Review 2014 (Our journey has just begun), p. 65. 
126 Temasek Review 2016 (Generational Investing), p. 28. 
127 Ibid. 
128 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
129 ADIA 2010 Review (Prudent Global Growth), p. 4, available at: 
<http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual_Review_Website_2010.pdf>  
130 <http://www.adia.ae/en/Governance/Santiago_Principles_more.aspx>  
131 ADIA 2013 Review, p. 8, available at: <http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual_Review_Website_2013.pdf> 
132 <http://www.adia.ae/en/Governance/Santiago_Principles_more.aspx>  
133 ADIA 2010 Review (Prudent Global Growth), p. 42. 
134 Ibid., p. 7. 
135 Ibid. 
136 ADIA 2013 Review, p. 33. 
137 <http://www.adia.ae/en/Governance/Santiago_Principles_more.aspx>  
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real estate and infrastructure.138 Although ADIA does not actively seek to manage the public companies in 
which it invests, it does exercise its voting rights in certain circumstances ‘to protect its interests or to oppose 
motions that may be detrimental to shareholders as a body’.139 Its assets under management are estimated at 
US$ 828 billion (February 2018).140 
 
2.9.4 China Investment Corporation 
 
2.9.4.1 Incorporation & objective(s) 
 
CIC was incorporated on 29 September 2007 as a wholly State-owned company under the Company Law of 
China with the purpose to “diversify China’s foreign exchange holdings and seek maximum returns for its 
shareholder within acceptable risk tolerance.”141  
 
Its overseas investments are made through CIC International Co., Ltd. (established in September 2011), CIC 
International (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. (established in November 2010) and CIC Capital Corporation (established 
in January 2015). CIC pursues domestic investments through Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (established in 
December 2003).142  
 
2.9.4.2 Legal form & governance 
 
CIC is a corporation wholly-owned by the Government of China and governed by the Company Law of China. 
Its three governing bodies are the Board of Directors (responsible for the overall performance and strategy), 
the Board of Supervisors (responsible for monitoring the performance of directors and executives) and the 
Executive Committee (which translates the guidance of the Board of Directors into detailed strategies and 
oversees day-to-day operations).143 The chairman and vice-chairman of the board are appointed by the State 
Council,144 whereas the appointment and removal of other directors are subject to the approval of the State 
Council.145 The Board of Directors is assisted by the International Advisory Council, comprising world-
renowned experts.146 
 
2.9.4.3 Funding & portfolio  
 
CIC was funded through issuing special treasury bonds.147 It has to pay dividends to the State Council, as its 
owner, to cover the (interest) costs of these bonds. 
 
CIC’s portfolio consists of: (i) public market equity and bond investments, hedge fund and real estate 
investments, private equity fund investments, co-investments, and minority investments (through CIC 
International); (ii) direct investments and bilateral, multilateral and platform fund investments (through CIC 
Capital); (iii) global investment-grade corporate bonds and H-shares (through CIC Hong Kong); and (iv) 
                                                             
138 ADIA 2016 Review (A Legacy in Motion), p. 15, available at: 
<http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/2016/pdf/ADIA_2016_Review_01_FULL.pdf>  
139 ADIA 2016 Review (A Legacy in Motion), p. 45. 
140 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
141 China Investment Corporation Annual Report 2015, p. 7. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid., p. 11. 
144 <http://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/china-investment-corporation> 
145 <http://www.china-inv.cn/> 
146 China Investment Corporation Annual Report 2015, p. 11. 
147 <http://www.ifswf.org/member-profiles/china-investment-corporation> 
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equity investments in key state-owned financial institutions in China (through CIC Huijin).148 Its assets under 
management are estimated at US$ 900 billion (February 2018).149 
 
2.10. Home State tax status of sovereign wealth investors 
 
As noted in the introduction to this study, the tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors in their home State 
could be relevant for the international tax analysis of such investors, from a source State perspective. It is 
often believed that sovereign wealth investors are never taxed in their home State.150 This does not appear to 
be correct. A few sovereign wealth investors, including Singapore’s Temasek,151 are taxed in their home State 
based on a territoriality principle, while China’s CIC and Korea Investment Corporation are taxed on their 
worldwide income.152 However, these examples are only limited exceptions to the general rule that SWFs and 
their ‘local’ SWEs are not taxed in their home State.153 
 
From a theoretical point of view, there are three conflicting theories on home State taxation of legal persons of 
public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law – together referred to as 
State entities –, which could also shed light on the home State taxation of sovereign wealth investors.154 These 
theories are discussed below and can be relevant for the analyses in Chapter 5 (tax treaty aspects) and 
Chapter 6 (European law). The first theory is that home State taxation of public entities is superfluous. That is, 
there is no need to tax public entities, as the profits already belong to the State-owner. Imposing residence 
taxation on State entities would merely result in a transfer of money from one pocket controlled by the State 
to another.155 The State, as the owner, can collect revenue by simply extracting profits through (dividend) 
distributions, which saves (unnecessary) costs, because there is no need to compute taxable income (under 
often complex tax rules). In this view, home State taxes and dividends are seen as functionally equivalent.156 
The first theory, however, also provides an explanation why a State would tax its State entities: it is simply a 
substitution mechanism for extracting profits through (dividend) distributions. The second theory is 
completely different from the first one. It holds that home State taxation is necessary to put State entities on 
equal footing with private investors.157 In other words, imposing home State taxation on State entities would 
neutralize the tax-induced competitive advantage of State entities relative to private investors that are liable 
to home State taxation. Finally, the third theory sees home State taxation as a tool to force payments that is 
                                                             
148 China Investment Corporation Annual Report 2016, p. 14 & pp. 36 et seq. 
149 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
150 For example, M. Desai & D. Dharmapala, “Taxing the Bandit Kings” (2008) 118 Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 98, p. 
99; M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703, p. 715; M. Kandev, “Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Are They Welcome in Canada?” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 649, p. 650. 
151 Temasek Review 2012 (Extending Pathways), p. 45, available at: 
<http://www.temasek.com.sg/documents/download/downloads/20120703190357/TR2012_Eng.pdf>. 
152 Wei Cui, “Responding to Sovereign Funds: Are We Looking in the Right Place?” (2009) 123 Tax Notes 1237, p. 1241. 
153 SWEs which are resident in another State than the home State of SWFs are more likely to be taxed in their residence 
State. 
154 Wei Cui, “Taxation of State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China” (2015), available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583284>. 
155 M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703, p. 715. 
156 R. Gordon, “Taxes and privatization” (2001), Discussion Paper No. 2977, Centre for Economic Policy Research, p. 5. 
157 This was also the motivation of the EC in its letter of 2 May 2013 in which it invited the Netherlands to take 
appropriate measures to abolish the corporate income tax-exemption for Dutch public enterprises. In the view of the EC, 
the former Dutch tax regime for Dutch public enterprises was incompatible (and existing) State aid. Under that regime, 
Dutch public enterprises which performed economic activities could be exempt from Dutch corporate income tax. The EC 
argued that this tax-exemption provided an economic advantage to Dutch public enterprises which performed economic 
activities on the European market in comparison to Dutch private enterprises, as the tax-exemption reduced the charges 
that are normally included in the operating costs of an undertaking carrying out economic activities.  
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preferable over dividend distributions.158 The third theory relates to the agency problem with respect to 
dividend payments, caused by the divergent interests between managers and shareholders.159 For example, 
managers may prefer low return investments over dividend distributions to shareholders (i.e. they are pay 
out averse), as this may increase the powers and responsibilities of a manager. To achieve this, managers may 
use the information asymmetry between themselves and shareholders to their advantage by withholding 
information from or not providing accurate information to shareholders. In this view, the taxation of State 
entities is simply a way of dealing with the agency problem by forcing payment of a fixed percentage of annual 
profits to the State. With respect to private companies, the agency problem regarding dividend distributions 
can typically be solved by: (i) increasing shareholder monitoring, or (ii) giving the manager an equity stake. 
However, it has been argued that a State cannot rely on such measures.160/161 
 
With respect to SWFs and their ‘local’ SWEs, the first theory seems clearly dominant, given that, in practice, 
they are generally not taxed in their home State. With respect to the remaining theories, this could indicate 
the following. As regards the second theory (level-playing field), the absence of taxation by the residence State 
could indicate that a State has no interest in creating a level-playing field between domestic sovereign wealth 
investors and private investors. Why would a State want to tax its own sovereign wealth investors and take 
away any tax-induced competitive advantage over private investors? It should be noted that imposing home 
State taxation on domestic sovereign wealth investors in the same way as on private investors is in itself not 
sufficient to create a level-playing field. Other measures would need to be taken as well. In the author’s view, 
what is required is that the relationship between the owner-State and the domestic sovereign wealth investor 
becomes such that the tax imposed will be a real cost for the domestic sovereign wealth investor (just like for 
private investors), i.e. domestic sovereign wealth investors should be made sensitive to home State taxes. This 
would require, for example, that tax paid by the domestic sovereign wealth investor should not (immediately) 
flow back, and also that any dividend pay-out policy should not take into account tax payments. If ‘tax’ 
payments would (immediately) flow back or would reduce dividends otherwise due, imposing tax would have 
no real effect on a sovereign wealth investor. As regards the third theory (agency problem), the absence of 
taxation in the residence State could indicate that, in relation to many sovereign wealth investors, there is no 
agency problem, or that a State is simply not aware of an existing agency problem. Given that sovereign 
wealth investors by definition are created for (a variety of) macroeconomic purposes and established out of 
public funds, it can be expected that sovereign wealth investors be closely assimilated to the owner-State 
itself, also when they happen to have a separate legal personality. An agency problem may, therefore, not exist 
in relation to many sovereign wealth investors.  
 
 
 
                                                             
158 Wei Cui, “Taxation of State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China” (2015), available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583284>. 
159 Wei Cui, “Taxing State-Owned Enterprises: Towards an Understanding of a Basic Institution of State Capitalism” 
(2016) 52 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 775, available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2676193>.  
160 Wei Cui, “Taxation of State Owned Enterprises: A Review of Empirical Evidence from China” (2015), available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583284>. This is because: (i) representatives of the State (as the 
sole shareholder) who are responsible for the monitoring might have less of an incentive than shareholders of private 
companies, and (ii) because the law may simply not allow another equity holder than the State, while the effectiveness of 
(other) incentive contracts for managers has been questioned.  
161 In 1986, Jensen explained that another way of dealing with agency costs of free cash flow is to use shareholder debt 
funding as a substitute for dividends. This obliges managers to pay out future cash flows (interest and principle payments) 
instead of spending the money at discretion of the managers on investment with returns below the cost of capital. M. 
Jensen, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers” (1986) 76 American Economic Review 323. 
Shareholder debt can also be used as a substitute for taxation as a means to force payments (in relation to sovereign wealth 
investors).  
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2.11. Conclusions 
 
A first purpose of this chapter was to come to a working definition of SWFs and SWEs, to use throughout this 
study. A second purpose was to get an understanding not only of what sovereign wealth investors are, but 
also why they exist, what they do and how they can look like. As SWEs are merely a component of some SWFs, 
this chapter mainly focused on SWFs. 
 
Purpose of SWFs. Most SWFs are either established to save funds for future generations by converting non-
renewable resources into assets from which future income streams can be derived, or to cover for liabilities 
that may arise from fluctuations of commodity prices. Other SWFs are established because of a projected 
shortfall in the public pension system, or simply to increase the returns on reserve assets. It should be noted 
that the objectives of SWFs could be multiple, overlapping or changing over time. 
 
Definition of SWFs. No universal definition of SWFs exists. This study adopts the definition of SWFs as 
formulated by the IWG. This definition is widely-followed, has been reflected in the OECD Commentary and 
captures the common characteristics which distinguish SWFs from other groups of investors.162 The definition 
is as follows: 
 
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which 
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.” 
 
SWEs. SWFs sometimes structure investments through separate wholly-owned and controlled investment 
vehicles, known as SWEs (sovereign wealth enterprises). They do so for a variety of reasons, such as allowing 
greater flexibility, avoiding public spotlight, creating an efficient tax structure, avoiding being categorized as 
SWF and centralizing specific investment activities. SWEs can be established in the home State of an SWF or in 
other States. 
 
Investment trend. Mainly driven by the current economic environment of low interest rates and slow 
economic growth, sovereign wealth investors are increasingly proactive and no longer just operate as passive 
(portfolio) investors. As active investors, they increasingly make foreign direct investments, including long-
term investments in real estate, infrastructure and private companies. 
 
Legal forms. Sovereign wealth investors can have different legal forms and governance structures. Based on 
their legal form, they can be divided as follows: 
 
(i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State (which includes a 
pool of assets forming a unit within a central bank that has no separate legal personality); 
 
(ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the 
State itself (comprising SWFs and SWEs established as a separate legal entity under public 
law or company law, as well as SWFs constituted by a pool of assets within a central bank that 
has a separate legal personality); 
                                                             
162 See Section 1.2 for all developments and distinctive features which together justify addressing sovereign wealth 
investors separately from other investor groups. 
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(iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, 
such as partnerships (comprising SWEs organized in such manner).     
 
This distinction between sovereign wealth investors according to their legal form is relevant for other parts of 
this study, such as Chapter 5 (regarding the application of tax treaties) and Chapter 6 (regarding the personal 
scope of the freedom of capital movement in the EEA Agreement and the freedom of establishment). 
 
Home State tax status of sovereign wealth investors. Sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in 
their home State, because taxation of such investors is seen as superfluous. There are, however, a few 
exceptions to this rule. Since creating a level-playing field would generally not be in a home State’s own 
interest, the few home States that do impose tax on sovereign wealth investors, would either seem to be 
dealing with an agency problem, or simply use taxation as a substitute for extracting profits through 
(dividend) distributions. The tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors in their home State could be 
relevant for the international tax analysis of such investors, from a source State perspective.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Tax Policy Considerations and Approaches to Taxation of Foreign 
Sovereign Wealth Investors 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss tax policy considerations and to measure approaches to source 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors against generally accepted principles and objectives of 
international tax policy. Basic principles and objectives often underlie a State’s international tax policy and its 
design of international tax rules. A State’s international tax policy choices, and the underlying basic principles 
and objectives, may depend on various factors – such as the size and nature of its economy, public interests, 
societal values, as well as tax policy choices of other States – and may change over time. This study identifies 
as today’s three main ‘substantive’ attributes of international tax policy: (i) neutrality (efficiency), (ii) equity 
(fairness), and (iii) international attractiveness. It will discuss and present the key theoretical implications of 
these policy principles and objectives for the design of international tax rules, focusing on (foreign) sovereign 
wealth investors. This presentation will enable to measure approaches to source taxation of foreign sovereign 
wealth investors by their neutrality, equity and international attractiveness. However, this chapter will first 
consider the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors by source States, and how such taxation compares 
to the taxation of other investor groups, such as CIVs and pension funds. This comparison puts things into 
perspective, and is relevant for the international law analysis. 
 
3.2. Tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors and other investors  
 
Section 3.2 will provide a general overview of how States tax investment income derived by investors. In this 
respect, most States distinguish between resident investors and non-resident investors, as well as between 
‘regular’ investors and types of investors to which special tax rules could apply. These distinctions will be 
followed in this Section.  
 
3.2.1 Tax treatment of investment income derived by residents 
 
3.2.1.1 Regular investors 
 
In most States, residents are, as a general rule, subject to taxation on worldwide income (i.e. from whatever 
source derived) – residence taxation. The scope of this rule, which applies to both resident individuals and 
companies, is often effectively limited to passive (investment) income, because active (business) income of 
residents earned abroad tends to be exempt (or deferred),163 either unilaterally or under tax treaties. Instead 
of worldwide taxation, some States impose tax on residents on the basis of territoriality and subject them to 
taxation on domestic sources of income only – source taxation.164 
 
Under both types of tax systems, active (business) income earned domestically and passive (investment) 
income of residents is combined and subject to the same tax rate (schedule) in some States, and separated and 
                                                             
163 R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 3.  
164 In Singapore, tax is not only imposed on income accruing in and derived from Singapore, but also on income received 
in Singapore from outside Singapore. See N. Umar, Singapore - Corporate Taxation, Country Analyses IBFD, sec. 1.2.1. 
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subject to different tax rates in other States. Rather than distinguishing between active and passive income, 
some States differentiate between ordinary income (which includes both active and passive income) and 
capital gains, and tax-exempt or subject capital gains to reduced tax rates.165 In calculating the total taxable 
income of residents, expenses made to generate the income and, in case of individuals, personal allowances 
and circumstances, etc., are often taken into account (i.e. taxation on a net-basis).   
 
Taxation of income in the hands of residents could result in double taxation. States have developed various 
mechanisms to avoid or mitigate (inter)national economic or juridical double taxation, as the case may be, 
such as exempting dividend income at the (corporate) shareholder level or allowing (foreign) tax credits in 
respect of passive income.      
 
3.2.1.2 Sovereign wealth investors and other State entities 
 
SWFs and their ‘local’ SWEs are generally not taxed in their residence State (Section 2.10). In many States, 
legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law – together 
referred to as ‘State entities’ – are (effectively) not taxed, either entirely or at least to the extent they exercise 
public functions or do not compete with private economic operators. As explained in Section 2.10, there are 
three conflicting theories on home State taxation of State entities. The first theory is that home State taxation 
is superfluous, because the profits of State entities already belong to the owner-State. The second theory holds 
that home State taxation of State entities is necessary to put them on equal footing with private operators. In 
the author’s view, this would, however, require that State entities be made tax sensitive (just like private 
operators).166 The third theory relates to the agency problem with respect to dividend payments, caused by 
the divergent interests between managers and shareholders. It requires the taxation of State entities simply as 
a way to deal with this problem by forcing payment of a fixed percentage of annual profits to the State. In 
Chapter 2, it was concluded that sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in their home State, 
because taxation of such investors is seen as superfluous. Since creating a level-playing field would generally 
not be in a home State’s own interest, the few home States that do impose tax on sovereign wealth investors, 
would either seem to be dealing with an agency problem, or simply use taxation as a substitute for extracting 
profits through (dividend) distributions. 
 
3.2.1.3 Collective investment vehicles 
 
Rather than investing directly, many (smaller) portfolio investors pool their money in and invest collectively 
through CIVs. CIVs are managed by professional parties and offer investors various benefits as compared to 
investing directly, such as lower transactions costs, better market access, risk diversification and benefiting 
from market knowledge of professional managers and advisors.167 Most States have separate tax rules dealing 
with CIVs.168 The common aim of these rules is to achieve neutrality between investing directly and investing 
indirectly through a CIV, as much as possible.169 Different States, however, apply different mechanisms to 
accomplish this neutrality. States typically follow one of the following approaches:170 (i) disregard CIVs (flow-
                                                             
165 As a general rule, Singapore does not impose tax on capital gains of resident companies, as well as resident individuals. 
See N. Umar, Singapore - Corporate Taxation, Country Analyses IBFD, sec. 1.7; N. Umar, Singapore - Individual 
Taxation, Country Analyses IBFD, sec. 1.7. In the U.S., long-term capital gains of resident individuals are subject to 
reduced federal income tax rates. See J. Rienstra, United States - Individual Taxation, Country Analyses IBFD, sec. 1.10.2. 
166 See Section 2.10 for a more detailed discussion of this matter. 
167 OECD (2010), The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles, Paras. 6-
9, available at: <https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/45359261.pdf>. The main conclusions of this report have been reflected 
in Paras. 22-48 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 (Persons covered). 
168 Ibid., Para. 1. 
169 Ibid. Para. 4. 
170 Paras. 25-26 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 (Persons covered). 
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through) and tax the investors in the CIV directly; (ii) treat CIVs as separate entities, but exempt them under 
certain conditions, e.g. with regard to the plurality of investors, distribution policy, regulatory requirements 
and types of assets to be invested in;171 (iii) subject CIVs to tax, but reduce the tax base by reference to 
distributions paid to the investors; (iv) tax CIVs at a low or zero rate; or (v) subject CIVs to tax and avoid 
double taxation at the resident investor level through an exemption or credit method. Under approaches (ii) 
to (iv), taxation by the State in which the CIV has been established is triggered at the level of the investors – 
and neutrality may be achieved – when distributions are received from the CIV or when capital gains are 
realized on the sale of their interests in the CIV. It is noted that neutrality is not achieved if States have 
different tax rules (and rates) for different categories of passive income and the income received by the CIV 
(e.g. interest) is classified differently than the distributions received by the participants (e.g. dividend). 
 
3.2.1.4 Pension funds 
 
Pension schemes can provide a basic level of income for individuals after retirement and can be mandatory, 
voluntary and linked to an employment relationship or not. Pension funds, being pooling vehicles that manage 
and invest the contributions on behalf of the participants, offer benefits to participants that are largely similar 
to CIVs.172 Many States have special tax rules dealing with pension funds/schemes. In general, pension 
schemes involve three transactions that could trigger taxation: (i) when contributions to the fund are made, 
(ii) when investment income and capital gains accrue to the pension fund vehicle, and (iii) when funds are 
withdrawn.173 In many States, pension contributions are made by employers and/or employees out of pre-tax 
income, investment returns of pension funds are tax-exempt and pension payments, including the investment 
return, are due with tax (so-called exempt-exempt-taxed schemes).174 In other States, pension contributions 
are made out of pre-tax income, while investment returns of pension funds as well as pension payments are 
taxed (so-called exempt-taxed-taxed schemes). Others schemes, ranging from taxed-exempt-exempt to taxed-
taxed-taxed schemes, also exist.175 In many States, the effective tax rate on pension income is (much) lower 
relative to other types of saving,176 indicating the social importance that States attribute to (the promotion of) 
retirement saving. In summary, reasons why pension funds are not, or more favourably, taxed is that the 
investment returns will effectively be taxed when pensions are paid and/or because they fulfil an important 
social function in society. 
 
3.2.1.5 Not-for-profit organizations 
 
A not-for-profit organization is a type of organization that does not aim to earn profit for its owners 
(shareholders), but uses profit and donations to further a particular social cause, or advocate for a particular 
point of view. In many States, special tax arrangements are available to not-for-profit organizations.177 These 
special rules generally reflect a policy intended to support non-profit activities through tax expenditure.178 
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173 K-Y. Yoo & A. de Serres, “Tax Treatment of Private Pension Savings in OECD Countries and the Net Tax Cost Per 
Unit of Contribution to Tax-favoured Schemes” (2004), OECD Working Paper No. 406, p. 6, available at: 
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Treatment of Private Pension Savings in OECD Countries and the Net Tax Cost Per Unit of Contribution to Tax-favoured 
Schemes” (2004), OECD Working Paper No. 406, pp. 26-28. 
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Special tax rules for not-for-profit organizations include reduced tax rates, tax base limitations (e.g. 
distinguishing between business and non-business income) or a full tax-exemption.179 To be eligible for these 
special tax rules, an organization is typically required to further a certain (charitable, public, social and/or 
political) purpose and/or is prohibited to distribute profits. Additional conditions could apply, for example 
regarding the level of remuneration of directors or the activities (not) to be performed. 
 
3.2.1.6 Comparison 
 
The discussion above and in Section 2.10 makes it clear that the home State tax treatment of sovereign wealth 
investors is based on a different rationale, compared to the tax treatment accorded by home States to other 
resident investor groups. Sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in their home State, because 
taxation of such investors is seen as superfluous. The few home States that do impose tax on sovereign wealth 
investors, would either seem to be dealing with an agency problem, or simply use taxation as a substitute for 
extracting profits through (dividend) distributions. On balance, taxes collected from resident sovereign 
wealth investors do not improve the financial position of the home State, because such investors are already 
owned, controlled and funded by that home State. Tax-exemptions or tax reductions granted to other groups 
of resident investors are based on a different rationale, such as achieving neutrality between directly 
investing and indirectly investing (CIVs), or the social importance attributed to certain resident investors 
(pension funds and not-for-profit organizations). And imposing or increasing taxes on such resident investors 
could improve the financial position of the home State. In Chapter 6, it will become apparent that the rationale 
for taxing or not taxing a resident investor is an important element for the European law analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Tax treatment of investment income derived by non-residents 
 
3.2.2.1 Regular non-resident investors 
 
Whereas most States tax their residents on a worldwide basis (i.e. from whatever source derived), non-
residents are taxed on (certain items of) domestic-source income only. In this respect, many States have 
detailed rules to determine where income is (deemed to be) sourced. The right of States to tax income derived 
from their territory – source taxation – is well established in international law.180 Here again, many States 
differentiate between active (business) income and passive (investment) income. With respect to active 
income, States often tax non-residents in the same way as residents and, therefore, allow taking into account 
business expenses (i.e. taxation on a net-basis). On the other hand, if passive income of non-residents is taxed, 
the tax is commonly withheld at source at a flat rate and on a gross-basis. Many States have different flat tax 
rates on different categories of passive income paid to non-residents, and withholding tax rates are often 
reduced under tax treaties. To illustrate, under OECD MTC based treaties, the source tax rate in respect of 
dividends is limited to 15% in case of ‘portfolio’ dividends and 5% in case of ‘participation’ dividends,181 
whereas the source tax rate in respect of interest is limited to 10%182. Non-residents may be indifferent to 
source taxation if this tax can be fully credited against their tax liability in their residence State. However, 
since the tax base in the residence State is generally calculated on a net-basis and withholding tax is gross-
based, foreign taxes can often not be fully credited.  
 
                                                             
179 Ibid., pp. 38-45. 
180 R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 27. 
181 Art. 10 OECD MTC. The rate for ‘participation’ dividends applies if dividends are paid by a resident subsidiary of one 
State to a parent company of another State, provided that – in short – the parent owns directly a holding of at least 25%. 
The rate for ‘portfolio’ dividends applies in all other cases (provided the tax treaty applies). 
182 Art. 11 OECD MTC. 
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In an intra-EU context, Member States could be required to exempt from source taxation cross-border 
dividend as well as interest (and royalty) payments between affiliated entities under the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive.183  
 
Further, some (source) States do, and others do not tax capital gains of non-residents under domestic law, 
unless in the case of immovable property situated in their territory.184 It is noted that OECD MTC based 
treaties allow source taxation of capital gains derived by a non-resident in a number of situations, without any 
limitation as to the tax rate to be applied, such as capital gains derived from immovable property situated in 
the source State, as well as capital gains derived from ‘immovable property companies’185.  
 
3.2.2.2 Foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
In many States, the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors follows the tax treatment of regular 
non-resident corporate investors,186 both under domestic law and tax treaties. Depending on a source State’s 
tax rules, this could mean that source taxation differentiates between types of income, such as interest and 
dividends, but it does so without distinction between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-
resident corporate investors, including CIVs and pension funds. Source taxation imposed by other States 
represents a net cost to foreign sovereign wealth investors and their home States. 
 
Some States accord specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, 
either unilaterally or under tax treaties. A few States even grant a general tax-exemption to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, either unilaterally or under tax treaties187. Specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions 
refer to exemptions or reductions which conditionally apply to a specific category of income, whereas a 
general tax-exemption refers to a(n) (un)conditional exemption of all income. These general and specific tax-
exemptions or reductions may be available to some foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to other 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. They are generally not available to ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
The unilateral tax-exemptions, both specific and general ones, are granted under domestic law or 
administrative practice, and are often motivated with reference to sovereign immunity. According to the 
sovereign immunity principle, States have, as a general rule, no jurisdiction over foreign States and their 
                                                             
183 Discussed in more detail in Section 6.5. 
184 This exception to capital gains taxation in the case of immovable property applies in, for example, the U.S. (under the 
Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act). R. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law: An Analysis of the 
International Tax Regime (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 90-92.   
185 Art. 13(4) OECD MTC. Immovable property companies are companies the shares of which derive more than 50% of 
their value directly or indirectly from immovable property situated in the source State.  
186 F. Bassan, “SWFs and taxation: National, bilateral and multilateral approach”, Chapter 8 in: F. Bassan (ed.), Research 
Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 
p. 209.  
187 A general exemption from source taxation of income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors can, for example, 
be found in the following tax treaties: Agreement Between Mongolia and the United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (21 February 2001), Treaties 
IBFD; Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (22 September 
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Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income (18 September 2006), Treaties IBFD; Convention Between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital (20 November 2006), Treaties IBFD; Agreement Between the Government of Georgia and the Government of the 
United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital (25 November 2010), Treaties IBFD. 
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instrumentalities in civil proceedings.188 Some States, including Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., extend 
the sovereign immunity principle to the taxation of foreign States and their instrumentalities, including 
foreign sovereign wealth investors.189 In this respect, most States distinguish between active income and 
passive income, and only grant tax-exemptions to passive income, as defined. This distinction is explained by 
the restrictive sovereign immunity theory, according to which immunity cannot be applied to commercial 
activities, as opposed to governmental activities. These States associate commercial activities with active 
income (taxed) and governmental activities with passive income (tax-exempt). Sovereign immunity as a 
motivation for unilateral tax-exemptions by source States vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors is 
elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 4 of this study. In a few other States, such as Singapore, unilateral tax-
exemptions accorded to foreign sovereign wealth investors are explicitly motivated by international 
attractiveness.190   
Tax-exemptions, both specific and general ones, granted to foreign sovereign wealth investors under a tax 
treaty are sometimes also motivated by reference to sovereign immunity (and perhaps a codification of 
administrative practice)191, but more often based on reciprocity, as a leading principle of tax treaty 
negotiations, or motivated by international attractiveness. Reciprocity is often relied on between two States 
that are both home to sovereign wealth investors, for example under the tax treaty between Russia and the 
United Arab Emirates (‘U.A.E.’).192 Numerous source States without sovereign wealth investors, such as 
Germany,193 the Netherlands194 and Spain,195 have also been willing to accord tax benefits to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors from the other State, either in return for tax benefits by that other State, or simply to attract 
investments. 
 
In summary, source States have generally adopted one or more of the following five approaches to the 
taxation of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors:196   
 
(1) taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative 
practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
                                                             
188 See in more detail, Chapter 4 of this study. 
189 See Section 4.3.1. 
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(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
 
These approaches will be referred to as Approaches (1) to (5) in this study and will be measured by their 
neutrality, equity and international attractiveness in Section 3.4 through Section 3.6. The impact international 
law could have on source States’ ability to implement these approaches, and to achieve (or promote) tax 
policy objectives, will be examined in Chapter 4 to Chapter 6. 
 
3.2.2.3 Non-resident collective investment vehicles 
 
Investment income derived by non-resident CIVs (from a source State perspective) could be subject to regular 
source taxation under domestic law. Because of the different legal forms that CIVs can take, as well as the 
different ways that CIVs are treated for tax purposes in the State in which they have been established,197 it 
may not be clear whether non-resident CIVs are entitled to tax treaty benefits on investment income derived 
from a source State. Issues and policy considerations relating to CIVs in a tax treaty context have been 
discussed by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in its report The Granting of Treaty Benefits with Respect to 
the Income of Collective Investment Vehicles, the main conclusions of which have been reflected in Paras. 22-48 
of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 (Persons covered). The report discusses a number of approaches and 
suggests different treaty provisions that explicitly provide for the treaty entitlement of CIVs under certain 
conditions. In essence, the ultimate goal is to achieve, as much as possible, neutrality for investors between a 
direct investment and an indirect investment through a CIV in an international setting.198 Therefore, the 
approach that is most in line with this goal is that non-resident CIVs can be entitled to reduced source taxation 
under treaties, as applicable to each type of income, but the rate cannot generally be lower than the rate that 
the investor in the CIV could have claimed had it received the income directly. As this would, however, require 
CIVs to determine the entitlement of every single investor, and these investors could be resident in a third 
State, other, sometimes more practical, approaches are also discussed in the report.  
 
3.2.2.4 Non-resident pension funds 
 
As explained in Section 3.2.1.4, many pension funds are tax-exempt in their residence State.199 As a result, tax 
imposed by other States on such pension funds as non-residents represents a net cost to them (such pension 
funds cannot credit foreign taxes). This could distort neutrality with respect to the investment location. That 
is, pension funds could favour domestic investments over foreign investments. This consideration mutatis 
mutandis applies to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but, surprisingly, does not seem to have played a part 
for source States (Section 3.2.2.2). In order to promote neutrality, and attract investments, some States have 
agreed in their tax treaties not to impose source taxation on (certain items of) investment income of a non-
resident pension fund in their bilateral relationship, usually on a reciprocity basis.200 This, in deviation from 
the regular (domestic and tax treaty) rules that otherwise would have applied and continue to apply to 
‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. Other States apply a tax treaty to non-resident pension funds 
without having agreed any special tax treatment, whereas a limited number of States consider a tax treaty not 
to be applicable (and so disallow its benefits) to non-resident pension funds if they are tax-exempt in their 
residence State. In the 2017 version of the OECD MTC, “recognized pension funds”201 are explicitly mentioned 
                                                             
197 See Section 3.2.1.3. 
198 Para. 32 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 (Persons covered). 
199 See also Para. 13.1 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10 (Dividends). 
200 Para. 13.1 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10 (Dividends); Para. 7.10 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 11 
(Interest); Para. 28.8 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 13 (Capital gains); Para. 69 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 18 
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as tax treaty residents, regardless of whether they benefit from a limited or complete exemption from taxation 
in their residence State.202 
 
3.2.2.5 Non-resident not-for-profit organizations 
 
In some States, non-resident not-for-profit organizations are not treated any differently from resident not-for-
profit organizations, provided they meet the local requirements, they meet additional requirements, or 
pursuant to a tax treaty.203 Such equal treatment may have been forced upon EU Member States and (other) 
members to the EEA Agreements by the fundamental freedoms. In other States, non-resident not-for-profit 
organizations are subject to the ordinary corporate tax rules.204 The comments made above in Section 3.2.2.4 
in respect of the application of tax treaties to pension funds, are also relevant to not-for-profit organizations.   
 
3.2.2.6 Comparison 
 
The discussion regarding resident investors indicated that the home State tax treatment of sovereign wealth 
investors is based on a different rationale, compared to the tax treatment accorded by home States to other 
resident investor groups. However, the discussion above regarding non-resident investors shows that the 
(theoretical) rationales for source States to accord tax-exemptions or tax reductions to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors and other groups of non-resident investors, overlap to a great extent. This overlap exists, for 
example, with respect to tax-exemptions and tax reductions which are motivated by achieving neutrality 
between investing at home and abroad, and those which are motivated by attracting investments. In contrast, 
no overlap exists in case of tax-exemptions granted to foreign sovereign wealth investors by reference to the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.205 By its nature, this international law doctrine cannot apply to other investor 
groups, because they are not owned, controlled and funded by a foreign State. Finally, the rationale of 
achieving neutrality between directly investing and investing indirectly through a vehicle could, to some 
extent, also be relevant to foreign sovereign wealth investors if the home State – as the sole owner – would 
have been entitled to a tax-exemption or tax reduction had it invested directly. 
 
3.3. Identifying the main attributes of international tax policy 
 
A 2001 OECD study identified three general principles that should underlie ‘good’ tax policy: 
 
“First, so long as taxation affects incentives it may alter economic behaviour (…) in ways that reduce 
economic efficiency. These effects should be taken into account when the costs and benefits of public 
expenditure to be funded are being assessed. Second, the distribution of taxation’s impact across the 
population raises issues of equity, or fairness, which must be given substantial weight even if it entails 
costs in terms of economic efficiency. Third, the practical enforceability of tax rules and the costs 
arising from compliance are important considerations, the more so since these are both affected by, 
and have implications for, the efficiency and public perceptions of the fairness of tax systems.”206 
(Emphasis added) 
 
                                                             
202 Paras. 8.6-8.10 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4. See also OECD (2016), Discussion Draft on Changes to the 
OECD Model Tax Convention Concerning the Treaty Residence of Pension Funds, available at: 
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Economic efficiency (neutrality) and equity (fairness) can be seen as ‘substantive’ policy principles, whereas 
enforceability and compliance can be seen as ‘procedural’ policy principles. According to the OECD study, 
policymakers should find the best possible balance between these tax policy design criteria.207  
 
Procedural policy principles 
 
In its inquiry into Principles of tax policy, the U.K. House of Commons reports that procedural principles imply 
that:208 
 
 tax laws should be clear, simple and certain; 
 tax policy should be stable, i.e. changes to the rules should be kept to a minimum, changes should be 
justified and this justification and its underlying policy should be made public, while policy shocks 
should be avoided; 
 tax policy should be practicable, in the sense that the tax liability should be easy to calculate, and easy 
and cheap to collect.  
 
A source State should consider procedural policy principles when introducing new tax policy or reconsidering 
existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors. These policy principles will, however, not be 
further considered in this study, because they do not offer insights as to how foreign sovereign wealth 
investors should be taxed (in substantive terms) from a source State perspective. 
 
Substantive policy principles 
 
A review of State practice confirms the importance of economic efficiency (neutrality) and equity (fairness) as 
principles that underlie ‘good’ international tax policy. Examples of States in which economic efficiency is an 
important international tax policy driver include Australia,209 Brazil,210 Germany,211 the Netherlands,212 
Norway,213 the U.K.214 and the U.S. Equity (fairness) considerations have explicitly been referred to as an 
important tax policy driver in Germany,215 Norway,216 the U.K.217 and the U.S.,218 among others. In addition to 
efficiency and equity (fairness), nowadays international competitiveness of a tax system is considered another 
                                                             
207 Ibid. 
208 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Principles of tax policy, Eight Report of Session 2010-2011, HC 753, pp. 
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210 L. Schoueri & M. Barbosa, “Brazil”, Chapter 4 in: M. Lang et al., Trends and Players in Tax Policy, IBFD 2016, 
Online Books IBFD, Section 4.7.1. 
211 G. Müller-Gatermann, “Germany”, Chapter 10 in: M. Lang et al., Trends and Players in Tax Policy, IBFD 2016, 
Online Books IBFD, Section 10.7. 
212 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7. 
213 F. Zimmer, A. Scapa Passalacqua & L. Henie, “Norway”, Chapter 14 in: M. Lang et al., Trends and Players in Tax 
Policy, IBFD 2016, Online Books IBFD, Section 14.7.2. 
214 House of Commons, Treasury Committee, Principles of tax policy, Eight Report of Session 2010-2011, HC 753, pp. 
10-12. 
215 G. Müller-Gatermann, “Germany”, Chapter 10 in: M. Lang et al., Trends and Players in Tax Policy, IBFD 2016, 
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important attribute of international tax policy in many States, including Australia,219 Austria,220 Canada,221 
China,222 Colombia,223 the Czech Republic,224 Germany,225 the Netherlands,226 New Zealand,227 Norway228 and 
the U.K.229 Given the apparent international importance of: (i) efficiency (neutrality), (ii) equity (fairness), and 
(iii) international attractiveness, these three attributes of international tax policy, and their relationship with 
source taxation of sovereign wealth investors, are considered in more detail below.  
 
3.4. International neutrality (efficiency) 
 
3.4.1 General 
 
Tax neutrality theories are economic theories believed to increase economic efficiency and welfare.230 Tax 
neutrality is achieved when economic decisions are not (or, at least, as little as possible) distorted by taxation. 
In an international context, tax neutrality, referred to as international tax neutrality, is said to promote an 
efficient allocation of global capital, thus promoting global welfare.231 The baseline for assessing international 
tax neutrality is a non-tax world, which is considered to be ideally efficient. The two classic welfare 
benchmarks for assessing (one side of) international tax neutrality, introduced by Peggy Musgrave232 and an 
underlying principle of international tax policy in many States, are capital export neutrality (‘CEN’) and capital 
import neutrality (‘CIN’). As the terminology already suggests, both neutrality concepts are not fully neutral as 
they address one-sided capital movements only.233 A third, more recently introduced, global welfare 
benchmark is capital ownership neutrality (‘CON’).234 These three neutrality concepts, their implications for 
the design of international tax rules and relevant considerations for source State taxation of foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, are discussed below.  
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3.4.2 Capital export neutrality 
 
3.4.2.1 The concept explained 
 
CEN addresses a State taxing in a residence capacity235 and promotes neutrality with respect to the location of 
investment.236 A tax system is said to achieve CEN when tax considerations do not influence a resident 
investor’s decision between investing capital in its home market or abroad (i.e. export neutral), thus allocating 
capital of residents economically most efficient. This requires resident investors to face the same tax burden 
on their domestic and outbound investments (investment location neutrality). Under CEN, investors have an 
incentive to locate investments where pre-tax returns are highest. CEN implies a tax system of worldwide 
taxation with a full credit for foreign taxes (residence-based taxation).237 There is no consensus on whether 
CEN is relevant for the taxation of non-resident investors (i.e. foreign inbound investments). Some authors 
argue that CEN implies no taxation of non-resident investors,238 while others argue that CEN appears to have 
nothing to do with the taxation of non-resident investors.239 According to the present author, CEN is as such 
not concerned with a State taxing in a source capacity; CEN does not tell a source State to tax or to forgo tax in 
relation to non-resident investors. In fact, ‘pure’ CEN would even require a State acting in a residence capacity 
to refund foreign source taxation to the extent it exceeds residence taxation (i.e. the responsibility to achieve 
export neutrality rests with the residence State, as opposed to the source State). 
 
3.4.2.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
Although the present author does not consider CEN as such to be concerned with the taxation of non-resident 
investors, this neutrality concept could provide an argument for a source State not to tax income derived by 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. This argument is similar to the argument discussed in Section 3.2.2.4 
regarding tax-exempt pension funds. As explained Section 2.10, foreign sovereign wealth investors are 
generally not taxed in their residence State. Source State taxation of tax-exempt non-resident investors could 
distort neutrality with respect to the investment location, i.e. it could result in tax-exempt investors favouring 
domestic investments over foreign investments. In order to promote export neutrality, a source State could 
consider to exempt from source taxation investment income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors 
and other non-resident tax-exempt investors. It could accord such treatment unilaterally or through tax 
treaties.  
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5), under which source States grant a general or specific tax-
exemptions to (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors, either unilaterally or through tax treaties, could be 
motivated by referring to promoting CEN. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source States tax 
foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, does not 
promote CEN, unless taxation in the same way means no taxation at all.  
 
3.4.3 Capital import neutrality  
 
3.4.3.1 The concept explained  
 
                                                             
235 M. de Wilde, “Some Thoughts on a Fair Allocation of Corporate Tax in a Globalizing Economy” (2010) 38 Intertax 
281, p. 294.  
236 R. Mason, “Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality” (2010) 2 World Tax Journal 126, p. 130. 
237 ‘Pure’ CEN would even require a refund to the extent that the foreign tax exceeds the tax in the residence State.  
238 M. Graetz, “The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts 
and Unsatisfactory Policies” (2001) 54 Tax Law Review 261, p. 271 
239 R. Mason, “Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality” (2010) 2 World Tax Journal 126, p. 133. 
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CIN is the flipside of CEN, and promotes neutrality with respect to the location of investors, rather than the 
location of investment. Musgrave introduced CIN with a view to create “equal opportunities for expansion” in 
a particular State for all (foreign) investors.240 A tax system is said to achieve CIN when tax considerations do 
not influence which investor, that is, a resident or non-resident investor, makes which investment in one 
particular State (i.e. import neutral). CIN implies a territorial (or source-based) tax system rather than a 
residence-based tax system;241 in other words, a tax system which exempts foreign sourced income and treats 
domestic sourced income of resident and non-resident investors in the same way. In this respect, the 
characteristics of investors and place of residence are irrelevant. CIN simply requires equal treatment of 
investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source State. Although equal source 
taxation of all investors investing in one particular jurisdiction, regardless of their residency, promotes CIN, it 
does not necessarily achieve CIN. Taxes imposed by foreign States may distort import neutrality in the source 
State, for example when the residence State of a foreign investor applies worldwide taxation (promoting CEN) 
at rates exceeding those of the source State.242 It has been said that ‘pure’ CIN obtains only if all States would 
adopt source-based taxation.243 Nevertheless, CIN based tax systems at least aim to promote capital import 
neutrality. 
 
There is no consensus in literature on whether CIN is relevant for portfolio investments, i.e. investments that 
give the investor little or no control over business activities. Some authors argue that CIN only has relevance 
for direct investments, because taxation of portfolio investments has no, or at most a small, influence on the 
location of plant or equipment (i.e. location of investment) and, therefore, productivity.244 The thinking 
behind this seems to be that capital from portfolio investors is easy to obtain and that portfolio investors are 
easily replaceable in a global market. Other authors do apply CIN in relation to portfolio investments, because 
unequal tax treatment of resident and non-resident portfolio investors could impact relative prices, and 
distort investment decisions and an efficient global allocation of capital.245 In the present author’s view, it is 
not unlikely that portfolio investments could have influence on the location of business activity. The 
availability of portfolio capital may vary per country, per region within a country, per sector, per industry and 
even per company, and may change over time. Currently, portfolio capital may, for example, not be widely 
available to small and medium-sized enterprises, start-ups and other companies with high-risk profiles. In 
addition, the distinction between direct investment and portfolio investment, although analytically helpful, is 
not always clear in practice. For these reasons, this study considers CIN without distinguishing between direct 
investments and portfolio investments. It is noted, though, that both individuals and companies can make 
portfolio investments, whereas direct investments are almost always made by companies.246  
 
 
 
                                                             
240 P. Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 
1963), at 8. 
241 K. Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments (Part II)” (1988) 10 
Intertax 310, p. 311. 
242 R. Mason, “Tax Discrimination and Capital Neutrality” (2010) 2 World Tax Journal 126, p. 130. 
243 F. Shaheen, “International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations” (2007) 27 Virginia Tax Review 203, p. 212. This assumes 
that the location of the investment is fixed. 
244 M. Graetz & I. Grinberg, “Taxing International Portfolio Income” (2003) 56 Tax Law Review 537, pp. 554-556. 
245 E. Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models (2001), Dongen: Mr. Eric C.C.M. 
Kemmeren/Pijnenburg vormgevers, uitgevers, pp. 78-81, available at <https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/439888/87428.pdf>; 
M.P. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and Tax Policy Considerations, Research 
Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, July 2008, available at: 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/faculty-research/tax/publications/working-papers/taxation-outbound-direct-investment-
economic-principles-and-tax-policy-considerations>. 
246 M. Graetz & I. Grinberg, “Taxing International Portfolio Income” (2003) 56 Tax Law Review 537, p. 547. 
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3.4.3.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
CIN is promoted if a State exempts foreign sourced income and taxes domestic sourced income of all investors 
in the same way, regardless of their residence and characteristics (source-based taxation). In other words, all 
activity within a State’s territory should be treated alike. Equal tax treatment of resident and non-resident 
investors sounds straightforward, but the actual implementation raises several potential issues. One potential 
issue relates to the appropriate comparison of investors. If CIN is indeed limited to direct investments, it 
seems clear that the position of individuals can be disregarded, because, direct investments are almost always 
made by companies, as indicated. As a consequence, income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors 
from direct investment in a source State should receive the same source tax treatment as income derived by 
other resident and non-resident corporate investors from direct investment in that State. On the other hand, if 
CIN is also relevant for portfolio investments, it seems necessary to consider the position of individuals as 
well, because individuals can also make portfolio investments. As a consequence, since CIN does not 
distinguish between types of investors, income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors from portfolio 
investment in a source State should receive the same source tax treatment as income directly derived by 
resident and non-resident individuals from portfolio investment in that State. However, as discussed, portfolio 
investments of individuals are often made indirectly through investment vehicles, such as CIVs. As explained, 
portfolio income can be tax-exempt at the level of these (corporate) vehicles, but subsequent distributions are 
then usually taxed at the level of the individuals. In the author’s view, equal tax treatment as prescribed by 
CIN requires that resident and non-resident investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a 
source State are faced with the same overall tax burden as imposed by the source State. For resident 
individuals deriving source income through investment vehicles, this would mean that both corporate level 
taxes (if any) and personal income tax should be taken into account, and this combined tax burden should be 
equal to the source tax burden of portfolio income of foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-
resident portfolio investors performing the same level of investment activities in a source State. 
 
Another potential issue relates to the treatment of different categories of investment income. At first sight, the 
uniform tax treatment of all different categories of income, e.g. a flat rate of 20% on all source income derived 
by resident and non-resident investors, seems to be neutral. However, dividends are often paid out of profits 
that already have been or will become subject to corporate tax in a source State, effectively at the expense of 
the investors-shareholders. This could also apply to capital gains on shares. Imposing a flat tax rate on such 
dividends and capital gains, as well as other categories of income, could influence investors’ behaviour and 
preference for type of investment income, and produce inefficient outcomes. In the author’s view, equal tax 
treatment as prescribed by CIN also requires neutrality with respect to the type of investment activity, e.g. an 
investment in loans, shares or immovable property. In other words, the decision to invest in e.g. loans, shares 
or immovable property should not be influenced by tax considerations. This would require investors with an 
equal level of investment income from a source State to face equal source State tax burdens, irrespective of 
the composition of the investment income. 
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)247 regarding the tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors 
cannot be explained by CIN, because they could result in different tax treatment among foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, and between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other (resident and non-resident) 
investors, both individuals and companies. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source States tax 
                                                             
247 As identified in Section 3.2.2.2. Approaches (2) to (5) are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
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foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, could be 
motivated by CIN.  
 
3.4.4 Capital ownership neutrality 
 
3.4.4.1 The concept explained 
 
Desai and Hines introduced CON, as a benchmark that promotes global welfare, in 2003.248 They explain that 
“[t]ax systems satisfy capital ownership neutrality if they do not distort ownership patterns”.249 The basic 
assumption underlying CON is that productivity of capital (assets) varies depending on the investor 
(owner).250 This means that CON is relevant with respect to direct investments – active investments giving the 
investor influence on the business decisions and, therefore, productivity –, but not so much with respect to 
portfolio investments – passive investments giving the investor little or no influence on productivity. CON 
requires that the most efficient ownership pattern be reached across investors in terms of productivity.251 
According to Desai and Hines, CON would be satisfied if all States would adopt either a residence-based tax 
system or a territorial tax system (source-based taxation).252  
 
As explained below, ownership neutrality is achieved when each investor retains the same proportion of the 
before-tax return across investments. It does not matter when different investors retain different proportions 
of before-tax returns, as long as each investor retains the same proportion of the before-tax return across 
investments.  
 
Suppose that two investors, Investor X and Investor Y, are competing for Investment A (the candidate 
investment), an investment opportunity in source State A.253 Assume that an investment of 1,000 in 
Investment A generates 1,120 (or 12%) to Investor X and 1,100 (or 10%) to Investor Y. Let us further assume 
that the best alternative investment to each investor is another investment in State A, which would produce a 
rate of return of 6% to both investors. The rate of return on this alternative investment determines the 
maximum price each investor is willing to pay for Investment A. Investor X is willing to pay up to 1,056254, 
while Investor Y is willing to pay no more than 1,037.255 Ownership neutrality require that Investor X (being 
the most productive owner) would acquire Investment A for 1,038 and that Investor Y would acquire the 
alternative investment. Now, taxation is added to the example. Assume that source State A taxes all investors 
on State A sourced-income at a rate of 20%. Source-based taxation by State A does not change the value each 
investor places on Investment A. This is because each investor retains the same proportion of the before-tax 
return on both investments. That is, each investor retains 80% across both investments.256  
 
                                                             
248 M. Desai & J. Hines Jr., “Evaluating International Tax Reform” (2003) 56 National Tax Journal 487.  
249 Ibid., p. 494. 
250 F. Shaheen, “International Tax Neutrality: Revisited” (2011) 64 Tax Law Review 131, p. 136. 
251 Ibid., p. 141. 
252 M. Desai & J. Hines Jr., “Evaluating International Tax Reform” (2003) 56 National Tax Journal 487, pp. 494-495. 
253 The example in this section is inspired by the example in F. Shaheen, “International Tax Neutrality: Revisited” (2011) 
64 Tax Law Review 131, pp. 139-143. 
254 1,120/1.06 ≈ 1,056.60. An investment of 1,056.60 in the alternative investment would generate 1,120 (or 6%) to 
Investor X. If Investor X would pay more than 1,056.60 for Investment A, the rate of return would be less than 6% and she 
would prefer the alternative investment. 
255 1,100/1.06 ≈ 1,037.74. An investment of 1,037.74 in the alternative investment would generate 1,100 (or 6%) to 
Investor Y. If Investor Y would pay more than 1,037.74 for Investment A, the rate of return would be less than 6% and 
Investor Y would prefer the alternative investment. 
256 For Investor X, the after-tax rate of return on Investment A would be reduced from 7.9% to 6.3% and on the alternative 
investment from 6% to 4.8%. For Investor Y, the after-tax rate of return on both investments would be reduced from 6% to 
4.8%. 
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Residence-based taxation may also achieve ownership neutrality between investors. For purposes of the 
example above, assume that Investor X is a resident in State X and taxed on its worldwide income at a rate of 
30%, whereas Investor Y is a resident in State Y and taxed on its worldwide income at a rate of 40%. Assume 
that State A also applies residence-based taxation. Investor X and Investor Y would still value Investment A at 
1,056257 respectively 1,037258. As explained, the reason why the value each investor places on Investment A 
does not change is because each investor retains the same proportion of the before-tax return across 
investments. That is, the retention rate for Investor X on all investments is 70%, whereas the retention rate 
for Investor Y on all investments is 60%.  
 
Source-based taxation and residence-based taxation may also achieve ownership neutrality when the 
alternative investment generates a different rate of return between investors. Recall the original example 
above where an investment of 1,000 in Investment A, located in State A, generates 1,120 (or 12%) to Investor 
X and 1,100 (or 10%) to Investor Y. Recall that source State A taxes all investors on State A sourced-income at 
a rate of 20%. Now assume that the alternative investment in State A generates 9% to Investor X and 6% to 
Investor Y. Both in a non-tax world and in a tax world, Investor X is now willing to pay no more than 1,027259 
for Investment A, while Investor Y is still willing to pay up to 1,037.260 Thus, Investor Y would outbid Investor 
X (the most productive owner for Investment A) and acquire Investment A for 1,028, whereas Investor X 
would acquire the alternative investment. Although Investor X is the most productive owner for Investment A, 
this outcome of Investor Y acquiring Investment A and Investor X acquiring the alternative investment, is the 
desired outcome from an ownership neutrality perspective. The overall productivity of such an ownership 
pattern (10% + 9%) is higher than that of Investor X acquiring Investment A and Investor Y acquiring the 
alternative investment (12% + 6%). Therefore, the ownership pattern reached across investors is most 
efficient in terms of productivity. The analysis does not change under residence-based taxation when each 
investor retains the same proportion of the before-tax return across investments.   
 
In the examples discussed above, ownership neutrality is satisfied. However, the co-existence and interplay of 
tax systems may distort ownership neutrality. When all States involved would have adopted residence-based 
tax systems, both ownership and competitiveness neutrality would be satisfied, since each investor would 
retain the same proportion of the before-tax return across all investments, also when tax rates differ across 
States.261 In contrast, the interplay of source-based tax systems only, or the interplay of residence-based and 
source-based tax systems, may not satisfy ownership neutrality when tax rates differ across States. The 
following example illustrates that the interplay of source-based tax systems might not be ownership neutral 
when tax rates differ across States. Recall the original example above where an investment of 1,000 in 
Investment A, located in State A, generates 1,120 (or 12%) to Investor X and 1,100 (or 10%) to Investor Y. 
                                                             
257 1,120/1.06 ≈ 1,056.60. The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor X is 4.2% ((1 – 0.3) * 6%). An 
investment of 1,056.60 in the alternative investment would generate 1,120 (or 4.2% after taxes) to Investor X. If Investor 
X would pay more than 1,056.60 for Investment A, the after-tax rate of return would be less than 4.2% and Investor X 
would prefer the alternative investment. 
258 1,100/1.06 ≈ 1,037.74. The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor Y is 3.6% ((1 – 0.4) * 6%). An 
investment of 1,037.74 in the alternative investment would generate 1,100 (or 3.6%) to Investor Y. If Investor Y would 
pay more than 1,037.74 for Investment A, the rate of return would be less than 3.6% and Investor Y would prefer the 
alternative investment. 
259 1,120/1.09 ≈ 1,027.52. The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor X is 7.2% ((1 – 0.2) * 9%). An 
investment of 1,027.52 in the alternative investment would generate 1,120 (or 7.2% after taxes) to Investor X. If Investor 
X would pay more than 1,027.52 for Investment A, the after-tax rate of return would be less than 7.2% and Investor X 
would prefer the alternative investment. 
260 1,100/1.06 ≈ 1,037.74. The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor Y is 4.8% ((1 – 0.2) * 6%). An 
investment of 1,037.74 in the alternative investment would generate 1,100 (or 4.8% after taxes) to Investor Y. If Investor 
Y would pay more than 1,037.74 for Investment A, the after-tax rate of return would be less than 4.8% and Investor Y 
would prefer the alternative investment. 
261 M. Knoll, “Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality” (2011) 64 Tax Law Review 99. 
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Recall further that source State A taxes all investors on State A sourced-income at a rate of 20%. Now assume 
that the alternative investment generates 9% to Investor X and 6% to Investor Y, but is now located in State B 
(instead of State A). State B imposes source taxation on all investors at a rate of 60%. As demonstrated in the 
previous paragraph, ownership neutrality requires that Investor Y acquires Investment A and Investor X 
acquires the alternative investment. However, because State B imposes source taxation at a rate of 60% and 
State A imposes source taxation at a rate of 20%, Investor X would be willing to pay up to 1,071262 for 
Investment A and would outbid Investor Y, who would be willing to pay no more than 1,068263. The reason 
why Investment A is now worth more to Investor X than to Investor Y, is because being taxed at a lower rate is 
worth more to a more productive investor (Investor X) than to a less productive investor (Investor Y). 
Similarly, the interplay of residence-based and source-based tax systems might fail ownership neutrality. For 
purposes of the example in this paragraph, further assume that Investor X is a resident in State X and taxed on 
its worldwide income at a rate of 30%, whereas Investor Y is a resident in State Y and taxed on its worldwide 
income at a rate of 40%. State X and State Y allow foreign tax credits but limited to the level of domestic tax. 
Investor X and Investor Y would now value Investment A at 1,065264 respectively 1,057265. Hence, Investor X 
would outbid Investor Y for Investment A and ownership neutrality would not be achieved.  
 
3.4.4.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
The theory behind ownership neutrality is clear: ownership neutrality is achieved when each investor retains 
the same proportion of the before-tax return across investments; it does not matter when different investors 
retain different proportions of before-tax returns, as long as each investor retains the same proportion of the 
before-tax return across investments. Whether this standard is satisfied in an international setting, depends 
on the interplay of tax systems, the outcome of which is driven by various connected factors, such as tax rates, 
the location of investments, the location of investors and the nature of the investments. It is argued here that 
in today’s global economy, where investment assets are located in numerous States that may tax investors in 
different ways at different rates, this neutrality concept has little, if any, practical meaning. And so it will not 
be further considered in this study.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
262 The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor X is 3.6% ((1 – 0.6) * 9%). An acquisition price of 
1,071.77 for Investment A would generate the same after-tax rate of return for Investor X on Investment A ((1,120 – 
1,071.77) * (1 – 0.2) / 1,071.77 * 100 = 3.6%). If Investor X would pay more than 1,071.77 for Investment A, the after-tax 
rate of return on this investment would be less than 3.6% and Investor X would prefer the alternative investment.  
263 The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor Y is 2.4% ((1 – 0.6) * 6%). An acquisition price of 
1,067.96 for Investment A would generate the same after-tax rate of return for Investor Y on Investment A ((1,100 – 
1,067.96) * (1 – 0.2) / 1,067.96 * 100 = 2.4%). If Investor Y would pay more than 1,067.96 for Investment A, the after-tax 
rate of return on this investment would be less than 2.4% and Investor Y would prefer the alternative investment. 
264 The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor X is 3.6% ((1 – 0.6) * 9%). An acquisition price of 
1,065.21 for Investment A would generate the same after-tax rate of return for Investor X on Investment A ((1,120 – 
1,065.21) * (1 – 0.3) / 1,065.21 * 100 = 3.6%). If Investor X would pay more than 1,065.21 for Investment A, the after-tax 
rate of return on this investment would be less than 3.6% and Investor X would prefer the alternative investment. 
265 The after-tax return on the alternative investment for Investor Y is 2.4% ((1 – 0.6) * 6%). An acquisition price of 
1,057.69 for Investment A would generate the same after-tax rate of return for Investor Y on Investment A ((1,100 – 
1,057.69) * (1 – 0.4) / 1,057.69 * 100 = 2.4%). If Investor Y would pay more than 1,057.69 for Investment A, the after-tax 
rate of return on this investment would be less than 2.4% and Investor Y would prefer the alternative investment. 
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3.5. Equity (fairness)  
 
3.5.1 General 
 
Equity is a moral concept, derived from justice (fairness),266 and an important tax policy principle. The 
concept of equity has two main elements in a tax policy context: inter-nation equity and inter-taxpayer equity. 
Inter-nation equity is concerned with a fair (equitable) allocation of national gain (and loss) between States 
with respect to cross-border activities.267 On the other hand, inter-taxpayer equity is concerned with a fair 
(equitable) allocation of tax obligations between taxpayers. Inter-taxpayer equity has two main elements: 
horizontal equity and vertical equity.268 Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers who are equals pay equal 
amounts of tax,269 whereas vertical equity, in essence, requires that taxpayers who are not equals be taxed 
differently taking into account their differences.270 In the author’s view, horizontal and vertical inter-taxpayer 
equity are corollaries of the principle of equality.271 Aristotle formulated the equality principle as: “things that 
are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their 
unalikeness. (…) Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just is to be equal, to be unjust is to be 
unequal.”272 It is fair to say that inter-taxpayer equity deals with (economic) justice between taxpayers, in that 
it prescribes a just allocation of the tax burden among taxpayers. Inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation 
equity, their implications for the design of international tax rules and relevant considerations for source State 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, are discussed below. 
 
3.5.2 Inter-taxpayer equity 
 
3.5.2.1 The concept explained 
 
Two theories have dominated discussions on inter-taxpayer equity: the ability-to-pay theory and the benefit 
theory. Under the ability-to-pay theory, each taxpayer should pay tax in accordance with its ability to pay; 
taxpayers with greater abilities should pay more tax than taxpayers with lesser abilities, while taxpayers with 
equal abilities should pay an equal amount of tax. Ability-to-pay theory in taxation has become associated 
with theories of distributive justice, i.e. the re-distribution of goods and welfare between persons within a 
society through taxation.273 The other theory, the benefit theory, requires that each taxpayer should pay tax in 
accordance with its level of benefit from governmental goods and services; taxpayers who benefit more from 
public goods and services should pay more tax than taxpayers who benefit less, while taxpayers who benefit 
equally should pay an equal amount of tax.  
 
In the tax systems of many States, a basic distinction is made between residents and non-residents, which 
indicates that residents and non-residents are generally not considered equals. The following discussion 
                                                             
266 K. Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments (Part III)” (1988) 11 
Intertax 393, p. 393. 
267 OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, Chapter 2 - Fundamental Principles of Taxation, p. 21. 
268 OECD (2015), Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 - 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, Chapter 2 - Fundamental Principles of Taxation, p. 21. 
269 D. Elkins. “Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory” (2006) 24 Yale Law & Policy Review 43. 
270 M. de Wilde, ‘Sharing the Pie’; Taxing multinationals in a global market (2015), p. 45, available at: 
<https://repub.eur.nl/pub/77496/>. 
271 Similarly, M. de Wilde, ‘Sharing the Pie’; Taxing multinationals in a global market (2015), p. 45; D. Herman, Taxing 
Portfolio Income in Global Financial Markets, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 2 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2002), p. 101. 
272 Derived from N. Bammens, The Principle of Non-discrimination in International and European Tax Law, IBFD 
Doctoral Series, Vol. 24 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2012), p. 5. 
273 N. Kaufman, “Fairness in International Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International 
Business 145, pp. 157-158. 
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about the ability-to-pay theory and the benefit theory also points to a basic difference between residents and 
non-residents in the context of inter-taxpayer equity. In addition, the benefit theory might indicate a basic 
equality between non-residents inter se when they perform similar activities in the same State.  
 
Residence-based taxation is often associated with the ability-to-pay theory274 and source-based taxation is 
not. This is because the source of income is irrelevant to ability to pay275 and worldwide income of taxpayers 
serves as a better indication of a taxpayer’s ability than does domestic (sourced) income only. Also, the 
redistribution function attributed to a tax system is better served when worldwide income is used, while 
redistribution is often limited to residents within a society. Indeed, the ability-to-pay theory points to a basic 
difference between residents and non-residents and its practical relevance is limited to residents.276 
 
Sometimes, the benefit theory is used to explain residence-based taxation, as well as source-based taxation in 
general and source-based taxation of non-residents.277 In theory, the benefit principle is relevant for both 
residents and non-residents. However, general points of criticism about the benefit theory are that the 
meaning of benefit is unclear and that it is difficult, if not impossible, to measure a taxpayer’s benefit (when 
defined).278 Given this criticism, it has been argued that source-based taxation of non-residents can perhaps 
be best explained on the basis of the international law principle of territoriality (entitling a State to impose tax 
on activities and wealth within its territory).279 Although the benefit theory has been criticized, often for 
reasons of practicality, it does offer rules for the taxation of residents and non-residents. Since residents have 
a stronger personal and generally a stronger economic connection to a State than do non-residents, it can be 
argued that residents generally benefit more from public goods and services than do non-residents. Unlike 
non-residents, residents also benefit from public goods and services when they do not perform (economic) 
activities. In the author’s view, this should apply to both individuals and legal entities. The foregoing gives the 
following practical, rules of thumb under the benefit theory from a single State perspective:280 (1) residents 
who perform the same economic activities and earn the same level of income might pay a different amount of 
tax in their home State (as their level of benefit might differ), (2) residents who perform the same economic 
activities in a State as non-residents and earn the same level of income might pay a higher, but not a lower, 
amount of tax in that State (as non-residents would never benefit more than residents), (3) non-residents 
performing the same economic activities in and earning the same level of income from a source State should 
receive equal tax treatment in that State (as their level of benefit should be the same under such 
circumstances), and (4) since residents and non-residents always benefit from public goods and services to 
some extent, forgoing taxation would not make sense from a benefit perspective. The benefit theory not only 
                                                             
274 N. Kaufman, “Fairness in International Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International 
Business 145. J. Englisch, “Ability to Pay”, Chapter 19 in: C. Brokelind (ed.), Principles of Law: Function, Status and 
Impact in EU Tax Law, IBFD 2014, Online Books IBFD. 
275 J. Fleming, R. Peroni & S. Shay, “Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide 
Income” (2001) 5 Florida Tax Review 301, p. 311. 
276 Similarly, D. Herman, Taxing Portfolio Income in Global Financial Markets, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 2 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2002), p. 130. 
277 N. Kaufman, “Fairness in International Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International 
Business 145. 
278 For other points of criticism, see N. Kaufman, “Fairness in International Taxation of International Income” (1998) 29 
Law & Policy in International Business 145, pp. 183-188. 
279 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. I (St. 
Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1987), Para. 402(1); N. Kaufman, “Fairness in International Taxation of 
International Income” (1998) 29 Law & Policy in International Business 145, pp. 187-188. On this principle, see also E. 
Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models (2001), Dongen: Mr. Eric C.C.M. 
Kemmeren/Pijnenburg vormgevers, uitgevers, pp. 21-22, available at: <https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/439888/87428.pdf>. 
280 Inspired by Vogel, who has argued that the benefit principle requires that an investor investing in another country and 
thus utilizing “the other country’s facilities (public goods) can be sure of being taxed no more than anyone else who, under 
the same circumstances, uses these facilities to the same extent.” K. Vogel, “Worldwide vs. source taxation of income – A 
review and re-evaluation of arguments (Part II)” (1988) 10 Intertax 310, p. 314. 
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points to a basic difference between residents and non-residents but also to a basic equality between non-
residents inter se in case they perform the same economic activities in and earn the same level of income from 
the same State. 
 
3.5.2.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
As it was argued that the practical relevance of the ability-to-pay theory is limited to residents, the focus is on 
the benefit principle. This principle, which is relevant for the taxation of both residents and non-residents, 
requires that each taxpayer should pay tax in accordance with its level of benefit from governmental goods 
and services. From this principle, three, more practical, rules of thumb can be derived which are relevant for 
source taxation of non-resident investors. Before discussing these rules, it is noted that these rules apply as 
much to foreign sovereign wealth investors as they apply to other non-resident investors, both individuals 
and companies. In fact, the identity of the non-resident investor is completely irrelevant from a benefit 
perspective. The first rule is that a source State should generally not tax non-resident investors less favourably 
than resident investors when performing the same investment activities in and earning the same level of 
income from that source State. Under such circumstances, non-resident investors would generally not benefit 
more from the public goods and services of a source State than resident investors would do. It may, in such 
circumstances, even require non-resident investors to be taxed more favourably than resident investors. The 
second rule is that a source State should treat and tax all non-resident investors as equals when they perform 
the same investment activities in and earn the same level of income from that source State (i.e. horizontal 
non-discriminatory treatment). Under such circumstances, non-resident investors would benefit to the same 
extent from the public goods and services of a source State. Thus, the benefit principle would require equal 
tax treatment among and between them on income derived from similar economic activities. The third rule, 
which applies to both the first and second rule, is that forgoing taxation would not make sense from a benefit 
perspective, since residents and non-residents that perform investment activities in the source State always 
benefit from public goods and services to some extent.  
 
Conceptually, the benefit principle could demand a source State to differentiate between different categories 
of income if it can be demonstrated that different asset classes benefit differently from public goods and 
services. For instance, it is not unimaginable that investors investing in immovable property benefit more 
from public goods and services than investors investing in bonds or shares. If so, different tax treatment of 
such investors would be appropriate from a benefit perspective, because of their different circumstances in 
this context. However, from a practical point a view, not differentiating between different categories of 
income could be understandable, subject to the comment in the following paragraph. It is noted that the 
foregoing consideration applies without distinction to foreign sovereign wealth investors and other (resident 
and non-resident) investors, including CIVs and pension funds.  
 
The benefit principle could, in addition, demand a source State to differentiate between different categories of 
income in the case of dividends paid out of, or capital gains relating to, profits that have been or will become 
subject to corporate tax in a source State. This corporate tax (effectively at the expense of the investors) can 
already be sufficient from a benefit perspective, so that additional source taxation upon distribution would be 
unnecessary. Therefore, in the context of the benefit principle, recipients of dividend income could be in 
different circumstances than recipients of interest income or rental income, requiring different tax treatment. 
It is noted, again, that the foregoing consideration applies without distinction to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and other (resident and non-resident) investors, including CIVs and pension funds.   
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Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)281 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors cannot be motivated by the benefit principle, because they could result in different tax treatment 
among foreign sovereign wealth investors, and between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-
resident investors, be it individuals or companies, that perform the same investment activities in a source 
State. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors in 
the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors that perform the same investment activities in a 
source State, could be inspired by the benefit principle.  
 
3.5.3 Inter-nation equity 
 
3.5.3.1 The concept explained 
 
Inter-nation equity, introduced by Richard and Peggy Musgrave,282 deals with the allocation of national gain 
(and loss) between States arising from international activities. These authors use the following example to 
illustrate what inter-nation equity is about: 
 
“Let X, a resident of A, invest in B. Income earned thereon constitutes a national ‘gain’ to country A. If 
country B taxes the income earned by X, the gain accruing to country A as a nation is reduced. This is 
the issue of inter-nation equity. The fact that the gain accrues to B’s treasury is not the crucial point. B 
may pass this gain on to tax-payers by tax reduction, but it still retains the national gain. Similarly, A 
has suffered a national loss due to B’s tax. This national loss results, whether A gives a credit to X for 
taxes paid to B, thereby suffering a treasury loss, or whether the income is taxed again and X is left to 
bear the burden. National gain or loss may or may not be accompanied by a treasury gain or loss; the 
latter is a matter of intra-nation transfer between treasury and individual and does not affect the 
existence of national gain or loss. It is thus the national gain or loss (not the treasury gain or loss) that 
is the subject of inter-nation equity as defined here.”283 
 
So, inter-nation equity is not about the allocation of revenue between States, but is concerned with the 
allocation of national gain. This allocation is affected when the source State imposes tax on the income derived 
by non-resident investors; taxation in the residence State has no impact on this allocation284 (though it could 
affect inter-taxpayer equity and capital efficiency).285 The central question of inter-nation equity is, therefore, 
whether the source State has a legitimate claim to impose tax on the income derived by non-residents and, if 
so, how source taxation should be designed. The Musgraves argue that a source State does have a legitimate 
claim, based on the idea that it should be entitled to charge non-residents for the benefits of public goods and 
services, as well as the idea that a source State should be entitled to (a share of) pure economic rents derived 
from activity within its territory.286 The more difficult issue is how source taxation should be designed, which 
also involves the question how redistributive a tax system should be in an international setting. However, the 
                                                             
281 As identified in Section 3.2.2.2. Approaches (2) to (5) are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
282 R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, “Inter-nation equity”, in: R. Bird & J. Head, Modern Fiscal Issue: Essays in Honour of 
Carl. S. Shoup (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972). 
283 Ibid., p. 68. 
284 K. Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax Policy 
Objective”, Chapter 17 in: J. Head & R. Krever, Tax Reform in the 21st Century: A Volume in Memory of Richard 
Musgrave, Series on International Taxation, Vol. 34 (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009), p. 474. 
285 R. Musgrave & P. Musgrave, “Inter-nation equity”, in: R. Bird & J. Head, Modern Fiscal Issue: Essays in Honour of 
Carl. S. Shoup (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1972), pp. 69-70. 
286 Ibid., pp. 70-73. 
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“concept of inter-nation equity will never provide an answer to that question”.287 A possible approach 
suggested by the Musgraves is the idea of an internationally coordinated tax rate system where source rates 
depend on the per capita income of capital importing countries relative to the per capita income of capital 
exporting countries, and lower-income countries would be allowed to impose higher tax rates relative to 
higher-income countries.       
 
Since inter-nation equity provides little guidance as to how taxation vis-à-vis non-resident investors should be 
designed, it is unclear whether inter-nation equity would allow a source State to differentiate between 
different categories of income, e.g. imposing a heavier tax burden on dividends than on interest, or whether it 
would require equal treatment of all categories of investment income. In the author’s view, an indication can 
be found in the nature of the legitimate claim for source State taxation. If the legitimate claim is based on the 
benefit principle, different tax treatment of different categories of income would seem acceptable only if it can 
be demonstrated that different asset classes benefit differently from public goods and services.288 On the 
other hand, if the legitimate claim is based on the idea that a source State should be entitled to (a share of) 
pure economic rents derived from activity within its territory, it would not seem acceptable to differentiate 
between different categories of income. 
 
3.5.3.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors  
 
Under inter-nation equity, a source State does have a legitimate claim to impose tax on non-resident investors 
deriving income from its territory. This claim applies as much to foreign sovereign wealth investors as it 
applies to other non-resident investors, both individuals and companies. The fact that foreign sovereign 
wealth investors are generally not taxed in their residence State is irrelevant from the perspective of inter-
nation equity. Although the concept of inter-nation equity provides little guidance as to how taxation vis-à-vis 
non-resident investors should be designed, the following general rule can, in the author’s view, be derived 
from it. The rule is that non-residents performing the same (investment) activities in a source State should be 
treated alike in that source State (i.e. horizontal non-discriminatory treatment), unless different treatment can 
be justified on grounds of international redistribution. In applying this rule, it would seem obvious not to 
distinguish between non-resident investors from the same State (all-in approach). In other words, if an 
exemption from source taxation applies to foreign sovereign wealth investors from State A, it should also 
apply to other investors from that State, but not necessarily to investors from third States. Thus, non-
residents from the same State that perform the same (investment) activities in a source State should be 
treated alike. A different treatment of non-resident investors of different States can be justified on 
redistribution grounds only.  
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)289 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors cannot be explained by inter-nation equity, at least as far as they result in different source taxation 
between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors from the same State, be it 
individuals or companies. Approach (1), under which source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors in 
the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, could be motivated by inter-nation equity. 
 
                                                             
287 K. Brooks, “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax Policy 
Objective”, Chapter 17 in: J. Head & R. Krever, Tax Reform in the 21st Century: A Volume in Memory of Richard 
Musgrave, Series on International Taxation, Vol. 34 (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009), p. 493. 
288 See Section 3.5.2.2. 
289 As identified in Section 3.2.2.2. Approaches (2) to (5) are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
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3.6. International attractiveness (instrumentalism) 
 
3.6.1 General considerations 
 
Another attribute of international tax policy is the attractiveness of a tax regime in an international setting, i.e. 
the attractiveness of a State’s tax regime vis-à-vis tax regimes of other States. Many States use their tax 
system, including tax treaties, as an instrument to influence investment decisions and create an attractive 
investment location in order to stimulate economic growth and to create jobs (tax instrumentalism).290 
Several considerations play a role in deciding on whether or not to use tax incentives with a view to attract 
investments. Two important considerations are discussed below. First, because tax incentives are aimed at 
influencing investment decisions and could result in preferential tax treatment of some investors over others, 
they could raise capital efficiency and equity concerns. A policy decision should be made as to the relative 
importance of these policy principles and objectives (see, in more detail, Section 3.7). Second, tax incentives 
do not necessarily have the desired effect of maintaining or attracting additional investments. Although tax 
considerations play a part in investment decisions, investors are influenced by non-tax factors as well,291 such 
as public security, political stability, economic stability and infrastructure.292 Also, tax incentives by one State 
may be copied, and can even be accorded more generously, by other States. The specific effects of a tax 
measure on the international attractiveness of a State’s tax system may, therefore, be difficult to predict. Even 
if a tax incentive increases investment, this comes with a loss of tax revenue on the non-incremental part of 
the investment (i.e. part that would have occurred without the incentive), which could require further policy 
measures to counterbalance any deficit,293 such as shifting part of the tax burden to less mobile factors 
including labour and immovable property.294 On the other hand, the incremental part of the investment could 
increase other sources of tax revenue, such as value-added tax (‘VAT’) and payroll taxes, and could have social 
and economic benefits, such as creating new jobs.295 It is noted that the monetary value of these social and 
economic benefits may be difficult to determine though.296 
 
Various considerations play a role in determining the scope of tax incentives. A first consideration relates to 
the distinction between direct investment and portfolio investment. Tax incentives are often, but not always, 
aimed at attracting (foreign) direct investments, as opposed to (foreign) portfolio investments, because direct 
investments are believed to affect the location of business activity. However, as explained in Section 3.4.3.1 
above, where portfolio capital is not widely available, portfolio investments could also influence the location 
                                                             
290 An econometric study performed by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis concluded that bilateral tax 
treaties increase bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) significantly. The study used a very extensive data set covering 
all bilateral FDI data of 34 OECD countries towards 233 partner countries in the period 1985 to 2011. It also concluded 
that lowering dividend withholding tax rates increases bilateral FDI. See A. Lejour & M. van ‘t Riet, “De Economische 
Betekenis van Bilaterale Belastingverdragen” (2013), Annex to; Bilaterale Belastingverdragen en Buitenlandse 
Investeringen, CPB Policy Brief 2013/07, available at: <https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/cpb-
achtergronddocument-de-economische-betekenis-van-bilaterale-belastingverdragen.pdf>. The results of this study have 
been published in English, see A. Lejour, “The Foreign Investment Effects of Tax Treaties” (February, 2014), Oxford 
University Center for Business Taxation, WP 14/03, available at: <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/2014-the-
foreign-investment-effects-of-tax-treaties_oxford-univ-centre-for-business-taxation.pdf>.   
291 M. Podolny, “The Limits of Sovereign Immunity: A Study and Analysis of the Canadian Income Taxation of Sovereign 
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The CAGE-Chatham House Series No. 4, available at: 
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294 OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 16. 
295 A. Easson, “Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Recent Trends and Countertrends (Part I)” (2001) 55 
Bulletin for International Taxation 266, p. 273. 
296 Ibid. 
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of investment. Furthermore, some States, including the Netherlands, aim to attract foreign portfolio 
investments through tax incentives, without having regard to the availability of portfolio capital.297 A second 
consideration relates to selectivity of tax incentives. Tax incentives are typically narrowly targeted, in that 
they identify particular types of investments, sectors, industries, etc., and exclude others. The benefit of 
precise targeting is that it reduces the number of free riders and so the cost of tax incentives.298 Other relevant 
considerations are whether tax incentives should be granted automatically (once the conditions have been 
satisfied) or on a discretionary basis, and whether investment thresholds should apply.299 
 
Rather than using a tax system to encourage foreign investments, source States may, in theory, also consider 
using the tax system to discourage investments (in specific situations) from certain non-resident investors, for 
example to protect vital economic or infrastructural activities from (indirect) foreign influence. The author 
did, however, not come across tax measures that are specifically aimed at discouraging investments from 
(certain) non-resident investors.300 One could call into question whether tax measures are the appropriate 
way to achieve this goal. State practice indicates that foreign investment regulation is a more effective and 
appropriate tool for banning certain non-resident investors301; however, non-tax measures are outside the 
scope of this study and will therefore not be considered. 
 
Finally, proper tax policy requires that the effect of tax incentives is – ex post – evaluated.302 
 
3.6.2 Considerations regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
Approaches (2) through (5), under which a general tax-exemption or specific tax-exemptions or reductions 
are granted to (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors, either unilaterally or through tax treaties, could be 
motivated by international attractiveness. However, as explained in Section 3.2.2.2 above, source States 
typically motivate unilateral tax-exemptions by reference to sovereign immunity (i.e. Approaches (2) and (3)), 
whereas treaty based tax-exemptions (i.e. Approaches (4) and (5)) are sometimes also motivated by 
sovereign immunity. One could, therefore, argue that international attractiveness is not the main driver for 
granting tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors which are said to be based on sovereign 
immunity. The validity of this argument is examined in Chapter 4. Its outcome could be significant, because 
Approaches (2) through (5)303 raise capital efficiency concerns since they could influence investment 
                                                             
297 Tweede Kamer, 2011-2012, 33 003, No. 3, p. 38 (concerning the refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax to non-
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298 A. Easson, “Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Design Considerations (Part II)” (2001) 55 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 365, p. 366. 
299 A. Easson, “Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Design Considerations (Part II)” (2001) 55 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 365. 
300 Nor did the author come across situations where certain benefits of a tax system developed to increase attractiveness 
were denied in such specific situations. 
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prior approval from the Australian government, see Treasurer, Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy (2016), available at: 
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een steeds veranderende wereld”, in: H. van Arendonk, J. Jansen & L. Stevens (eds.), Wetgevingskunsten: Vriendenbundel 
voor Jan Kees Bartel (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 2010). 
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(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
  
53 
 
decisions of foreign sovereign wealth investors. They could also raise equity concerns since they could result 
in preferential tax treatment of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors over other investors. If the validity 
of sovereign immunity as a foundation for tax-exemptions for foreign sovereign wealth investors becomes 
questionable, the justification for treating foreign sovereign wealth investors more favourably than other 
investors becomes questionable as well. Be that as it may, Approaches (2) through (5)304 could promote a 
source State’s international attractiveness for foreign sovereign wealth investors, whether motivated by 
sovereign immunity or not.  
 
In the author’s view, as will be explained in Section 3.7 below, equity considerations should play a vital role in 
relation to international attractiveness. When motivated by international attractiveness (rather than 
sovereign immunity), source States should only differentiate between investors if – ex ante –they have valid 
(economic) reasons for doing so. One such reason could be the distinctiveness of one or more investors over 
other investors in terms of stimulating economic growth and creating jobs. This means that a source State 
which relies on international attractiveness for granting tax-exemptions to (some) foreign sovereign wealth 
investors (rather than sovereign immunity), but not to other investors, needs to be able to demonstrate the 
relevant distinctiveness of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors in terms of stimulating economic 
growth and creating jobs. The fact that foreign sovereign wealth investors own and invest extremely large 
amounts of money is not distinctive, because this also applies to other investors, such as CIVs and pension 
funds. Nor is the fact that foreign sovereign wealth investors are owned, controlled and funded by a foreign 
State. It is true that foreign sovereign wealth investors “can bring benefits normally associated with foreign 
investment such as stimulating business activity and creating jobs”,305 but this applies to other foreign 
investors as well. In the context of international attractiveness, the distinctiveness must in particular lie in 
foreign sovereign wealth investors’ willingness to make an investment that no, or at least few, others are 
willing to make, and may, for instance, be found in the very long-term investment strategy of some foreign 
sovereign wealth investors, or their willingness to make risky investments.306 This may include certain large 
infrastructure projects. But even then, a tax incentive may not have the desired effect and could come with a 
loss of tax revenue for which compensating policy measures may need to be taken. Another valid economic 
reason to differentiate between sovereign wealth investors and other investors may exist if a source State can 
demonstrate that according tax-exemptions to sovereign wealth investors promotes good bilateral relations, 
which could give companies of the source State business opportunities in the home markets of sovereign 
wealth investors (getting access to these markets can be difficult).307  
 
3.7. Is there a clear hierarchy among the tax policy principles and objectives? 
 
The question whether a hierarchy exists between the policy principles and objectives is relevant, because they 
cannot be fully achieved simultaneously. According tax-exemptions to selected investors could increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
304 Ibid. 
305 OECD (2008), Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies, p. 2, available at: 
<https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/40408735.pdf>.  
306 PwC, Sovereign Investors 2020: A growing force (April, 2016), p. 23; Sovereign Wealth Funds; gezamenlijke notitie 
ministeries van Financiën en Economische Zaken, Tweede Kamer, 2007-2008, 31 350, No. 1, p. 20. Cf. also Report of the 
Royal Commission on Taxation, Vol. 2: The use of the tax system to achieve economic and social objectives (1966), p. 
157: “We believe that there are several considerations which justify the inclusion of special tax incentives to encourage 
investment in risky ventures. First, the capital markets are by no means “Perfect” in the efficiency of their allocation of 
resources to highly risky ventures, particularly because such ventures are generally new, small enterprises. Second, while 
there is need for direct governmental action in assisting new firms to obtain financing, we have concluded that incentives 
built into the tax system, can provide an efficient means both of making risky investments more profitable and of reducing 
their need for external funds.” 
307 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 76; Sovereign Wealth Funds; 
gezamenlijke notitie ministeries van Financiën en Economische Zaken, Tweede Kamer, 2007-2008, 31 350, No. 1, p. 20. 
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international attractiveness for such investors, but this would not be equitable and could be inefficient. 
Equitable tax systems are fair, but they may not be efficient or internationally attractive, while efficient tax 
systems may be inequitable and internationally unattractive.308 In the author’s view, there is no clear 
theoretical hierarchy among the policy principles and objectives which applies to all States in all situations.309 
Nevertheless, in practice, individual States have followed an order of priority. For example, in the Carter 
Report (1966), on Canadian tax policy, it was stated that “a higher priority [was assigned] to the objective of 
equity than to all the others.”310 The drafters were “convinced that unless this objective is achieved to a high 
degree all other achievements are of little account.”311 Some academic studies, however, have prioritized 
international tax neutrality (efficiency), but this was because the underlying aim was to maximize global 
and/or European economic growth; though it was acknowledged that equity considerations could allow for a 
deviation from this neutrality principle.312 In other research, it has been argued that neutrality benchmarks 
are inappropriate tools for designing international tax policy altogether.313 This study does not purport to 
develop a tax system aimed at maximizing or promoting (global or national) economic output (efficiency), 
(inter-taxpayer or inter-nation) equity, or international attractiveness.314 Rather, its starting point is the 
individual sovereign State. The State is a product of the people and is charged with (political) authority within 
a society.315 Today’s functions of the modern State are many; in addition to the classic functions of 
maintaining peace and security, responsibilities and tasks include the promotion of (social and economic) 
welfare for its citizens and the protection of liberty and justice. The modern State deeply interferes with the 
social and economic life and freedom of its citizens. To finance its legal tasks and responsibilities, the State has 
the legal authority to impose tax.316 The function of promoting the economic welfare of its citizens arguably 
calls for an (internally) efficient and attractive tax system, whereas other functions arguably demand an 
equitable tax system above everything else. However, because the functions of the State co-exist, and no clear 
hierarchy exists among them, an order of priority as regards tax policy principles and objectives does not 
logically follow from this perspective.  
 
In a democracy under the rule of law, the legislature determines how the authority to impose tax is exercised. 
However, a legal system should respect and consider fundamental (legal) values, such as fairness (equity) and 
the principle of equality before the law as derived from this value, in the author’s view.317/318 Indeed, these 
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310 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, The use of the tax system to achieve economic and social objectives 
(1966), Vol. 2, p. 17. 
311 Ibid. 
312 See, for example, E. Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models (2001), Dongen: Mr. 
Eric C.C.M. Kemmeren/Pijnenburg vormgevers, uitgevers, Chapter 3; D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and 
Non-EU Member States and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 
2011), pp. 80-106. 
313 D. Weisbach, “The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy” (2014) Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and 
Economics, Working Paper No. 697. 
314 See, for example, M. de Wilde, ‘Sharing the Pie’; Taxing multinationals in a global market (2015). 
315 For a historical review of the rise and development of the concepts of sovereignty and the State, see M. Isenbaert, EC 
Law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation, IBFD 2009, Online Books IBFD, Chapter 2. 
316 A. Christians, “Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract” (2009) 18 Minnesota Journal of International Law 99, pp. 
104-106; R. Niessen, Inleiding tot het Nederlands belastingrecht, Fiscale Handboeken, 9th edn. (Deventer: Kluwer, 2010), 
Chapters 1, 2, 4 & 5. 
317 Similarly, R. Niessen, “Instrumentalisme en belastingrecht” (1997) Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 653; H. Gribnau, 
“Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax Law” (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 89; J. Boer, Sturende 
belastingheffer een monster? Juridische kanttekeningen bij fiscaal instrumentalisme en ‘tax nudging’ (Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers, 2013).  
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fundamental (legal) values “can be regarded as legal translations of important social and cultural values 
[which] guide the interactions and relations between free and equal people. No other institution than society 
can be regarded as the author of values.”319 This understanding is valuable in a tax policy context, because it 
indicates that the tax legislator should not be able to implement (international) tax policy as it sees fit, 
without taking into account these fundamental societal values.320 It also points to the importance of inter-
taxpayer equity, as an expression of fairness, in matters of international tax policy. In the context of this study, 
based on the discussion in Section 3.5.2, the benefit principle, which can apply to both resident and non-
resident investors, gives meaning to the concept of fairness. It means that (resident and non-resident) 
investors should pay tax in accordance with their level of benefit from governmental goods and services. In 
relation to international attractiveness (instrumentalism), the importance of inter-taxpayer equity (benefit 
principle) does not imply that a tax incentive should be rejected per se. It implies that a tax incentive must 
serve a legitimate – i.e. ‘rationally defensible’321 – purpose.322 In addition, the principle of inter-taxpayer 
equity should be considered in relation to other tax policy principles and objectives, if adopted, which may 
also result in conflicts. Ultimately, in case of conflicts, the tax legislator of each individual sovereign State “has 
to take into account the relative weight”323 of the principle of inter-taxpayer equity and any other conflicting 
tax policy principle or objective it wishes to implement. Although this is not an exact measurement,324 it 
should be done in a transparent way, based on rational, convincing arguments.325 This way, the necessarily 
subjective choice is being based on objective elements as much as possible and the analysis is verifiable. 
Otherwise, the legitimacy of tax legislation and the morality of taxpayers could be adversely affected.326 The 
ultimate outcome may depend on various factors – such as the size and nature of the economy, public 
interests, societal values as well as tax policy choices of other States – and may change over time.  
 
Finally, in addition to fundamental legal values, the authority to impose tax in an international setting could be 
further restricted by international law. The impact of international law will be the topic of the following 
chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
318 It is noted that in many countries, these fundamental values are enshrined in the constitution. However, in some 
countries, such as the Netherlands, legislation cannot be tested by the courts against these fundamental values enshrined in 
the constitution, whereas in other countries these fundamental values may not have been codified. In the author’s view, 
this does not mean that the legislature and policy makers should not take fundamental values into consideration. 
319 H. Gribnau, “Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax Law” (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 89, p. 106. 
320 R. Niessen, “Instrumentalisme en belastingrecht” (1997) Weekblad Fiscaal Recht 653; H. Gribnau, “Legislative 
Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax Law” (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 89; J. Boer, Sturende belastingheffer 
een monster? Juridische kanttekeningen bij fiscaal instrumentalisme en ‘tax nudging’ (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 2013). 
321 H. Gribnau, “Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax Law” (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 89, p. 91. 
322 On incentives in general, see R. Grant, “Ethics and Incentives: A Political Approach” (2006) 100 American Political 
Science Review 29, p. 32. 
323 More in general, see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1977), p. 26. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Similarly, H. Gribnau, “Rechtsbeginselen en evaluatie van belastingwetgeving: rechtvaardigheid hanteerbaar gemaakt”, 
in: A. Rijkers & H. Vording, Vijf jaar Wet IB (Deventer: Kluwer, 2006). 
326 C. Alley & D. Bentley, “A remodelling of Adam Smith’s tax design principles” (2005) 20 Australian Tax Forum 579, 
p. 606; H. Gribnau, “Legislative Instrumentalism vs. Legal Principles in Tax Law” (2013) 16 Coventry Law Journal 89, 
pp. 94-95; J. Boer, Sturende belastingheffer een monster? Juridische kanttekeningen bij fiscaal instrumentalisme en ‘tax 
nudging’ (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 2013), pp. 16-18. 
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3.8. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has identified five approaches to taxation of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors by source 
States. They are as follows: 
 
(1) taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative 
practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
 
Each approach has been measured by its neutrality, equity and international attractiveness. The results, 
which are summarized in the table below, show that each approach could satisfy, at least to some degree, at 
least two policy principles or objectives. In the absence of a clear theoretical hierarchy among these, often 
conflicting, international tax policy principles and objectives which applies to all States in all situations, no 
general judgment can be made about which approach is the ‘correct’ approach. Nevertheless, the analysis in 
this chapter indicates that inter-taxpayer equity (benefit principle), as an expression of the fundamental value 
of fairness, should be an important international policy principle in every democracy under the rule of law. 
Ultimately, the tax legislator of each individual sovereign State, therefore, has to weigh and balance the 
principle of inter-taxpayer equity and any other conflicting tax policy principle or objective it wishes to 
implement.  
  
 
  
(CEN) (CIN) (inter-nation) (inter-taxpayer)
√ X X X √
*
International 
attractiveness
X √
X √
X
√
X
Neutrality Equity
√ √
X
Approach (1)* X √
Approach (2)* √ X X
Approach (5)* 
Approach (4)* √
Approach (3)* √ X
X X
Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Sovereign Immunity and Taxation of Foreign Sovereign Wealth Investors 
 
 
4.1. Introduction327  
 
In the field of international taxation, relations between sovereign States may also be governed by public 
international law other than (tax) treaties. In its discussion on the application of the OECD MTC to States, their 
subdivisions and their wholly-owned entities, including SWFs, the OECD Commentary mentions the 
customary international law principle of sovereign immunity.328 According to this principle, a sovereign State 
can be held immune from the jurisdiction of the courts and from the enforcement power of another sovereign 
State in civil proceedings, and this principle may also apply to State entities. A number of States, including 
Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., apply the sovereign immunity principle to taxation as well. Foreign 
sovereign wealth investors might also benefit from these tax immunities.329  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine what impact the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of 
customary international law, could have on the ability of source States to achieve (or promote) tax policy 
objectives. Since source States often motivate unilateral tax-exemptions by reference to sovereign immunity 
(i.e. Approaches (2) and (3)), and this motivation may sometimes apply to treaty based tax-exemptions as 
well (i.e. Approaches (4) and (5)), the summarizing table at the end of Chapter 3 already indicates how the 
sovereign immunity principle may have impacted neutrality, equity and international attractiveness in 
practice. That is, sovereign immunity could (unintentionally) enhance international attractiveness, while, at 
the same time, it raises capital efficiency concerns since it could influence investment decisions of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. It also raises equity concerns since it results in preferential tax treatment of 
(some) foreign sovereign wealth investors over other investors.  
 
The more elementary question that will be addressed in this chapter is, however, whether the sovereign 
immunity principle, as a principle of customary international law, actually requires source States to accord tax 
immunities to foreign sovereign wealth investors.330 The answer to this question indicates what impact the 
sovereign immunity principle could have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy 
objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors331. For example, if the sovereign immunity principle would 
require source States to accord a general tax-exemption to foreign sovereign wealth investors, it would leave 
source States no option but to implement Approach (2)332. This would make it virtually impossible for source 
States to achieve (or promote) CIN and equity. On the other hand, if the sovereign immunity principle would 
not require source States to accord any tax-exemption to foreign sovereign wealth investors, it would not 
                                                             
327 Parts of this chapter have originally been published in R. Snoeij, “Sovereign Immunity and Source State Taxation of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is It Time to Re-Evaluate?” (2016) 8 World Tax Journal 225. Reproduced by kind permission of 
IBFD. 
328 Para. 52 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1. 
329 Immunity from taxation could also apply to, inter alia, diplomatic and consular officials, and international organizations 
and their officials. On this topic, see M. Lang et al. (eds.), Tax Rules in Non-Tax Agreements, (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2012).  
330 Reference is made to footnote 29, where it was noted that, even in many dualist States, customary international law has 
domestic legal force, or it is applied by courts directly. 
331 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
332 Approach (2) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: according a general tax-exemption under 
domestic law or administrative practice. 
  
58 
 
restrict the ability of source States to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an 
approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors333.  
 
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 will give an introduction to the 
customary international law principle of sovereign immunity and discusses the rules on jurisdictional 
immunity in civil proceedings in force in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. Section 4.3 will discuss the tax 
immunity regimes of Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., compare each regime with a State’s rules on 
jurisdictional immunity, and examine whether a source State has obligations to accord tax immunity to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors under customary international law. Section 4.4 will consider immunity 
from measures of constraint in the context of source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. Based on 
the analysis in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, Section 4.5 will examine what impact the sovereign immunity 
principle, as a principle of customary international law, could have on the ability of source States to achieve 
(or promote) tax policy objectives. Section 4.6 will end this chapter with the main conclusions.  
 
4.2. The sovereign immunity principle  
 
4.2.1 Some general remarks 
 
A basic distinction in the field of sovereign immunity is made between: (i) immunity from jurisdiction, and (ii) 
immunity from measures of constraint, such as pre-judgment attachment or post-judgment enforcement 
measures. Immunity from jurisdiction restricts the judicial powers of national courts of a State vis-à-vis 
foreign States, whereas immunity from measures of constraint restricts the enforcement powers of a State vis-
à-vis foreign States. Foreign States that enjoy immunity from jurisdiction cannot be adjudicated by the courts 
of other States, whereas property situated in one State, but belonging to a foreign State, cannot be seized in the 
first mentioned State, if the foreign State enjoys immunity from measures of constraint in connection with 
that property. Immunity typically protects a foreign State (or its property) against claims from private parties.  
 
The international law doctrine of sovereign immunity is mainly derived from judicial practices of States, a 
development started in the nineteenth century,334 although national legislation and governmental practice 
also contributed to the progressive development of rules of international law on this subject matter.335 Even 
though the principle of sovereign immunity is (now) generally accepted as a principle of international law, it 
is not uniformly interpreted and applied by (national courts of) States. And so, at the international level, 
several attempts have been made to agree on a multilateral treaty on the subject of sovereign immunity. One 
successful attempt has been the conclusion of the European Convention on State Immunity (1972) (‘ECSI 
1972’), which was signed in Basel in 1972 and is currently in force between eight European States (only).336 
But probably the most extensive international project on sovereign immunity has been conducted under the 
auspices of the UN, with the UNCSI 2004 as the product of some twenty-two years of work.337 The UNCSI 2004 
                                                             
333 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
334 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II, Part II, Paras. 7-8, p. 143. 
335 Preliminary Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special 
Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/323, published in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1979, Vol. II, Part I, Paras. 22 
et seq., pp. 231 et seq. 
336 The ECSI 1972 is currently in force between Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the U.K. 
337 “Jurisdiction over foreign States” was selected by the ILC in its first session, in 1949, as one of the topics for 
codification, although it was not on its priority list. Based on the recommendations of the Working Group, as expressed in 
the report submitted to the ILC in 1978, it was decided by the ILC to include in its programme of work the topic 
“Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property”. The first set of draft articles on the topic, including commentaries, 
was published in 1980. Only in 1991, at its forty-third session, did the ILC adopt the final text of twenty-two Draft articles 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, with commentaries, which it submitted to the General 
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will enter into force once thirty States have deposited an instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession with the Secretary-General of the UN.338 In March 2018, only twenty-one States have deposited such 
an instrument, and so this treaty has not yet entered into force. As explained in the preamble to the UNCSI 
2004, it is believed “that an international convention on the jurisdictional immunities of States and their 
property would enhance the rule of law and legal certainty (…) and would contribute to the codification and 
development of international law and the harmonization of practice in this area”. The House of Lords has 
referred to the UNCSI 2004 as the “the most authoritative statement available on the current international 
understanding of the limits of state immunity in civil cases”.339   
 
The preamble to the UNCSI 2004 also provides that “the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property 
are generally accepted as a principle of customary international law”. This statement is supported by court 
decisions of a great number of States, including Canada,340 Germany,341 Greece,342 Italy,343 Israel,344 
Portugal,345 and the U.K.,346 to name just a few. 
 
4.2.2 Rational basis and origin of sovereign immunity 
 
As noted by the ILC347 in its historical and legal review of the doctrine of State (or sovereign) immunity in 
1980,348 even though the rational basis of sovereign immunity is expressed differently in different States:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Assembly. In between the period of the adoption of the draft articles by the ILC in 1991 and the final adoption of the 
UNCSI 2004, consisting of thirty-three articles, by the General Assembly on 2 December 2004, States as well as the ILC 
were invited to submit comments, informal consultations were held within the framework of the Sixth Committee and 
several working groups (of the Sixth Committee), an Ad Hoc Committee and two informative consultative groups were 
established to solve outstanding issues. 
338 Art. 30 UNCSI 2004. 
339 House of Lords, Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Another (2006) 129 International 
Law Reports 713, at 727. 
340 Ontario Court of Appeal, Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran (2004) 128 International Law Reports 586, at 596. 
341 Federal Constitutional Court, Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963) 45 International Law Reports 57, at 61: “[t]he 
general rules of international law on State immunity can only belong to customary international law. There are no treaty 
rules which might have found general recognition. There are, equally, few general principles of law which—
supplementing customary international law—could be authoritative as to the extent of State immunity.” 
342 For example, Court of Cassation, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Germany (2000) 129 International Law Reports 514, at 516: 
“[t]he extraterritoriality or sovereign immunity of foreign States, meaning their non-submission to the international 
jurisdiction of the courts of the forum State, is a rule of customary international law and consequently a generally accepted 
rule of public international law which, according to Article 28(1) of the Constitution, constitutes an integral part of Greek 
law and takes precedence over any contrary provision.” 
343 For example, Court of Cassation, Kingdom of Greece v. Gamet (1957) 24 International Law Reports 209, at 210. See 
also Court of Appeal of Napels, United States Government v. Bracale Bicchierai (1968) 65 International Law Reports 
273, at 274: “[i]n the opinion of the Italian Supreme Court, together with other generally recognized rules of international 
law (to which, under Art. 10 of the Constitution, the Italian legal system must conform) there is the customary principle 
par in parem non habit imperii which recognizes the jurisdictional immunity of foreign States.” 
344 For example, Supreme Court, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson and Others (1997) 131 
International Law Reports 279, at 287: “[t]he answer is that the rules of sovereign immunity are part of customary 
international law.” 
345 For example, Supreme Court, Brazilian Embassy Employee Case (1984) 116 International Law Reports 625, at 627: 
“(…) universally accepted rule of customary international law according to which, given the reciprocal independence of 
States and in accordance with the old principle of par in parem non habet juridictionem, foreign States enjoy immunity in 
local courts in cases in which proceedings are brought against them.” 
346 For example, House of Lords, Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe (2000) 119 International Law Reports 367, at 378. 
347 The ILC was established by the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947. According to Art. 1(1) of the Statute of 
the International Law Commission, the “Commission shall have for its object the promotion of the progressive 
development of international law and its codification”. 
348 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II, Part II, Paras. 9 et seq., pp. 144 et seq. The principle par 
in parem non habet imperium is often referred to by national courts, but also by international courts. For example, the 
judgment of the ECtHR in Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom (2001) Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 
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“[t]he most convincing arguments in support of the principle of State immunity may be found in 
international law as evidenced in the usage and practice of States and as expressed in terms of the 
sovereignty, independence, equality and dignity of States. All these notions seem to coalesce, together 
constituting a firm international legal basis for State immunity. State immunity is derived from 
sovereignty. Between two co-equals, one cannot exercise sovereign will or authority over the other: 
par in parem imperium non habet.”349  
 
The origin of the principle of sovereign immunity may be traced to the concept of the modern State-system. 
The modern State-system is generally regarded as being formally established with the Peace Treaties of 
Westphalia of 1648,350 which “recorded the birth of an international system based on plurality of independent 
States, recognizing no superior authority over them.”351 The Westphalian State-system, which aimed to bring 
peace at last to Western Europe after a long period of conflicts, battles and warfare, was based on the 
principle of absolute and exclusive jurisdiction within one’s own territory – territorial sovereignty – and the 
principle of equality and independence vis-à-vis other sovereign States – national or personal sovereignty.352 
Whenever one sovereign State enters the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign State, these 
two ‘basic principles of international law’353 would conflict. The principle of territorial sovereignty is 
generally more absolute so that in most cases of conflict the territorial State does not have to limit its 
jurisdictional power (or enforcement power) concerning (assets of) foreign sovereigns.354 However, this 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction is understood to be waived in a number of cases to promote comity and good 
relations between States. In such cases, the personal sovereignty of another State is respected by the 
territorial State and sovereign immunity is established.355   
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Para. 54: “(…) sovereign immunity is a concept of international law, developed out of the principle par in parem non 
habet imperium, by virtue of which one State shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of another State. The Court considers 
that the grant of sovereign immunity to a State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with 
international law to promote comity and good relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.” 
349 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II, Part II, Para. 55, p. 156. 
350 For example, C. Warbrick, “States and Recognition in International Law”, in: M. Evans, International Law, 2nd edn., 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 221.  
351 A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd edn., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 24. 
352 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd edn., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 41.  
353 Preliminary Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special 
Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/323, published in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1979, Vol. II, Part I, Para. 56, 
p. 239. 
354 Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special 
Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/376, published in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1984, Vol. II, Part I, Paras. 
81-82, p. 21. 
355 See also the ‘classic formulation’ and explanation of the concept of sovereign immunity by J. Marshall, Chief Justice of 
the US Supreme Court, in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others (1813) 11 U.S. Reports 116, pp. 136-137, 
concerning the question whether the US had jurisdiction over a claim against a French warship of Napoleon: 
“(…)  
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; (…) 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the 
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source. 
This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of 
construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory.  
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual 
benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates 
and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation, in practice, in cases under certain peculiar 
circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers. 
(…) 
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring 
extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their sovereign rights, as its objects. One 
sovereign being in no respect amenable to another, and being bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade 
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4.2.3 Scope of sovereign immunity 
 
4.2.3.1 Material scope of immunity from jurisdiction 
 
Prior to the First World War, the practice in most States was to apply the sovereign immunity principle in 
what has become known as an absolute, or unrestricted manner, as opposed to a (more) restrictive, or limited 
one.356 The absolute approach meant that foreign States were entitled to immunity for all acts performed by 
them. But the more States became involved in (international) trade and commerce, the more national courts 
felt the urge to apply the principle of sovereign immunity in civil cases in a (more) restricted way.357 The 
move from an absolute approach of sovereign immunity to a restrictive one was first found in decisions of the 
national courts of Belgium (since 1907), Egypt (since 1920) and Italy (since 1882),358 and was subsequently 
followed by the national courts of Germany, the U.S., the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Austria and a number 
of developing States.359 Under the restrictive theory of jurisdictional immunity, immunity applies to sovereign 
or governmental acts (acta jure imperii), but not to commercial or private law acts (acta jure gestionis). The 
legal protection of private parties in their commercial dealings with foreign States is said to be one of the two 
main foundations of the restrictive theory.360 Its second main foundation is that requiring a foreign State to 
answer a claim resulting from a commercial transaction is “neither a threat to the dignity of that State, nor any 
interference with its sovereign functions”.361 The restrictive jurisdictional immunity approach, which is 
reflected in both the UNCSI 2004 and the ECSI 1972, is now generally accepted.362 There is, however, 
continuing controversy on how to distinguish governmental/sovereign acts from commercial acts, partly due 
to a lack of guidance from international law. In the national practices of States regarding jurisdictional 
immunities, the following three approaches appear to be most common in distinguishing between the two 
acts: (i) reference to the nature of the transaction (nature test), (ii) reference to the purpose of the transaction 
(purpose test), and (iii) reference to the whole context, which includes both nature and purpose of the 
transaction (mixed approach). The drafting history of the UNCSI 2004 also shows that the question on the 
method of distinguishing sovereign acts from commercial acts was much disputed.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to 
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his 
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. 
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual 
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every 
sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been 
stated to be the attribute of every nation.” 
356 For example, in 1912 the Court of Appeal of Paris held: “No distinction should be made between the (…) public 
personality which would not be subject to foreign jurisdiction and the legal personality which would, on the contrary, be 
subject to it, since all the acts of a State can have only one goal and one end, which are always political, and its unity 
precludes such dualism.” See Gamen-Humbert v. Etat russe (1912), quoted in the Fourth Report on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur, Doc A/CN.4/357, published in 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II, Part I, Para. 62, p. 215. 
357 Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963) 45 International Law Reports 57, at 61. C. Schmitthoff & F. Wooldridge, 
“The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading” (1972) 2 
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, p. 199. 
358 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1991, Vol. II, Part II, Para. 16, p. 36. For a discussion of the relevant 
Belgian, Egyptian and Italian case law, see Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1982, Vol. II, Part II, Paras. 
56-61, pp. 214-215. 
359 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1991, Vol. II, Part II, Paras. 16-18, pp. 36-38 
360 Lord Wilberforce in Congreso Del Partido (1981) 64 International Law Reports 307, at 314. 
361 Ibid. 
362 H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd edn., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 201 et seq. 
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(i) Nature test 
Case law of European States shows a strong preference for the nature of the act363 and this method is 
probably also used in most States outside of Europe. Preference for the nature test is often motivated by the 
view that adherence to the purpose test would always result in immunity, as each transaction entered into by 
a foreign State serves a sovereign purpose, in one way or another, and such outcome is inconsistent with the 
rationale of restrictive immunity. An influential decision in favour of the nature of the activity is the decision 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963):   
 
“[t]he distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign State activities cannot be drawn according to 
the purpose of the State transaction and whether it stands in a recognizable relation to the sovereign 
duties of the State. For, ultimately, activities of State, if not wholly then to the widest degree, serve 
sovereign purposes and duties, and stand in a still recognizable relationship to them. (…) As a means 
for determining the distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis one should rather refer to 
the nature of the State transaction or the resulting legal relationships, and not to the motive or 
purpose of the State activity. It thus depends on whether the foreign State has acted in exercise of its 
sovereign authority, that is in public law, or like a private person, that is in private law.”364 
 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, which also looks at the nature of the activity rather than its purpose, a 
foreign State does not act in exercise of its sovereign authority:  
 
“where it exercises “only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens,” as distinct from 
those “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” Put differently, a foreign state engages in commercial activity 
for purposes of the restrictive theory only where it acts “in the manner of a private player within” the 
market.”365 
 
As the U.S. Supreme Court already mentioned in 1934, “[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking 
customers, it divests itself of its quasi-sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader (…)”.366 In 
other words, the relevant question under the nature test is whether a private party could have performed the 
activity in the same manner (indicating that a foreign sovereign was competing with private parties in the 
marketplace).367  
 
(ii) Purpose test 
Examples of court decisions that exclusively focus on the purpose of the transaction, rather than its nature, 
can be found in Italian case law.368 The purpose test could in fact be tantamount to absolute immunity, if the 
reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional in Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963) is followed that 
“ultimately, activities of State, if not wholly then to the widest degree, serve sovereign purposes and 
duties”.369 
 
 
 
                                                             
363 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), pp. 31 et seq. 
364 Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963) 45 International Law Reports 57, at 80. 
365 US Supreme Court, Saudi Arabia and Others v. Nelson (1993) 100 International Law Reports 545, at 553.  
366 Ohio v. Helvering (1934) 292 U.S. 360, at 369. 
367 Commissie van Advies inzake Volkenrechtelijke Vraagstukken, Advies inzake de United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, Advies No. 17, Den Haag, 19 mei 2006, p. 13. 
368 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 35. 
369 Claim Against the Empire of Iran (1963) 45 International Law Reports 57, at 80. 
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(iii) Mixed approach 
In other States, in distinguishing between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, reference is made to both 
the nature and the purpose of the transaction. For example, the House of Lords370 and the Supreme Court of 
Canada371 appear to focus on the (whole) context, in which the nature of the transaction is most important, 
but which also includes the purpose of the transaction. In the UNCSI 2004 the primary focus is on the nature 
of the contract or transaction, but the purpose should also be taken into account if: (a) agreed between the 
parties, or (b) relevant in the national practice of the other State.372 
 
With respect to foreign sovereign wealth investors, the activities that require classification will be investment 
activities. All investment activities of foreign sovereign wealth investors will likely be classified alike, either as 
commercial activities or governmental activities under the nature test and the purpose test. That is, under the 
nature test, all investment activities will likely be classified as commercial activities since private parties could 
have performed the activities in the same manner, whereas, under the purpose test, all investment activities 
will likely be classified as governmental activities since they serve macroeconomic purposes. Finally, the 
outcome under the mixed approach will depend on whether the focus is on the nature or the purpose of the 
activity. 
 
4.2.3.2 Material scope of immunity from measures of constraint 
 
Interestingly, compared with immunity from jurisdiction, immunity from execution has also developed 
towards a more restrictive approach, but it has done so at a much slower pace and in a less evident way.373 
The reason for this is that a measure of constraint is considered to have a (far) greater and (far) more direct 
impact on a foreign State’s personal sovereignty.374 A foreign State generally enjoys immunity from measures 
of constraint in respect of its property situated in another State, if the property is used for sovereign purposes. 
The relevance of immunity from execution for the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors is discussed 
in Section 4.4 below. 
 
4.2.3.3 Personal scope of sovereign immunity 
 
“The very foundation of the institution of immunity resides in the sovereign character of the subject to which 
it is granted.”375 Immunity is reserved for sovereign subjects only and this now coincides with the notion of 
‘State’. The notion of State has been defined for sovereign immunity purposes in international agreements, as 
well as in the legislation and case law of States. What it shows is that separate entities of States may, under 
certain circumstances, also enjoy immunity. The development of the notion of ‘State’ has generally followed 
the tightening of the material scope of jurisdictional immunity376 and this development is reflected in Art. 
2(1)b UNCSI 2004, which defines a ‘State’ as: 
                                                             
370 Congreso Del Partido (1981) 64 International Law Reports 307. 
371 Supreme Court of Canada, Kuwait Airways Corporation v Republic of Iraq (2010) 174 International Law Reports 303, 
at 315-316. 
372 Art. 2(2) and Art. 10 of the UNCSI 2004. 
373 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 151. 
374 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 156; H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd edn., (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 601. 
375 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 2. 
376 Ibid., pp. 14-20. Cf. Sec. 14(2) of the UK State Immunity Act 1978, which provides for immunity from the jurisdiction 
of the U.K. courts in relation to separate entities, if: (i) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise of 
sovereign authority (acta jure imperii), and (ii) the circumstances are such that a State would have been so immune. A 
separate entity is defined as “any entity (…) which is distinct from the executive organs of the government of the State and 
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“(i) the State and its various organs of government; 
(ii) constituent units of a federal State or political subdivisions of the State, which are entitled to 
perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority, and are acting in that capacity; 
(iii) agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent that they are entitled to 
perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State; 
(iv) representatives of the State acting in that capacity;” 
 
4.2.4 Jurisdictional immunity legislation of Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. 
 
The jurisdictional immunity legislation of Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. all apply to separate entities 
of a foreign State under certain conditions, and all follow a restrictive jurisdictional immunity approach. 
Nevertheless, their (personal and material) scope is not entirely uniform.  
 
4.2.4.1 Australia 
 
Under Australia’s Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 (‘AU FSIA 1985’), a separate entity comprises a foreign 
body corporate or foreign corporation sole that: (i) is an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state, and (ii) 
is not a department or organ of the executive government of the foreign State.377 The Federal Court held that 
an entity is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign State if it is carrying out the foreign State’s functions and 
purposes.378 In that regard, the court focused on the ownership and control of the entity, the functions 
performed by the entity, the foreign State’s purposes in supporting the entity and the manner in which the 
entity conducts itself or its business.379 For purposes of the AU FSIA 1985, the nature test is used to 
distinguish commercial activities from governmental activities.380 
 
4.2.4.2 Canada 
 
In Canada’s State Immunity Act 1985, a foreign State includes an agency of a foreign State, which is defined as 
any legal entity that is an organ of the foreign State but that is separate from the foreign State.381 Even though 
the definition of commercial activity in the Canadian legislation exclusively seems to refer to the nature of the 
activity,382 the Supreme Court of Canada appears to focus on the (whole) context, in which the nature of the 
activity is most important, but which also includes its purpose.383   
 
4.2.4.3 U.K. 
 
The UK State Immunity Act 1978 (‘UK SIA 1978’) applies to separate entities if: (i) the proceedings relate to 
anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii), and (ii) the circumstances are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
capable of suing or being sued” (Sec. 14(1)). This approach to separate entities has been adopted in the sovereign 
immunity legislation of Pakistan (The State Immunity Ordinance No. VI of 1981), Singapore (Sec. 16(1)-(2) of the State 
Immunity Act 1979) and South Africa (Sec. 2(1)(i) of the Foreign States Immunities Act 1981). 
377 Sec. 3(1) & sec. 22 AU FSIA 1985. 
378 Federal Court of Australia, PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2011) 
FCAFC 52, at 42. 
379 Ibid., at 48. 
380 Ibid., at 212 (referring to U.S. Supreme Court, Saudi Arabia and Others v. Nelson (1993)). 
381 Sec. 2 Canada’s State Immunity Act 1985. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Supreme Court of Canada, Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Republic of Iraq (2010) 174 International Law Reports 303, 
at 315-316. 
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such that a state would have been so immune.384 A separate entity is defined as any entity that is distinct from 
the executive organs of the government of the state and capable of suing or being sued.385 Just like the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords386 focuses on the (whole) context when characterizing an 
activity as being commercial or governmental in character.  
 
4.2.4.4  U.S. 
 
The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (‘US FSIA 1976’) applies to an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign State, which is defined as: (i) a separate legal person, (ii) which is an organ of a foreign State or whose 
shares or ownership interest is for more than 50% owned by a foreign State, and (iii) which is created under 
the laws of that foreign State (and not under the laws of any third State).387 The US FSIA 1976 and the US 
Supreme Court alike clearly characterize an activity by reference to its nature, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.388   
 
4.3. Tax immunity and income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors  
 
As noted in the OECD Commentary, many States do not recognize any application of the sovereign immunity 
principle in tax matters.389 And even among States that do recognize the relevance of this principle in the field 
of taxation, there are differences as regards the scope of application. Section 4.3 will discuss the tax immunity 
framework in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., compare each regime with a State’s rules on 
jurisdictional immunity in civil proceedings, and examine whether a source State has obligations to accord tax 
immunity to foreign sovereign wealth investors under customary international law.  
 
4.3.1 Immunity from source taxation in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. 
 
4.3.1.1 Australia 
 
Income derived by foreign governments from the performance of governmental functions within Australia, as 
opposed to commercial activities, is exempt from Australian tax under the international law doctrine of 
sovereign immunity. This exemption is based on (administrative) practice390 as outlined in Interpretative 
Decision 2002/45 of the Australian Taxation Office (‘ATO ID 2002/45’). Whether income is derived from 
governmental functions (non-commercial activity) or commercial activity depends on the particular facts of 
each case. With regard to dividend and interest income, ATO ID 2002/45 provides that a tax exemption 
applies to a foreign government, if the funds are and will remain government moneys and the income is being 
                                                             
384 Sec. 14(2) UK SIA 1978. 
385 Sec. 14(1) UK SIA 1978. 
386 Congreso Del Partido (1981) 64 International Law Reports 307. 
387 Sec. 1603(b) US FSIA 1976. 
388 Sec. 1603(d) US FSIA 1976; U.S. Supreme Court, Saudi Arabia and Others v. Nelson (1993) 100 International Law 
Reports 545, at 553. 
389 Para. 52 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1. 
390 Australia was in the process of adopting tax legislation on this subject matter. It was aimed at: (i) providing foreign 
governments with greater certainty with regard to the Australian tax implications of their Australian investments, (ii) 
providing greater certainty as to the withholding obligations for Australian residents, (iii) reducing compliance costs, and 
(iv) promoting Australia as a regional financial services hub. However, on 14 December 2013, the Australian government 
announced that it would not proceed with this proposed tax measure. For the latest proposals paper, see Options to codify 
the tax treatment of sovereign investments (April, 2011), available at: 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/2017/PDF/Proposals_Paper.pdf>. This paper was preceded by the consultation 
papers, Greater certainty for Sovereign Investment (November, 2009), available at: 
<http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1667/PDF/Consultation_paper.pdf> and Greater certainty for sovereign 
investment – the framework rules (June, 2010). 
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derived from a non-commercial activity. Dividend income from a shareholding of 10% or less will generally be 
accepted as income derived from a non-commercial (or governmental) activity.  
 
ATO ID 2002/45 also applies to foreign government agencies, provided they: (i) perform functions of 
government, (ii) are owned and controlled by the government, and (iii) do not engage in commercial 
activities. SWFs can also benefit from ATO ID 2002/45.391  
 
4.3.1.2 Canada 
 
Canadian sourced income derived by foreign governments, their agencies and central banks is exempt from 
Canadian taxation under the doctrine of sovereign immunity if: 
 
(1) it can be substantiated that the income is the property of the foreign government, agency or 
central bank; 
(2) the foreign State would provide reciprocal tax exemptions to the Canadian government and its 
agencies; 
(3) the income is derived in the course of exercising a function of a governmental nature and is not 
income arising in the course of an industrial or commercial activity carried on by the foreign 
authority; and 
(4) it is interest on an arm's length debt or portfolio dividends on listed company shares (meaning 
that income such as rentals, royalties or direct dividends from a company in which the foreign 
government has a substantial or controlling equity interest are excluded from the exemption).392   
 
The exemption is based on administrative practice as defined in Information Circular 77–16R4, dated 11 May 
1992. The term ‘agency of a foreign state’ is not defined; however, SWFs appear to qualify for the exemption if 
the fund has a public/humanitarian purpose, as opposed to a commercial purpose.393 It is not clear how to 
distinguish between the two. 
 
4.3.1.3 U.K. 
 
The U.K. tax exemption for foreign sovereigns is based on administrative practice as defined in INTM155010 - 
Sovereign and Crown Immunity and INTM368520 - DT applications and claims: Crown Immunity, Sovereign 
Immunity and Diplomatic Privilege.394 The U.K. exempts from its direct taxes all income arising to, and 
beneficially owned by, the head of State and the government of a foreign sovereign State. It explains that this 
tax immunity has its origins in a general principle of international law (i.e. the sovereign immunity principle). 
Unlike in Australia and Canada, INTM368520 does not distinguish between income from commercial activities 
and income from governmental activities. However, it does distinguish between a foreign State and State 
entities that are legally separate from the foreign State, in that: “[s]overeign [i]mmunity from taxation does 
                                                             
391 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, Appendix One: Foreign Law Tax Treatment of Government Investment, 
Australia, A-9 – A-10. 
392 For a discussion of the third and fourth condition, see M. Kandev, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are They Welcome in 
Canada?” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 649, pp. 652-655. 
393 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, Appendix One: Foreign Law Tax Treatment of Government Investment, 
Canada, A-4 & A-27. 
394 INTM155010 - Sovereign and Crown Immunity: “The United Kingdom recognises the principle of international law 
known as sovereign immunity whereby one sovereign state does not seek to apply its domestic laws to another sovereign 
state. In accordance with this principle, current UK practice is to regard as immune from direct taxes all income and gains 
which are beneficially owned by the head of state and the government of a foreign sovereign state recognised by the UK.” 
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not apply to income arising to and beneficially owned by a legal entity that is separate from the foreign 
Government, even though that government may own the whole of the share capital.” With respect to SWFs 
this means that they will only enjoy immunity from taxation, if they are an integral part of the foreign State.395 
Foreign sovereign wealth investors that are legally separate from the State do not appear to qualify for the 
exemption. 
 
4.3.1.4 U.S. 
 
“Since the beginning of the modern federal income tax, the U.S. has treated sovereign immunity from taxation 
as a corollary to the general principle of sovereign immunity.”396 The U.S. has detailed and complex rules and 
regulations to determine the application of income tax exemption for foreign sovereigns (Sec. 892 of the 
Internal Revenue Code (‘IRC’)).397 Certain passive items of U.S. sourced income398 received by foreign 
governments399 and fully controlled entities of foreign governments400 can be exempt from U.S. taxation. 
According to the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, SWFs will generally be treated as a foreign government 
within the meaning of Sec. 892, because they will either constitute an integral part, or a controlled entity of a 
foreign sovereign.401 
 
To be eligible for the exemption, the income must not be derived from any commercial activity anywhere in 
the world, or by or from a controlled commercial entity. An entity is a controlled commercial entity if the 
entity is engaged in commercial activities and if the foreign government holds an interest in that entity of at 
least 50%, measured by value or vote, or otherwise has effective control.402 For the purpose of Sec. 892, 
commercial activities are generally defined as those activities “which are ordinarily conducted by the taxpayer 
                                                             
395 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 28 April 2008, column 143W: “[w]here a sovereign wealth fund is an 
integral part of the government of a foreign sovereign state it will benefit from immunity from UK tax. As a result of this 
immunity, no taxation will have been received from sovereign wealth funds.” 
396 G. May, “The Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2008) 122 Tax Notes 389, p. 390. 
397 For more detailed information, see G. May, “The Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2008) 122 Tax Notes 389, pp. 
393-401. In relation to SWFs in particular, see M. Melone, “Should the United States Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?” 
(2008) 26 Boston University International Law Journal 143; V. Fleischer, “A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth Funds” 
(2009) 84 NYU Law Review 440; V. Fleischer, “Should We Tax Sovereign Wealth Funds?” (2008) 118 Yale Law Journal 
Pocket Part 93; M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign 
Wealth Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703; J. Bird-Pollan, “The 
Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of 
Corporate & Financial Law 987. 
398 For an elaboration on the eligible items of income, see Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-
3T. 
399 For the purpose of Sec. 892 IRC, the meaning of the term ‘foreign government’ is restricted to the integral parts or 
controlled entities of a foreign sovereign. An integral part of a foreign sovereign is defined as “any person, body of 
persons, organization, agency, bureau, fund, instrumentality, or other body, however designated, that constitutes a 
governing authority of a foreign country. The net earnings of the governing authority must be credited to its own account 
or to other accounts of the foreign sovereign, with no portion inuring to the benefit of any private person. An integral part 
does not include any individual who is a sovereign, official, or administrator acting in a private or personal capacity. 
Consideration of all the facts and circumstances will determine whether an individual is acting in a private or personal 
capacity.” Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-2T(a)(2). 
400 A controlled entity of a foreign government is an entity which is (legally) separate in form from a foreign sovereign and 
which meets the following four conditions: (i) the entity is wholly owned and controlled by a foreign sovereign directly or 
indirectly through one or more controlled entities, (ii) the entity is organized under the laws of the foreign sovereign by 
which owned, (iii) the net earnings of the entity are credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign 
sovereign, with no portion of its income inuring to the benefit of any private person, and (iv) the entity’s assets vest in the 
foreign sovereign upon dissolution. See Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-2T(a)(3). 
Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-2T(a)(2). 
401 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, p. 46. 
402 Sec. 892(a)(2)(B) IRC. 
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or by other persons with a view towards the current or future production of income or gain”.403 This broad 
definition is narrowed by excluding five categories of activities from being commercial activities. The first 
category (Investments) is most relevant for foreign sovereign wealth investors as it includes “investments in 
stocks, bonds and other securities, loans, [and] investments in financial instruments held in the execution of 
governmental financial or monetary policy (…)”, as well as “effecting transactions in stocks, securities, or 
commodities for a foreign government's own account”.404 The remaining four categories are certain cultural 
events, non-profit activities, governmental functions405 and the purchasing of goods. Income from these five 
categories of non-commercial activities is, in principle, eligible for the exemption. 
 
4.3.2 Comparison between the tax immunity regimes and the rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil 
proceedings 
 
When comparing the personal scope of each State’s tax immunity regime with a State’s rules on jurisdictional 
immunity, the most notable difference can be found in the U.K. Whereas the UK SIA 1978 applies to separate 
entities which have performed governmental activities, U.K. tax immunity never applies to legal entities that 
are separate from the foreign state (even though that foreign state may own the whole of the share capital and 
even though the separate entity may perform governmental activities). Thus, the personal scope of the U.K. 
tax immunity conflicts with the U.K. rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil proceedings, i.e. it is narrower. No 
difference in personal scope exists in Australia, while differences in the U.S. context seem to be limited to the 
ownership threshold (100% versus at least 50% state-owned). With respect to Canada, no difference in 
personal scope exists, if the term ‘agency’ has the same meaning in both fields.  
 
As regards the material scope, the tax immunity regimes in Australia, Canada and the U.S. make a basic 
distinction between commercial activities and governmental activities. This may not come as a surprise, 
though, given that all three States make a similar basic distinction for jurisdictional immunity purposes in civil 
proceedings. However, when the tax immunity regimes are further analysed, the distinction in Australia and 
Canada reveals to be one of ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ income, with immunity from tax available for (certain 
items of) passive income only. What constitutes active and passive income is defined differently in these two 
states. In the U.S., it seems that all income from investment activities is considered (passive) income from 
governmental activities. Neither the active/passive distinction between investments as applied in Australia 
and Canada, nor the U.S. approach of classifying investment activities of foreign sovereigns as governmental 
activities, logically follows from the doctrine of sovereign immunity itself.406 These tax approaches, in fact, 
conflict with the basic distinction each State makes between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis for 
jurisdictional immunity purposes in civil proceedings. As explained in Section 4.2.3.1 above, all investment 
activities of foreign sovereigns and SWFs will likely be classified alike, either as commercial activities or 
governmental activities under the nature test and purpose test. That is, under the nature test (which is used in 
both Australia and the U.S. in jurisdictional immunity cases), both active and passive investment activities will 
likely be classified as commercial activities since private parties could have performed the activities in the 
same manner. Thus, the tax immunities granted to foreign sovereign wealth investors by Australia and the 
                                                             
403 Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-4T(b). 
404 Ibid., § 1.892-4T(c)(1)(i) and (iii). 
405 According to § 1.892-4T(c)(4), “[g]overnmental functions are not commercial activities. The term “governmental 
functions” shall be determined under U.S. standards. In general, activities performed for the general public with respect to 
the common welfare or which relate to the administration of some phase of government will be considered governmental 
functions. For example, the operation of libraries, toll bridges, or local transportation services and activities substantially 
equivalent to the Federal Aviation Authority, Interstate Commerce Commission, or United States Postal Service will all be 
considered governmental functions for purposes of this section.”   
406 Also, S-A. Joseph, “Do Tax Treaties Embody Sovereign Immunity? – An Assessment with Regard to Sovereign Wealth 
Funds” (2015) 69 Bulletin for International Taxation 637, p. 643. 
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U.S. are likely broader in scope than would follow from jurisdictional immunity in civil cases.407 The outcome 
(of commercial activity or governmental activity) under the mixed approach, which is used in Canada and the 
U.K., will depend on whether the focus is on the nature or the purpose of the activity. Thus, for Canada, its tax 
immunities could be broader or narrower in scope. In the U.K., the personal scope for purposes of the U.K. tax 
immunity is narrower, but its subsequent all-in approach of according tax immunity to all activities of a 
foreign sovereign could be broader in scope than the material scope of the U.K. rules on jurisdictional 
immunity, depending on its classification of investment activities of foreign sovereigns as either commercial 
or governmental in character.   
 
The previous discussion demonstrates significant discrepancies between the tax immunity regimes, on the 
one hand, and the rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil cases, on the other, in all four States. It strongly 
suggests that the tax immunities granted to foreign sovereigns and foreign sovereign wealth investors by 
Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. are not (or, at least, are no longer) truly motivated by sovereign 
immunity. The tax-exemptions seem to be driven by other reasons, such as international attractiveness. As 
already noted in Section 3.6.2, if the validity of sovereign immunity as a foundation for tax-exemptions for 
foreign sovereign wealth investors becomes questionable, the justification for treating (some) foreign 
sovereign wealth investors more favourably than other investors becomes questionable as well. As a result, 
each State, and any other State in which a comparable situation exists, would either need to align the scope of 
its tax immunity framework with its rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil proceedings, or abolish any 
potential preferential tax treatment if such treatment cannot be justified by other good (tax) policy reasons.408 
 
4.3.3 Customary international law aspects in the field of taxation 
 
4.3.3.1 Do tax immunities logically follow from the sovereign immunity principle? 
 
The sovereign immunity principle is generally accepted as a principle of customary international law. From 
this principle, binding rules (obligations or prohibitions) for States can be derived. In Section 4.3.3.3 below, it 
is examined whether a source State is required to accord tax immunity to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
under customary international law. Before doing so, the author would like to point to two contradictory views 
on the elementary issue of why the sovereign immunity doctrine should be relevant to taxation (of foreign 
sovereigns) to begin with.409 One view holds that sovereign immunity should apply to taxation, whereas the 
other view denies a connection between sovereign immunity and taxation. The first view can be found in the 
already mentioned 1978 decision of the Italian Supreme Court. At issue was whether the Association of Italian 
Knights of the Order of Malta (‘AIKOM’), an instrumental body of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, which 
was recognized as a sovereign subject of international law, was entitled to immunity from Italian taxation in 
respect of a loan contract concluded for the financing of the construction of a hospital in Rome. The Italian 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
 
“A norm of [international law on the fiscal immunity of States and other international legal entities] 
(…) undoubtedly exists in the general international legal order. It constitutes, in fact, a corollary of the 
                                                             
407 With respect to the U.S. tax immunities, this view has been presented before by J. Bird-Pollan, “The Unjustified 
Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption” (2012) 17 Fordham Journal of Corporate 
& Financial Law 987. 
408 R. Snoeij, “Sovereign Immunity and Source State Taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is It Time to Re-Evaluate?” 
(2016) 8 World Tax Journal 225, pp. 241-242. See also Section 3.7. 
409 According to one author it is a “generally accepted principle that one government does not tax another”. See J. Taylor, 
“Tax Treatment of Income of Foreign Governments and International Organizations”, in: US Department of Treasury, 
Essays in International Taxation (Washington: Treasury Department, 1977), p. 154, cited by D. Tillinghast, in “Sovereign 
Immunity from the Tax Collector: United States Income Taxation of Foreign Governments and International 
Organizations” (1978) 10 Law and Policy in International Business 495, p. 495.  
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constitutional principle of customary international law which is expressed in the maxim par in parem 
non habet jurisdictionem. On the basis of this principle, out of the respect which is due to the 
fundamental rights of liberty which that same system recognizes as appertaining to all the members 
of the international community, each of these members has the duty, equally fundamental, not to 
interfere in the sphere of freedom which appertains to the others. Each must exercise the powers 
through which its sovereignty is given expression (and these include the power to impose taxes) in 
such a way as to comply with the exigencies of this principle. (…) This norm, like the constitutional 
principle of which it is a corollary, is customary by nature and is generally recognized and accepted by 
all States. (…) On the basis of this principle, sovereign subjects of international law are, therefore, 
immune from the fiscal provisions and powers of the Italian State in relation to those same activities 
in respect of which they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Italian courts.” (Emphasis added)410 
   
According to the highest Italian court, fiscal immunity exclusively applied “in respect of activities which (…) 
are destined to the realization of the inherent public objectives of the foreign State or other organization of 
international law”.411 Although the conclusion of the contract was, in the view of the court, undeniably of a 
private law nature, the objective pursued was undeniably public in character. It belonged to the internal 
sovereign order of the AIKOM, with which Italy must not interfere. And so the court concluded that Italy 
should refrain from imposing tax on the basis of the customary international law principle of sovereign 
immunity.412 In determining whether the activity was commercial (acta jure gestionis) or governmental (acta 
jure imperii) and, thus, whether Italy was allowed to impose tax or not, the Italian Supreme Court relied on the 
purpose rather than the nature of the activity. At that time, the purpose test was also repeatedly relied on by 
Italian courts to characterize an activity in civil proceedings.413 Apparently, the reasoning behind this decision 
was that exercising prescriptive jurisdiction in tax matters (i.e. the power to impose tax) and adjudicative 
jurisdiction in civil proceedings can equally interfere with the dignity and public functions of a foreign 
sovereign.  
 
The second view can be found in the Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
(‘Sixth Report’), published in 1984 by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special Rapporteur to the ILC.414 This Report 
forms part of the drafting history of the Draft articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 
with commentaries (1991), on which the UNCSI 2004 is based. According to the view expressed in the Sixth 
Report, sovereign immunity does not prohibit a source State (referred to as the territorial sovereign) from 
taxing foreign States, because, in the field of international taxation, the territorial sovereignty of a source State 
is superior to the personal sovereignty of foreign States:         
 
“81. A State is not normally liable to taxation or customs duties levied by another State, except in cases 
where it establishes a business – official or commercial – or maintains an office or agency in the 
territory of another State. The maxim par in parem imperium non habet or jurisdictionem non habet 
must be read in the context where there is no overlapping of activities of a State in the territory or 
under the territorial sovereign authority of another State. It is generally undisputed that the principle 
of “territoriality” or “territorial sovereignty” is more absolute and is not subject to limitations or 
                                                             
410 Court of Cassation, Ministry of Finance v. Association of Italian Knights of the Order of Malta (1978) 65 International 
Law Reports 321-322.  
411 Ibid., at 323. 
412 Ibid., at 324. 
413 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 35. 
414 Sixth Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, by Mr. Sompong Sucharitkul, Special 
Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/376, published in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1984, Vol. II, Part I. 
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qualifications by the national or personal sovereignty, or sovereign authority or personality of 
another State. 
82. It follows as a matter of course that, in most cases of contact, confrontation, clash or conflict, the 
territorial sovereign exercises supreme authority over and within its territory. An outside sovereign 
or extraterritorial power must be presumed to have submitted to the sovereign authority of the 
territorial State and could only exert or exercise such governmental or sovereign authority as had 
been previously agreed to by the territorial sovereign, which could either waive its sovereign 
authority or consent to the exercise of a limited governmental power by the visiting extraterritorial 
authority. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the recognition of a colonial status or regime, directly 
against the concept of jus cogens. 
83. Conceptually, liability in terms of jural relationship is the correlative of power, as opposed to 
immunity which is the correlative of non-power. Thus to admit the supremacy or superiority of the 
territorial sovereign is already one big step towards acceptance of liability, once the extraterritorial 
State projects its image or personality within the territorial sphere of a sovereign authority of another 
State. 
84. The matter has to a large extent been regulated in so far as diplomatic, consular or ad hoc missions 
are concerned. The special regime allowing for special privileges and exemptions from certain 
categories of taxation is based on functional necessity and justified by the principle of reciprocity. 
Beyond reciprocity and functional necessity, exemption from taxation is granted as a matter of 
generosity or courtesy; it stems from the comity of nations, based on considerations of reciprocal 
treatment rather than opinio juris or legal obligation. Besides, there is nothing to prevent two or more 
States or a group of States from agreeing to accord tax concessions inter se (or even unilaterally) as 
part of a generalized system of special preferences, whether for internal revenues or levies for import 
of goods or for other tariff or non-tariff barriers. The rationale behind the authority to tax or to collect 
levies lies in the supremacy of the territorial sovereign.”415 (Emphasis added) 
 
4.3.3.2 Constitutive elements of customary international law 
 
Customary international law is one of the sources of public international law. Art. 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ Statute’), which is generally accepted as the authoritative statement of the 
sources of public international law,416 speaks of “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”. From its wording, as well as from decisions of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’),417 it 
follows that customary international law results from a combination of the following two (constitutive) 
elements: 
 
i. State practice (uses or diuturnitas), as the objective element; and 
ii. Opinio juris sive neccessitatis (‘an opinion of law or necessity’), as the subjective element. 
 
 
                                                             
415 Ibid., Paras. 81-84, pp. 21-22. 
416 For example, J. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th edn., (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 56; H. Meijers, “On 
International Customary Law in the Netherlands”, in: I. Dekker & H. Post, On the Foundations and Sources of 
International Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), p. 80; T. Buergenthal & S. Murphy, Public International Law 
in a nutshell, 4th edn., (New York: Thomson/West Group, 2007), p. 19; M. Shaw, International Law, 6th edn., (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 70; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn., (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 5; H. Thirlway, “The Source of International Law”, in: M. Evans, International Law, 
3rd edn., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 97. 
417 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1969, Para. 77, p. 44; ICJ, 3 June 1985, Continental 
Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1985, Para. 27, pp. 29-30; ICJ, 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1986, Para. 183, p. 97. 
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4.3.3.2.1 State practice 
 
According to Meijers, a rule of custom can only arise through repetition, for which he finds evidence in case 
law of the ICJ.418 As pointed out by the ICJ in several of its judgments, the required State practice419 needs to 
be ‘constant and uniform’.420 In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ considered that “State 
practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and 
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked.”421 Indeed, minor inconsistencies in State practice do 
not prevent this requirement from being met.422 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Opinio juris 
 
According to Art. 38(1)b ICJ Statute, a rule of customary international law not only requires ‘evidence’ of a 
‘general practice’, but also ‘evidence’ of a general practice that is ‘accepted as law’ (opinio juris).423 This 
requirement expresses that States must act in a certain way because they feel obliged to do so by a legal 
obligation, or because of the existence of a binding rule of law. The requirement of opinio juris (i.e. the 
subjective element)424 serves to distinguish from acts that are not motivated by a feeling of legal obligation, 
such as acts of comity or friendship.425 
 
  
                                                             
418 H. Meijers, “On International Customary Law in the Netherlands”, in: I. Dekker & H. Post, On the Foundations and 
Sources of International Law (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), pp. 82-83, arguing that: “[w]ithout the repetition of 
similar conduct there can be no custom, and without custom no customary law.” 
419 According to one author, any activity of the State can contribute to State practice. M. Dixon, Textbook on International 
Law, 6th edn., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 31. Another author has proposed the following hierarchy of 
acts which, in his view, can constitute State practice in the context of customary international law: (a) acts and attitudes of 
State organs, (b) any national legislation or administrative ruling, (c) a State’s participation in and implementation of 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, (d) a State’s participation to treaties on the codification and/or progressive development 
of rules of customary international law, (e) resolutions adopted by political organs of international organizations, for 
example the UN General Assembly, and (f) abstract and verbal statements of representatives of a State, diplomatic 
correspondence as well as their voting in international organizations. V. Degan, Sources of International Law (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), pp. 156-161.   
420 ICJ, 20 November 1959, Colombian-Peruvian Asylum, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 276; ICJ, 12 April 1960, Right of 
Passage over Indian Territory, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 40. 
421 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1969, Para. 74, p. 43. 
422 ICJ, 27 June 1986, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, I.C.J. Reports 1986, Para. 186, p. 98: 
“It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in 
the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each 
other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the 
Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules.” 
423 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1969, Para. 77, p. 44: “Not only must the acts 
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a 
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., 
the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.” 
424 On the subjective element, see R. Walden, “The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law” 
(1977) 12 Israel Law Review 344; M. Mendelson, “The Subjective Element in Customary International Law” (1995) 66 
The British Year Book of International Law 177.  
425 ICJ, 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, I.C.J. Reports 1969, Para. 77, p. 44: “The frequency, or even 
habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and 
protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience 
or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.” 
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4.3.3.3 Analysis 
 
A comparative study that was conducted by the U.S. Directorate of Legal Research for International, 
Comparative, and Foreign Law of The Law Library of Congress on the Taxation of the Passive Income of 
Foreign Governments and Sovereign Wealth Funds in Selected Foreign Countries, indicates the lack of an 
extensive and uniform State practice on the taxation of income derived by foreign sovereigns and SWFs. The 
2008 report, which forms an appendix to a report that was prepared by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation 
on Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United States,426 
contains an analysis of the domestic tax legislation, policy or practice of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, 
Norway, Poland, Switzerland and the U.K. The practice of Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., all of which 
apply sovereign immunity in income tax matters, has been discussed in Section 4.3.1 of this chapter. From this 
discussion it appeared that significant differences exist between these four States, both with respect to who is 
eligible and what income is eligible. Other examples of States that grant immunity from income taxation to 
foreign sovereigns include France427 and Japan. The comparative study shows that Germany, Norway, Poland 
and Switzerland do not tax-exempt items of passive income derived by foreign governments or SWFs, 
although benefits may be available under applicable double tax treaties.428  
 
The above indicates the lack of an extensive and virtually uniform State practice in this area, as is required for 
the existence of a rule of customary international (tax) law. It is reasonable to assume that this also applies to 
SWEs. The OECD Commentary on Art. 1 also indicates the absence of an extensive and virtually uniform State 
practice.429 In addition, the discussion in Section 4.3.2 of this chapter strongly suggests that the tax 
immunities granted by Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. are not (or, at least, no longer) truly motivated 
by sovereign immunity, indicating the absence of opinio juris. So, there is currently no rule of customary 
international law requiring a source State to accord any immunity from income taxation to foreign States or 
foreign sovereign wealth investors.430 On the other hand, there is no rule of customary international law 
prohibiting a source State from doing so. 
 
 
 
                                                             
426 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, Appendix One: Foreign Law Tax Treatment of Government Investment. 
427 D. Gaukrodger, “Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government Controlled Investors” OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment, No. 2010/2, p. 35, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-
2010_2.pdf>. 
428 Joint Committee on Taxation, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in 
the United States (June, 2008), JCX-49-08, Appendix One: Foreign Law Tax Treatment of Government Investment, A-
3/4. 
429 Para. 52 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1: “(…) There is no international consensus (…) on the precise limits of the 
sovereign immunity principle. Most States, for example, would not recognise that the principle applies to business 
activities and many States do not recognise any application of this principle in tax matters. There are therefore 
considerable differences between States as regards the extent, if any, to which that principle applies to taxation. Even 
among States that would recognise its possible application in tax matters, some apply it only to the extent that it has been 
incorporated into domestic law and others apply it as customary international law but subject to important limitations. 
(…)” 
430 Similarly, American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. 
I (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1987), p. 448: “[u]nder international law, a state may tax not only a 
foreign state’s income from commercial activities or investments in the taxing state’s territory but also the foreign state’s 
income from activities that are “governmental” in character, such as interest or gains currency transactions by that state or 
its central bank.” See also B. Kelsey, “Recent Trends in Sovereign Immunity from Taxation” (1959) 17 Toronto Faculty of 
Law Review 81, p. 95; P. Paone, “Italian Income Tax and Tax Liability of Foreign States and International Organizations” 
(1976) 2 The Italian Yearbook of International Law 273, p. 276.  
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4.4. Immunity from measures of constraint and source State taxation of income derived by foreign 
sovereign wealth investors 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
Immunity from measures of constraint limits the enforcement power of (organs of) one State against property 
situated in that State, but belonging to another State, and generally applies to property that is used or 
intended for use for sovereign purposes. Immunity from measures of constraint could (effectively) result in the 
absence of source State taxation. Consider the situation where a foreign sovereign wealth investor refuses to 
pay income tax imposed on it by the tax authorities of a source State, or the situation where an SWE situated 
in a source State fails to comply with withholding tax obligations under the laws of that source State. In these 
exceptional situations, that source State is often left with the ultimum remedium of seeking enforcement 
measures to be taken against property of that foreign sovereign wealth investor, or possibly the foreign 
owner-State,431 to satisfy its tax claim. This property could be situated in the source State itself or in other 
States. Should a source State decide to take that route, immunity from measures of constraint, and, therefore, 
immunity from the collection of taxes (rather than immunity from taxation itself), would prevent a source 
State, or any other State, from taking enforcement measures, thus effectively resulting in the absence of 
source State taxation. Since a source State may also seek enforcement measures to be taken against property 
situated in foreign jurisdictions, this effect may depend on how immunity from execution would apply to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors in one or more foreign jurisdictions. It is important to note that State 
practice, as well as international instruments, dealing with immunity from execution is typically concerned 
with situations where the claimant is a private party that is seeking enforcement measures to be taken against 
property of a foreign State or State entity (private party vs. foreign State/State entity). However, for present 
purposes, the claimant is a source State that is seeking enforcement measures to be taken against property of 
a foreign sovereign wealth investor, or a foreign State (source State vs. foreign sovereign (investor)). Given 
this difference in situation, it is uncertain whether immunity from execution enjoyed by foreign sovereign 
wealth investors in a private law case would still apply in a tax case. Private parties could certainly consider a 
difference in application, in favour of a source State as claimant, as unfair. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the collection of taxes is in the general interest, thus justifying a difference in treatment. In the 
author’s view, based on the rationale of sovereign immunity as expressed in terms of sovereignty, 
independence, equality and dignity of States,432 there is much to say for not applying immunity from 
execution any differently in tax cases.  
 
The legal instruments and case law discussed below, and their potential application to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, deal with private law cases. Given that the international law status of immunity from 
execution in tax cases is unclear, these instruments and case law are nothing more than an indication of how 
immunity from execution might apply in tax cases. Although the international law status of immunity from 
execution in tax cases is unsettled, this delicate issue may only occur in rather exceptional circumstances; for 
example if a foreign sovereign wealth investor refuses to pay income tax imposed on it by a source State, or if 
an SWE does not comply with withholding tax obligations under the laws of a source State. 
                                                             
431 Under many legal instruments, foreign States and entities of foreign States are shielded against so-called cross-
execution. For example, Art. 19(c) UNCSI 2004 provides that post-judgment measures of constraint can only be taken 
against property which has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed. Therefore, if a creditor 
(such as a source State) has a claim against an SWF of a foreign State, the assets of that foreign State would be shielded 
against any post-judgment measures of execution, and vice versa. However, the issue of cross-execution has not yet been 
settled in State practice. See A. van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries Between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities. A 
Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution (March, 2013), Working Paper No. 2013-17, Law 
& Economics Research Paper Series, U. St. Gallen Law School, pp. 34-36.  
432 Section 4.2.2.  
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4.4.2 Personal scope 
 
The personal scope of immunity from measures of constraint is generally not different from the personal 
scope of jurisdictional immunity. As discussed in Section 4.2.3.3 of this chapter, the personal scope is not 
restricted to the State itself, but also includes separate entities to the extent they are entitled to perform and 
are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority. 
 
4.4.3 Material scope 
 
4.4.3.1 Property serving sovereign purposes 
 
Different from jurisdictional immunity, the material scope of immunity from measures of constraint is 
generally determined by reference to the purpose of the property against which measures of constraint are 
sought. In its judgment of 12 April 1983, after an extensive review of State practice, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court concluded that: 
 
“[a]ccording to established general State practice supported by cogent legal arguments, assets of a 
foreign State situated or present within the State of the forum cannot be subjected to measures of 
enforcement or even safeguarding measures without the consent of the foreign State concerned, so 
long as they serve sovereign purposes of that State.”433   
 
This distinction between property serving sovereign purposes, and property not serving sovereign purposes, 
can also be found in subsequent (international) legal instruments and case law of many other States. An 
example is the decision of the Italian Court of Cassation of 25 May 1989, in which it was held that “the idea 
that immunity from execution in the forum State is limited to the assets of the State (and its public entities or 
agencies) used in the exercise of sovereign functions or devoted to public purposes is now accepted as a rule 
of the international community”.434 Another example, of a more recent date, can be found in the UNCSI 2004, 
which provides that post-judgment measures of constraint are allowed if, inter alia, the property “is 
specifically in use or intended for use by the State for other than government non-commercial purposes and is 
in the territory of the State of the forum”. 435 
 
In determining whether or not property serves sovereign purposes, courts largely follow “judicially created 
categories”436 of property. These categories are also reflected in the UNCSI 2004, which is considered by the 
House of Lords as “the most authoritative statement available on the current international understanding of 
the limits of state immunity in civil cases.”437 The following categories of property are generally considered to 
serve sovereign purposes: (1) diplomatic and consular premises and related property, including accounts, (2) 
military property, (3) property of the central bank or other monetary authority, (4) cultural property, and (5) 
scientific-historic property. The classification of other categories of property is determined based on the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case.  
 
                                                             
433 Federal Constitutional Court, National Iranian Oil Company Revenues from Oil Sales Case (1983) 65 International 
Law Reports 215, at 242. 
434 Court of Cassation, Libyan Arab Socialist People’s Jamahiriya v. Rossbeton Srl (1989) 87 International Law Reports 
63, at 66. 
435 Art. 19(c) of the UNCSI 2004. 
436 Council of Europe (G. Hafner, M. Kohen & S. Breau (eds.)), State Practice Regarding State Immunities (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), p. 162. 
437 House of Lords, Jones v. Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Another (2006) 129 International 
Law Reports 713, at 727. 
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4.4.3.2 Property belonging to SWFs 
 
Case law concerning SWFs is scarce and inconclusive.438 In AIG Capital Partners v. Kazakhstan,439 the claimant, 
AIG, had obtained an arbitration award against the Republic of Kazakhstan, which it sought to enforce against 
cash and securities held in London by third parties on behalf of the National Bank of Kazakhstan under a 
custodian agreement. The securities held included U.K. government bonds and shares in U.K. listed 
companies. The cash and securities formed a part of the National Fund of Kazakhstan, an SWF established in 
2000, which was managed by the national bank. The purpose of the SWF was to ensure “stable social and 
economic development of the country, accumulation of financial resources for future generations, [and] 
reduction of the vulnerability of the economy to the influence of unfavourable external factors.”440 The 
National Bank of Kazakhstan intervened in this procedure and claimed that the assets were immune from 
execution under the UK SIA 1978. The High Court of England agreed because the assets constituted property 
of a central bank and such property was always immune from any enforcement process pursuant to Sec. 14(4) 
UK SIA 1978.441 Sec. 14(4) – dealing with property of a central bank or other monetary authority – grants 
absolute immunity and does not distinguish between property in use or intended for use for commercial 
purposes, and property in use or intended for use for sovereign purposes. Interestingly, the court held that, 
even without Sec. 14(4), immunity would have been enjoyed, because “all the London assets were, at all times, 
in use for sovereign purposes and pursuant to the exercise of sovereign authority of Kazakhstan”, acting 
through the national bank.442 The court argued that the assets formed part of the SWF and that the SWF was 
established “to assist in the management of the economy and government revenues of Kazakhstan”, which 
constituted a sovereign activity. The fact that the investments were aimed at achieving high profits and the 
securities were actively traded, was not considered relevant, because the aim of the exercise was, at all times, 
to ‘enhance’ the SWF, i.e. to assist the sovereign activity.443 The exercise was considered “part of the overall 
exercise of sovereign authority by Kazakhstan”.444   
 
In contrast, the Swiss Federal Tribunal445 has held that immunity from execution did not apply to Swiss assets 
of KIA, the SWF of Kuwait, in respect of a debt claim of a Spanish company. Kuwait claimed immunity because 
the assets (Swiss bank accounts) were part of the SWF that was established to provide for the future needs of 
the Kuwaiti people, when the State no longer had oil reserves. The Tribunal decided that immunity was not 
available, because the SWF could not be assimilated to the State of Kuwait. Based on its constitutive 
documents and statements by Kuwait, the SWF was considered to be an independent entity. The fact that its 
funds were provided by and held on behalf of the State of Kuwait, and the fact that its board of directors 
included representatives of the State of Kuwait, was not considered relevant. 
 
4.4.3.3 Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within a central bank  
 
Some sovereign wealth investors have been constituted as a unit within a central bank, or other monetary 
authority. A great number of States apply an absolute immunity approach to measures of constraint in 
relation to property of foreign central banks. In AIG Capital Partners v. Kazakhstan, discussed in Section 4.4.3.2 
                                                             
438 A. van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries Between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities. A Functional View on 
Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution (March, 2013), Working Paper No. 2013-17, Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series, U. St. Gallen Law School, pp. 28-29. 
439 High Court, AIG Capital Partners Inc. and Another v. Republic of Kazakhstan (2005) 129 International Law Reports 
589. 
440 Ibid., at 595. 
441 Ibid., at 607 – 616. 
442 Ibid., at 625 – 626. 
443 Ibid., at 625. 
444 Ibid. 
445 Kuwait v. X (1994) Revue Suisse de droit international et européen, 1995, Vol. 5, p. 593. 
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above, the High Court of England held immune from measures of enforcement “any asset (…) which is 
allocated to or held in the name of a central bank, irrespective of the capacity in which the central bank holds 
it, or the purpose for which the property is held.”446 Other examples of an absolute immunity approach in 
relation to property of foreign central banks can be found in the immunity legislation of Pakistan,447 
Singapore448 and South Africa,449 which are all based on the UK SIA 1978, making the actual purpose of the 
property irrelevant. Importantly, the UNCSI 2004 also follows an absolute approach in respect of property of 
foreign central banks. Under the absolute immunity approach, sovereign wealth investors constituted by a 
pool of assets within a central bank, enjoy immunity in respect of all property, including property that would 
otherwise not have been considered as serving sovereign purposes.  
 
But an absolute approach does not prevail in all States. For example, Swiss450 and German451 courts do not 
apply special rules to property of a central bank. Just like other categories of property, it needs to be 
demonstrated that the relevant property is in use or intended for use for governmental purposes. Such a 
(more) restrictive approach can also be found in Canada’s State Immunity Act 1985.452 The Special 
Rapporteur to the ILC also proposed a restrictive approach in relation to property of central banks, but this 
proposal did not have the general support of the ILC.453 One member argued that “central banks were 
instruments of the sovereign power and all activities conducted by them enjoyed immunity” from 
execution.454 However, a (more) restrictive immunity approach does not necessarily have to limit immunity in 
relation to property of a sovereign wealth investor constituted as a pool of assets within a central bank, 
because such property may be considered as serving sovereign purposes, as the decision in AIG Capital 
Partners v. Kazakhstan illustrates. 
 
4.4.4 Analysis 
 
Although immunity from execution in tax cases could (effectively) result in the absence of source State 
taxation, its impact on achieving tax policy objectives of source States is different in comparison to immunity 
from taxation. Whereas immunity from taxation raises capital efficiency concerns since it could influence 
investment decisions of foreign sovereign wealth investors, immunity from execution in tax cases will unlikely 
influence investment decisions because of the uncertainty that surrounds it. And because of that uncertainty, 
it cannot be said that immunity from execution in tax cases enhances a source State’s international 
attractiveness. What can be said with certainty, however, is that immunity from execution, once established in 
a particular tax case, does raise equity concerns since it results in preferential tax treatment of (some) foreign 
sovereign wealth investors over other investors. Nevertheless, the (potential) overall impact of immunity 
from execution on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement 
an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors,455 is negligible. 
 
 
 
                                                             
446 High Court, AIG Capital Partners Inc. and Another v. Republic of Kazakhstan (2005) 129 International Law Reports 
589, at 616. 
447 Sec. 15(4) of the Pakistani State Immunity Ordinance No. VI of 1981.  
448 Sec. 16(4) of the Singaporean State Immunity Act 1979. 
449 Sec. 15(3) of the South African Foreign States Immunities Act 1981. 
450 Swiss Federal Tribunal, Libyan Arab Socialist People’s Jamahiriya v. Actimon SA (1985) 82 International Law Reports 
30, at 35. 
451 Provincial Court of Frankfurt, Central Bank of Nigeria Case (1975) 65 International Law Reports 131, at 135. 
452 Sec. 12(4) of the Canadian State Immunity Act 1985. 
453 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1991, Vol. II, Part II, Para. 227, p. 42. 
454 Ibid. 
455 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
  
78 
 
4.5. Impact of the sovereign immunity principle on achieving neutrality (efficiency), equity 
(fairness) and international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
In this section, it will (shortly) be examined what impact the sovereign immunity principle could have on 
source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international 
attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors456.  
 
In Section 4.3.3.3, it was concluded that there is currently no rule of customary international law requiring a 
source State to accord any immunity from income taxation to foreign States or foreign sovereign wealth 
investors. On the other hand, there is no rule of customary international law prohibiting a source State from 
doing so. Therefore, the principle of jurisdictional immunity has no (negative) impact on source States’ ability 
to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors457. 
 
From the analysis in Section 4.4, it follows that the international law status of immunity from execution in tax 
cases is unsettled. Immunity from execution in tax cases could (effectively) result in the absence of source 
State taxation, which would raise equity concerns since it results in preferential tax treatment of (some) 
foreign sovereign wealth investors over other investors. However, because of the uncertainty that surrounds 
it and because it may only occur in rather exceptional circumstances, immunity from execution in tax cases 
should neither influence investment decisions of investors, nor enhance a source State’s international 
attractiveness. Therefore, the (potential) overall impact of immunity from execution on source States’ ability 
to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors,458 is negligible. 
 
To conclude, the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of customary international law, has, at most, a 
very small impact on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely 
implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
4.6. Conclusions 
 
Although many States do not recognize any application of the sovereign immunity principle to taxation, 
(some) foreign sovereign wealth investors may enjoy immunity from taxation in a number of other States, 
including Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. The elementary question addressed in this chapter was 
whether the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of customary international law, actually requires 
source States to accord tax immunities to foreign sovereign wealth investors. The answer to this question 
indicates what impact the sovereign immunity principle could have on source States’ ability to achieve (or 
promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international attractiveness), and to freely 
implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
The findings of Chapter 4 indicate that there is currently no rule of customary international law requiring a 
source State to accord any immunity from income taxation to foreign States or foreign sovereign wealth 
investors. A rule of customary international law requires: (i) evidence of a general State practice, (ii) that is 
accepted as law (opinio juris). As already noted in the OECD Commentary on Art. 1, there is no extensive and 
virtually uniform State practice regarding source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors; even among 
States which do apply sovereign immunity to direct taxation, significant differences exist between them. In 
                                                             
456 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Ibid. 
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addition, an examination of the tax immunity regimes and the rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil 
proceedings in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., strongly suggests that the tax-exemptions accorded to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors are not (or, at least, no longer) truly motivated by sovereignty, indicating 
the absence of opinio juris. Therefore, the principle of jurisdictional immunity has no (negative) impact on 
source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors459. 
 
Rather than through immunity from taxation, absence of source State taxation could effectively also be 
achieved when (property of) foreign sovereign wealth investors would enjoy immunity from execution in tax 
cases and, therefore, immunity from the collection of taxes. Given that a source State may also seek 
enforcement measures to be taken against property situated in foreign jurisdictions, this effect may depend 
on how immunity from execution would apply to foreign sovereign wealth investors in one or more foreign 
jurisdictions. While foreign sovereign wealth investors may enjoy immunity from execution in private law 
cases in respect of property serving sovereign purposes, it is uncertain whether this would still apply in a tax 
case. Although the international law status of immunity from execution in tax cases is currently unclear, it can 
be argued that immunity from execution in tax cases should not apply any differently from immunity from 
execution in private law cases. This could mean that property of foreign sovereign wealth investors may also 
enjoy immunity from execution in tax cases. Be that as it may, it should be kept in mind that this delicate issue 
would only occur in rather exceptional circumstances; for example, if a foreign sovereign wealth investor 
refuses to pay income tax imposed on it by a source State, or if an SWE does not comply with withholding tax 
obligations under the laws of a source State. Immunity from execution in tax cases could (effectively) result in 
the absence of source State taxation, which would raise equity concerns since it results in preferential tax 
treatment of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors over other investors. However, because of the 
uncertainty that surrounds it and because it will only occur in rather exceptional circumstances, immunity 
from execution in tax cases should neither influence investment decisions of investors, nor enhance a source 
State’s international attractiveness. Therefore, the (potential) overall impact of immunity from execution on 
source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, is negligible. 
 
It can be concluded that the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of customary international law, has, 
at most, a very small impact on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to 
freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. This is summarized in the 
table below. The table will be completed with the findings of Chapter 5 (concerning tax treaties) and Chapter 
6 (concerning European law). 
 
                                                             
459 Ibid. 
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(CEN) (CIN) (inter-taxpayer) (inter-nation)
*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
OECD/UN MTC based 
treaties
Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5 Chapter 5
Neutrality Equity International 
attractiveness
Sovereign immunity
Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
European (Union) law Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6
No (negative) impact No (negative) impact Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
No (negative) impact
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Chapter 5 
 
Tax Treaty Aspects of (Foreign) Sovereign Wealth Investors 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The position of sovereign wealth investors is carefully addressed in many bilateral tax treaties.460 From a 
source State perspective, many such treaties provide tax-exemptions on items of income derived by foreign 
sovereign wealth investors.461 Yet, many other tax treaties currently in force have been concluded between 
two States at a time where cross-border investments by sovereign wealth investors were not so prominent, 
and questions have now arisen as to the application of such tax treaties to sovereign wealth investors. Issues 
relating to the application of tax treaties to State-owned entities, including SWFs, have, to some extent, been 
considered by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, through its Working Party 1.462 The Committee’s 
proposals for additions and changes to the OECD Commentary have been reflected in the 2010 update. In the 
2011 revision of the UN MTC and its Commentaries, no such updates have been made. 
 
This chapter will consider the (possible) implications of tax treaties for source State taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. Based on these implications, it will be examined what impact tax treaties could 
have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and 
international attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors463. This chapter will focus on the OECD MTC (2017) and UN MTC (2011), and their Commentaries. 
Indeed, bilateral tax treaties are often based on, or inspired by, (earlier versions of) the OECD MTC464 or UN 
MTC465.  
 
After an introduction to the general tax treaty interpretation rule in Section 5.2, Section 5.3 to 5.6 will first 
consider the (possible) implications of OECD and UN MTC based treaties for source State taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors, by focusing on the resident article, the dividend and interest article, the capital 
gains article and the non-discrimination article. Based on these implications, Section 5.7 will then examine 
what impact tax treaties could have on the ability of source States to achieve (or promote) neutrality 
(efficiency), equity (fairness) and international attractiveness, and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. Section 5.8 will end this chapter with the main conclusions. 
 
  
                                                             
460 See, for example, some of the Dutch tax treaties discussed in the Appendix to this study. 
461 Ibid. 
462 OECD (2009), Discussion Draft on the Application of Tax Treaties to State-Owned Entities, Including Sovereign 
Wealth Funds, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/44080490.pdf>.  
463 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
464 The OECD MTC not only serves as the basic document of reference in tax treaty negotiations between OECD Member 
States, but it is also used in negotiations between OECD Member States and non-OECD Member States and even between 
non-OECD Member States. See Paras. 13-14, Introduction to the OECD MTC.  
465 The main difference between the two models is that the UN MTC gives more weight to the source principle compared 
to the OECD MTC, and this generally favours developing States. See Para. 3 and Para. 12, Introduction to the UN MTC. 
Hence the official title “United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries”. 
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5.2. The interpretation rule (Art. 3(2)) 
 
5.2.1 General 
 
Art. 3(2) of the OECD and UN MTC produces a rule of interpretation for any undefined tax treaty term. The 
interpretation of this interpretation rule will be relevant for the application of OECD and UN MTC based 
treaties to sovereign wealth investors. For that reason, a more general explanation of Art. 3(2) is provided this 
early in this chapter, followed by a more detailed elaboration in subsequent paragraphs.   
 
Art. 3(2) of both model tax conventions provides:  
 
“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting State, any term not defined 
therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires, or the competent authorities agree to a different 
meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25, have the meaning that it has at that time under the 
law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning under the 
applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that 
State.” 
 
Art. 3(2)’s primary reference is to the domestic legislation of the State that is applying the tax treaty, with any 
domestic tax meaning prevailing over any other domestic meaning. The primary reference to domestic tax law 
for undefined treaty terms makes sense considering that a tax treaty is concluded against the background of, 
interacts with and limits the application of the domestic tax laws of the Contracting States.466 However, the 
‘context’ may require a meaning of a term that is different from the meaning under the domestic (tax) law of 
the State that is applying the treaty.  
 
5.2.2 “Unless the context otherwise requires” 
 
As explained, under the interpretation rule of Art. 3(2), the domestic (tax) law meaning of the undefined tax 
treaty term can be ‘set aside’, if the ‘context’ so requires. ‘Context’ in Art. 3(2) has not been defined, but the 
Commentaries on Art. 3(2) of both model tax conventions shed (some) light on what ‘context’ comprises:467        
 
“(…) The context is determined in particular by the intention of the Contracting States when signing 
the Convention as well as the meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of the other 
Contracting State (an implicit reference to the principle of reciprocity on which the Convention is 
based). The wording of the Article therefore allows the competent authorities some leeway.” 
 
According to the Commentaries, the context comprises in particular, but not exclusively: (i) the common 
intention of the States when signing the treaty, and (ii) the meaning of the term under the domestic (tax) law 
of the other State (an expression of reciprocity). 
 
5.2.3 Relationship between Art. 3(2) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
 
Art. 3(2) is regarded by most authors as lex specialis to Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969) (‘VCLT 1969’).468 Since lex specialis derogat generali in international law, this would seem to 
                                                             
466 Avery Jones et al., “The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model - 
I” (1984) 1 British Tax Review 14, p. 17. 
467 Para. 12 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 3, quoted in Para. 14 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 3. 
468 H. Shannon, “US income tax treaties, reference to domestic law for the meaning of undefined terms” (1989) 17 Intertax 
453, p. 455; Dutch Advocate-General Wattel in the appendix to his Conclusion preceding Hoge Raad, 5 September 2003, 
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imply that Art. 3(2) exclusively governs any undefined treaty term.469 Also, the OECD Commentary and UN 
Commentary make no reference to the VCLT 1969 and observe that Art. 3(2) provides a ‘general rule’ of 
interpretation for undefined treaty terms.470 But this does not mean that the VCLT 1969 has no role to play in 
relation to Art. 3(2). Art. 3(2), as a treaty provision, requires interpretation too and cannot be subject to its 
own rule of interpretation.471 The interpretation of Art. 3(2) is governed by the interpretation rules included 
in the VCLT 1969.472 This means that Art. 3(2) is to be interpreted in good faith, which entails an 
interpretation that is honest, fair and reasonable, and in accordance with the common intention of the parties 
as expressed in the terms of the tax treaty.473 In addition, Arts. 31 and 32 of the VCLT 1969 come into play 
when an undefined treaty term has no domestic (tax) law meaning.474 
 
5.3. Tax treaty access (Arts. 1, 3 and 4) 
 
5.3.1 General 
 
Art. 1(1) of the OECD and UN MTC, on the persons covered, are identical and read as follows:  
 
“This convention shall apply to persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States.” 
(Italics added)  
 
Thus, according to the wording of Art. 1(1), tax treaty access is generally reserved for someone who or 
something which qualifies as a ‘person’ and as a ‘resident’ (of at least one of the two States).475 The first term 
(‘person’) is defined in Art. 3(1)(a), whereas the second term (‘resident’) is defined in Art. 4(1).  
 
As from the 2010 version, the OECD Commentary notices, that issues may arise as to whether SWFs qualify as 
a ‘person’ and as a ‘resident’ for tax treaty purposes.476 The first aspect is examined in Section 5.3.2 and the 
second in Section 5.3.3 below. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
No. 37 651, BNB 2003/379, Para. 2.15; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, IBFD Doctoral 
Series Vol. 7 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2004), pp. 477-478. 
469 F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 7 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 
2004), p. 478. 
470 Para. 11 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 3, and Para. 13 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 3. 
471 Similarly, Dutch Advocate-General Wattel in the appendix to his Conclusion preceding Hoge Raad, 5 September 2003, 
No. 37 651, BNB 2003/379, Para. 2.15.  
472 Ibid.; F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 7 (Amsterdam: 
IBFD, 2004), p. 478; L. de Broe, International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 14 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2008), p. 264.  
473 F. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 7 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 
2004), p. 131. 
474 M. Kandev, “Tax Treaty Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning Under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model” 
(2007) 55 Canadian Tax Journal 55. 
475 Notwithstanding Art. 1, certain articles of the OECD MTC may, under circumstances, apply to persons who may fail to 
qualify as resident. On this and the historical background, role and function of Art. 1, see P. Hattingh, “Article 1 of the 
OECD Model: Historical Background and the Issues Surrounding It” (2010) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 215; P. 
Hattingh, “The Role and Function of Article 1 of the OECD Model” (2010) 57 Bulletin for International Taxation 546. 
476 Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4. 
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5.3.2  The definition of “person” (Art. 3(1)(a)) 
 
5.3.2.1 Introduction 
 
The definition of ‘person’ in both model tax conventions is identical. The term ‘person’ is described in Art. 
3(1)(a) to include477 “an individual, a company and any other body of persons”. As noted in the Commentaries 
to both model tax conventions, and as its wording suggests, this definition of ‘person’ is not exhaustive and is 
used in a very wide sense.478 Out of these three categories, the OECD and UN MTC only contain a definition of 
the term ‘company’, which is defined as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate 
for tax purposes”.479 Because of the word any in ‘any body corporate’, the term ‘body corporate’ appears to be 
used in a very wide sense too. The definition of company has been formulated with special reference to the 
article on dividends (Art. 10).480 Art. 10 is important to sovereign wealth investors for obtaining relief of 
source State taxation on cross-border dividends derived from their investments and will be discussed in 
Section 5.4.2 of this chapter. A sovereign wealth investor qualifying as a ‘company’ automatically qualifies as a 
‘person’. The more general term ‘person’ is relevant for Art. 4(1), to be discussed in Section 5.3.3, and Art. 11 
(Interest), to be discussed in Section 5.4.3. Section 5.3.2 will only consider the application of the tax treaty 
term ‘company’ to sovereign wealth investors.  
 
5.3.2.2 ‘Company’ and Article 3(2) 
 
As mentioned, the definition of ‘company’ is especially relevant to the dividend article (Art. 10) and meeting 
this definition could result in the lowest rate of source State taxation of dividends (paragraph 2(a)).  
 
The OECD and UN MTC are silent whether the perspective of the Contracting State applying the treaty or the 
perspective of the Contracting State in which the entity is organized is relevant in determining whether an 
entity is a ‘body corporate’. With respect to the term ‘national’, Art. 3(1)(g)(ii) of the OECD MTC and Art. 
3(1)(f)(ii) of the UN MTC provide that the legal capacity of a person other than an individual is derived from 
the laws of the Contracting State in which the entity is organized. In the author’s view, the same conclusion 
should apply to the term ‘body corporate’. The question whether an entity is a body corporate is a legal 
question concerning the legal status of an entity. This status can only be derived from, and granted by, the 
laws of the State under which an entity is incorporated or established. So, it does not make much sense to 
answer this legal question from the perspective of the source State, not even when that State is applying the 
tax treaty. In the author’s view, the context referred to in Art. 3(2) requires this legal question to be answered 
on the basis of the (company) law of the State under which the entity has been established.481 
 
Obviously, whether an entity is treated as a ‘body corporate for tax purposes’ is a tax question. Unlike the legal 
question referred to above, this tax question can be answered from the perspective of the State in which the 
entity is a resident (residence State), as well as from the perspective of the State from which the dividends are 
paid (source State). One might expect a source State to interpret the term ‘body corporate for tax purposes’ 
(as species of the genus ‘company’) on the basis of its own domestic tax laws, unless the context otherwise 
requires, pursuant to Art. 3(2). However, according to the OECD Commentary, whether an entity is a ‘body 
corporate for tax purposes’ has to be answered according to the tax laws of the State in which the entity is 
                                                             
477 In the OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention of 1963, the word “comprises” was used instead of “includes”. 
478 Para. 2 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 3, and Para. 4 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 3. Similar wording was 
already used in the 1963 OECD Commentary on Art. 3. 
479 Art. 3(1)(b) of the OECD MTC and Art. 3(1)(b) of the UN MTC. 
480 Para. 3 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 3, and Para. 5 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 3. 
481 Also, A. Rust, in Reimer & Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th edn., (Alphen a/d Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2015), p. 186. 
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organized.482 The UN Commentaries are silent on this matter. The OECD Commentary speaks of a ‘taxable 
unit’ that is not a body corporate in a legal sense, but is treated as a separate entity for tax purposes in the 
State in which the entity is organized.483 An explanation why the OECD Commentary unconditionally chooses 
the home State perspective to answer this query may be found in the relationship with the ‘liable to tax’ test. 
That is, an entity that is not a ‘body corporate’ in a legal sense will not be ‘liable to tax’ (and so will not have 
tax treaty access) if it does not classify as a ‘body corporate for tax purposes’ in its home State.   
 
From the above, it follows that a ‘body corporate’ is an entity with a separate legal identity (i.e. a legal person 
or an entity with legal personality according to laws under which the entity has been incorporated or 
established), whereas a ‘body corporate for tax purposes’ is an entity without a separate legal identity that is 
treated on a par with separate legal entities for tax purposes of the home State.     
 
On a separate note, the use of the word other in ‘any other body of persons’, could suggest that a ‘company’ is 
necessarily a body of persons, i.e. a body of at least two persons. This would mean that a separate legal entity 
with, for example, one shareholder, such as SWFs or SWEs, could never qualify as a ‘company’. Surely, this was 
not the intention of the drafters. The definition of a company does not make any reference to the quality or 
quantity of (share)holder(s). Around the world many types of corporate bodies exist that can have one 
(share)holder only.   
 
5.3.2.3 States, political subdivisions and local authorities, and ‘person’ 
 
A ‘resident of a Contracting State’ is referred to in Art. 4(1) as: (i) any person who is liable to tax under the 
domestic laws of one of the States by reason of a certain criterion, and (ii) also includes the State itself and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof. Under (i) someone or something cannot be a ‘resident of a 
Contracting State’ without being a ‘person’, while the requirement of a ‘person’ as such is not mentioned 
under (ii). In the author’s view, Arts. 1, 3 and 4 of the OECD and UN MTC, when read in conjunction with each 
other, should be read to say that a ‘resident of a Contracting State’ under (ii) automatically qualifies as a 
‘person’, or that a ‘person’ (the definition of which is non-exhaustive) includes a State and any political 
subdivision or local authority thereof.484 
 
5.3.2.4 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
Sovereign wealth investors meeting the treaty definition of ‘company’ qualify as a ‘person’ under Arts. 1(1) 
and 4(1), and satisfy one of the conditions of Art. 10 (Dividends). 
 
The distinction made in Section 2.8.3 between sovereign wealth investors based on their legal form will be 
followed throughout the remaining part of this chapter, where relevant. 
                                                             
482 Para. 3 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 3. See also Para. 24 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1 (dealing with this 
matter in relation to collective investment funds). 
483 Ibid. 
484 Cf. P. Hattingh, “The Role and Function of Article 1 of the OECD Model” (2010) 57 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 546, p. 546, who reads Art. 1, when reading it in conjunction with Art. 3 and 4, as follows: “[t]his Convention 
shall apply to persons who are residents of a Contracting State, which (a) include an individual, any body corporate or any 
entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes, and any other body of persons who/which are, under the laws of 
that State, liable to tax therein by reason of his/its domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a 
similar nature, and (b) also include that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof. (…)” In other words, 
a State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof are persons who are a resident of a Contracting State as 
mentioned in Art. 1. See also R. Vann, ““Liable to Tax” and Company Residence under Tax Treaties”, in: G. Maisto, 
Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law, EC and International Tax Law Series, Vol. 5 (Amsterdam: 
IBFD, 2009), p. 198, fn. 4. 
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5.3.2.4.1 (i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State 
 
Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State are not corporate bodies 
‘themselves’, but they may be treated as such for home State tax purposes. If not, the relevant question is 
whether the State qualifies as a ‘company’ for tax treaty purposes. The term ‘company’ is defined in a wide 
sense as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” (italics 
added).485 So, the word ‘any’ suggests that the term body corporate includes both corporate bodies/legal 
persons of private law and corporate bodies/legal persons of public law. Whether an entity is a body 
corporate in a legal sense is determined on the basis of the (company) law of the State under which the entity 
has been established. For example, under Dutch law, the Dutch State (as well as Dutch provinces, Dutch 
municipalities and other Dutch entities to which public functions have been assigned and which have legal 
personality by virtue of a specific law)486 is a corporate body of public law (publiekrechtelijke rechtspersoon). 
Other States can be expected to have legal personality as well,487 as this enables them to carry out their duties, 
conduct transactions on their own behalf, hold the ownership of assets, enter into political agreements, etc. 
So, the State itself will most likely be a body corporate (of public law) and fall within the definition of 
‘company’. In this respect, the terms ‘State’ and ‘government’, as the representative governing body of the 
State, are interchangeable, as also appears from the Commentaries.488  
 
5.3.2.4.2 (ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the  
State itself 
 
Based on its wide definition of “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax 
purposes”, the tax treaty term ‘company’ includes both corporate bodies/legal persons of private law and 
corporate bodies/legal persons of public law. So, sovereign wealth investors established as separate legal 
entities under the laws of a Contracting State should meet the definition of company, whether established 
under public law or private law. 
 
5.3.2.4.3 (iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal 
personality 
 
SWEs organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, such as partnerships, will only qualify 
as a ‘company’ if they are treated as a body corporate for tax purposes according to the tax laws of the State in 
which the entity is organized. Otherwise, the sovereign wealth investor that has set-up the SWE would qualify 
as ‘company’ (look-through approach).   
 
  
                                                             
485 Art. 3(1)(b) of the OECD/UN MTC.  
486 Cf. Art. 2:1 and Art. 2:3 of the Dutch Civil Code. 
487 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Grotius Classic Reprint 
Series, No. 2, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 182-183, fn. 489. Political subdivisions will also have a 
separate legal personality (fn. 489). In most European States the local authority itself, and not so much its organs, will 
have a legal personality, while in other European States, such as Russia and Ukraine, the organs of the local authority carry 
a separate legal identity (as well). See Council of Europe, Local authority competences in Europe (situation in 2007), 
Study of the European Committee on Local and Regional Democracy, p. 12. 
488 Para. 8.4 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 6 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4, which refers the 
government of each State. 
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5.3.3 Residency (Art. 4) 
 
5.3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Art. 4(1) of the OECD MTC defines as a ‘resident’: 
 
“(…) any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason of his domicile, 
residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature, and also includes that State 
and any political subdivision or local authority thereof as well as a recognised pension fund of that 
State. This term however, does not include any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only 
of income from sources in that State or capital situated therein.” (Italics added) 
 
Art. 4(1) of the UN MTC reproduces Art. 4(1) OECD MTC, with one relevant exception; place of incorporation 
has been added as a criterion giving rise to the required tax liability. 
 
The first preliminary remark in the OECD Commentary on Art. 4,489 as reproduced in the UN Commentaries on 
Art. 4,490 identifies the following functions of the concept of resident for tax treaty purposes: 
 
1. to determine the personal scope (ratione personae) of application of a tax treaty; 
2. to solve issues of double taxation caused by double residence (which is done through the tie-breaker 
rules); and 
3. to solve issues of double taxation arising from simultaneous taxation in the State of residence and the 
State of source – which is done in the subsequent articles by means of allocating taxing rights 
between the State of which the owner of the income is a resident (‘residence State’) and the State 
where the income arises (‘source State’), and by providing for relief of double taxation. However, tax 
treaties as such do not create (domestic) taxing rights.  
 
Section 5.3.3 will consider the application of the ‘liable to tax’ test to sovereign wealth investors (i.e. the first 
function). 
5.3.3.2 Relationship between ‘liable to tax’ and the interpretation rule of Art. 3(2)? 
 
From the perspective of a source State, whether a person is a ‘resident of the other Contracting State’ (cf. Arts. 
10 and 11), in principle depends on the domestic tax laws of that other Contracting State, because Art. 4(1) 
refers to liable to tax under the laws of that (other) State by reason of a listed criterion. Thus, if a person is not 
liable to tax under the laws of the other Contracting State, or a person is liable to tax under the laws of the 
other Contracting State by reason of an unlisted criterion (not of a similar nature), this person is not a 
‘resident of the other Contracting State’. Does the exclusive reference to the laws of the other Contracting 
State mean that the source State perspective has no role to play in determining whether a person is a ‘resident 
of the other Contracting State’? The author tends to believe it does have a role to play for the following 
reasons.  
 
The term ‘liable to tax’ as referred to in Art. 4(1) is an undefined treaty term, which seems to leave room for 
the application of the interpretation rule of Art. 3(2). Pursuant to Art. 3(2), the meaning of any undefined 
treaty term is determined by the meaning under the domestic (tax) laws of the State that is applying the 
treaty, unless the context otherwise requires. In determining whether the source State needs to provide relief 
                                                             
489 Para. 1 of the Preliminary remarks on Art. 4 of the OECD MTC. 
490 Para. 1 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
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of taxation under the tax treaty (e.g. Arts. 10 and 11), the result of this rule of interpretation seems to be that a 
person needs to be ‘liable to tax’ from the viewpoint of the State of source as well (as the source State is 
looking to apply the treaty), unless the context otherwise requires.491 As explained in Section 5.2.2, according 
to the Commentaries, the context comprises in particular, but not exclusively: (i) the common intention of the 
States when signing the treaty, and (ii) the meaning of the term under the domestic (tax) law of the other 
Contracting State (an expression of reciprocity). Although both elements can be relevant to the interpretation 
of the term ‘liable to tax’, point (ii) – reference to the meaning of the term under the domestic (tax) law of the 
other Contracting State – is particularly interesting for the current discussion, also because Art. 4(1) refers to 
liable to tax under the laws of the home State. Does this reference in point (ii) mean that the meaning of the 
term ‘liable to tax’ from the perspective of the State of source is not relevant in determining whether a person 
is a ‘resident of the other Contracting State’ (as referred to in e.g. Arts. 10 and 11)? The author tends to believe 
the source State perspective can be relevant. Art. 3(2)’s primary reference is to the domestic (tax) laws of the 
State that is applying the treaty, so the meaning of an undefined tax treaty term according to the domestic 
(tax) law of the other Contracting should only have an overriding effect in exceptional circumstances. 
Otherwise, there is little point in Art. 3(2)’s primary reference to the domestic (tax) laws of the State that is 
applying the treaty. However, one could argue that, because Art. 4(1) refers to liable to tax under the laws of 
the home State, such an exceptional circumstance is present and, consequently, that the interpretation of the 
term ‘liable to tax’ by the source State is not relevant. In other words, assuming that Art. 3(2) applies, the 
context would require the source State simply to rely on the home State’s understanding of ‘liable to tax’. The 
author did not come across this particular issue and argument in literature or case law. As far as the author 
could establish, Swedish,492 Finnish,493 Indian and French494 case law dealing with access of foreign tax-
exempt entities to OECD MTC based treaties suggests that the ‘liable to tax’ test is also interpreted from a 
source State perspective. Also, as far as the author could establish, no explicit reference was made by these 
courts to the interpretation rule contained in Art. 3(2). And so this may have left these courts with the 
following two means of interpretation: (i) establishing an independent treaty meaning without reference to 
domestic (tax) law, or (ii) implicit reference to domestic (tax) law based on Art. 3(2). Given the limited 
guidance in the OECD Commentary on the meaning of ‘liable to tax’ in relation to tax-exempt entities, the 
courts may implicitly have applied Art. 3(2) to determine the meaning of ‘liable to tax’ from a source State 
perspective. In addition, the OECD Commentary and UN Commentaries on tax-exempt entities, discussed in 
Section 5.3.3.7.5 below, also seem to leave room for source State interpretation. However, to avoid 
discussions, States should preferably clarify the tax treaty status of entities bilaterally.   
 
5.3.3.3 Relevance of the connecting criteria for the meaning of ‘liable to tax’ 
 
A resident of a Contracting State includes any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax by 
reason of a certain criterion. The criteria mentioned in Art. 4(1) of the OECD MTC are domicile, residence, 
                                                             
491 This is the view of Van Weeghel. See Para. 1 of Van Weeghel’s comment on Hoge Raad, 4 December 2009, No. 
07/10383, BNB 2010/177.  
492 Regeringsrätten, Supreme Administrative Court, 2 October 1996, RÅ 1996 ref 84 (6301-1994), Tax Treaty Case Law 
IBFD (summary by M. Hilling), concerning the tax treaty residency of Luxembourg tax-exempt SICAVs.  
493 Korkein hallinto-oikeus, Supreme Administrative Court, 22 December 2004, KHO 2004:111, Tax Treaty Case Law 
IBFD (summary by K. Pettersson), concerning the tax treaty residency of a Luxembourg tax-exempt SICAV. 
494 In three decisions dated 6 December 2007, the Cour Administrative d'Appel de Paris held that three Dutch pension 
funds, although subjectively exempt from tax in the Netherlands by virtue of a specific provision, were liable to tax in the 
Netherlands and could, therefore, be regarded as residents for purposes of the treaty. However, more recently, on 9 
November 2015, the Conseil d’État held that a German tax-exempt pension fund did not qualify as a tax treaty resident. 
Regarding the decisions of 6 December 2007, see C. Védrine, “Treaty between France and Netherlands – French 
Administrative Court of Appeal finds withholding taxes applied to Dutch pension funds contrary to treaty non-
discrimination clause and EU free movement of capital”, 26 June 2008, IBFD Tax News Service. Regarding the decision 
of 9 November 2015, see P. Burg, “Treaty between France and Germany – French Administrative Supreme Court rules 
that exempt pension fund is not resident entitled treaty benefits”, 11 November 2015, IBFD TNS Online. 
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place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature. In Art. 4(1) of the UN MTC, place of 
incorporation has been added. These criteria are relevant for the interpretation of the term ‘liable to tax’. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has considered in Crown Forest Industries495 what these criteria have in common. 
Norsk Pacific Steamship Company Limited (‘Norsk’), a company incorporated under the laws of the Bahamas 
with business operations and a place of management in the U.S., received rental payments from a Canadian 
resident group company, Crown Forest Industries Limited. The rental payments were subject to Canadian 
taxation. If the Bahamian incorporated company could be considered a resident of the U.S. for purposes of the 
Canada – U.S. tax treaty, as claimed by the Canadian company, the statutory rate of 25% would be reduced to 
10% under the tax treaty. Norsk was liable to tax in the U.S. as a foreign taxpayer because it was engaged in a 
trade or business effectively connected with the U.S. The Supreme Court of Canada held that Norsk’s place of 
management in the U.S. was only one of the factors to be considered to determine whether it was engaged in 
the conduct of a trade or business in the U.S. It was liable to tax in the U.S. by reason of this trade or business 
and not ‘by reason’ of its place of management, as was required by the tax treaty. The Supreme Court of 
Canada then considered whether engaged in a trade or business is a criterion of a similar nature. It held that 
“(…) the most similar element among the enumerated criteria is that, standing alone, they would each 
constitute a basis on which states generally impose full tax liability on world-wide income”.496 In more 
abstract terms, the Canadian court may have been distinguishing between liability to residence taxation and 
liability to source taxation. The OECD MTC, which served as the basis for the Canada – U.S. tax treaty 
(1980),497 and its Commentaries, also assume a distinction between (and a concurrence of) residence taxation 
and source taxation, and allocate taxing rights over a number of items of income and capital between the 
residence State (i.e. the State of which the owner of the income or capital is a resident) and the source State 
(i.e. the State where the income or gain arises).498 Residence-based taxation refers to taxation based on a 
principle of residence and principally attaches to the person (subject) instead of the income (object), whereas 
source-based taxation refers to taxation based on a principle of source and principally attaches to sourced 
income (object) instead of the person (subject).499 In general, liability to residence-based taxation (which can 
take different forms) is more comprehensive as the tax base has no geographical boundaries. In the author’s 
opinion, what all criteria have in common is that they generally serve as a basis for imposing a liability to 
(some type of) residence taxation by reason of a personal connecting factor, i.e. they attach to a person 
(subject) rather than income (object). The Commentaries on both model tax conventions also point in this 
direction: 
 
“Generally the domestic laws of the various States impose a comprehensive liability to tax – “full tax 
liability” – based on the taxpayers’ personal attachment to the State concerned (the “State of 
residence”). This liability to tax is not imposed only on persons who are “domiciled” in a State in the 
sense in which “domicile” is usually taken in the legislations (private law). The cases of full liability to 
tax are extended to comprise also, for instance, persons who stay continually, or maybe only for a 
certain period, in the territory of the State.”500 
 
5.3.3.4 ‘Liable to tax’ as (the most) comprehensive taxation 
 
The discussion on the connecting criteria has shed some light on the meaning of the ‘liable to tax’ requirement 
in Art. 4(1). What all criteria have in common is that they generally serve as a basis for imposing a liability to 
                                                             
495 Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 22 June 1995, File No.: 23940, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD. 
496 Ibid., at 40.  
497 Ibid., at 55. 
498 See, for example, Paras. 19-25, Introduction to the OECD MTC. 
499 R. Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation, (IBFD Publications BV: Amsterdam, 2002), pp. 148-149. 
500 Para. 3 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 2 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
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residence taxation, principally attaching to a person (subject) rather than income (object). The Commentary 
on Art. 4(1) reveals what it aims to cover:501  
 
“The definition refers to the concept of residence adopted in the domestic laws (…). As far as 
individuals are concerned, the definition aims at covering the various forms of personal attachment to 
a State which, in the domestic taxation laws, form the basis of a comprehensive taxation (full liability 
to tax).” 
 
This statement is as relevant for companies as it is for individuals. Therefore, liability to tax in Art. 4(1) refers 
to ‘comprehensive liability to tax’ or ‘full liability to tax’ and is relevant for all persons, including companies. 
Support for this can be found in Canadian502 and Dutch503 case law, among others. In many States, 
comprehensive taxation is understood as taxation on worldwide income and, at first sight, this appears to be 
supported by the second sentence of Art. 4(1), which excludes as a resident ”any person who is liable to tax in 
that State in respect only of income from sources in that State or capital situated therein”. This would imply 
that persons who are ‘resident’ in a State which has adopted in its income tax system the territoriality 
principle, would never qualify as a resident under Art. 4. The OECD Commentary clarifies that such a result is 
clearly not intended and also not achieved when the second sentence of Art. 4(1) is interpreted in the light of 
its object and purpose, which is to exclude persons who are not subject to comprehensive taxation.504 The 
OECD Commentary implies that comprehensive taxation (full liability to tax) cannot be understood as a 
universal concept, but should be construed in the light of an individual tax system and the principles upon 
which that tax system is based (i.e. it should be made country-specific). Comprehensive taxation is therefore 
sometimes referred to as the ‘most comprehensive tax liability’ imposed by a State,505 which then seems to be 
a more appropriate expression. Thus, persons who are resident in a State that applies a territoriality principle 
in taxation are liable to the most comprehensive taxation under the laws of that State. 
 
The object and purpose of the second sentence (introduced in the 1977 OECD Model and the 1999 UN MTC) is 
in particular to exclude persons who, although liable to residence taxation under the domestic laws of a State 
(i.e. liable to tax in the meaning of the first sentence), are in fact liable to tax in that State only on income from 
sources or capital situated in the receiving State as a consequence of international law other than the tax 
treaty concerned.506 The original cause for the introduction of the second sentence seems to be to exclude as 
                                                             
501 Para. 8 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 5 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. Similar wording was 
already used in Para. 10 of the 1963 OECD Commentary on Art. 4. 
502 Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 22 June 1995, File No.: 23940, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD, at 40, concerning the residence status under the Canada – U.S. tax treaty of a company 
incorporated under the laws of the Bahamas with business operations and a place of management in the U.S.: “(…) the 
most similar element among the enumerated criteria is that, standing alone, they would each constitute a basis on which 
states generally impose full tax liability on world-wide income. (…) In this respect, the criteria for determining residence 
in Article IV, paragraph 1 involve more than simply being liable to taxation on some portion of income (source liability); 
they entail being subject to as comprehensive a tax liability as is imposed by a state. In the United States and Canada, such 
comprehensive taxation is taxation on world-wide income.” 
503 Hoge Raad, 28 February 2001, No. 35 557, BNB 2001/195, Para. 3.7, concerning the residence status under the 
Netherlands – Belgium tax treaty of a company incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands of which the place of 
effective management was moved to the Netherlands Antilles. 
504 Para. 8.3 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4. Reference to the object and purpose of the second sentence with respect 
to the territoriality principle was included in 2008 and changed the Commentary as it was from 1992 onwards, which 
stated that the second sentence had “to be interpreted restrictively”. This amendment should be seen as a clarification 
rather than a material change.   
505 Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 22 June 1995, File No.: 23940, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD, at 40; A. de Graaf & F. Pötgens, “Worrying Interpretation of ‘Liable to Tax’: OECD Clarification 
Would Be Welcome” (2011) 39 Intertax 169, p. 169.  
506 H. Pijl, “Excluded Resident and the Term “Law”/“Laws” in Article 4 of the OECD Draft (1963) and OECD Model 
(1977/2010)” (2012) 66 Bulletin for International Taxation 3, pp. 5-14 & p. 22. 
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tax treaty residents diplomatic and consular personnel who are accredited to other States. Such persons are 
often resident for tax purposes of the receiving State, but the possibility for that receiving State to impose tax 
on diplomatic and consular staff is (often) restricted by (customary rules of) international law to certain 
income from sources or capital situated in the receiving State.507/508 However, not only diplomats can become 
excluded residents under the second sentence. In December 1971, after the OECD Draft of 1963, but prior to 
the OECD Model of 1977, it was first proposed to extend the scope of the excluded resident to ‘individuals’, not 
just diplomats and consular staff,509 while in April 1973, it was agreed to widen the scope to ‘persons’,510 thus 
including companies as well. Another example of an excluded resident under the second sentence, also 
mentioned in both Commentaries,511 is that of dual residents (i.e. residents under the domestic tax laws of two 
States) who are resident of the loser-State under the tie-breaker rule in the tax treaty between the winner-
State and loser-State. Such dual residents do not have access to tax treaties concluded between the loser-State 
and third States, because, pursuant to the tax treaty between the loser-State and the winner-State (the other 
international law), they are de facto liable to tax in the loser-State on source income only. The territorial 
principle applied to the taxation of residents also limits the liability to tax to income from sources or capital 
situated in that State, but this is the result of domestic tax policy and not of other international law.      
 
Couzin has pointed to some of the shortcomings of the ‘most comprehensive tax liability’ expression.512 He 
gives the example, which this author has modified somewhat, of a corporation that is liable to the general 
territorial regime in its State of residence. This corporation can also elect to become liable to worldwide 
taxation. In this situation, what is the most comprehensive form of taxation? He also gives the examples of 
leasing corporations in Canada to whom favourable tax depreciation rules apply and mortgage investment 
corporations that can deduct dividend payments. Again, what is the most comprehensive form of taxation? 
According to Couzin, in line with the basic distinction underlying the OECD MTC as a whole, Art. 4(1) intends 
to cover persons who are liable to some type of residence taxation (i.e. taxation by reason of a personal 
connecting criterion) rather than source taxation.513 It does not require residence-based taxation to result in 
‘comprehensive’, ‘full’ or ‘the most comprehensive tax liability’: 
 
“The attempt to confine Article 4(1) to instances of residence-based taxation on the basis of an 
implicit requirement that the taxation be comprehensive or full, or the most comprehensive that is 
imposed by the state, could only succeed if the domestic tax systems were constructed with two 
simple regimes: “residence” taxation applied at a single rate or schedule of rates to a defined, 
invariable, tax base on those who present a particular personal nexus, and “source” taxation applied to 
items of income considered to arise in the jurisdiction upon those not subjected to residence taxation. 
In that case, Article 4(1) would refer to the former, rather than the latter. Since this is not how tax 
systems actually work, the adjectives [“(the most) comprehensive” or “full” tax liability] can lead one 
into error.”514   
 
The OECD and UN MTC as a whole indeed reflect a distinction between two basic forms of taxation: residence-
based taxation and source-based taxation. The connecting criteria listed in Art. 4(1) reflect forms of personal 
                                                             
507 Para. 8.1 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 4 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
508 Art. 34(b) and (d) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961, and Art. 49(b) and (d) of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations 1963. 
509 Report on Arts. 16, 17 and 19 and the Question Concerning Residence of Diplomats, 23 December 1971, 
CFA/WP1(71)7, p. 14. 
510 Summary of Discussions at the Seventh Meeting of Working Party No. 1 on Double Taxation, 11 April 1973, 
DAF/CFA/WP1(73)5, p. 5.  
511 Para. 8.2 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 4 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
512 R. Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation, (IBFD Publications BV: Amsterdam, 2002), pp. 152-154. 
513 Ibid., pp. 147-150 & pp. 154-155. 
514 Ibid., p. 154. 
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attachment commonly used by States as a basis for imposing residence-based taxation.515 In the author’s 
opinion, the expression ‘a comprehensive taxation (full tax liability)’ as adopted in both Commentaries, 
precisely aims to refer to forms of residence taxation, as opposed to source taxation. Residence taxation (or, in 
the words of both Commentaries, ‘comprehensive taxation (full liability to tax)’) can include taxation on 
worldwide income, but also taxation based on a territoriality principle, as long as the tax liability has been 
imposed based on a person’s subjective attachment to a State. However, when focusing on Art. 4(1) of the 
OECD MTC, the connecting factors seem to contain a territorial, more economic link between a taxpayer and a 
Contracting State. In contrast, under Art. 4(1) of the UN MTC, a more formal link also seems sufficient, as place 
of incorporation is listed as connecting factor as well. The difference could have implications for the 
interpretation of the term “any other criterion of a similar nature” and the scope of both articles. It seems that 
any domestic feature giving rise to residence taxation is sufficient under Art. 4(1) of the UN MTC. However, 
since it can be argued that Art. 4(1) of the OECD MTC requires a more economic link between a taxpayer and a 
Contracting State, place of incorporation may not qualify as a similar criterion, even when it gives rise to 
residence taxation.516 In the author’s view, both articles have the same scope and any domestic feature giving 
rise to residence taxation should be sufficient to qualify as a tax treaty resident. The OECD Commentary 
indicates that Art. 4(1) also covers persons who are deemed to be resident according to the tax laws of a 
Contracting State.517     
 
5.3.3.5 A source State perspective on “any other criterion of a similar nature”? 
 
In determining whether a source State needs to provide relief of taxation under the tax treaty (e.g. Arts. 10 
and 11), the question arises whether the source State perspective on the expression “any other criterion of a 
similar nature” is relevant. Different from the term ‘liable to tax’ (Section 5.3.3.2), the author tends to believe 
it is not. As an undefined treaty term, this expression seems to be covered by Art. 3(2) and so its meaning is in 
principle determined according to the laws of the State of source, unless the context otherwise requires. Since 
the term “any other criterion of a similar nature” itself will not be used or defined in the laws of the State of 
source, it can be argued that the correct approach to determine its domestic law meaning is to establish 
whether this other criterion would have given rise to residence taxation in the State of source. However, such 
approach could make an OECD MTC based treaty largely inoperative in the situation where the other State 
solely imposes residence taxation on companies by reason of their incorporation, while the State of source 
does not.518 In this situation, a company incorporated under the laws of the other State would not be liable to 
tax by reason of a qualifying criterion from the perspective of the State of source. In the author’s view, it can 
be argued that the context requires an alternative interpretation, because the meaning of the expression “any 
other criterion of a similar nature” is sufficiently clear from the context of Art. 4(1) itself. It refers to forms of 
‘personal or locative’519 attachment commonly used by States as a basis for imposing (forms of) residence 
taxation, as opposed to (forms of) source taxation, but not expressly listed in Art. 4(1). If the other Contracting 
State imposes residence taxation on companies by reason of incorporation, then it is sufficiently clear from 
                                                             
515 This conclusion was also reached by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal of Mumbai, India in ITO (IT) v. Rameshkumar 
Goenka, I.T.A. No. 3562/Mum/2009: “[t]he expression 'liable to tax' is not to read in isolation but in conjunction with the 
words immediately following it i.e., 'by reason of domicile, residence, place of management, place of incorporation or any 
other criterion of similar nature'. (…) These tests of fiscal domicile which are given by way of examples following the 
expression 'liable to tax by reason of' i.e., domicile, residence, place of management, place of incorporation etc. are no 
more than examples of locality related attachments that attract residence type taxation” (Italics added). 
516 A. Rust, in Reimer & Rust (eds), Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 4th edn., (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2015), p. 261. According to the Dutch explanatory notes to the tax treaty between the Netherlands and Qatar, 
place of incorporation is a criterion of a similar nature. Tweede Kamer, 2008–2009, 31 764, No. 7, p. 3.  
517 Para. 8 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4. 
518 This problem would not arise under UN MTC based treaties, as place of incorporation is among the listed criteria.    
519 R. Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation, (IBFD Publications BV: Amsterdam, 2002), p. 134. 
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the context of Art. 4(1) that such companies are liable to tax by reason of a criterion of a similar nature, which 
leaves no room for a meaning under the domestic tax law of the State of source.        
 
5.3.3.6 Liable to tax vs. subject to tax 
 
In the English language, the term ‘liable to tax’ is distinguished from the term ‘subject to tax’. The latter is said 
to refer to an actual tax liability of a person on all or part of his income, whereas the former is said to refer to a 
potential, more abstract, tax liability of a person.520 In this sense, the term ‘liable to tax’ has a broader meaning 
and includes the term ‘subject to tax’, i.e. someone who is subject to tax is always liable to tax, but someone 
who is liable to tax is not necessarily subject to tax. The conclusion that liable to tax has a broader meaning 
than subject to tax was also reached during the panel discussion at the IFA Congress in 2004.521 At this 
Congress, it was furthermore concluded that ‘tax effectively due’ was narrower than ‘subject to tax’ and ‘paid 
tax’ was the narrowest term of all.522 The Commentaries provide no guidance as to whether Art. 4(1) requires 
an actual or a more abstract tax liability, but only observe that “[i]n many States, a person is considered liable 
to comprehensive taxation even if the Contracting State does not in fact impose tax” (italics added).523 Both 
Commentaries imply that the term ‘liable to tax’ is not uniformly interpreted by States, although many States 
seem to interpret this treaty term as meaning a more abstract tax liability.524 If liable to tax is understood as a 
potential, more abstract, tax liability, it seems clear that, for example, exemptions of items of income or tax 
deductions and losses as a result of which no tax is due in a given year, but otherwise would have been due, do 
not preclude the application of a tax treaty to a person.525 If liable to tax is understood as subject to tax, it can 
be unclear whether in such cases a person is a tax treaty resident.526 If liable to tax is interpreted as tax 
effectively due or tax paid, this could have as an absurd consequence that, depending on the nature of the 
income or the amount of deductions or losses, a person (without any change of its tax status) is a resident for 
tax treaty purposes in one year, but not in another. 
                                                             
520 A. de Graaf & F. Pötgens, “Worrying Interpretation of ‘Liable to Tax’: OECD Clarification Would Be Welcome” 
(2011) 39 Intertax 169, p. 172. 
521 I. Burgers, “Recente ontwikkelingen in het Nederlands belastingverdragenrecht” (2005) 78 Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal 
Ondernemingsrecht, fn. 11.  
522 Ibid. 
523 Para. 8.11 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4, quoted in Para. 6 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
524 See, for example, India: ITO (IT) v. Rameshkumar Goenka, I.T.A. No. 3562/Mum/2009, at 8: “[t]herefore, as long as a 
person has such locality related attachments which attract residence type taxation, that ‘person’ is to be treated as resident 
and this status of being a ‘resident’ of the Contracting State is independent of the actual levy of tax on that person. Viewed 
in this perspective, we are of the considered opinion that being ‘liable to tax’ in the Contracting State does not necessarily 
imply that the person should actually be liable to tax in that Contracting State by the virtue of an existing legal provision 
but would also cover the cases where that other Contracting State has the right to tax such persons - irrespective of whether 
or not such a right is exercised by the Contracting State” (Italics added); Sweden: Regeringsrätten (Supreme 
Administrative Court), 2 October 1996, RÅ 1996 ref 84 (6301-1994), Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD (summary by M. 
Hilling). This interpretation has also found support in international literature. See, for example, D. Ward et al., “A 
Resident of a Contracting State for Tax Treaty Purposes: A Case Comment on Crown Forest Industries” (1996) 44 
Canadian Tax Journal 408, pp. 419-422; A. de Graaf & F. Pötgens, “Worrying Interpretation of ‘Liable to Tax’: OECD 
Clarification Would Be Welcome” (2011) 39 Intertax 169, pp. 172-173; N. Bammens, “Belgium”, in: Residence of 
Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law, EC and International Tax Law Series, Vol. 5 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), p. 
393. 
525 A. Scapa & L. Henie, “Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation under the OECD Model Tax Convention” (2005) 33 
Intertax 266, p. 271. 
526 According to the International Manual, which can be used by HM Revenue & Customs staff for guidance, a person 
would be regarded as subject to tax for U.K. tax treaty purposes if, for example, they do not pay any U.K. tax because their 
income is covered by personal allowances and reliefs. See INTM162020 - UK residents with foreign income or gains: 
double taxation relief - claims and procedures - 'Subject to tax'. 
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5.3.3.7 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
5.3.3.7.1 Tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors in their home State 
 
More often than not, it is believed that sovereign wealth investors are never taxed in their home State.527 This 
is probably true in most cases, but certainly not in all. Some sovereign wealth investors, including Singapore’s 
Temasek,528 are liable to tax based on a territoriality principle, while other sovereign wealth investors, 
including China’s CIC and the Korea Investment Corporation, appear to be liable to tax on their worldwide 
income.529 In Section 2.10, three conflicting views were discussed regarding the issue of home State taxation 
of sovereign wealth investors: (i) home State taxation is superfluous, because taxes and dividends are 
functionally equivalent, (ii) home State taxation is necessary as its puts sovereign wealth investors on equal 
footing with private investors, and (iii) home State taxation is necessary to deal with the agency problem.     
 
Some argue that taxing resident entities wholly-owned by a State, including SWFs and SWEs, makes no sense, 
as the profits of such entities already belong to that State. Imposing tax on its own SWFs and SWEs would 
merely result in a transfer of money from one pocket controlled by the State to another.530 The State, as its 
owner, can collect revenue by simply extracting profits through (dividend) distributions, which saves 
(unnecessary) costs, because there is no need to compute taxable income (under often complex tax rules). In 
this view, which is relevant for State entities in general, home State taxes and dividends are seen as 
functionally equivalent.531 Most home States are not convinced by the arguments to tax their own SWFs and 
SWEs. To the author’s knowledge, many sovereign wealth investors are not taxed in their home State, because 
they are carved out/excluded from the tax statute as a person, because they have been established in a State 
(or political subdivision) with no or a very limited (corporate) income tax system in place532 (e.g. the Future 
Generations Reserve Fund of Bahrain), or because income tax legislation has been enacted, but is not (yet) 
enforced upon them (e.g. the U.A.E.).533 Sovereign wealth investors could also not be taxed in their home State 
because they are subjectively exempt from tax, just like many (other) State entities.   
 
In summary, some sovereign wealth investors may be taxed in their home State, because they are: 
 
(1) liable to tax on their worldwide income; or 
(2) liable to tax under a territorial tax system.  
 
However, most sovereign wealth investors are not taxed in their home State, because: 
 
(3) they are subjectively exempt from tax;  
(4) income tax legislation has been enacted, but is not (yet) enforced upon them; 
(5) they are carved out/excluded from the tax statute as a person; or 
                                                             
527 For example, M. Desai & D. Dharmapala, “Taxing the Bandit Kings” (2008) 118 Yale Law Journal Pocket Part 98, p. 
99; M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703, p. 715; M. Kandev, “Sovereign 
Wealth Funds: Are They Welcome in Canada?” (2010) 64 Bulletin for International Taxation 649, p. 650. 
528 Temasek Review 2012 (Extending Pathways), p. 45, available at: 
<http://www.temasek.com.sg/documents/download/downloads/20120703190357/TR2012_Eng.pdf>. 
529 Wei Cui, “Responding to Sovereign Funds: Are We Looking in the Right Place?” (2009) 123 Tax Notes 1237, p. 1241. 
530 M. Knoll, “Taxation and the Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Invest in the United States?” (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 703, p. 715. 
531 R. Gordon, “Taxes and privatization” (2001), Discussion Paper No. 2977, Centre for Economic Policy Research, p. 5. 
532 Bahrain only levies income tax on oil companies. See S. Gueydi, Bahrain - Corporate Taxation, Country Surveys 
IBFD. 
533 H. Hull, “United Arab Emirates: Tax Treaty Relief on International Investment” (2009) 63 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 52, p. 52. 
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(6) they have been established in a State (or political subdivision) with no or a very limited 
(corporate) income tax system in place. 
 
Below, it is examined for each of these categories whether the ‘liable to tax’ test would be satisfied. 
 
5.3.3.7.2 Relationship between ‘liable to tax’ and the interpretation rule of Art. 3(2)? 
 
From the discussion in Section 5.3.3.2 above, it appears to be somewhat unclear whether the source State 
perspective on the undefined term ‘liable to tax’ is relevant in determining whether the source State needs to 
provide relief of taxation (e.g. Arts. 10 and 11). The author tends to believe it is relevant and finds support for 
this view in literature, case law and the OECD Commentary and UN Commentaries.534  
 
5.3.3.7.3 (1) Liable to home State taxation on worldwide income 
 
Sovereign wealth investors being liable to home State taxation on worldwide income by reason of a listed 
criterion should qualify as a resident under Art. 4(1). In the view of most States this would be no different if 
the income of a sovereign wealth investors would be wholly or partly tax-exempt. 
 
5.3.3.7.4 (2) Liable to territorial based home State taxation 
 
Some sovereign wealth investors are liable to tax in their home State, but only to the extent they derive 
(certain items of) income or profit from that State. One might argue that since sovereign wealth investors only 
invest abroad they de facto will never pay any tax in their home State. However, not paying tax in the State of 
residence does not necessarily mean that a person is not regarded as a resident under Art. 4(1). Also, some 
sovereign wealth investors do invest in and pay tax in their home State on profits from domestic 
investments.535 One might further argue that the term ‘liable to tax’ in Art. 4(1) refers to a comprehensive tax 
liability and that comprehensive tax liability should be understood as taxation of worldwide income and, 
therefore, territoriality-based income tax systems are excluded from its scope. However, as explained in more 
detail in Section 5.3.3.4, this view conflicts with the principles underlying the OECD and UN MTC itself, the 
nature of the connecting factors, as well as the Commentaries. Therefore, sovereign wealth investors set up in 
States that have adopted a territorial tax system can be a resident under Art. 4(1), as long as the tax liability 
has been imposed by reason of a personal or locative attachment to that State. This would also apply if the 
sovereign wealth investor in fact does not pay tax in its home State, because it enjoys foreign sourced income 
or domestic tax-exempt income only.  
 
5.3.3.7.5 (3) Subjectively exempt from home State taxation 
 
Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 points to the relevance of Paras. 8.11 and 8.12 in cases where 
SWFs are not (considered) an integral part of the State. Paras. 8.11 and 8.12, quoted in Para. 6 of the UN 
Commentaries on Art. 4, are concerned with tax treaty residency of tax-exempt entities and express the views 
of States taken on this matter. The majority view can be found in Para. 8.11, where the Commentary observes 
that:   
 
“In many States, a person is considered liable to comprehensive taxation even if the Contracting State 
does not in fact impose tax. For example, charities and other organisations may be exempted from tax, 
                                                             
534 Reference is made to Section 5.3.3.2. 
535 Singapore’s Temasek pays taxes to the Singapore Government and, as on 31 March 2012, 30% of its funds were 
invested domestically. See Temasek Review 2012 (Extending Pathways), p. 16 & p. 45.   
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but they are exempt only if they meet all of the requirements for exemption specified in the tax laws. 
They are, thus, subject to the tax laws of a Contracting State. Furthermore, if they do not meet the 
standards specified, they are also required to pay tax. Most States would view such entities as 
residents for purposes of the Convention (see, for example, paragraph 1 of Article 10 and paragraph 5 
of Article 11).”  
 
The minority view can be found in Para. 8.12: 
 
“In some States, however, these entities are not considered liable to tax if they are exempt from tax 
under domestic tax laws. These States may not regard such entities as residents for purposes of a 
convention unless these entities are expressly covered by the convention.”  
 
The Commentaries do not take sides, but only observe that States understand the term ‘liable to tax’ 
differently when it comes to tax-exempt entities. The majority view, among others expressed by the U.S. 
Treasury Department and the U.S. tax authorities,536 the Swedish and Finnish Administrative Supreme 
Court537 and the French Administrative Court of Appeal538 is that tax-exempt entities which would have been 
taxable but for the exemption, to which conditions are attached, are considered liable to tax. The 
Commentaries introduce the expression ‘subject to the tax laws’ of a State, which probably means to say that 
these entities have a personal attachment to a State that would have given rise to residence taxation in the 
absence of the exemption. The State could have imposed tax on the entity as a resident, but chose not to. The 
minority view, among others expressed by the Canada Revenue Agency,539 the Supreme Court of Canada,540 
the Dutch Supreme Court,541 the French Administrative Supreme Court,542 the French tax authorities,543 is that 
tax-exempt entities are not ‘liable to tax’ as referred in Art. 4(1). States adhering to the majority view interpret 
the term ‘liable to tax’ as a potential, more abstract, tax liability of a person. Couzin aptly refers to such 
                                                             
536 For example, Revenue Ruling 2000-59, p. 8: “While the 1981 U.S. Model does not specifically provide that persons 
organized under the laws of a state that are generally exempt from tax and established and maintained exclusively to 
provide pension or other similar benefits are residents of that state (and the 1996 U.S. Model does so provide), the 
Treasury Department’s Technical Explanation to the 1996 U.S. Model confirms that the specific provision in the 1996 
U.S. Model merely clarifies the generally accepted practice that these entities are residents even though they may be 
entitled to a complete or partial exemption from tax.” 
537 See Section 5.3.3.2. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Technical News No. 35, 26 February 2007, as discussed by K. Brooks, 
“Canada”, in: G. Maisto, Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law, EC and International Tax Law Series, 
Vol. 5 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), p. 429. 
540 Crown Forest Industries Ltd. v. Her Majesty the Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 22 June 1995, File No.: 23940, Tax 
Treaty Case Law IBFD. From this decision, learned authors have drawn the conclusion that: “(…) if the broad sweep of 
statements of the Supreme Court in Crown Forest Industries were to be applied, [tax-exempt charitable organizations and 
pension funds] would be considered not to be residents of a contracting state and therefore would not be entitled to the 
treaty-reduced rates of tax.” See D. Ward et al., “A Resident of a Contracting State for Tax Treaty Purposes: A Case 
Comment on Crown Forest Industries” (1996) 44 Canadian Tax Journal 408, p. 419. 
541 Hoge Raad, 4 December 2009, No. 07/10383, BNB 2010/177. Admittedly, there is no consensus in Dutch literature on 
this point. The Supreme Court decision of 4 December 2009 involved a Dutch resident association which was not 
subjectively tax-exempt, but carved out from the Dutch tax statute because it did not carry on a business. The Dutch 
Supreme Court held that the Dutch association was not “liable to tax” under the U.S. – Netherlands tax treaty (1992). The 
author agrees with De Graaf & Pötgens’ view that, based on the reasoning in this decision, the Dutch Supreme Court 
would not consider subjectively tax-exempt entities as being liable to tax either. See A. de Graaf & F. Pötgens, “Worrying 
Interpretation of ‘Liable to Tax’: OECD Clarification Would Be Welcome” (2011) 39 Intertax 169, p. 169. For a different 
view, see H. Pijl, “De additionele inwonerseis in het verdrag met de Verenigde Staten: HR 4 december 2009, BNB 
2010/177” (2010) Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht 1371, Para. 1. 
542 Conseil d’État, 9 November 2015, Case 370054, Tax Treaty Case Law IBFD, concerning the tax treaty residency of a 
German tax-exempt pension fund.  
543 N. de Boynes, “France”, in: G. Maisto, Residence of Companies under Tax Treaties and EC Law, EC and International 
Tax Law Series, Vol. 5 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), p. 453. 
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potential liability as ‘liable to be liable’.544 To conclude, subjectively tax-exempt sovereign wealth investors 
will be considered ‘liable to tax’ by many States, but certainly not by all.  
 
5.3.3.7.6 (4) Income tax legislation has been enacted, but is not enforced 
 
Most emirates of the U.A.E. have enacted corporate income tax decrees for the taxation of income earned by 
corporate bodies. However, in practice, these decrees are currently only enforced upon oil and gas companies 
and branches of foreign banks.545 Most sovereign wealth investors from the U.A.E. have been set up as 
corporate bodies under the laws of the U.A.E.546 and so it seems likely that they are covered by the relevant 
income tax decree. The issue whether U.A.E. entities (other than oil and gas companies and branches of 
foreign banks) are ‘liable to tax’ for model based tax treaty purposes was considered by the Indian Income-tax 
Appellate Tribunal in Green Emirate Shipping & Travels Ltd.547 It held that the enumerated criteria in Art. 4(1) 
are examples of ‘locality-related attachments’ which attract residence type taxation and that ‘liable to tax’: 
 
“(…) does not necessarily imply that the person should actually be liable to tax in that Contracting 
State by virtue of an existing legal provision but would also cover the cases where that other 
Contracting State has the right to tax such persons irrespective of whether or not such a right is 
exercised by the Contracting State.”  
 
As a result, this U.A.E. entity was considered ‘liable to tax’ for purposes of the tax treaty between the U.A.E. 
and India (1993). 
 
Similar to subjectively tax-exempt entities, it can be argued that U.A.E. corporate bodies (other than oil and 
gas companies and branches of foreign banks) are ‘subject to the tax laws’ of the U.A.E., because they are 
covered by the relevant income tax decree. Therefore, many States would probably view such entities, 
including U.A.E. sovereign wealth investors, as being ‘liable to tax’ for tax treaty purposes.    
 
5.3.3.7.7 (5) Carved out from their home State’s tax statute as a person 
 
Entities, including sovereign wealth investors, that are excluded from the tax statute from the start, appear 
not to be considered liable to tax for tax treaty purposes. In comparison with subjectively tax-exempt entities 
and entities that are covered by income tax legislation that is not enforced upon them, it cannot be said that 
entities excluded from the reach of a tax system are subject to the tax laws of a State. The ‘subject to the tax 
laws’ argument is presented by a majority of States to grant tax treaty entitlement to subjectively tax-exempt 
entities. The rationale behind this reasoning is that such entities have the required personal connection to a 
State which would have resulted in residence taxation in the absence of the exemption. Not only do such 
entities have the required connection to a State (the personal connection), they also fall within reach of that 
State’s tax system (the tax (law) connection). Although entities that have been carved out from the tax statute 
can have the required personal attachment to a State, it cannot be said they are governed by or subject to the 
tax laws of that State. The term ‘liable to tax’ implies at least some sort of tax connection between the entity 
and the State. In this respect, a connection to the tax laws (subject to or governed by) is considered sufficient 
in most sources States, and this is where the term ‘liable to tax’ appears to find its limit. Since carved out 
entities, including carved out sovereign wealth investors, have no such connection, they would most likely not 
meet the ‘liable to tax’ test in the view of most States.   
                                                             
544 R. Couzin, Corporate Residence and International Taxation, (IBFD Publications BV: Amsterdam, 2002), p. 107. 
545 United Arab Emirates – Corporate Taxation – Country Surveys – Introduction, IBFD Database. 
546 See Section A.3.2 of this study. 
547 Green Emirate Shipping & Travels Ltd v. Assistant Director of Income Tax, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, 30 
November 2005, (2006) 99 TTJ Mum 988. 
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5.3.3.7.8 (6) No or a very limited (corporate) income tax system in place 
 
Just like sovereign wealth investors which have been carved out from the statute, sovereign wealth investors 
resident in a State with no or a very limited income tax system in place, do not have the required tax (law) 
connection. As a result, such sovereign wealth investors would most likely not meet the ‘liable to tax’ test in 
the view of most States. It, therefore, seems unlikely that States with no or a very limited income tax system in 
place would adopt the ‘liable to tax’ test in a tax treaty. 
 
5.3.3.7.9 Comment 
 
Many States choose not to tax their sovereign wealth investors. Many States also choose, for a number of 
reasons, not to tax certain private investors, such as pension funds and CIVs. However, as demonstrated, the 
way this non-taxation of sovereign wealth investors and private investors is achieved in the legislation of the 
home State can make a difference for the outcome of the ‘liable to tax’ test.548 This is a major point of criticism 
about the ‘liable to tax’ test. The ‘liable to tax’ test fulfils a key function within the traditional main purpose of 
a tax treaty according to both the OECD Commentary and UN Commentaries:549 the avoidance of international 
juridical double taxation.550 It identifies and solves potential situations of international juridical double 
taxation by allocating taxing rights between two States. This is the system underlying the OECD and UN MTC 
as a whole. If a person is liable to tax, there is, at least, a risk of international juridical double taxation. In 
situations (3) to (6), discussed in Section 5.3.3.7.5 to 5.3.3.7.8 above, there is, in principle, no risk of 
international juridical double taxation, but (source) States may still consider the ‘liable to tax’ test to be 
satisfied in one situation but not in another. However, this is done so without distinction among and between 
sovereign wealth investors and other investors. 
 
The author argues that the ‘liable to tax’ test generally has no proper meaning in relation to sovereign wealth 
investors. A State can simply choose to impose tax on its own sovereign wealth investors and let these funds 
immediately flow back, or reduce the amount of dividends otherwise due with the amount of tax. In these 
cases, imposing tax on sovereign wealth investors would have no impact on that State’s revenue, or on its 
sovereign wealth investor. 
 
5.3.4 “[T]hat State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof” (Art. 4(1))  
 
5.3.4.1 Introduction 
 
The term ‘resident of a Contracting State’ in Art. 4(1) also includes that State and any political subdivision or 
local authority thereof. Section 5.3.4 will consider how this phrase applies to sovereign wealth investors. 
 
 
                                                             
548 Van Weeghel has also observed this in more general terms in his comment on Hoge Raad, 4 December 2009, No. 
07/10383, BNB 2010/177. See also, J. Wheeler, “The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties” (2011) 3 World Tax 
Journal 247, p. 252. 
549 Para. 1 of the Preliminary remarks on Art. 4 of the OECD MTC, and Para. 1 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. See 
Section 5.3.3.1. 
550 Paras. 1-3, Introduction of the Commentary on the OECD MTC. International juridical double taxation is defined as the 
imposition of comparable taxes by at least two States on the same taxpayer with respect to the same item of income or 
capital during the same period. Reference to this main purpose could also be found in the title of the 1963 OECD Draft 
Double Taxation Convention as well as the 1977 Model Double Taxation Convention, but was dropped in the 1992 
version because it was recognized that the avoidance of (international juridical) double taxation was not the only purpose 
of the OECD MTC. 
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5.3.4.2 History 
 
The phrase that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof was added to Art. 4(1) of the 
OECD MTC in 1995 and Art. 4(1) of the UN MTC in 1999. The OECD Commentary explains that, even without 
this phrase, most (hence, not all) OECD Member States would have considered the State and its political 
subdivisions and local authorities as tax treaty residents.551 This explanation has been copied into the 
Commentaries of the UN MTC.552 Unfortunately, neither of the Commentaries explains why most Member 
States would consider them a ‘resident of a Contracting State’. The addition cannot be explained on the basis 
of the traditional main purpose of a tax treaty according to both the OECD Commentary and UN 
Commentaries: the avoidance of international juridical double taxation. Because of the unique position of the 
State as legislator, tax recipient and investor, there is de facto never a risk of international juridical double 
taxation in relation to States themselves (in a bilateral relation), not even if a State decides to tax itself. Nor 
can the addition of the phrase be explained on the basis of the customary international law principle of 
sovereign immunity.553 Further, the purpose of attracting investments is unlikely the reason behind the 
special treatment, because cross-border investments by States were not so prominent at that time. Perhaps 
the addition of the phrase that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof can be explained, 
because the personal attachment as expressed in the ‘liable to tax’ test is by definition not in question. 
However, it would then further be required that a tax (law) connection can be established (Section 5.3.3.7.7), 
which would depend on the way the non-taxation is achieved in the tax legislation of a State. Perhaps the best 
explanation for the addition is that the ‘liable to tax’ test has no proper meaning in relation to States 
themselves (or political subdivisions and local authorities), as a State can simply choose to impose tax on itself 
without this having any (financial) impact on that State. However, this would require a State to compute 
taxable income, file a tax return and pay tax to itself (through the tax office). To keeps things simple, States 
may simply have decided to grant tax treaty access to each other (reciprocity), and allocate taxing jurisdiction 
between them.  
 
5.3.4.3 Integral part of the State, etc. 
 
As noted in Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 (added in 2010), the phrase that State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof may be relevant for sovereign wealth investors:554 
 
“[w]hether a sovereign wealth fund qualifies as a “resident of a Contracting State” depends on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. For example, when a sovereign wealth fund is an integral part of 
the State, it will likely fall within the scope of the expression “[the] State and any political subdivision 
or local authority thereof” in Article 4. In other cases, paragraphs 8.11 and 8.12 below will be relevant. 
States may want to address the issue in the course of bilateral negotiations, particularly in relation to 
whether a sovereign wealth fund qualifies as a “person” and is “liable to tax” for purposes of the 
relevant tax treaty (see also paragraphs 50 to 53 of the Commentary on Article 1).” (Italics added) 
 
                                                             
551 Para. 8.4 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 (added in 1995): “It has been the general understanding of most member 
countries that the government of each State, as well as any political subdivision or local authority thereof, is a resident of 
that State for purposes of the Convention. Before 1995, the Model did not explicitly state this; in 1995, Art. 4 was 
amended to conform the text of the Model to this understanding.” 
552 Para. 6 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 4. 
553 See Chapter 4; S-A. Joseph, “Do Tax Treaties Embody Sovereign Immunity? – An Assessment with Regard to 
Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2015) 69 Bulletin for International Taxation 637. 
554 S. Janssen, “How to Treat(y) Sovereign Wealth Funds? The application of tax treaties to state-owned entities, including 
sovereign wealth funds”, in: D. Weber and S. van Weeghel, The 2010 OECD Updates, Model Tax Convention & Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, A Critical Review, Series on International Taxation, Vol. 38 (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2011). 
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This and other OECD Commentary on State-owned entities has not been reflected in the Commentaries on the 
UN MTC. On the one hand, this might cause surprise, because the UN MTC is sometimes used by States that are 
home to SWFs, such as the U.A.E.,555 and may very well be used by a source State for treaty negotiations 
(developing countries). On the other hand, the Commentary on the OECD MTC dealing with State-owned 
entities, in general, and SWFs, in particular, adds little and raises new questions. Although the OECD 
Commentary on SWFs and State-owned entities has not been adopted in the Commentaries on the UN MTC, 
the author does not see why sovereign wealth investors cannot form an integral part of a State under UN MTC 
based treaties, given the reproduction of the OECD definition of resident in the UN MTC.   
 
5.3.4.4 Application to sovereign wealth investors  
 
5.3.4.4.1 When are sovereign wealth investors an integral part of a State? 
 
As discussed in Section 5.3.4.3 above, the OECD Commentary indicates that when an SWF is an integral part of 
the State, it will likely be covered by expression that State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof. The OECD Commentary only points to a possibility, but it lacks any guidance as to when a sovereign 
wealth investor forms an integral part of the State. This Commentary can be interpreted from three 
perspectives: (1) a legal perspective, (2) a tax perspective, or (3) a material/functional perspective. It is 
unlikely, though, that the relevant Commentary is intended to be interpreted from a tax perspective; if so 
intended, the use of different wording, such as SWFs which are tax transparent, would have been more 
appropriate. When interpreted from a legal perspective, as is done under the U.K. tax immunity regime,556 the 
relevant Commentary will have very limited effect given that the vast majority of sovereign wealth investors 
have been established as separate legal entities (other than the State). When interpreted from a 
material/functional perspective, which seems to be the most appropriate way, the question arises under 
which circumstances a sovereign wealth investor can materially/functionally be identified with the State. For 
purposes of the U.S. tax exemption for foreign sovereigns, an integral part of a foreign sovereign is defined as 
“any person, body of persons, organization, agency, bureau, fund, instrumentality, or other body, however 
designated, that constitutes a governing authority of a foreign country”.557 In addition, “[t]he net earnings of 
the governing authority must be credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign sovereign, 
with no portion inuring to the benefit of any private person. An integral part does not include any individual 
who is a sovereign, official, or administrator acting in a private or personal capacity (…)”.558 What is relevant 
under this U.S. approach is whether the entity constitutes a governing authority; the legal design of the entity 
is not relevant. There is, however, no guidance when an entity constitutes a governing authority. A mixture 
between a legal and material/functional approach can be found in a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
dealing with the issue of whether KIA, the SWF of Kuwait, was entitled to immunity.559 The tribunal took into 
consideration various documents, including the SWF’s constitutional law and its articles, statements from the 
SWF and its representatives, the fact that the SWF had brought suit in its own name in previous proceedings, 
the composition of the SWF’s board and the purpose of its investments. According to the Tribunal, the SWF 
was not entitled to immunity, because it had an independent status based on the decree by which the SWF 
was established (which referred to its ‘autonomous status’), its articles, letters and statements by Kuwait 
(which considered the SWF as an ‘independent public authority’) and the fact that the SWF had brought suit in 
its own name in previous proceedings. The fact that its funds were provided by and held on behalf of the State 
of Kuwait, and the fact that its board of directors included representatives of the State of Kuwait, was not 
                                                             
555 H. Hull, “United Arab Emirates: Tax Treaty Relief on International Investment” (2009) 63 Bulletin for International 
Taxation 52, p. 53. 
556 See Section 4.3.2.3. 
557 Temporary Treasury Regulations (1988), Subchapter A, § 1.892-2T(a)(2). 
558 Ibid. 
559 Kuwait v. X (1994) Revue Suisse de droit international et européen, 1995, Vol. 5, p. 593. 
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considered relevant. In the author’s view, the elements that the Swiss Federal Tribunal took into 
consideration are indeed useful in determining whether a sovereign wealth investor is an integral part of the 
State under Art. 4(1), if interpreted from a material/functional perspective. The Swiss Federal Tribunal had to 
determine whether the SWF could (materially/functionally) be identified with the State, and this also seems 
to be the most appropriate test under Art. 4(1). Whether a sovereign wealth investor is an integral part of a 
State needs to be determined a case-by-case basis. 
 
5.3.4.4.2 (i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within a State  
 
Whether interpreted from a legal, tax or material/functional perspective, sovereign wealth investors 
constituted by a pool of assets will most likely be considered an integral part of the State, as the pool of assets 
(arrangement) has no separate legal identity. The absence of a separate legal personality usually points to the 
close relationship with the State itself. The same conclusion should apply to sovereign wealth investors 
constituted by a pool of assets within a central bank that has no separate legal identity. 
 
5.3.4.4.3 (ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the 
State itself 
 
It is unclear from the OECD Commentary whether sovereign wealth investors established as a separate legal 
entity (other than the State) can be covered by the expression that State and any political subdivision or local 
authority thereof, and whether a further distinction should be made between legal persons of public law and 
legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law. The OECD Commentary on Art. 1 observes 
that some States have modified Art. 4(1) by including as a ‘resident of a Contracting State’, a ‘statutory body’, 
an ‘agency or instrumentality’ or a ‘legal person of public law’ of a State, a political subdivision or local 
authority.560 Such terminology indeed clarifies that sovereign wealth investors set up as a separate legal entity 
under public law qualify as a tax treaty resident, but it may still leave doubt for sovereign wealth investors 
established as corporations under company law. 
 
As explained Section 5.3.4.4.1, it is unlikely that Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 is intended to be 
interpreted from a tax perspective. When Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 intends to follow a legal 
approach, sovereign wealth investors established as a separate legal entity (other than the State) are not 
covered by the expression that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof. Since the vast 
majority of sovereign wealth investors have been established in that way, the relevant Commentary will then 
have very limited effect in practice. Finally, the outcome under the material/functional approach will depend 
on which element(s) is/are considered decisive. 
 
The phrase that State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof is interpreted broadly by the 
Dutch government in the Dutch Explanatory Note to the tax treaty between the Netherlands and Bahrain 
(which precedes the introduction of Para. 8.5 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 4 in 2010).561 In the agreed 
minutes, it has been made explicit that this phrase includes “a governmental agency, national bank (which is a 
commercial bank and not a central bank) and a wholly owned company” of a State, a political subdivision or a 
local authority thereof.562 Notably, it was mentioned in the Dutch Explanatory Note that, even without the 
phrase from the agreed minutes, it would have been clear to the Netherlands that these governmental and 
                                                             
560 Para. 50 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 1. 
561 Convention Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (16 
April 2008), Treaties IBFD. 
562 Tweede Kamer, 2008-2009, 31 591, No. A/1, p. 5. 
  
102 
 
State-owned entities would qualify as a resident under this tax treaty.563 Put differently, even without the 
phrase from the agreed minutes, the Netherlands would have considered these entities as an integral part of 
the State of Bahrain, etc. This interpretation was motivated by saying that tax treaty entitlement of these 
entities is of importance, because of possible investments into the Netherlands.564 In other words, this 
interpretation was motivated by an economic reason (international attractiveness). The Dutch Explanatory 
Note to other treaties does not refer to a similar interpretation, though. 
 
In some tax treaties, sovereign wealth investors are expressly recognized as an integral part of the State. An 
example can be found in the protocol to the tax treaty between Mauritius and the U.A.E.,565 in which a 
sovereign wealth investor of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, ADIA, and a sovereign wealth investor of the Emirate 
of Dubai, Dubai Investment Corporation, are expressly recognized as an integral part of the (local) 
government.  
 
5.3.4.4.4 (iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal 
personality 
 
SWEs organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, such as partnerships, could be 
considered an integral part of the State when the SWF that holds an SWE is considered an integral part of the 
State. 
 
5.4. Dividends (Art. 10) and interest (Art. 11) 
 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
Art. 10, concerning dividends, and Art. 11, concerning interest, are of particular importance to sovereign 
wealth investors. Both articles apply to payments by a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other 
Contracting State, and allocate taxing rights between the Contracting States. The primary taxing right is 
allocated to the residence State, and the source State has been allocated a limited taxing right only. Art. 10 
limits the rate of tax to be applied by a source State to the lowest rate if a certain threshold is met and if the 
recipient of the dividends is the beneficial owner and a company.  
 
5.4.2 Dividends 
 
The first two paragraphs of Art. 10 read as follows: 
 
“1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the company paying 
the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the 
dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
a)  [OECD MTC: 5 per cent][UN MTC: (…) per cent] (…) of the gross amount of the dividends if 
the beneficial owner is a company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 
[OECD MTC: 25][UN MTC: 10] per cent of the capital of the company paying the dividends (…);  
b)  [OECD MTC: 15 per cent][UN MTC: (…) per cent] (…) of the gross amount of the dividends 
                                                             
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the United Arab Emirates for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (18 September 
2006), Treaties IBFD. 
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in all other cases. (…)” 
 
The OECD Commentary explains the allocation of tax jurisdiction between the State of residence and the State 
as follows:  
 
  “Taxation of dividends exclusively in the State of source is not acceptable as a general rule. (…) 
On the other hand, taxation of dividends exclusively in the State of the beneficiary's residence is not 
feasible as a general rule. It would be more in keeping with the nature of dividends, which are 
investment income, but it would be unrealistic to suppose that there is any prospect of it being agreed 
that all taxation of dividends at the source should be relinquished.”566 
 
The OECD rate structure is motivated as follows: 
 
“(…) the rate of tax is limited to 15 per cent, which appears to be a reasonable maximum figure. A 
higher rate could hardly be justified since the State of source can already tax the company's profits. 
 
On the other hand, a lower rate (5 per cent) is expressly provided in respect of dividends paid by a 
subsidiary company to its parent company. If a company of one of the States owns directly (…) a 
holding of at least 25 per cent in a company of the other State, it is reasonable that the payment of that 
dividend by the subsidiary to the foreign parent company should be taxed less heavily to avoid 
recurrent taxation and to facilitate international investment. (…)”567 
 
The UN MTC leaves these rates to be established through bilateral negotiations.568 
 
Both the OECD Commentary and UN Commentaries indicate that some tax treaties provide for an exemption 
from source taxation on dividends paid to tax-exempt pension funds, in order to achieve (greater) neutrality 
between domestic and foreign investments by these investors.569 Also, some treaties provide for an exemption 
from source taxation on dividends paid to other States and their wholly-owned entities.570 
  
5.4.3 Interest 
 
The first two paragraphs of Art. 11 read as follows: 
 
“1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be 
taxed in that other State. 
2. However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which it arises and according 
to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the interest is a resident of the other 
Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed [OECD MTC: 10 per cent][UN MTC: (…) per cent] 
(…) of the gross amount of the interest. (…)” 
 
The OECD Commentary on the interest article does not contain an explanation for the prescribed allocation of 
tax jurisdiction between the State of residence and the State of source. As regards the maximum source rate, 
the OECD Commentary considers a rate of 10% to be “a reasonable maximum bearing in mind that the State of 
                                                             
566 Paras. 5-6 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10. 
567 Paras. 9-10 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10. 
568 Para. 5 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 10.  
569 Para. 13.1 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10, quoted in Para. 13 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 10. 
570 Para. 13.2 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 10, quoted in Para. 13 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 10. 
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source is already entitled to tax profits or income produced on its territory by investments financed out of 
borrowed capital.”571 The UN MTC leaves the source rate to be established through bilateral negotiations.572 
 
Similar to the OECD Commentary on Art. 10, the OECD Commentary on Art. 11 indicates that some tax treaties 
provide for an exemption from source taxation on interest paid to tax-exempt pension funds,573 as well as 
interest paid to other States and their wholly-owned entities.574 
 
5.4.4 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
As appeared from Section 5.3, qualifying as a resident of a Contracting State is of key importance for the 
entitlement to tax treaty benefits. Foreign sovereign wealth investors will only be entitled to reduced treaty 
rates on dividends and interest if they qualify as a tax treaty resident. As indicated in the OECD Commentary 
on Arts. 10 and 11 (added in 2010), some source States even accord tax-exemptions to foreign States and 
(some of) their wholly-owned entities. Foreign sovereign wealth investors might also be entitled to such 
exemptions from source taxation.  
 
The beneficial ownership test should generally play no role in relation to sovereign wealth investors. If 
sovereign wealth investors should, for some reason, not be considered the beneficial owner of the income 
themselves, the owner-State should be considered so and, therefore, be entitled to the tax treaty benefits. 
 
5.5.  Capital gains (Art. 13) 
 
5.5.1 Introduction 
 
Art. 13 allocates taxing rights between Contracting States – the residence State and the source State – 
regarding capital gains on property. The allocation depends on the type of property concerned. Art. 13 of the 
UN MTC is broadly in line with Art. 13 of the OECD MTC, except for capital gains derived from “non-
immovable property companies”. Whereas the OECD MTC allocates the taxing right over gains from such 
companies exclusively to the residence State, the UN MTC allocates the primary taxing right over gains from 
such companies to the source State in case of a substantial participation (the percentage to be established 
during negotiations, but commonly set at 25% or more575). The UN MTC only allocates the taxing right over 
gains from non-immovable property companies exclusively to the residence State in the absence of a 
substantial participation.576   
 
Both the OECD and UN MTC allocate the primary taxing right to the source State in respect of gains derived by 
a resident of the other Contracting State from the alienation of: (i) immovable property (Art. 6)577, (ii) 
business assets forming part of a permanent establishment (and, in case of the UN MTC, movable property 
pertaining to a fixed base for performing independent personal services), (iii) shares (and, in case of the UN 
MTC, an interest in a partnership, trust or estate) that derive value for more than 50% from immovable 
property situated in the source State (the UN MTC provides for an exception in respect of immovable property 
used by entities in their business activities).  
 
                                                             
571 Para. 7 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 11. 
572 Para. 5 of the UN Commentaries on Art. 10.  
573 Para. 7 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 11. 
574 Para. 7.4 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 11. 
575 Global Tax Treaty Commentaries, Article 13: Capital Gains, Para. 3.1.5.2, IBFD Database.  
576 Art. 13(5) of the UN MTC. 
577 The taxing right on income from immovable property is exclusively allocated to the source State, based on Art. 6. 
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Where Art. 13 allocates the primary taxing right to the source State, the residence State’s taxing rights are 
residual in that it is allowed to tax the capital gain, but must provide relief of double taxation. Art. 13 neither 
specifies the tax rate, nor the method of taxation. 
 
5.5.2 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
As appeared from Section 5.3, qualifying as a resident of a Contracting State is of key importance for the 
entitlement to tax treaty benefits. Foreign sovereign wealth investors will only be entitled to exclusive 
residence taxation (i.e. the absence of source taxation) on the listed categories of capital gains if they qualify 
as a tax treaty resident. 
 
5.6. Non-discrimination (Art. 24)  
 
5.6.1 Introduction 
 
Art. 24 is aimed at eliminating tax discrimination in very specific situations.578 That is, “the various provisions 
of Article 24 prevent differences in tax treatment that are solely based on certain specific grounds”.579 Section 
5.6 will examine whether the non-discrimination rules of Art. 24 could have special implications in relation to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. The focus will be on Art. 24(1) and Art. 24(5), as these provisions might 
contain elements specifically relevant vis-à-vis sovereign wealth investors. 
 
5.6.2 Sovereign wealth investors and Art. 24(1) 
 
Art. 24(1) reads as follows: 
 
“1. Nationals of a Contracting State shall not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any 
taxation or any requirement connected therewith, which is other or more burdensome than the 
taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other State in the same 
circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision shall, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both 
of the Contracting States.” 
 
Art. 24(1) prohibits tax discrimination between two persons in the same circumstances on the grounds of 
nationality. This provision applies to individuals possessing the nationality or citizenship of a Contracting 
State, as well as legal persons deriving their status from the laws of a Contracting State.580 The OECD 
Commentary explains that Art. 24(1) does not sanction a difference in tax treatment of two persons based on 
a different residence because such persons are not in the same circumstances.581 So, Art. 24(1) does not forbid 
a source State to tax resident companies and non-resident companies differently based on a different (place 
of) residence, as many source States do. Art. 24(1) does forbid a situation where a State taxes a resident 
investor of that State which is incorporated in that State more favourably than another resident investor of 
that State because that other resident investor is incorporated in the other Contracting State (absent other 
relevant different circumstances). In such case, the two investors are in the same circumstances, also with 
respect to their residence, but one of them is treated less favourably on the basis of its nationality (that is, its 
legal status derived from the laws of the other Contracting State). The following parts of the OECD 
Commentary on Art. 24(1), dealing with public bodies and services, should be read against this background: 
                                                             
578 Para. 1 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24, reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
579 Para. 3 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24, reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
580 Art. 24(1) in conjunction with Art. 3(1)(g)(ii) of the OECD MTC and Art. 3(1)(f)(ii) of the UN MTC.  
581 Paras. 7, 17-18 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24(1), reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
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“(…) the provisions of paragraph 1 are not to be construed as obliging a State which accords special 
taxation privileges to its own public bodies or services as such, to extend the same privileges to the 
public bodies and services of the other State.”582 
 
“(…) if a State accords immunity from taxation to its own public bodies and services, this is justified 
because such bodies and services are integral parts of the State and at no time can their circumstances 
be comparable to those of the public bodies and services of the other State. Nevertheless, this 
reservation is not intended to apply to State corporations carrying on gainful undertakings. To the 
extent that these can be regarded as being on the same footing as private business undertakings, the 
provisions of paragraph 1 will apply to them.”583 
 
The relevance of these comments is limited to public bodies (and services) of one State that are comparable to 
public bodies (and services) of the other State. The OECD Commentary explains that public bodies (and 
services) of one State can never be comparable to public bodies (and services) of the other State to the extent 
they do not carry on gainful undertakings (public tasks). And to the extent that these public bodies (and 
services) do carry on gainful undertakings, Art. 24(1) will only apply if public bodies (and services) of the 
Contracting State are in the same circumstances. They will be in different circumstances if a (source) State 
taxes its own public bodies (and services) and those of the other State differently based on a different (place 
of) residence, as many (source) States do. This also applies to non-resident private investors. Therefore, Art. 
24(1) should have very limited practical relevance for both sovereign wealth investors and non-resident 
private investors. 
 
5.6.3 Sovereign wealth investors and Art. 24(5) 
 
Art. 24(5) reads as follows: 
 
“5. Enterprises of a Contracting State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in 
the first-mentioned State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which is other or 
more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which other similar enterprises 
of the first-mentioned State are or may be subjected.” 
 
Art. 24(5) forbids tax discrimination between two similar resident enterprises of the same Contracting State 
which is solely based on the (direct or indirect) ownership or control by a resident of the other Contracting 
State.584 Art. 24(5) is only concerned with the position of the enterprise itself and not with the position of its 
non-resident shareholders. It requires equal tax treatment of similar enterprises residing in the same State, as 
opposed to equal treatment of resident shareholders and non-resident shareholders.585  
 
Resident entities wholly-owned by a State, including sovereign wealth investors, are often not taxed in an 
internal situation. A State may also exempt its wholly-owned resident entities to the extent they do not carry 
on gainful undertakings or to the extent they are not in competition with private-owned businesses. In 
contrast, resident entities wholly-owned by a foreign State are (often) taxed in their residence State. Based on 
Art. 24(5), the residence State is required to give equal tax treatment to a similar resident entity wholly-
owned by a foreign State, if the difference in tax treatment is solely based on the fact that the resident entity is 
                                                             
582 Para. 10 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24(1), reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
583 Para. 12 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24(1), reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
584 Para. 79 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24(5), reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
585 Para. 76 of the OECD Commentary on Art. 24(5), reproduced in the UN Commentaries. 
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(directly or indirectly) owned or controlled by a foreign State. Equal treatment of a resident entity owned by a 
foreign State could benefit that foreign State, as a (partial) tax-exemption leaves more distributable profits in 
the resident entity. In the author’s view, whether or not the difference in tax treatment is based on the 
ownership of or control by a foreign State depends on the (true) motivation for not taxing the State entity in a 
domestic situation.  
 
Often, the difference in tax treatment is based on the unique tax position of State entities in a domestic 
situation. That is, in relation to domestic State entities, revenue does not necessarily has to be collected 
through taxation, as a State can extract profits from such entities instead. This unique tax position of domestic 
State entities, including sovereign wealth investors, is often the reason for the difference in tax treatment of 
State entities in a domestic situation and resident entities owned by a foreign State. If the resident entity had 
been held by a resident private investor, or by a non-resident private investor, it would have been taxed 
similar to a resident entity owned by a foreign State. This comparison makes it clear that the different tax 
treatment is based on the unique tax position of domestic State entities, rather than the ownership of or 
control by a foreign State. Therefore, Art. 24(5) should have very limited practical relevance for sovereign 
wealth investors as well. 
 
5.7. Impact of tax treaties on achieving neutrality (efficiency), equity (fairness) and international 
attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
In this section, it will be examined what impact tax treaties could have on source States’ ability to achieve (or 
promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international attractiveness), and to freely 
implement an approach to the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. For the sake of convenience, the 
different approaches as identified in Chapter 3, and their relationship with the tax policy objectives, are 
repeated below: 
 
(1) taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative 
practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
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5.7.1 Neutrality (efficiency) 
 
5.7.1.1 Capital export neutrality 
 
Foreign sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in their residence State.586 Source State taxation of 
tax-exempt non-resident investors could distort neutrality with respect to the investment location, i.e. it could 
result in tax-exempt investors favouring domestic investments over foreign investments.587 In order to 
promote export neutrality (from a residence State perspective), a source State could consider to exempt from 
source taxation investment income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident tax-
exempt investors. It could accord such treatment through tax treaties. Reference is made to Approach (4) and 
(5), under which source States grant a general or specific tax-exemptions to (some) foreign sovereign wealth 
investors on the basis of a tax treaty. As such, OECD and UN MTC based treaties have no (negative) impact on 
source States’ ability to promote CEN through Approaches (2) to (5) by according exemptions from source 
taxation to tax-exempt foreign sovereign wealth investors (i.e. tax treaties do not impose restrictions on 
source States to do so).  
 
5.7.1.2 Capital import neutrality 
 
CIN requires equal treatment of investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source 
State, which implies a territorial (or source-based) tax system; in other words, a tax system which exempts 
foreign sourced income and treats domestic sourced income of resident and non-resident investors in the 
same way.588 
 
Qualifying as a resident of a Contracting State is of key importance for the entitlement to tax treaty benefits. 
Investors have access to a tax treaty and its benefits if they are ‘liable to tax’. Many States choose not to tax 
their sovereign wealth investors.589 Many States also choose, for a number of reasons, not to tax certain 
private resident investors, such as pension funds and CIVs.590 However, as demonstrated in this chapter, the 
way this non-taxation of sovereign wealth investors and private resident investors is achieved in the 
                                                             
586 See Section 2.10 and Section 3.2.1.2. 
587 See Section 3.4.2.2. 
588 See Section 3.4.3.1. 
589 See Section 2.10 and Section 3.2.1.2. 
590 See Section 3.2.1. 
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legislation of the home State can make a difference for the outcome of the ‘liable to tax’ test.591 This is a major 
point of criticism about the ‘liable to tax’ test. In addition to the ‘liable to tax’ test, sovereign wealth investors 
could also be a tax treaty resident if they are covered by the expression that State and any political subdivision 
or local authority thereof. Thus, Art. 4(1) of the OECD and UN MTC not only creates a distinction among 
sovereign wealth investors, on the one hand, and among private investors, on the other hand, but also 
between sovereign wealth investors and private investors. In summary, Art. 4(1) creates the following 
distinctions between investors: 
 
(1) private investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. private investors which are not ‘liable to tax’;  
(2) sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable 
to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof; 
(3) sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to 
tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof; 
(4) sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. private investors which are not ‘liable to tax’; 
(5) sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. private investors which are not ‘liable to tax’; 
(6) sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and 
any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. private investors which are ‘liable to tax’.  
 
These distinctions created by Art. 4(1) entitle some investors to tax treaty benefits (e.g. reduced tax rates 
under Arts. 10 and 11), while excluding others. This could give rise to tax differences and different tax 
burdens, from a source State perspective, between investors that perform the same level of investment 
activities in a source State, which would not promote CIN. Art. 24 (non-discrimination) does not change this 
outcome. Tax differences and different tax burdens between investors that are and investors that are not 
entitled to tax treaty benefits could also occur under tax treaties which deviate from the OECD and UN MTC. 
Tax treaties, including those based on the OECD or UN MTC, could not only result in tax differences and 
distortions between investors that do and investors that do not have treaty access, but also among investors 
that do have tax treaty access (even though a tax treaty applies in the same way to all treaty residents in 
similar circumstances). First, the different source rates under treaties for the same category of income could 
result in different tax burdens, such as in case of dividends. Second, the different source rates under treaties 
for different categories of income could result in different tax burdens, for example for dividends and interest. 
Third, the different allocation rules for different categories of income could result in different tax burdens, for 
example capital gains on shares (exclusive allocation to the residence State) and dividends (allowing limited 
source taxation). Different source rates for the same category of income, different source rates for different 
categories of income, and different allocation rules for different categories of income, could result in different 
tax burdens between investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source State, which 
would not promote CIN. In determining the tax burden, the fact that dividends and capital gains can relate to 
profits that have been or will become subject to corporate tax in a source State should, however, be taken into 
account.  
 
Source States wishing to promote CIN by introducing equal treatment between investors could be required to 
reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other 
investors). However, its obligations under existing tax treaties – with respect to maximum tax rates and 
allocation rules – could restrict a source State to follow the second route (increase), as opposed to the first 
                                                             
591 Van Weeghel has also observed this in more general terms in his comment on Hoge Raad, 4 December 2009, No. 
07/10383, BNB 2010/177. See also, J. Wheeler, “The Missing Keystone of Income Tax Treaties” (2011) 3 World Tax 
Journal 247, p. 252. 
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route (reduction), while the first route may not always be realistic from a revenue perspective. This would 
generally leave a State with the option to amend or terminate existing tax treaties. But tax treaties are rarely 
renegotiated, or unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long 
period of time. Based on the above, it can be concluded that tax treaties could restrict source States’ ability to 
promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1).  
 
Source States wishing to promote CIN through tax treaties would need to implement more CIN driven tax 
treaties, based on the principle of exclusive source jurisdiction, non-discrimination, as well as neutrality for all 
categories of investment income. Since investors’ tax status and characteristics are irrelevant from the 
perspective of CIN, tax treaty access should not be determined on the basis of the ‘liable to tax’ test, as used in 
the current models. Rather, tax treaty access should be granted to investors from the other Contracting State 
that have derived income from the source State, irrespective of their tax status and characteristics. The exact 
design of CIN driven tax treaties is outside the scope of this study, but reference is made to the comprehensive 
research of Kemmeren, who has advocated and outlined a tax treaty model based on the principle of origin, 
rather than the principle of source.592 Different from the principle of source, traditionally associated with CIN, 
the principle of origin requires a causal relationship between the production of income and the territory of a 
State for establishing tax jurisdiction.593 If income arises from a State, but is not generated from activities 
within the territory of that State, tax jurisdiction can be established under the principle of source but not 
under the principle of origin.594 
 
5.7.2 Equity (fairness) 
 
5.7.2.1 Inter-taxpayer equity 
 
The benefit theory, which, unlike the ability-to-pay theory, is also relevant for the taxation of non-residents, 
requires that each taxpayer should pay tax in accordance with its level of benefit from governmental goods 
and services.595 From this general rule, three, more practical, rules of thumb were derived which are relevant 
for the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, from a source State perspective.596 The first rule is that 
a source State should generally not tax non-resident investors less favourably than resident investors when 
performing the same investment activities in and earning the same level of income from that source State. It 
may, in such circumstances, even require non-resident investors to be taxed more favourably than resident 
investors. The second rule is that a source State should treat and tax all non-resident investors as equals when 
they perform the same investment activities in and earn the same level of income from that source State (i.e. 
horizontal non-discriminatory treatment). The third rule, which applies to both the first and second rule, is 
that forgoing taxation would not make sense from a benefit perspective, since residents and non-residents 
that perform investment activities in the source State always benefit from public goods and services to some 
extent.  
 
OECD and UN MTC based treaties may achieve, but do not guarantee compliance with the first rule, and may 
produce effects incompatible with the second and third rule. As regards the first rule, it is noted that the 
primary aim of OECD and UN MTC based treaties is to prevent international juridical double taxation, rather 
than guaranteeing that non-residents are not taxed less favourably than residents (in similar circumstances). 
The allocation provisions of a tax treaty may achieve that tax treaty resident foreign sovereign wealth 
                                                             
592 E. Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models (2001), Dongen: Mr. Eric C.C.M. 
Kemmeren/Pijnenburg vormgevers, uitgevers, available at: <https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/439888/87428.pdf>.  
593 Ibid., pp. 35-36.  
594 Ibid. 
595 See Section 3.5.2.1.  
596 See Section 3.5.2.2. 
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investors (and other non-resident investors) are not taxed less favourably than resident investors performing 
the same investment activities in and earning the same level of income from the same source State, but Art. 24 
(non-discrimination provision) would normally not prohibit non-residents from being taxed less favourably 
than resident investors, regardless of whether they perform the same investment activities in and earn the 
same level of income from the same source State. Therefore, tax treaties may achieve, but do not guarantee 
that foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors) do not pay more source State tax 
than resident investors performing the same investment activities in the same source State.  
 
The analysis regarding the second rule is largely similar to the analysis above in respect of CIN, but limited to 
non-resident investors. Art. 4(1) of OECD and UN MTC based treaties potentially creates the following 
distinctions among and between non-resident investors: 
 
(1) non-resident private investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. non-resident private investors which are 
not ‘liable to tax’;  
(2) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. foreign sovereign wealth investors 
which are not ‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or 
local authority thereof; 
(3) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and 
any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not 
‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof; 
(4) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. non-resident private investors which 
are not ‘liable to tax’; 
(5) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and 
any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. non-resident private investors which are not 
‘liable to tax’; 
(6) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase 
State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. non-resident private investors which 
are ‘liable to tax’.  
 
These distinctions created by Art. 4(1) entitle some non-resident investors to tax treaty benefits (e.g. reduced 
tax rates under Arts. 10 and 11), while excluding others. This could give rise to tax differences and different 
tax burdens among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among non-resident private investors, as well as 
between foreign sovereign wealth investors and non-resident private investors, that perform the same 
investment activities in a source State, which would be in conflict with inter-taxpayer equity. Art. 24 (non-
discrimination) does not change this outcome, since it does not prohibit horizontal discrimination between 
non-resident investors. Tax differences and different tax burdens between non-resident investors that are and 
non-resident investors that are not entitled to tax treaty benefits could also occur under tax treaties which 
deviate from the OECD and UN MTC.  
 
As explained in Section 3.5.2.2, the benefit principle would prescribe different treatment of different 
categories of income if it can be demonstrated that different asset classes benefit differently from public goods 
and services. If, however, this cannot be demonstrated, tax differences and different tax burdens that tax 
treaties, including those based on the OECD or UN MTC, could create among non-resident investors that do 
have tax treaty access, would also be in conflict with the second rule. As explained in Section 5.7.1.2, these tax 
differences and different tax burdens could result from different source rates for the same category of income, 
different source rates for different categories of income, and different allocation rules for different categories 
of income. In determining the tax burden, the fact that dividends and capital gains can relate to profits that 
have been or will become subject to corporate tax in a source State should, however, be taken into account. 
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This final remark is also relevant for the application of the third rule. 
 
Source States wishing to promote inter-taxpayer equity would need to reduce the current level of taxation of 
foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other investors) paying too much tax from a benefit perspective, and 
increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other investors) paying too 
little. However, obligations under existing tax treaties – with respect to tax rates and allocation rules – could 
restrict a source State to follow the second route (increase), as opposed to the first route (reduction), while the 
first route may not always be realistic from a revenue perspective. This would generally leave a State with the 
option to amend or terminate existing tax treaties. But tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or unilaterally 
terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time. Based on the 
above, it can be concluded that tax treaties could restrict source States’ ability to achieve inter-taxpayer 
equity, and to implement Approach (1). 
 
Including a horizontal non-discrimination rule in a tax treaty – stipulating that investors from the other 
Contracting State receive equal treatment in the source State – would serve inter-taxpayer equity. In this 
respect, tax treaty access should (also) be granted to investors from the other Contracting State that have 
derived income from the source State, irrespective of their tax status and characteristics. In addition, 
including a most-favoured nation rule in a tax treaty – ensuring equal source State treatment of investors 
from different States – would also serve inter-taxpayer equity.  
 
5.7.2.2 Inter-nation equity 
 
Under inter-nation equity, non-resident investors from the same State that perform the same (investment) 
activities in a source State should be treated alike in that source State.597 A different treatment of non-resident 
investors from different States can be justified on redistribution grounds only.598 The analysis regarding the 
impact of tax treaties on States’ ability to achieve inter-nation equity is largely similar to the analysis above in 
respect of CIN, but limited to non-resident investors from the same State. Art. 4(1) of OECD and UN MTC 
based treaties potentially creates the following distinctions among and between non-resident investors from 
the same State: 
 
(1) non-resident private investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. non-resident private investors which are 
not ‘liable to tax’;  
(2) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. foreign sovereign wealth investors 
which are not ‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or 
local authority thereof; 
(3) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and 
any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not 
‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof; 
(4) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are ‘liable to tax’ vs. non-resident private investors which 
are not ‘liable to tax’; 
(5) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’, yet covered by the phrase State and 
any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. non-resident private investors which are not 
‘liable to tax’; 
                                                             
597 See Section 3.5.3.2. 
598 Ibid.  
  
113 
 
(6) foreign sovereign wealth investors which are not ‘liable to tax’ and also not covered by the phrase 
State and any political subdivision or local authority thereof vs. non-resident private investors which 
are ‘liable to tax’.  
 
These distinctions created by Art. 4(1) entitle some non-resident investors to tax treaty benefits (e.g. reduced 
tax rates under Arts. 10 and 11), while excluding other non-resident investors from the same State. This could 
give rise to tax differences and different tax burdens among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among 
non-resident private investors from the same State, as well as between foreign sovereign wealth investors and 
non-resident private investors from the same State, that perform the same investment activities in a source 
State, which would be in conflict with inter-nation equity. Art. 24 (non-discrimination) does not change this 
outcome, since it does not prohibit horizontal discrimination between non-resident investors from the same 
State. Tax differences and different tax burdens between non-resident investors that are and non-resident 
investors from the same State that are not entitled to tax treaty benefits, could also occur under tax treaties 
which deviate from the OECD and UN MTC.  
 
As explained in Section 3.5.3.1, it is unclear whether inter-nation equity would allow a source State to 
differentiate between different categories of investment income, or whether it would require equal treatment 
of all categories of investment income. If inter-nation equity would not allow a source State to differentiate, 
tax differences and different tax burdens that tax treaties, including those based on the OECD or UN MTC, 
could create among non-resident investors from the same State that do have tax treaty access, would also be 
in conflict with inter-nation equity. As explained in Section 5.7.1.2 above, these tax differences and different 
tax burdens could result from different source rates for the same category of income, different source rates for 
different categories of income, and different allocation rules for different categories of income. In determining 
the tax burden, the fact that dividends and capital gains can relate to profits that have been or will become 
subject to corporate tax in a source State should be taken into account. 
 
Source States wishing to promote inter-nation equity by introducing equal treatment between non-resident 
investors from the same State could be required to reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of 
foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors). However, obligations under existing 
tax treaties – with respect to maximum tax rates and allocation rules – could restrict a source State to follow 
the second route (increase), as opposed to the first route (reduction), while the first route may not always be 
realistic from a revenue perspective. This would generally leave a State with the option to amend or terminate 
existing tax treaties. But tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty 
enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time. Based on the above, it can be concluded that 
tax treaties could restrict source States’ ability to achieve inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1).  
 
Including a horizontal non-discrimination rule in a tax treaty – stipulating that investors from the other 
Contracting State receive equal treatment in the source State – would serve inter-nation equity. In this 
respect, tax treaty access should (also) be granted to investors from the other Contracting State that have 
derived income from the source State, irrespective of their tax status and characteristics. 
 
5.7.3 International attractiveness 
 
States can use a tax treaty as an instrument to enhance the international attractiveness of their tax system for 
foreign sovereign wealth investors.599 Recently, the OECD has recognized that “there are also many non-tax 
factors that can lead to the conclusion of a tax treaty and that each country has a sovereign right to decide to 
                                                             
599 See Section 3.6. 
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enter into tax treaties with any jurisdiction with which it decides to do so.”600 Nowadays, many tax treaties are 
(also) concluded for a specific economic purpose. The memorandum on Dutch tax treaty policy (2011) gives 
two examples of a specific economic purpose for concluding a tax treaty: (i) facilitating cross-border 
investments by Dutch tax-exempt pension funds, and (ii) attracting investments from SWFs.601 The 
Netherlands, and many other States, have, in more recent times, concluded tax treaties with a purpose of 
attracting investments from sovereign wealth investors602 and protecting their competitiveness position vis-
à-vis other States.603 Offering tax benefits through tax treaties, rather than unilaterally, might give a source 
State the possibility to obtain tax (or other) benefits in return (reciprocal approach). 
 
In a tax treaty context, any restrictions on source States’ ability to pursue international attractiveness must 
come from a treaty provision that is based on Art. 24 (non-discrimination) of the OECD or UN MTC. However, 
Art. 24 does not prohibit reverse discrimination, i.e. it does not prohibit non-resident investors from being 
treated more favourably than resident investors. Nor does it prohibit horizontal discrimination between non-
resident investors from the same State, or between non-resident investors from different States, i.e. Art. 24 
does not prohibit one non-resident investor from being treated more favourably than other non-resident 
investors from the same State, or from different States. Therefore, OECD and UN MTC based treaties have no 
(negative) impact on source States’ ability to pursue international attractiveness through Approaches (2) to 
(5).  
 
5.8.  Conclusions 
 
This chapter has considered the (possible) implications of tax treaties for source State taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. Based on these implications, it was examined what impact tax treaties could have 
on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international 
attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors604. This 
chapter has focused on the OECD and UN MTC, and their Commentaries. 
 
Qualifying as a resident of a Contracting State (Art. 4(1)) is of key importance for the entitlement to tax treaty 
benefits. Investors have access to a tax treaty and its benefits if they are ‘liable to tax’ – i.e. a comprehensive 
taxation (full tax liability). Many States choose not to tax their sovereign wealth investors. Many States also 
choose, for a number of reasons, not to tax certain private resident investors, such as pension funds and CIVs. 
However, as demonstrated in this chapter, the way this non-taxation of sovereign wealth investors and 
private resident investors is achieved in the legislation of the home State, can make a difference in the 
outcome of the ‘liable to tax’ test. The phrase State or any political subdivision or local authority thereof in Art. 
4(1) of both the OECD and UN MTC offers sovereign wealth investors an additional possibility to get tax treaty 
access. Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets can most likely be considered an integral 
part of the State. It is, however, unclear whether sovereign wealth investors with a separate legal identity are 
covered by this expression, and whether a further distinction should be made between legal persons of public 
law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law.  
 
Tax treaty benefits include reduced treaty rates on outbound dividends and interest payments. As indicated 
by the OECD Commentary on Arts. 10 (Dividends) and 11 (Interest), some source States even accord tax-
                                                             
600 OECD (2015), Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 – 2015 Final 
Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, Para. 76, p. 94.   
601 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 17. 
602 See, for example, the Dutch tax treaties discussed in the Appendix to this study. 
603 Tweede Kamer, 2009-2010, 32 346, No. 3, p. 6 (Discussion notes to the tax treaty with the U.A.E., referring to the 
favourable tax treaty concluded between the U.A.E. and Belgium and between the U.A.E. and Austria). 
604 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
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exemptions to foreign States and (some of) their wholly-owned entities. And these exemptions from source 
taxation might also be available to foreign sovereign wealth investors. Tax treaty benefits could also include 
the absence of source taxation on the listed categories of capital gains, including capital gains derived from 
non-immovable property companies. In the author’s view, the non-discrimination article (Art. 24) has no 
impact on source taxation of sovereign wealth investors. 
 
Art. 4(1) creates distinctions between investors which entitle some investors to tax treaty benefits (e.g. 
reduced tax rates under Arts. 10 and 11), while excluding others. From a source State perspective, this could 
give rise to tax differences and different tax burdens:  
- between investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source State; which would 
not promote CIN; 
- among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among non-resident private investors, as well as 
between foreign sovereign wealth investors and non-resident private investors, that perform the 
same investment activities in and earn the same level of income from a source State; which would be 
in conflict with inter-taxpayer equity; 
- among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among non-resident private investors from the same 
State, as well as between foreign sovereign wealth investors and non-resident private investors from 
the same State, that perform the same investment activities in a source State; which would be in 
conflict with inter-nation equity.  
 
Art. 24 (non-discrimination) does not change these outcomes.  
 
Tax treaties, including those based on the OECD or UN MTC, could not only result in tax differences and 
different tax burdens between investors that do and investors that do not have treaty access, but also among 
investors that do have tax treaty access (even though a tax treaty applies in the same way to all treaty 
residents in similar circumstances). These tax differences and different tax burdens could result from 
different source tax rates for the same category of income, different source tax rates for different categories of 
income, and different allocation rules for different categories of income, which would not promote CIN and 
might be in conflict with both inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity. 
 
Source States wishing to promote CIN by introducing equal treatment between investors could be required to 
reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other 
investors). Source States wishing to promote inter-taxpayer equity would need to reduce the current level of 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other investors) paying too much tax from a benefit 
perspective, and increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other 
investors) paying too little. Source States wishing to promote inter-nation equity by introducing equal 
treatment between non-resident investors from the same State could be required to reduce and/or increase 
the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors). 
However, obligations under existing tax treaties – with respect to maximum tax rates and allocation rules – 
could restrict a source State to follow the second route (increase), as opposed to the first route (reduction), 
while the first route may not always be realistic from a revenue perspective. This would generally leave a 
State with the option to amend or terminate existing tax treaties. But tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or 
unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time. 
Considering the above, OECD and UN MTC based treaties could restrict source States’ ability to promote CIN, 
inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1)605. 
 
                                                             
605 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
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On the other hand, tax treaties have no (negative) impact, as such, on source States’ ability to promote CEN 
through Approaches (2) to (5)606 by according exemptions from source taxation to tax-exempt foreign 
sovereign wealth investors (i.e. tax treaties do not impose restrictions on source States to do so).  
 
Finally, OECD and UN MTC based treaties, as such, have no (negative) impact on source States’ ability to 
pursue international attractiveness through Approaches (2) to (5)607. 
 
It can be concluded that OECD and UN MTC based treaties could restrict source States’ ability to pursue CIN, 
inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1). However, they have no 
(negative) impact on the ability of source States to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors, nor on their ability to pursue international attractiveness through Approaches (2) to (5). This is 
summarized in the table below. 
 
  
                                                             
606 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
607 Ibid. 
(CEN) (CIN) (inter-taxpayer) (inter-nation)
*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
OECD/UN MTC based 
treaties
No (negative) impact Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
No (negative) impact
Neutrality Equity International 
attractiveness
Sovereign immunity
Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
European (Union) law Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6 Chapter 6
No (negative) impact No (negative) impact Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
No (negative) impact
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Chapter 6 
 
European Tax Law Aspects of Foreign Sovereign Wealth Investors 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider the (possible) implications of European law for source State taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. Based on these implications, it will be examined what impact European law could 
have on the ability of source States to achieve (or promote) neutrality (efficiency), equity (fairness) and 
international attractiveness, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors608. 
 
From a source State perspective, the European law analysis will only be relevant to EU Member States and 
(other) members to the EEA Agreement. This chapter will consider primary European law, notably the 
fundamental freedoms and State aid rules included in the TFEU609 and the EEA Agreement,610 which can all 
apply in (direct) tax matters. An important reason for including the EEA Agreement is that Norway, a member 
to this agreement, hosts currently the largest sovereign wealth investor in the world in terms of assets under 
management. As regards the fundamental freedoms, it is noted that the freedom of capital movement, rather 
than the freedom of establishment, potentially has the most relevance in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors. The first reason for this is that, although sovereign wealth investors increasingly operate as long-
term, active investors, they are still predominantly (passive) portfolio investors (to which the free movement 
of capital has the most relevance). The second reason is that most sovereign wealth investors reside outside 
the EU. Importantly, the personal and territorial scope of the free movement of capital in the TFEU is not 
limited to EU Member States; it has universal personal and territorial scope. As a result, the free movement of 
capital in the TFEU, as opposed to its counterpart in the EEA Agreement, may be relevant in relation to 
sovereign wealth investors from so-called third countries. Nevertheless, because sovereign wealth investors 
are increasingly operating as active investors, and may reside inside EU Member States and (other) members 
to the EEA Agreement, the freedom of establishment will be considered as well. With respect to the State aid 
rules, the analysis will be a first general analysis in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, aimed at 
identifying potential issues in this complex area of European law. As regards secondary EU law, the focus will 
be on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive611 and Interest & Royalties Directive612. 
 
After a basic introduction to European law in Section 6.2, Section 6.3 will first consider the (possible) 
implications of the freedom of capital movement and the freedom of establishment for source State taxation of 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. Section 6.4 concerns the State aid rules and will provide a first general 
analysis in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, which will be aimed at identify potential issues 
in this complex area of European law. Section 6.5 will briefly consider the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 
                                                             
608 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
609 Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 55, C 326, 26 October 2012. 
610 Official Journal of the European Communities, Vol. 37, L 1, 3 January 1994. 
611 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent 
companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 54, L 345, 29 
December 2011, as amended by Council Directive (EU) 2015/121 of 27 January 2015, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 58, L 21, 28 January 2015. 
612 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty 
payments made between associated companies of different Member States, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 
46, L 157, 29 June 2003. 
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Interest & Royalties Directive. Based on the findings of Section 6.3 to 6.5, Section 6.6 will examine what impact 
European law could have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) neutrality (efficiency), equity 
(fairness) and international attractiveness, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. Section 6.7 will end this chapter with the main conclusions.  
 
6.2. European law; a basic introduction 
 
6.2.1 The European Union and the internal market 
 
The EU is founded on the TFEU.613 A principal aim of the EU is to further the economic and social progress of 
its Member States, currently twenty-eight in total, by eliminating the barriers that divide Europe, and to 
improve the living and working conditions of their peoples.614 The establishment and the progressive 
development of the internal market serve this aim. The TFEU provides that the “internal market shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.”615 The internal market refers to an 
economic market striving for free competition between economic operators. 
 
6.2.2 How the internal market is achieved 
 
6.2.2.1 Integration 
 
The internal market between the currently twenty-eight Member States is being developed by positive and 
negative integration in accordance with the TFEU. Positive integration (policy integration) is achieved 
through the harmonization and coordination/unification of national legislation or national policies of EU 
Member States. Negative integration (market integration) is mainly achieved through the fundamental 
freedoms, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’), the judicial institution of the 
EU, and through the State aid rules. The fundamental freedoms and State aid rules prohibit national measures 
that are incompatible with the TFEU.616 In the field of direct taxation, negative integration was clearly 
dominant until not so long ago. However, more recently, positive integration in direct tax matters is clearly on 
the rise with the EU Directive on country-by-country reporting,617 the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives,618 
and the proposals for a European corporate tax system,619 as major contributors. 
 
 
 
                                                             
613 Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 55, C 326, 26 October 2012. Art. 1(2) TFEU. 
614 Preamble to the TFEU. 
615 Art. 26(2) TFEU. 
616 The CJEU’s primary responsibility is to examine the compatibility of EU measures and national measures of EU 
Member States with EU law, including the fundamental freedoms, and ensure the uniform interpretation and application of 
EU law. 
617 These rules, which are based on OECD BEPS Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-
by-Country Reporting, will require large multinational enterprises to report to their local tax authorities of EU Member 
States certain information on a country-by-country basis as from the 2016 fiscal year. The country-by-country reports will 
subsequently be exchanged between relevant EU Member States.   
618 These directives, which build on OECD recommendations to address tax base erosion and profit shifting, lay down anti-
tax avoidance rules in the following five fields: (i) interest deductibility, (ii) exit taxation, (iii) general anti-abuse, (iv) low-
taxed controlled foreign companies, and (v) hybrid mismatches. 
619 On 25 October 2016, the EC published a Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 
COM(2016) 685 final, and a Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, 
COM(2016) 683 final. The proposals need to be approved unanimously by all EU Member States.   
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6.2.2.2 Fundamental freedoms 
 
The most important contributors to negative tax integration are the four fundamental freedoms – the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital – as laid down in the TFEU. These fundamental freedoms 
are (specific) expressions of the general principle of non-discrimination,620 which prescribes that “comparable 
situations must not be treated differently and different situations must not be treated in the same way unless 
such treatment is objectively justified.”621 The fundamental freedoms traditionally prohibit cross-border 
situations from being treated less favourably than comparable domestic situations. They not only prohibit 
overt discrimination on the basis of nationality, “but also all covert forms of discrimination which, by the 
application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result”.622 A different treatment based 
on a person’s ‘residence’ could result in indirect discrimination. These concepts of direct and indirect 
discrimination also apply in the field of direct taxation, which means that (foreign) nationality and (foreign) 
residence as such cannot be relied on to explain a different tax treatment of otherwise comparable persons 
(comparable subjects from a source State perspective).623 While prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
nationality or residence of taxpayers, the fundamental freedoms also prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
place or destination of activity.624 This means that a taxpayer’s cross-border activity (e.g. investment) must 
not be treated less favourably than a domestic activity in comparable circumstances (comparable objects from 
a residence State perspective).625 Clearly, the focus in this study is on the first perspective. Although the 
fundamental freedoms typically prohibit cross-border situations from being treated less favourably than 
comparable internal situations (i.e. vertical discrimination), recent case law indicates that the freedoms may 
also prohibit discrimination between comparable non-residents (i.e. horizontal discrimination). 
All fundamental freedoms have direct effect; they are an integral part of the legal systems of the EU Member 
States, and nationals of an EU Member State can directly rely upon the freedoms before their national 
courts.626 The free movement of persons, one of the four fundamental freedoms, includes the right of citizens 
of the EU to move and reside freely within the EU,627 the free movement of workers,628 and the freedom of 
establishment for self-employed persons, companies and firms.629 The freedom of establishment (Arts. 49-55 
TFEU) and freedom of capital movement (Arts. 63-66 TFEU) are the relevant freedoms in the context of this 
study.  
 
6.2.2.3 State aid rules 
 
An increasingly important contributor to negative tax integration is the State aid framework (Arts. 107-108 
TFEU). Both the free movement provisions and State aid rules prohibit certain national tax measures affecting 
                                                             
620 N. Bammens, The Principle of Non-discrimination in International and European Tax Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 
24 (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2012), pp. 501-502. 
621 CJEU, 13 December 1984, Case C-106/83 (Sermide SpA v. Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero), Para. 28. According to 
Bammens, the CJEU’s concept of non-discrimination reflects the Aristotelian concept of non-discrimination. See N. 
Bammens, The Principle of Non-discrimination in International and European Tax Law, IBFD Doctoral Series, Vol. 24 
(Amsterdam: IBFD, 2012), pp. 501-502.  
622 CJEU, 12 February 1974, Case 152/73 (Sotgiu), Para. 11. 
623 For an overview of relevant case law, see S. Douma, Optimization of Tax Sovereignty and Free Movement (2011), PhD. 
Thesis, pp. 26-27 and case law cited in footnotes 53 to 66, available at: 
<https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/17973>. 
624 CJEU, 27 September 1988, Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), Para. 16. 
625 For an overview of relevant case law, see S. Douma, Optimization of Tax Sovereignty and Free Movement (2011), PhD. 
Thesis, pp. 28-29 and case law cited in footnotes 67 to 83. 
626 CJEU, 5 February 1963, Case 26-62 (van Gend & Loos); CJEU, 15 July 1964, Case 6/64 (Costa v. ENEL). 
627 Arts. 21 TFEU et seq. 
628 Arts. 45-48 TFEU. 
629 Arts. 49-55 TFEU. 
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free competition within the internal market. Whereas rules on free movement traditionally deal with 
distinctions between cross-border positions and internal positions (inter-State distinctions), State aid rules 
are concerned with distinctions between economic operators operating within the same State (intra-State 
distinctions).630 While the free movement rules traditionally aim to remove disadvantages (negative 
discrimination) in cross-border situations as compared to comparable domestic situations, State aid rules aim 
to remove certain benefits (positive discrimination) that economic operators enjoy over other economic 
operators operating within the same State.631  
 
The EC is the exclusive administrative body in charge of ensuring that Member States comply with State aid 
rules. All decisions of the EC in State aid matters can be challenged (ultimately) before the CJEU. 
 
6.2.2.4 Directives in the field of direct taxation 
 
A directive is one of the legal instruments of the EU and an important contributor to positive integration in the 
field of direct taxation. The adoption of a tax directive requires the unanimous consent of all EU Member 
States632 and, once adopted, the directive must be incorporated into the national legal order of EU Member 
States.633 In this respect, an EU Member State is free to choose form and methods, as long as the results of the 
directive are achieved.634 Examples of European directives in the field of direct taxation are the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, Interest & Royalties Directive, Merger Directive and Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives. 
 
6.2.3 The European Economic Area and the extension of the internal market 
 
In some respects, the internal market within the EU is extended to Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (three 
of the four members of the European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’))635 through the EEA Agreement, by 
adopting the four fundamental freedoms.636 The EEA Agreement provides for the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital between Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein (‘EEA-EFTA States’), on the one 
hand, and between the EU (Member States) and the EEA-EFTA States, on the other. The fundamental 
freedoms included in the EEA Agreement have direct effect.637 The CJEU has recognized that, in order to 
realize the extension of the internal market to the EEA-EFTA States, the rules of the EEA Agreement that are 
identical in substance to those of the TFEU, are to be interpreted uniformly.638 Further, based on its 
constitutional rules, the EFTA Court, which has jurisdiction with respect to the EEA-EFTA States, has to take 
due account of case law of the CJEU concerning the interpretation of rules of the TFEU that are identical in 
substance to those of the EEA Agreement.639 As will be discussed in more detail in this chapter, the freedom of 
establishment and freedom of capital movement, the focus of this chapter, are (substantially) identical in 
                                                             
630 P. Wattel, “Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters” 
(2013) 5 World Tax Journal 128.   
631 Ibid., pp. 128-129.   
632 Art. 114(2) in conjunction with Art. 115 TFEU. 
633 Art. 288 TFEU 
634 Ibid. 
635 The other EFTA State, Switzerland, did not accede the EEA due to a negative referendum in December 1992. 
636 CJEU, 23 September 2003, Case C-452/01 (Margarethe Ospelt), Para. 29; EFTA Court, 23 November 2004, Case E-
1/04 (Fokus Bank), Para. 23. See also Art. 1(2) EEA Agreement. 
637 D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax 
Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), pp. 346-347, available at: 
<https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/5897717/Smit_freedom_02_12_2011_emb_tot_01_09_2013.pdf>. 
638 CJEU, 23 September 2003, Case C-452/01 (Margarethe Ospelt), Para. 29; EFTA Court, 12 December 2003, Case E-
1/03 (EFTA Surveillance Authority v. The Republic of Iceland), Para. 27; CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 
(European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany), Para. 95. 
639 Art. 3(2) of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of 
Justice (Surveillance and Court Agreement). 
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substance. Thus, both courts seek to interpret the relevant provisions in the TFEU and the EEA Agreement 
uniformly, although there may be differences in reality.  
 
The EEA Agreement also contains State aid rules (Arts. 61-64 EEA Agreement), which are broadly in line with 
State aid rules in the TFEU. The EFTA Surveillance Authority is in charge of ensuring that EEA-EFTA States 
comply with State aid rules. The Authority has similar powers and functions as the European Commission 
(‘EC’) as far as the enforcement of State aid rules is concerned. All decisions of the Authority on State aid can 
be challenged before the EFTA Court, which has jurisdiction with respect to the EEA-EFTA States.   
 
The directives discussed in this study, namely the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties 
Directive, do not apply to EEA-EFTA States. 
 
6.2.4 Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
 
In December 1997, a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation was adopted within the EU to curb harmful tax 
competition between the EU Member States.640 The Code is a political agreement between the EU Member 
States to counter harmful tax measures; it is, however, not a legally binding instrument. The Code covers 
those tax measures (legislative, regulatory and administrative) in the area of business taxation “which affect, 
or may affect, in a significant way the location of business activity”641 in the EU. Within this parameter, the 
defining characteristic of a (potentially) harmful tax measure is a tax measure that provides “for a 
significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply 
in the Member State in question”.642 The Code sets out criteria for assessing whether a tax measure is 
potentially harmful, including: (i) whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of 
transactions carried out with non-residents; (ii) whether advantages are ring-fenced from the domestic 
market, so that they do not affect the national tax base; (iii) whether advantages are granted without any real 
economic activity and substantial economic presence within the Member State offering such tax advantage; 
(iv) whether transfer pricing rules depart from internationally accepted principles, notably the rules agreed 
upon within the OECD; (v) whether the tax measures lack transparency. 
The Code is enforced by a group of representatives of the EU Member States, known as the Code of 
Conduct Group on Business Taxation.643 The Group – which meets regularly and is assisted by several 
subgroups – selects, reviews and assesses tax measures against the criteria of the Code. In November 1999, 
the Group presented its first final report, known as the Primarolo Report, in which sixty-six tax measures 
were identified as potentially harmful.644 Since then, the Group reports regularly to the Council and many 
other tax measures have been found harmful. Although the Code is a soft law instrument, it has achieved 
significant negative integration in the area of business taxation. Relying on peer pressure, the Code has 
resulted in the abolishment of many existing tax measures and has held back the introduction of new harmful 
tax measures. Since the criteria of the Code require interpretation, consensus is not always achieved within 
the Group though.  
 
                                                             
640 Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, Annex to the Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 December 
1997 concerning taxation policy (98/C 2/01), Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 41, C 2, 6 January 1998.  
641 Ibid. 
642 Ibid. 
643 Council Conclusions of 9 March 1998 concerning the establishment of the Code of Conduct Group (business taxation) 
(98/C 99/01), Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 41, C 99, 1 April 1998, p. 1. For an overview of issues the 
Group is currently dealing with, see M. Nouwen, “The European Code of Conduct Group Becomes Increasingly Important 
in the Fight Against Tax Avoidance: More Openness and Transparency is Necessary” (2017) 45 Intertax 138. 
644 Code of Conduct Group, Council of the European Union, Report on the Code of Conduct (Business Taxation), SN 
4901/99, 23 November 1999. 
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The Code of Conduct will not be further considered in this study, but it could impose restrictions, in a political 
sense, on an EU Member State to introduce tax policy in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors. In the 
author’s view, the main question to be answered is whether tax-exemptions or reductions accorded to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors – i.e. Approaches (2) through (5)645 – affect, or may affect, in a significant way the 
location of business activity in the EU. In Section 3.4.3.1, it was explained that not only direct investments, but 
also portfolio investments could, under circumstances, have influence on the location of business activity. 
However, the question remains whether tax-exemptions or reductions accorded to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors may influence the location of business activity in the EU in a significant way. In this respect, tax-
exemptions or reductions through a tax treaty – i.e. Approaches (4) and (5) – may have less of an impact than 
unilateral tax-exemptions or reductions – i.e. Approaches (2) and (3).   
 
6.3. Freedom of establishment, freedom of capital movement and foreign sovereign wealth 
investors 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
Section 6.3 will consider the (possible) implications of the freedom of establishment and freedom of capital 
movement for the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, from a source State perspective. The CJEU 
and the EFTA Court have developed a decision tree to examine whether a national measure in the field of 
direct taxation is (in)compatible with the fundamental freedoms. The courts generally apply the following 
order of steps:  
 
(1) Does the person invoking the fundamental freedoms have access to the TFEU or EEA Agreement and 
its fundamental freedoms? 
(2) If so, does the national measure distinguish between cross-border situations and domestic situations 
in a manner incompatible with the fundamental freedoms? Are the cross-border situations and the 
domestic situations comparable, but treated differently, or are they different, but treated in the same 
way (comparability test)?  
(3) If so, is this justified by overriding reasons in the public interest?646 
(4) If so, is the national measure appropriate to achieve the objective? 
(5) If so, does it go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective (steps (3) to (5) are referred to as 
the justification test)? 
 
6.3.2 Step (1): Access to the TFEU or EEA Agreement and the freedom of establishment and freedom of 
capital movement 
 
6.3.2.1 Purely domestic situations 
 
The fundamental freedoms are aimed at contributing to the internal market by eliminating obstacles to the 
cross-border movement of goods, persons, services and capital. This implicates that the fundamental 
                                                             
645 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
646 The CJEU does not always distinguish between step two and step three, in that it sometimes treats incomparability as a 
justification. Cf., for example, CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 (European Commission v. Federal Republic of 
Germany) with CJEU, 10 May 2012, Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-347/11 (Santander Asset Management). See also B. 
Terra & P. Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th edn., (Deventer: Kluwer, 2012), p. 45. 
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freedoms do not apply to purely domestic situations; i.e. situations not involving a cross-border element.647 It 
also implicates that the freedoms do not prohibit reverse discrimination: residents of a Member State who are 
treated less favourably than comparable cross-border situations cannot rely upon EU law.648   
 
6.3.2.2 Freedom of establishment 
 
6.3.2.2.1 Personal and territorial scope 
 
Art. 49 TFEU prohibits restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EU Member State in the 
territory of another EU Member State. Although the concept of establishment is interpreted broadly by the 
CJEU,649 its territorial scope is ‘limited’ to acts of establishment within the EU. In terms of personal scope, 
according to Art. 54 TFEU, the freedom of establishment not only applies to natural persons (individuals) who 
are nationals of Member States,650 but also to “[c]ompanies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within 
the [European] Union”. “Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State” refers to 
“[c]ompanies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other 
legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which are non-profit-making.”651 So, 
companies and firms with the required nexus to an EU Member State are treated on equal footing with 
individuals who are nationals of an EU Member State.652  
 
The CJEU has held that the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Art. 31 EEA Agreement is identical in 
substance to the freedom of establishment laid down in the TFEU.653 The EEA Agreement uses the same 
definition of company or firm. As a result, the provisions dealing with the freedom of establishment in the 
TFEU and EEA Agreement need to be interpreted uniformly. 
 
6.3.2.2.2 Material scope (acts of establishment) 
 
The CJEU and the EFTA Court interpret the concept of establishment broadly: 
 
“The concept of establishment within the meaning of the [TFEU and EEA Agreement] is therefore a 
very broad one, allowing a Community [or EEA] national to participate, on a stable and continuous 
basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so 
contributing to economic and social interpenetration within the Community [or within the EEA] 
(…)”.654 
                                                             
647 CJEU, 3 October 1990, Joined Cases C-54/88 (Nino), C-91/88 and C-14/89, Para. 11; CJEU, 27 June 1996, Case C-
107/94 (Asscher), Para. 32. However, a purely internal situation is not considered present in cases where nationals of a 
Member State are, by reason of their conduct and with regard to their Member State of origin, in a situation which may be 
regarded as equivalent to that of any other person enjoying access to the fundamental freedoms. 
648 CJEU, 23 February 2006, Case C-513/03 (Van Hilten-van der Heijden); P. Matos, “Reverse Discrimination and Direct 
Taxation in the EU”, Chapter 9 in: D. Weber (ed.), EU Income Tax Law: Issues for the Years Ahead, IBFD 2013, Online 
Books IBFD. 
649 CJEU, 30 November 1995, Case C-55/94 (Reinhard Gebhard), Para. 25. 
650 Whether a natural person (individual) possesses the nationality of a Member State is determined solely by reference to 
the national law of the Member State concerned. See the Final Act and Declarations of the Intergovernmental Conferences 
on the European Union, 7 February 1992, Declaration on nationality of a Member State, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 35, C 191, 29 July 1992, p. 98.  
651 Art. 54 TFEU. 
652 Ibid. 
653 CJEU, 19 July 2012, Case C-48/11 (A Oy), Para. 21 and case law cited. 
654 CJEU, 30 November 1995, Case C-55/94 (Reinhard Gebhard), Para. 25; EFTA Court, 9 July 2014, Cases E-3/13 and 
E-20/13 (Fred Olsen and Others and The Norwegian State), Para. 94. 
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The freedom of establishment includes the right for companies and firms with the required nexus to a 
Member State to set-up and manage agencies, branches or subsidiaries in another Member State.  
 
According to constant case law, establishment involves the pursuit of a real and genuine economic activity by 
a national of one Member State through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite 
period.655 Whether an entity conducts a real and genuine activity depends on the facts and circumstances, 
although some general guidelines can be derived from case law. The concept of ‘economic activity’ is used in 
other areas of EU law as well, such as the competition rules and the VAT Directive. It is, however, not entirely 
clear whether this concept has an identical meaning in different areas of EU law.656 In the context of both the 
competition rules657 and the VAT Directive,658 the CJEU has repeatedly held that the mere acquisition, holding 
and sale of shares and other negotiable securities does not constitute an economic activity, basically because 
any returns are merely the fruits of the (passive) ownership of an asset. On the other hand, being directly or 
indirectly involved in the management of a company is sufficient to constitute an economic activity for VAT 
purposes,659 whereas “an entity which, owning controlling shareholdings in a company, actually exercises that 
control by involving itself directly or indirectly in the management thereof must be regarded as taking part in 
the economic activity carried on by the controlled undertaking”660 under the EU competition rules. These 
concepts, which clearly require a more active ownership of assets, do not fully resemble the criterion the CJEU 
introduced in Baars,661 where it held that a situation involving a “national of a Member State who has a 
holding in the capital of a company established in another Member State which gives him definite influence 
over the company's decisions and allows him to determine its activities”662 falls within the material scope of 
the freedom of establishment. Different from the relevant test for purposes of the VAT Directive and the EU 
competition rules, the Baars criterion does not appear to require that the influence is actually exercised; 
instead, it is sufficient that a holding enables a national to exercise influence.663 However, a shareholder that is 
able to exercise influence will normally do so in practice, so that the Baars criterion is typically associated 
with (more) active shareholders. Whether a holding allows definite influence has to be determined on a case-
by-case basis; a holding of less than 50% could still constitute definite influence.664 The EFTA Court has held 
that not only the involvement “in the management of a group’s companies”, but also the involvement in “other 
activities for a group, such as managing a pool of resources (…) has to be regarded as a real and genuine 
economic activity, which constitutes establishment” (italics added)665 It is, however, unclear whether the CJEU 
would follow this interpretation. 
 
With respect to the purchasing and holding of immovable property, the CJEU has held that the freedom of 
establishment can only apply if the property is actively managed.666 The mere holding of immovable property 
is insufficient to constitute an economic activity. 
                                                             
655 CJEU, 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05 (International Transport Workers’ Federation), Para. 70; EFTA Court, 9 
July 2014, Cases E-3/13 and E-20/13 (Fred Olsen and Others and The Norwegian State), Paras. 95-97. 
656 Different views can be found in D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and its 
Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), p. 46. 
657 CJEU, 10 January 2006, Case C-222/04 (Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA), Para. 111. 
658 CJEU, 12 January 2017, Case C-28/16 (MVM Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt.), Para. 31 and case law cited. 
659 Ibid., Paras. 32-33 and case law cited. 
660 CJEU, 10 January 2006, Case C-222/04 (Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA), Para. 112. 
661 CJEU, 13 April 2000, Case C-251/98 (Baars), Para. 22. 
662 (Italics added). 
663 F. Pötgens & M. Straathof, “Establishment and Substance of Intermediate and Other Holding Companies from an EU 
Law Perspective” (2016) 44 Intertax 608, p. 619. 
664 For a discussion of relevant case law, see D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and 
its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), pp. 53-57. 
665 EFTA Court, 9 July 2014, Cases E-3/13 and E-20/13 (Fred Olsen and Others and The Norwegian State), Para. 99. 
666 CJEU, 14 September 2006, Case C-386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer), Para. 19. 
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Further, it may not always be clear whether a situation is covered by the (material scope of the) freedom of 
establishment or the freedom of capital movement, particularly in case of cross-border shareholdings. This 
distinction, and its relevance in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors, is discussed in more detail in 
Section 6.3.2.4 below.   
 
6.3.2.2.3 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
As regards its material scope, it is noted that the framework discussed above equally applies to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors. An act of establishment involves the pursuit of a 
real and genuine economic activity by a national of one Member States through a fixed establishment in 
another Member State for an indefinite period. Whether an entity conducts a real and genuine activity 
depends on the facts and circumstances. In any case, sovereign wealth investors owning shares of a company 
established in a Member State that give them definite influence over the company's decisions and allow them 
to determine its activities, are regarded to conduct a real and genuine economic activity. This so-called Baars 
criterion is typically associated with (more) active foreign sovereign wealth investors.  
 
Whether sovereign wealth investors are covered by the personal and territorial scope of the freedom of 
establishment is analysed below. In this respect, the distinction made in Section 2.8.3 between sovereign 
wealth investors based on their legal form is relevant and will be followed. 
 
(i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State 
 
In relation to sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State, such as Norway’s 
GPFG, the question arises whether a Member State and its government can be considered a national of a 
Member State for purposes of the freedom of establishment. This concerns the question whether or not a 
Member State can be a national of itself.667 As explained in Section 6.3.2.2.1 above, the term “companies or 
firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State” includes (other) legal persons governed by public 
law.668 Member States themselves can be expected to be legal persons governed by public law669 and to have 
legal personality,670 as this enables them to carry out their duties, conduct transactions on their own behalf, 
hold the ownership of assets, enter into (political) agreements, etc. For purposes of the freedom of 
establishment, a legal person governed by public law is furthermore required to have its registered office 
(statutaire zetel), central administration (hoofdbestuur) or principal place of business (hoofdvestiging) within 
a Member State. These criteria, which together establish the required nexus of a company or firm to the 
EU/EEA-EFTA,671 have probably been drafted without having in mind a Member State itself as a legal person 
governed by public law, unless the reference to central administration includes the central government. One 
might argue that, in the absence of a registered office, central administration or principal place of business, a 
Member State does not have access to the freedom of establishment. In contrast, others might argue that such 
a strict interpretation would not only be contrary to the purpose of the three criteria, namely to establish a 
connection to the EU or EEA-EFTA States, but also to the purpose of the freedom of establishment in general, 
namely to contribute to an internal market with free competition. In the author’s view, a Member State has a 
                                                             
667 It is noted that a State, having a separate legal personality, can be the subject of (its ‘own’) national (tax) legislation. 
668 Art. 54 TFEU/Art. 34 EEA Agreement. 
669 For example, under the laws of the Netherlands, the (Dutch) State, provinces, municipalities and other entities that 
exercise public functions are legal persons of public law (publiekrechtelijke rechtspersonen), have a separate legal 
personality. 
670 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Grotius Classic Reprint 
Series, No. 2, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 182-183, fn. 489. 
671 CJEU, 14 December 2006, Case C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal BV), Para. 22. 
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‘natural’ connection to the EU/EEA-EFTA and as an economic operator within the internal market it should be 
protected by the freedom of establishment in the same way as its competitors in similar circumstances. This 
interpretation, under which a Member State is treated as a national of an EU Member State respectively EEA-
EFTA State, would best serve the freedom of establishment and the internal market. 
 
(ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the State itself 
 
Sovereign wealth investors established as a separate legal identity under public law or private law of a 
Member State should have the required nexus, provided they have their registered office, central 
administration or principal place of business within a Member State. 
 
(iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality 
 
In relation to sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, the 
question arises whether an entity without a legal personality, such as a partnership, qualifies as a ‘company or 
firm’. The EFTA Court has held that the right of establishment is not restricted to legal entities having a legal 
personality.672 In a recent case, the CJEU was asked the question whether a UK trust could rely on the freedom 
of establishment. This is a question as to the scope of the concept of ‘other legal persons governed by public or 
private law’. The CJEU explained that this concept “extends to an entity which, under national law, possesses 
rights and obligations that enable it to act in its own right within the legal order concerned, notwithstanding 
the absence of a particular legal form, and which is profit-making.”673 This reasoning is in line with the 
purpose of the freedom of establishment to contribute to an internal market with free competition. Based on 
the above, sovereign wealth investors without a separate legal identity, but formed in accordance with the law 
of Member State, possessing rights and obligations that enable it to act in its own right and performing an act 
of establishment in another Member State, should be covered by the personal, territorial and material scope 
of the freedom of establishment.  
 
6.3.2.3 Freedom of capital movement  
 
6.3.2.3.1 Personal and territorial scope 
 
Art. 63(1) TFEU, in principle, not only prohibits restrictions on the movement of capital and payments 
between EU Member States, but also between EU Member States and non-EU Member States/third countries. 
Unlike the freedom of establishment, the TFEU (unilaterally) extends the free movement of capital and 
payments to third countries (i.e. universal territorial scope) and does not require an eligible entity or person 
(i.e. universal personal scope). According to the CJEU, the objectives of the liberalization of the free movement 
of capital with third countries include, in particular, “that of ensuring the credibility of the single Community 
currency on world financial markets and maintaining financial centers with a world-wide dimension within 
the Member States”.674 In literature, the unilateral extension of free movement of capital towards third 
countries is further explained by the wish to create a global capital market with free competition for capital.675 
The freedom of capital movement included in the TFEU has direct effect, also in relation to third countries.676 
 
                                                             
672 EFTA Court, 9 July 2014, Cases E-3/13 and E-20/13 (Fred Olsen and Others and The Norwegian State), Para. 93. 
673 CJEU, 14 September 2017, Case C-646/15 (Trustees of the P Panayi Accumulation & Maintenance Settlements), Para. 
29. 
674 CJEU, 18 December 2007, Case C-101/05 (A), Para. 31. 
675 For an overview of relevant literature, see D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States 
and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), pp. 401-402. 
676 CJEU, 18 December 2007, Case C-101/05 (Skatteverket v. A), Para. 26. 
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Different from Art. 63(1) TFEU, Art. 40 EEA Agreement does not accord universal territorial and personal 
scope to the freedom of capital movement. Its territorial scope is limited to the EEA-EFTA States/EU Member 
States, while its personal scope is limited to (capital belonging to) persons resident in an EU Member 
State/EEA-EFTA State.677 
 
6.3.2.3.2 Material scope (capital movements) 
 
It follows from case law of the CJEU that the term capital movement is interpreted broadly. In the absence of a 
definition of ‘movement of capital’ in the TFEU, the CJEU has recognized that the – non-exhaustive – 
Nomenclature annexed to an old Council Directive678 has indicative value. Although profit distributions 
(dividends) are not expressly mentioned as capital movements, the CJEU has held in Verkooijen, concerning a 
Dutch resident individual who received dividends from a company listed on the Belgian stock exchange, that 
receipt of dividends “necessarily presupposes participation in new or existing undertakings referred to in (…) 
the nomenclature”679 and that receipt of dividends from the Belgian company could “also be linked to 
‘Acquisition by residents of foreign securities dealt in on a stock exchange' as referred to in (…) the 
nomenclature”.680 This judgment seems to indicate that income from a capital movement according to the 
Nomenclature, itself qualifies as a capital movement. In more recent case law concerning the taxation of 
outbound cross-border dividends, the CJEU no longer referred to the Nomenclature in examining the free 
movement of capital.681 As such, the classification of profit distributions as capital movements appears to be a 
given.682 This makes sense for the Nomenclature is non-exhaustive683 and should “not be interpreted as 
restricting the scope of the principle of full liberalization of capital movements”.684 
 
The concept of capital movement is in particular concerned with two main categories: direct investments and 
portfolio investments.685 According to the Explanatory Notes to the Nomenclature, direct investments are 
“[i]nvestments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which 
serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the 
entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an 
economic activity”. The Nomenclature further provides a list of examples of direct investments.686 In assessing 
whether a direct investment exists, the CJEU primarily focuses on whether it concerns a shareholding that 
gives the shareholder the possibility to participate effectively in the management and control of the 
                                                             
677 Art. 40 EEA Agreement. 
678 Council Directive 88/361 EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, Official Journal of 
the European Union, Vol. 31, L 178, 8 July 1988, p. 5. 
679 CJEU, 6 June 2000, Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), Para. 28 (referring to Heading I(2)); Opinion of Advocate General 
Sharpston, 19 July 2012, Case C-342/10 (European Commission v. Republic of Finland), Para. 28.  
680 Ibid. (Verkooijen), Para. 29 (referring to Heading III.A(2)). 
681 For instance, CJEU, 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta); CJEU, 3 June 2010, Case C-487/08 (European 
Commission v. Kingdom of Spain); CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 (European Commission v. Federal Republic of 
Germany); CJEU, 8 November 2012, Case C-342/10 (European Commission v. Republic of Finland). 
682 Cf. CJEU, 13 November 2012, Case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), Para. 103. 
683 CJEU, 17 September 2008, Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Welcome), Para. 39 and case law cited. 
684 Council Directive 88/361 EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, Official Journal of 
the European Union, Vol. 31, L 178, 8 July 1988, p. 5. 
685 CJEU, 21 October 2010, Case C-81/09 (Idrima Tipou), Para. 48; D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-
EU Member States and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 
2011), p. 67. 
686 1. Establishment and extension of branches or new undertakings belonging solely to the person providing the capital, 
and the acquisition in full of existing undertakings; 2. Participation in new or existing undertaking with a view to 
establishing or maintaining lasting economic links; 3. Long-term loans with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting 
economic links; 4. Reinvestment of profits with a view to maintaining lasting economic links. 
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company.687 Such a possibility also constitutes an act of establishment for the purpose of the freedom of 
establishment (Section 6.3.2.2.2 of this chapter). Thus, the concept of direct investment and the concept of 
establishment overlap to a large extent.688 Whether an investor is able to effectively participate in the 
management and control depends on the facts and circumstances, taking into account company law and other 
factors.689 Based on the above, the concept of direct investment is typically associated with (more) active 
investors. On the other hand, portfolio investments are described by the CJEU as the acquisition of securities on 
the capital market solely with the intention of making a financial investment without any intention to 
influence the management and control of the undertaking.690 The concept of portfolio investment is typically 
associated with passive investors. Examples of portfolio investments listed in the Nomenclature include 
securities dealt in and not dealt in on a stock exchange, bonds, investments in real estate, credits, financial 
loans, and others. In the author’s view, by analogy with Verkooijen, income from portfolio investments should 
also qualify as capital movements for the purposes of the TFEU. 
 
The nomenclature referred to by the CJEU applies to the free movement of capital in the EEA Agreement as 
well.691 Since the CJEU has held that the relevant provisions on the free movement of capital in the TFEU and 
the EEA Agreement692 are substantially identical, having the same legal scope,693 the analysis for the EEA 
Agreement and the TFEU is the same.   
 
6.3.2.3.3 Standstill provision TFEU 
 
In relation to capital movements to and from third countries, Art. 64(1) TFEU allows restrictions on the free 
movement of capital imposed by national legislation which already existed on 31 December 1993, involving: 
(i) direct investment (including in real estate), (ii) establishment, (iii) the provision of financial services, or 
(iv) the admission of securities to capital markets.694 The concept of direct investment versus portfolio 
investment was discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.2 of this chapter.  
 
The list of capital movements mentioned in Art. 64(1) TFEU is exhaustive and must be interpreted strictly.695 
Art. 64(1) TFEU, which can also apply in the field of taxation, expresses the wish of EU Member States to 
partially maintain sovereignty with respect to capital movements to and from third countries.696 
 
                                                             
687 CJEU, 13 November 2012, Case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), Para. 102 and case law cited. 
This terminology seems to be derived from the Explanatory Notes to Heading I-2 of the Nomenclature (Participation in 
new or existing undertaking with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting economic links) in which it is stated that 
“there is participation in the nature of direct investment where the block of shares held by a natural person of another 
undertaking or any other holder enables the shareholder, either pursuant to the provisions of national laws relating to 
companies limited by shares or otherwise, to participate effectively in the management of the company or in its control.” 
(Italics added) 
688 D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax 
Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), p. 68. 
689 Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
690 CJEU, 21 October 2010, Case C-81/09 (Idrima Tipou), Para. 48 and case law cited. 
691 Art. 40 EEA Agreement refers to the application of Annex XII (Free movement of capital) to the EEA Agreement 
which, in its turn, refers to the nomenclature of capital movements in Annex I to Directive 88/361/EEC, as relied upon by 
the CJEU for the interpretation of Art. 63 TFEU. 
692 Art. 63 TFEU and Art. 40 EEA Agreement (and Annex XII). 
693 CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 (European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany), Para. 96 and case 
law cited. 
694 For Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary, the relevant date is 31 December 1999. 
695 CJEU, 21 May 2015, Case C-560/13 (Wagner-Raith), Para. 21 and case law cited. 
696 D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax 
Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), pp. 668-672. 
  
129 
 
National tax measures adopted after 31 December 1993 may also fall under the scope of the grandfathering 
rule, provided that the new tax measure is, in essence, identical to the previous measure, or the new tax 
measure merely reduces or eliminates EU law infringements that existed under the previous measure.697 In 
contrast, new tax measures which are different in approach than the previous measure and establish new 
procedures, are excluded from Art. 64(1) TFEU.698  
 
A national tax measure of an EU Member State can simultaneously impose restrictions on the free movement 
of capital involving direct investment, establishment, the provision of financial services, etc., and on the free 
movement of capital not involving such situations. In such case, an EU Member State can rely on Art. 64(1) 
TFEU, but only to the extent that it concerns capital movements referred to in that provision.699 
 
National measures which relate to capital movements and restrict the provision of financial services, can also 
be safeguarded by the standstill provision. The effect of this particular derogation can be that portfolio 
investments, although not listed as a particular category in Art. 64(1) TFEU, could effectively be safeguarded 
by the standstill provision. The application of this particular derogation requires that “the national measure 
(…) relate[s] to capital movements that have a sufficiently close link with the provision of financial services, 
which requires that there be a causal link between the movement of capital and the provision of financial 
services.”700 Because the scope of Art. 64(1) is defined by particular capital movements, rather than particular 
persons, this provision could still apply to national measures which are (primarily) directed at the investor 
and not the financial service provider, on condition that the causal link can be established.701 In Wagner-Raith 
(2015) and X (2017), the CJEU concluded that a causal link between the capital movements concerned and the 
provision of financial services was present. Wagner-Raith concerned a German tax measure under which 
income from a non-EU collective investment fund was under conditions taxed on a notional instead of an 
actual basis. According to the CJEU, both the acquisition by German residents of units in foreign investment 
funds and the receipt of dividends from the investment funds qualify as capital movement,702 and both involve 
the existence of financial services provided by the funds to the investors.703 The court added that the 
investment in a collective investment fund must be distinguished from a direct acquisition of company shares 
on the market, because investors investing directly do not benefit from such services.704 Thus, in case of 
investors investing directly, there does not appear to be a (sufficient) link with the provision of financial 
services. Finally, the CJEU held that the German measure was “liable to deter resident investors from 
acquiring units in non-resident investment funds and therefore results in those investors having recourse to 
the services of such funds less frequently.”705 In X, a Dutch resident had opened a securities account with a 
banking institution outside the EU (Switzerland). The Dutch taxpayer had not reported the account to the 
Dutch tax authorities. According to the CJEU, there was a causal link in this case because the Dutch account 
holder transferred capital (money) to the Swiss securities account in order to benefit from management 
services of the Swiss bank.706 As a result of this decision, the Dutch tax office was able to impose additional 
assessments under the extended recovery period applicable to foreigners. 
                                                             
697 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 48 and case law cited. 
698 Ibid. 
699 CJEU, 15 February 2017, Case C-317/15 (X), Paras. 20-25. 
700 CJEU, 15 February 2017, Case C-317/15 (X), Para. 28 and case law cited. 
701 Ibid., Paras. 32-33 and case law cited. 
702 CJEU, 21 May 2015, Case C-560/13 (Wagner-Raith), Paras. 23-26. 
703 Ibid., Para. 46. 
704 Ibid. 
705 CJEU, 21 May 2015, Case C-560/13 (Wagner-Raith), Para. 47. 
706 CJEU, 15 February 2017, Case C-317/15 (X), Paras. 29-30. 
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It is obvious that these decisions have widened the scope of the standstill provision, to the detriment 
of the freedom of capital movement. As a result of these judgments, portfolio investments, although not listed 
as a category of capital movement in Art. 64(1), could effectively be covered by the standstill provision if a 
causal link with the provision of financial services can be established. In both Wagner-Raith and X, the 
services were provided to resident investors of a Member State by service providers outside the EU (i.e. 
inbound financial services). In the author’s view, it is clear from Wagner-Raith, which concerned outbound 
investments in non-EU investment funds, that inbound portfolio investments by non-EU collective investment 
funds, including non-EU pension funds, should come within the concept of a capital movement involving the 
provision of financial services, irrespective of the location of the participants.707 This means that 
discriminatory tax treatment of inbound investments by such funds could be safeguarded by the standstill 
clause of Art. 64(1), also in respect of portfolio investments. Furthermore, there seems to be a tension 
between Wagner-Raith and X. In Wagner-Raith, the CJEU noted that the direct acquisition of company shares 
on the market does not involve the existence of financial services. However, in X, the mere opening by a 
resident of a Member State of a securities account with a Swiss bank was enough for the court to establish a 
causal link between the movement of capital and the provision of financial services. An investor investing 
directly, rather than through an investment fund, can use a securities account. It is unclear whether a tax 
measure that applies to such investments made through a securities account could be considered to involve 
the provision of financial services. This is even more so if such investments are made through an ordinary 
bank account. Finally, it is noted that a broad interpretation of the financial services exception in Art. 64(1) 
TFEU, as was the case in X, carries the risk that the freedom of capital movement would to a large extent be 
deprived of its practical effect in relation to third countries. 
 
The EEA Agreement does not contain a general grandfathering provision which allows tax measures that 
restrict the free movement of capital. In the author’s opinion, this means that EU Member States should not be 
able to rely on Art. 64(1) TFEU in relation to the EEA-EFTA States, as the EEA Agreement is more restrictive in 
this respect.  
 
6.3.2.3.4 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
As regards its material scope, it is noted that the framework discussed above equally applies to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors. Since sovereign wealth investors are still 
predominately passive investors their investments will often be regarded as portfolio investments. However, 
since sovereign wealth investors are increasingly operating as active investors their investments could 
increasingly be regarded as direct investments.  
 
Whether sovereign wealth investors are covered by the personal and territorial scope of the freedom of 
capital movement is analysed below. In this respect, the distinction made in Section 2.8.3 between sovereign 
wealth investors based on their legal form is relevant and will be followed. 
 
(i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State 
 
Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets (arrangement) within the State are covered by the 
(universal) personal and territorial scope of the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU, whether 
established inside or outside the EU. 
 
                                                             
707 Similarly, W. Egelie, Case note on CJEU, 15 February 2017, Case C-317/15 (X), Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal 
Recht 2017/637. 
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Art. 40 EEA Agreement makes reference to a person resident in a Member State. Such reference gives rise to a 
question similar as under the freedom of establishment: does the personal scope include Member States and 
their governments themselves? Can a Member State be a resident in that Member State? The provisions 
dealing with the free movement of capital in the EEA Agreement have probably been drafted without having 
regard to a State itself and its government. One might argue that it would be impossible and contradictory for 
a State to meet this condition. In contrast, others might argue that such a strict interpretation would not only 
be contrary to the purpose of this condition, namely to establish the required nexus between that (legal) 
person and the EU or EEA-EFTA States, but also to the purpose of the freedom of capital movement in general, 
namely to contribute to an internal market with free competition. In the author’s view, a Member State has 
that ‘natural’ connection and as an operator within the internal market it should be protected by the freedom 
of capital movement in the same way as other operators in similar circumstances. This interpretation, under 
which a Member State is treated as a resident in a Member State, would best serve the freedom of capital 
movement and the internal market. Moreover, the CJEU has held that, in the context of the relations governed 
by the EEA Agreement,708 the relevant provision on the free movement of capital in the TFEU and EEA 
Agreement709 are substantially identical provisions having the same legal scope.710 Both provisions would not 
have the same legal scope if an Member State itself and its government cannot be a person resident in an EU 
Member State/EEA-EFTA State for purposes of the free movement of capital in the EEA Agreement. Based on 
the above, it is argued that an EU Member State/EEA-EFTA State needs to be treated as a resident under Art. 
40 EEA Agreement.  
 
(ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the State itself 
 
SWFs, central banks and SWEs established as a separate legal identity under public law or private law fall 
within the personal and territorial scope of the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU, whether 
established inside or outside the EU. 
 
Such sovereign wealth investors will be covered by the personal scope of the freedom of capital movement in 
the EEA Agreement (art. 40 EEA Agreement), if they qualify as a person resident in an EU Member State/EEA-
EFTA State. The EEA Agreement does not indicate when a person meets this condition. The purpose of this 
condition is to establish personal nexus, something not required under Art. 63(1) TFEU because of its 
universal scope. As the EEA Agreement distinguishes between natural persons and legal persons, the more 
general term ‘person’ seems to include legal persons – of public law and private law – as well. However, it is 
not clear when a legal person is a resident in an EU Member State/EEA-EFTA State. Be that as it may, EU 
Member States should in the author’s view, in any case, be bound by the wider (and universal) personal scope 
of Art. 63(1) TFEU, also vis-à-vis EEA-EFTA States. This limits any potential issue to the application of Art. 40 
EEA Agreement by the EEA-EFTA States. Nevertheless, the author expects sovereign wealth investors 
established and managed and controlled in a Member State to have the required personal nexus, and so to be 
covered by the personal scope of Art. 40 EEA Agreement. 
 
(iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality 
 
Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, such as 
partnerships, are covered by the universal personal and territorial scope of the freedom of capital movement 
in the TFEU. 
 
                                                             
708 Being capital movements between EEA-EFTA States and between EU Member States and EEA-EFTA States. 
709 Art. 63 TFEU and Art. 40 EEA Agreement (and Annex XII). 
710 CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 (European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany), Para. 96 and case 
law cited. 
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With respect to the freedom of capital movement in the EEA Agreement, the question arises whether an entity 
without legal personality, such as a partnership, can be a person that is a resident in an EU Member 
State/EEA-EFTA State. Based on the fact that the CJEU has held that, in the context of the relations governed by 
the EEA Agreement,711 Art. 63(1) TFEU and Art. 40 EEA Agreement are substantially identical provisions 
having the same legal scope, and in order to give full effect to the freedom of capital movement and the rights 
that it grants, the author answers this question affirmatively. 
 
6.3.2.4 Freedom of establishment vs. freedom of capital movement: order of precedence 
 
According to European case law, the tax treatment of dividends may fall within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and freedom of capital movement.712 As regards sovereign wealth investors, the relevance of 
the applicable freedom in third country situations (excluding EEA-EFTA situations) is obvious; only the 
freedom of capital movement has universal scope. In intra-EU/EEA situations, its relevance is less obvious, 
because the CJEU interprets the freedoms in a similar fashion (creating legal certainty).713 However, as will be 
explained in this section below, also in intra-EU/EEA situations the applicable freedom can be relevant as 
regards sovereign wealth investors. 
 
From Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation,714 concerning dividends received by a U.K. resident company 
from non-EU resident companies, and Emerging Markets Series,715 concerning dividends paid by a Polish 
resident company to a US investment fund, rules can be derived regarding the issue of precedence.716 In this 
respect, it is necessary to look at the purpose of a domestic tax measure, and to distinguish between: (i) direct 
investments; shareholdings that enable the shareholder a definite influence over the decisions of the company 
and to determine its activities, and (ii) portfolio investments; shareholdings acquired solely with the intention 
of making a financial investment, with no intention of influencing the management and control of the 
company. In addition, a distinction should be made between intra-EU/EEA situations and third country 
situations.    
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, the following rules apply regarding the order of precedence: 
 
(1) if a domestic tax measure exclusively applies to direct investments, it is exclusively governed by the 
freedom of establishment (purpose approach);717 
(2) if a domestic tax measure exclusively applies to portfolio investments, it falls exclusively within the 
scope of the freedom of capital movement (purpose approach);718 
(3) if a domestic tax measure applies to both direct investments and portfolio investments – i.e. a general 
tax measure – it must be examined in the light of the freedom of establishment in case of a direct 
investment, and in the light of the free movement of capital in case of a portfolio investment (factual 
approach).719 
 
In non-EU/EEA situations, the following rules apply regarding the order of precedence: 
                                                             
711 Being capital movements between EEA-EFTA States and between EU Member States and EEA-EFTA States. 
712 CJEU, 10 February 2011, Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 (Haribo Lakritzen and Österreichische Salinen), Para. 
89 and case law cited; CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest), Para. 30. 
713 B. Terra & P. Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th edn., (Deventer: Kluwer, 2012), p. 49. 
714 CJEU, 13 November 2012, Case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation). 
715 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 32. 
716 See also, E. Nijkeuter & M. de Wilde, “FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country Situations” 
(2013) 22 EC Tax Review 250. 
717 CJEU, 13 November 2012, Case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), Para. 91. 
718 Ibid., Para. 92.  
719 Ibid., Paras. 93-94. 
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(1) if a domestic tax measure exclusively applies to direct investments, neither the freedom of 
establishment, nor the freedom of capital movement applies (purpose approach);720 
(2) if a domestic tax measure exclusively applies to portfolio investments, it must be examined in the light 
of the freedom of capital movement (purpose approach);721 
(3) if a domestic tax measure applies to both direct investments and portfolio investments – i.e. a general 
tax measure – it must be examined in the light of the free movement of capital (purpose approach).722 
 
The rules regarding the order of precedence in intra-EU/EEA situations could put more emphasis on the 
personal scope of the freedom of establishment in situations involving direct investments. In intra-EU/EEA 
situations involving direct investments, tax measures aimed at such investments, as well as general tax 
measures, must exclusively be examined in the light of the freedom of establishment. However, the freedom of 
establishment does not apply if a taxpayer falls outside its personal scope. The analysis in Section 6.3.2.2.3 
shows that the application of the concept of ‘companies and firms’ is not entirely clear regarding sovereign 
wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within a State. As regards general tax measures, falling outside 
the personal scope of the freedom of establishment might have as an absurd consequence that an EU/EEA 
resident sovereign wealth investor would enjoy less protection than a non-EU/EEA resident sovereign wealth 
investor in similar circumstances; the latter would have access to the freedom of capital movement, whereas 
the former would not. If a sovereign wealth investor would fall outside the personal scope of the freedom of 
establishment, it would need to be able to rely on the general non-discrimination provision of Art. 18 
TFEU/Art. 4 EEA Agreement in order to enjoy protection.  
 
6.3.3 Step (2): Comparability 
 
The general principle underlying the comparability analysis under European law is that “discrimination can 
arise only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the application from the same 
rule to different situations.”723 Based on recent case law, it is now clear that discrimination of non-residents is 
not only possible in relation to residents (vertical comparability), but also in relation to other non-residents 
(horizontal comparability).724 This distinction is followed below when discussing the general guidelines in 
regard to the comparability analysis, and their application to sovereign wealth investors.  
It is important to note from the outset that, in the context of the free movement of capital, the CJEU 
addresses the issue of comparability in intra-EU situations and third country situations in the same way.725 
                                                             
720 Ibid., Para. 98. 
721 Ibid., Para. 92. 
722 Ibid., Paras. 99-104. According to the CJEU, taking account of the particular facts and circumstances with respect to 
general tax measures in third country situations, as suggested by the U.K., Germany, France and the Netherlands, “would 
produce effects incompatible with Article 64(1) TFEU” (the standstill provision). In this respect, the CJEU finds that the 
standstill provision for the free movement of capital is relevant for the interpretation of the material scope of the free 
movement of capital. The standstill provision refers to the movement of capital involving establishment or direct 
investment. Such capital movements are characterized by the possibility for the shareholder to effectively participate in the 
management and control of the company. The author believes the CJEU’s line of reasoning to be the following. Capital 
movements involving establishment or direct investment are acts of establishment as well as capital movements. However, 
since the freedom of establishment is not capable of applying to third country situations, there is no need to determine 
which freedom of movement takes precedence in case of general tax measures, unlike in intra-EU situations. 
Consequently, the freedom of capital movement is relied upon. Capital movements not involving establishment or direct 
investment are not acts of establishment and, therefore, covered by the freedom of capital movement. In summary, in third 
country situations, the paths always lead to the free movement of capital when tax measures with a general purpose are 
involved. 
723 CJEU, 14 February 1995, Case C-279/93 (Schumacker), Para. 30. 
724 CJEU, 24 February 2015, Case C-512/13 (Sopora). 
725 For a discussion of relevant case law, see D. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States and 
its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, (Tilburg: CentER, 2011), pp. 527-540. 
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Furthermore, the CJEU and the EFTA Court do not distinguish between the freedom of establishment and 
freedom of capital movement in addressing the comparability question. 
 
6.3.3.1 Vertical comparability 
 
The CJEU and the EFTA Court (often) use a two-step comparability analysis.726 As a first step, the courts 
determine whether the cross-border situation is prima facie comparable to a domestic situation at all (prima 
facie comparison). National (tax) measures which treat such cross-border situations less favourably than 
domestic situations are, in principle, prohibited, because such measures may, for example, discourage non-
residents from acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in another State (inbound investments), or 
from making investments in another State (outbound investments). In the context of direct taxes, the courts 
have constantly held that, as a general rule, residents and non-residents are not comparable.727 However, once 
a Member State, either unilaterally or by way of a convention, imposes tax on income, not only of residents, 
but also on income of non-residents, their situation becomes prima facie comparable.728 This also applies if a 
Member State tax-exempts payments to its residents, while creating a risk of a series of tax charges or 
economic double taxation by imposing tax on payments to non-residents.729 In this respect, the (absence of) 
taxation in another State is irrelevant, since “it is solely because of the exercise by [the Member] State of its 
taxing powers that (…) a risk of a series of charges to tax may arise”.730 Thus, once a Member State chooses to 
exercise its taxing jurisdiction over non-residents, these non-residents find themselves in a situation prima 
facie comparable to that of residents as regards the risk of a series of charges to tax.731 Further, a Member 
State cannot rely on a neutralizing measure granted unilaterally by another (Member or third) State to justify 
its more burdensome taxation of non-residents.732 However, a Member State can rely on a (bilateral) tax 
treaty, provided this treaty guarantees full neutralization733 in the other State.734  
 
As a second step, if a cross-border situation is prima facie comparable to a domestic situation, and treated less 
favourably, the courts focus on whether a cross-border situation is objectively comparable to a domestic 
situation.735 Whether a non-resident is in an objectively (in)comparable situation to that of residents is 
                                                             
726 P. Wattel, “Non-Discrimination à la Cour: The ECJ’s (Lack of) Comparability Analysis in Direct Tax Cases” (2015) 55 
European Taxation 542.   
727 CJEU, 14 February 1995, Case C-279/93 (Schumacker), Para. 31; CJEU, 12 June 2003, Case C-234/01 (Arnoud 
Gerritse), Paras. 43-45; CJEU, 14 December 2006, Case C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal BV), Para. 24; CJEU, 22 
December 2008, Case C-282/07 (Truck Center), Para. 38. 
728 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 67; 
CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 58 and case law cited; CJEU, 19 November 2009, 
Case C-540/07 (European Commission v. Italian Republic), Paras. 51-52 and case law cited; CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-
303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest), Paras. 42-43 and case law cited, and Para. 54.  
729 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 68; 
CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 58 and case law cited. 
730 CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), Para. 70; CJEU, 8 
November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta), Para. 39; CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest), 
Para. 51 and 54; CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 59. 
731 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 69 and 
case law cited. 
732 CJEU, 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta), Para. 78; CJEU, 3 June 2010, Case C-487/08 (European 
Commission v. Kingdom of Spain), Para. 66. 
733 Meaning that “the tax withheld at source under national legislation can be set off against the tax due in the other 
Member State in the full amount of the difference in treatment arising under the national legislation”. See CJEU, 17 
September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 79.  
734 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Paras. 77-80. 
735 With respect to Art. 49 TFEU (which is identical in substance to Art. 31 EEA Agreement), see e.g. CJEU, 18 June 
2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest), Para. 32 and case law cited. With respect to Art. 63 TFEU and Art. 
65 TFEU, see e.g. CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Paras. 54-57 and case law cited; 
CJEU, 10 May 2012, Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-347/11 (Santander Asset Management), Paras. 20-23 and case law cited. 
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determined in the light of the purpose of the national tax measure at issue,736 and by taking account of any 
relevant distinguishing criteria or characteristics established by the national tax measure in question.737 In 
Hein Persche,738 Germany refused to allow tax deductions in respect of gifts in kind made by a German 
resident individual to a Portuguese resident organization which had charitable status according to Portuguese 
law. According to Germany, the recipient of the gift was not established in Germany and the German 
individual failed to produce a donation certificate in proper form. According to the CJEU:  
 
“(…) a body which is established in one Member State but satisfies the requirements imposed for [the] 
purpose [of determining the charitable status] by another Member State for the grant of tax 
advantages, is, in respect of the grant by the latter Member State of tax advantages intended to 
encourage the charitable activities concerned, in a situation comparable to that of bodies recognised 
as having charitable purposes which are established in the latter Member State.”739 
 
Hein Persche is consistent with previous and subsequent other European case law:740 objective comparability 
is determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax measure at issue, 
and by the conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State as imposed on its residents. In this 
respect, “only the relevant distinguishing criteria established by the legislation in question must be taken into 
account in determining whether the difference in treatment resulting from that legislation reflects an 
objectively different situation.”741 This substantive approach regarding comparability applies without 
distinction to non-resident ‘shareholders’, ‘share companies’, ‘pension funds’ or ‘investment funds’.742 In the 
context of CIVs, this substantive approach means that, if the position of the participants in the fund is not a 
relevant element under the national tax measure in question, comparability between resident and non-
resident funds needs to be carried out only at the level of the fund vehicle, and vice versa.743 As regards other 
types of non-resident taxpayers, this rule implies that comparability generally takes place at the level of the 
non-resident taxpayer itself.744 Furthermore, from case law it can be derived that the conditions 
(distinguishing criteria) may not be such that they would deprive the freedoms of all effectiveness, such as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
With respect to Art. 40 EEA Agreement, see e.g. EFTA Court, 23 November 2004, Case E-1/04 (Fokus Bank), Para. 28 
and case law cited. 
736 Cf. CJEU, 8 November 2012, Case C-342/10 (European Commission v. Republic of Finland), Para. 36 and case law 
cited; CJEU, 20 October 2011, Case C-284/09 (European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany), Para. 53; CJEU, 
3 June 2010, Case C-487/08 (European Commission v. Kingdom of Spain), Para. 48; CJEU, 19 November 2009, Case C-
540/07 (European Commission v. Italian Republic), Para. 50; CJEU, 27 January 2009, Case C-318/07 (Hein Persche), 
Paras. 50-52. 
737 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 61 and case law cited; CJEU, 10 May 2012, 
Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-347/11 (Santander Asset Management), Para. 27 and case law cited. 
738 CJEU, 27 January 2009, Case C-318/07 (Hein Persche). 
739 Ibid., Para. 50. Based on Hein Persche and other European case law, the Dutch Supreme Court decided that the 
Netherlands is not obliged to recognize the Finnish tax-exempt status of a Finnish resident CIV for Dutch tax purposes. 
Since the Finnish CIV did not satisfy the conditions imposed on Dutch resident entities for obtaining a tax-exempt status, 
relating to the nature of their activities or the destination of their profit, it was not comparable to a Dutch resident tax-
exempt entity, according to the Dutch Supreme Court. Therefore, the Finnish CIV was not entitled to a refund of Dutch 
dividend withholding, unlike Dutch tax-exempt entities. Hoge Raad, 15 November 2013, No. 12/01866, BNB 2014/20. 
740 CJEU, 14 September 2006, Case C-386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer), Paras. 40-42; CJEU, 8 November 
2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta); CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 73 and 87; CJEU, 
2 June 2016, Case C-252/14 (Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek), Para. 48. 
741 CJEU, 2 June 2016, Case C-252/14 (Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek), Para. 49 and case law cited. 
742 G. Hippert, “The TFEU Eligibility of Non-EU Investment Funds Subjected to Discriminatory Dividend Withholding 
Taxes” (2016) 25 EC Tax Review 77. 
743 CJEU, 10 May 2012, Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-347/11 (Santander Asset Management), Paras. 39-40; CJEU, 10 
April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 62. 
744 CJEU, 14 December 2006, Case C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal BV); CJEU, 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 
(Amurta); CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 
69 and case law cited. 
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requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems of other States (Aberdeen),745 or requiring that non-
residents (fully) comply with local source State regulations, such as the EU directive on undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (Emerging Markets Series). In the latter case, Poland required a 
US resident investment fund to comply with a European directive, which the fund could not since the directive 
does not apply to investment funds established in third countries. The CJEU held that “a requirement that 
[non-resident] investment funds be regulated in the same way as resident investment funds would deprive 
the principle of free movement of capital of any practical effect”.746 In the author’s view, based on Emerging 
Markets Series, the rule which prohibits requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems of other States 
should apply without distinction between EU Member States and third countries. 
 
The purpose of a national tax measure at issue can result in non-residents being in a situation incomparable 
to that of residents. Notably, in the Swedish case Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek, the CJEU concluded that a 
non-resident (Dutch) pension fund was not comparable to a (Swedish) resident pension fund in the light of 
the aim pursued by the Swedish national tax measure as regards resident pension funds.747 Although both 
were subject to Swedish taxation at a rate of 15%, this rate was applied to a different tax base. A notional yield 
applicable to all asset classes, irrespective of the actual receipt of income, was used to calculate the tax base 
for Swedish pension funds, whereas the Dutch pension fund was subject to Swedish withholding tax on 
distributed dividends. The aim of the calculation method for Swedish pension funds was to achieve “neutral 
taxation independent of the economic climate surrounding various kinds of assets and all of the kinds of 
pension products concerned”.748 The CJEU held that such an aim, which presupposes taxation on the entire 
asset base, cannot be achieved in relation to non-resident pension funds pursuant to the limited taxing 
powers of Sweden under the tax treaty with the Netherlands.749 The CJEU therefore held in that particular 
case that – in the light of the aim pursued by the Swedish national measure – a non-resident pension fund was 
not comparable to a Swedish pension fund. Although this decision seems to conflict with previous decisions of 
the court,750 it does illustrate that a national tax measure, despite being capable of imposing a heavier tax 
burden on non-residents and discouraging non-residents from making investments in a Member State, can be 
compatible with EU law. 
 
When a non-resident is objectively comparable to a resident, a Member State is, in principle, not allowed to tax 
that non-resident more heavily. That is to say, a State is allowed to apply a different tax method or different 
tax base and tax rate to non-residents as compared to comparable residents, but it is not allowed to impose a 
higher final tax burden, as defined, on those non-residents.751 As a result, the taxation at the level of a non-
resident must be compared with the overall taxation at the level of a comparable resident, which could consist 
of (a gross-based) withholding tax and (a net-based) income tax combined.752 The relevant period for 
comparing the tax burden is the period taken into account for residents; usually one tax year.753 In comparing 
the tax burden, only expenses that are directly linked to an activity that has generated taxable income can be 
taken into account when calculating the tax burden of a comparable resident.754 In this respect, the CJEU 
                                                             
745 CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest), Para. 50. In the author’s view, the consideration 
that the legal form unknown to the legal system of another Member State does not create an objective difference also 
applies to the free movement of capital.  
746 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 67. 
747 CJEU, 2 June 2016, Case C-252/14 (Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek), Paras. 47-63. 
748 Ibid., Para. 53. 
749 Ibid., Paras. 53-62. 
750 In particular, CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale). 
751 CJEU, 14 December 2006, Case C-170/05 (Denkavit Internationaal BV); CJEU, 17 May 2017, Case C-68/15 (X), Para. 
41. 
752 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Paras. 73-74. 
753 CJEU, 2 June 2016, Case C-252/14 (Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek), Para. 37 and case law cited. 
754 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 57. 
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seems to distinguish between expenses related to business income and expenses related to passive (portfolio) 
income, and to follow a stricter approach in respect of the latter category.755 For passive (portfolio) income, a 
direct link only exists for expenses directly linked to the actual payment of the passive income itself.756 As a 
result, financing costs related to the acquisition of portfolio assets should not be taken into account when 
calculating the tax burden of a comparable resident (since such financing costs are not directly linked to the 
actual payment of the income itself). On the other hand, it seems much easier for the CJEU to establish a direct 
link between financing costs and business income.757  
 
6.3.3.2 Horizontal comparability 
 
The previous discussion shows that the freedoms prohibit non-residents from being treated less favourably 
than objectively comparable residents (vertical comparability). The question has been raised before the CJEU 
whether the freedoms also prohibit discrimination among objectively comparable non-residents (horizontal 
comparability).    
 
In D.758 and subsequent case-law, the CJEU ruled that the freedoms do not entitle residents of one Member 
State to the benefits that a second Member State has made available to residents of a third Member State 
under a bilateral tax treaty. It considered that a tax treaty is a product of reciprocal rights and obligations 
confined to residents of one of the two Member States, and that a specific tax treaty benefit is an integral part 
of the overall tax treaty, and contributes to its overall balance. In Riskin & Timmermans, the CJEU made explicit 
that this reasoning similarly applies to tax treaties concluded with third States.759 So, from a source State 
perspective, non-residents covered by different tax treaties are not in an objectively comparable situation due 
the bilateral character of a tax treaty. With these decisions, the CJEU refuses to apply most-favoured-nation 
treatment in case of bilateral tax treaty benefits (i.e. horizontal inter-State comparison). The question whether 
non-residents from the same State that are, and those that are not entitled to the same benefit under a tax 
treaty with a Member State can be objectively comparable (i.e. horizontal intra-State comparison), has not 
been explicitly answered by the CJEU. The issue of horizontal intra-State comparison in case of tax treaty 
benefits was at stake in ATC Group Litigation.760 The question referred to the CJEU was whether the ‘limitation 
of benefits’ clause under the U.K. – Netherlands tax treaty could constitute discrimination.761 Based on this 
clause, some tax treaty residents of the Netherlands were denied a U.K. tax treaty benefit, while other tax 
treaty residents of the Netherlands were entitled to this benefit, thus resulting in different treatment between 
tax treaty residents from the same Member State. The CJEU answered that the ‘limitation of benefits’ 
provision did not constitute (horizontal) discrimination, by referring to D.762 However, in doing so, the court 
wrongly referred to non-residents from different States, rather than to non-residents from the same Member 
                                                             
755 Compare, CJEU, 12 June 2003, Case C-234/01 (Arnoud Gerritse) and CJEU, 15 February 2007, Case C-345/04 
(Centro Equestre da Lezíria Grande), Paras. 22-26, on the one hand, and CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-
10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 58 and CJEU, 2 June 2016, Case C-252/14 
(Pensioenfonds Metaal en Techniek), on the other. 
756 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Para. 58  
757 CJEU, 13 July 2016, Case C-18/15 (Brisal), Para. 48. 
758 CJEU, 5 July 2005, Case C-376/03 (D.), Paras. 53-63. For different views on this case, see D. Weber, “Most-Favoured-
Treatment under Tax Treaties Rejected in the European Community: Background and Analysis of the D Case: A proposal 
to include a most-favoured-nation clause in the EC Treaty” (2005) 33 Intertax 429; A. de Graaf & G. Janssen, “The 
implications of the judgment in the D case: the perspective of two non-believers” (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 173. 
759 CJEU, 30 June 2016, Case C-176/15 (Riskin & Timmermans), Para. 31; A. Dourado, “The EU Free Movement of 
Capital and Third Countries: Recent Developments” (2017) 45 Intertax 192, p. 203. 
760 CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), Paras. 82-93. 
761 On the topic of the EU law compatibility of limitation of benefit clauses, see F. Debelva et al., “LOB Clauses and EU-
Law Compatibility: A Debate Revived by BEPS?” (2015) 24 EC Tax Review 132; J. Calejo Guerra, “Limitation on 
Benefits Clauses and EU Law” 51 (2011) European Taxation 85.  
762 CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), Paras. 88-94. 
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State.763 In another case, Riskin & Timmermans,764 concerning two Belgian resident individuals who had 
received dividends from a company established in Poland, the CJEU had to deal with the issue of horizontal 
intra-State comparison, but this time in an inbound situation. Mr Riskin and Ms Timmermans were denied to 
credit Polish dividend withholding tax against Belgian income tax, pursuant to the conditions of the Belgium – 
Poland tax treaty. Under tax treaties concluded with third States, Belgium would have allowed foreign tax to 
be credited against Belgian income tax, without imposing similar conditions. The CJEU concluded that Belgian 
residents covered by the tax treaty with Poland are not objectively comparable to Belgian residents covered 
by other tax treaties.765 It held, by referring to D., that: 
 
“[i]n the context of bilateral tax conventions, it follows from the case-law of the Court that the scope of 
such a convention is limited to the natural or legal persons defined by it. Likewise, the benefits 
granted by it are an integral part of all the rules under the convention and contribute to the overall 
balance of mutual relations between the two contracting States (…). It must be noted (…) that that 
situation is the same with regard to double taxation conventions concluded with Member States or 
with third States.”766  
In the author’s view, this strongly indicates that non-residents from the same State that are, and those that are 
not entitled to the same tax treaty benefit, will not be held objectively comparable by the CJEU. The only 
difference with both D. and Riskin & Timmermans is that the taxpayers in these cases were covered by a tax 
treaty, but claimed benefits of other tax treaties. The issue of horizontal comparability between non-residents 
from the same Member State that are, and those that are not entitled to the same benefit under a tax treaty 
with another Member State, involves one tax treaty only. However, based on Riskin & Timmermans, this 
difference does not appear to be relevant, because a tax treaty benefit accorded to one non-resident but not to 
another non-resident from the same State, is also an integral part of the wider treaty and contributes to its 
overall balance. The previous discussion should be distinguished from decisions such as Saint-Gobain767 and 
Gottardo768. These judgments do not concern the issue of horizontal discrimination (most-favoured-nation 
treatment), but deal with vertical discrimination (national treatment of non-residents). Based on Sain-Gobain, 
a company of Member State A with a permanent establishment in Member State B could be entitled to benefits 
under tax treaties concluded by Member State B with other States, on the same conditions applicable to 
companies of Member State B. Based on Gottardo, residents of other Member States could be entitled to the 
same benefits as those enjoyed by residents of Member State A under a treaty between Member State A and 
third States.  
In the beginning of 2015, in Sopora,769 the CJEU for the first time explicitly accepted that a freedom, the 
freedom of movement of workers in this case, could prohibit discrimination between non-residents 
(horizontal comparability). This case concerned a Dutch wage tax facility, which allowed a fixed exemption of 
30% of employment income and was open only to foreign high-skilled expatriates who had lived outside a 
certain radius from the Dutch border during a certain period prior to their employment in the Netherlands. 
The court mainly based its decision on the wording of Art. 45(2) TFEU, which prohibits discrimination 
“between workers of the Member States”, but also referred to Art. 26 TFEU, which instructs the EU to 
establish and develop the functioning of the internal market.770 In Sopora, horizontal comparability under a 
tax treaty was not at stake. The question arises whether the Sopora decision also applies to the other 
                                                             
763 Ibid., Paras. 91-94.  
764 CJEU, 30 June 2016, Case C-176/15 (Riskin & Timmermans). 
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freedoms. The freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services clearly lack language similar to Art. 
45(2); they both focus on vertical comparability. The language used in the free movement of capital leaves 
more room for a horizontal comparability. In literature, several arguments have been identified in favour of 
extending the Sopora decision to all other freedoms, including:771 
 
- the CJEU’s converging interpretation of the freedoms; 
 
- the CJEU’s reference to Art. 26 TFEU, paragraph 2 which provides that the “internal market shall 
comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital is ensured (…)”. All freedoms appear to contribute to the internal market and not 
extending Sopora to the other freedoms would be contrary to the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market;  
 
- Art. 18 TFEU, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality and is broad enough to 
cover ‘horizontal discrimination’. Since the fundamental freedoms are lex specialis to Art. 18 TFEU, 
this general provision should govern any discrimination not covered by a fundamental freedom, 
including horizontal discrimination.    
 
However, in the context of the free movement of capital, the CJEU currently does not seem to allow the 
possibility of horizontal comparability in relation to third States. Four years prior to Sopora, the CJEU already 
held in Haribo and Salinen that “the different treatment of income from one non-member State compared to 
income from another non-member State is not concerned, as such, by” the free movement of capital.772 Also, 
the CJEU explicitly justified horizontal comparability in Sopora with reference to the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market (Art. 26 TFEU). Based on these decisions, horizontal comparability seems 
confined to intra-EU/EEA situations, which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU 
has no universal scope when it comes to horizontal comparability. Although Sopora was concerned with non-
resident workers from different States, the author does not see why the concept of horizontal comparability 
would apply any differently to non-residents from the same Member State. Further, horizontal comparability 
under a tax treaty was not at stake in Sopora, so the rule laid down in D. should continue to apply, i.e. no most-
favoured-nation treatment in case of tax treaty benefits.  
 
6.3.3.3 Application to sovereign wealth investors 
 
There is currently no European tax case law dealing with the issue of comparability as regards foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. To whom, if any, should foreign sovereign wealth investors that have access to 
either the freedom of capital movement or the freedom of establishment be compared? This question has not 
been answered before, but becomes relevant when foreign sovereign wealth investors are treated differently 
than other investors. Below, the issue of comparability as regards foreign sovereign wealth investors is 
addressed by applying existing guidelines as discussed above, and by relying on common features of direct tax 
systems. 
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6.3.3.3.1 Vertical comparability 
 
In accordance with the rules on prima facie comparability as discussed in Section 6.3.3.1 above, if a Member 
State imposes tax on a foreign sovereign wealth investor, as well as resident investors, their situation should 
become prima facie comparable. This should also apply if a Member State tax-exempts payments to its 
residents, while creating a risk of a series of tax charges or economic double taxation by imposing tax on 
payments to foreign sovereign wealth investors. In this respect, the (absence of) taxation in a foreign State is 
of no relevance, whereas a Member State can only rely on a neutralizing measure granted under a (bilateral) 
tax treaty, provided this treaty guarantees full neutralization in that other State. 
 
If a foreign sovereign wealth investor is prima facie comparable to a resident, the next step is to determine 
whether a foreign sovereign wealth investor is objectively comparable to any resident (investor). Objective 
comparability is determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax 
measure at issue, and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State as imposed 
on its residents. In the direct tax system of many Member States, including the Netherlands, a basic distinction 
is made between the following categories of residents: (1) the State and State entities, (2) CIVs, (3) pension 
funds, (4) not-for-profit organizations, (5) regular corporate shareholders, and (6) individuals. Their common 
features, tax status and comparability (or not) to foreign sovereign wealth investors is discussed below. The 
analysis below is at a more abstract level and relies to a large extent on the information from Section 3.2. 
 
(1) The State and State entities 
 
In many States, legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public 
law – together referred to as ‘State entities’ – are (effectively) not taxed, either entirely or at least to the extent 
they exercise public functions or do not compete with private economic operators. As explained in Section 
2.10, there are three conflicting theories on home State taxation of State entities. The first theory is that home 
State taxation is superfluous, because the profits of State entities already belong to the owner-State. The 
second theory holds that home State taxation of such entities is necessary to put them on equal footing with 
private operators. In the author’s view, this would, however, require that they are made tax sensitive (just like 
private operators).773 The third theory relates to the agency problem with respect to dividend payments, 
caused by the divergent interests between managers and shareholders. It requires taxation of State entities 
simply as a way to deal with this problem by forcing payment of a fixed percentage of annual profits to the 
State.  
As explained, comparability must be examined by having regard to the purpose of and taking into account the 
relevant distinguishing criteria established by the national tax measure in question. Thus, if legal persons of 
public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal entity of public law are not taxed, because 
taxation is considered to be superfluous, it could be argued that a foreign sovereign wealth investor is not 
comparable to such resident entities in the light of the objective of a national tax measure and the tax system 
as a whole; that is, source State taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors is not superfluous. On the other 
hand, if resident State entities are not taxed to the extent they exercise public functions or do not compete 
with private economic operators, the type of functions and activities become relevant. In such cases, it can be 
argued that, having regard to the aim pursued by the national measure at issue, as well as its purpose and 
content and taking into account the relevant distinguishing criteria, a foreign sovereign wealth investor is 
objectively comparable to resident State entities, if it performs a similar function and/or similar activities, and 
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meets any other relevant conditions imposed on resident State entities.774 Thus, if resident State entities are 
not taxed to the extent they exercise public functions or do not compete with private economic operators, the 
tax treatment of investment activities of a foreign sovereign wealth investor should in principle follow the 
treatment of similar activities performed by resident State entities. However, the (remaining) conditions 
cannot be such that they would deprive the freedoms of all effectiveness, such as requiring a legal form 
unknown to the legal systems of other States. In the author’s view, based on Emerging Markets Series, the rule 
which prohibits requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems of other States should apply without 
distinction between EU Member States and third countries. Furthermore, the fact that a foreign sovereign 
wealth investor is not taxed in its home State is irrelevant for the comparability analysis. 
In this context, a certain level of interaction exists between the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules. 
As will be discussed in Section 6.4, the State aid rules could require a Member State to impose tax on economic 
(business) activities of resident State entities in a manner similar to private companies, without being 
superfluous. Furthermore, passive investment activities should fall outside the scope of the State aid rules. 
Therefore, the distinction between economic (business) activities and passive investment activities, and the 
tax treatment of such activities performed by resident State entities, could become relevant for the required 
treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors by Member States. 
(2) Collective investment vehicles 
 
Rather than investing directly, many (smaller) portfolio investors pool their money in and invest collectively 
through CIVs. CIVs are managed by professional parties and offer investors various benefits as compared to 
investing directly, such as lower transactions costs, better market access, risk diversification and benefiting 
from market knowledge of professional managers and advisors. Most Member States have separate tax rules 
dealing with CIVs. The common aim of these rules is to achieve neutrality between investing directly and 
investing indirectly through a CIV, as much as possible. Different States, however, apply different mechanisms 
to accomplish this neutrality. Tax neutrality may be achieved in different ways, such as through subjective tax 
exemptions, objective tax exemptions or a 0% tax rate.775 Eligibility is typically subject to certain conditions, 
e.g. in terms of a plurality of investors, distribution policy, regulatory requirements, and types of assets to be 
invested in.776 Because foreign sovereign wealth investors are not established to achieve tax neutrality 
between direct and indirect investment for a wider group of investors, they are unlikely to meet these 
conditions. For instance, a foreign sovereign wealth investor will not meet a condition regarding plurality of 
investors, since it has one single (ultimate) shareholder only, namely the owner-State. Therefore, in the light 
of the objective pursued and the relevant conditions imposed under a domestic tax measure, a foreign 
sovereign wealth investor is unlikely to be objectively comparable to resident CIVs. 
 
(3) Pension funds 
 
Many States do not tax funds which facilitate and organize the investment of contributions by the employer 
and employees for retirement purposes,777 provided they comply with local pension fund regulations and/or 
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141, p. 143. 
777 K-Y. Yoo & A. de Serres, “Tax Treatment of Private Pension Savings in OECD Countries and the Net Tax Cost Per 
Unit of Contribution to Tax-favoured Schemes” (2004), OECD Working Paper No. 406, available at: 
<https://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/35663569.pdf>. 
  
142 
 
meet other specific conditions. These regulations and/or conditions will typically require, amongst others, 
that the aim of the fund is to facilitate and organize private retirement saving plans. One reason why pension 
funds are not taxed is that the investment returns will effectively be taxed when pensions are paid; in most 
countries, pension contributions are made out of pre-tax income, investment returns of pension funds are tax-
exempt and pension payments, including the profit component, are due with tax.778 Another reason why many 
States do not tax pension funds is because they fulfil an important social function in society.779 Based on Hein 
Persche, it can be argued that foreign sovereign wealth investors that do not comply with similar or 
comparable regulations at home and/or do not meet other conditions imposed on resident pension funds, are 
not objectively comparable to resident pension funds. However, the conditions cannot be such that they 
would deprive the freedoms of all effectiveness, such as requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems 
of other States, or requiring full compliance with local pension fund regulations. As most foreign sovereign 
wealth investors will have a different, or less specific, purpose than the purpose required under the legislation 
of many Member States to qualify for the status of tax-exempt pension fund, most foreign sovereign wealth 
investors will unlikely meet the conditions imposed on resident pension funds under domestic (tax) law. 
Therefore, having regard to the purpose of and taking into account the relevant distinguishing criteria 
established by a national tax measure in question, a foreign sovereign wealth investor will unlikely be 
objectively comparable to such resident pension funds.  
 
Other pension funds, known as SPRFs (sovereign pension reserve funds), are set up and funded by the 
government to cover for expected future deficits of the social security system as a result of an aging 
population.780 Given that the objective of SPRFs is less specific, and perhaps of a more macro-economic 
nature, than that of pension funds which facilitate and organize private retirement saving plans, a foreign 
sovereign wealth investor is arguably more likely to be objectively comparable to resident SPRFs. 
 
(4) Not-for-profit organizations 
 
A not-for-profit organization is a type of organization that does not aim to earn profit for its owners 
(shareholders), but uses profit and donations to further a particular social cause, or advocate for a particular 
point of view. In many States, special tax arrangements are available to not-for-profit organizations.781 These 
special rules generally reflect a policy intended to support non-profit activities through tax expenditure.782 
Special tax rules for not-for-profit organizations include reduced tax rates, tax base limitations (e.g. 
distinguishing between business and non-business income) or a full tax-exemption.783 To be eligible for these 
special tax rules, an organization is typically required to further a certain (charitable, public, social and/or 
political) purpose and/or is prohibited to distribute profits. Additional conditions could apply, for example 
regarding the level of remuneration of directors or the activities (not) to be performed. Member States have 
discretion to determine which activities qualify as charitable and are to be tax incentivized.784 In Hein Persche, 
the CJEU indicated that Member States “(…) are free to define the interests of the general public that they wish 
to promote by granting benefits to associations and bodies which pursue objects linked to such interests in a 
disinterested manner and comply with the requirements relating to the implementation of those objects.”785 
                                                             
778 Ibid. 
779 See Section 3.2.1.4. 
780 See Section 2.3.4.2.  
781 D. Gliksberg, “General Report”, in: Taxation of Non-Profit Organizations, IFA Cahiers de droit fiscal international, 
Vol. 84a (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
782 Ibid., p. 36. 
783 Ibid., pp. 38-45. 
784 A. Yevgenyeva, “The Taxation of Non-profit Organizations after Stauffer”, Chapter 11: in W. Haslehner et al. (eds.), 
Landmark Decisions of the ECJ in Direct Taxation, (Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2015). 
785 CJEU, 27 January 2009, Case C-318/07 (Hein Persche), Para. 48 (referring to CJEU, 14 September 2006, Case C-
386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer), Para. 39).  
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However, a Member State cannot refuse the benefit to an entity “solely on the ground that it is not established 
in its territory.”786 
According to the ‘consensus’ definition,787 foreign sovereign wealth investors are established to 
achieve financial objectives (i.e. earn profit) for macroeconomic purposes. It could be argued that foreign 
sovereign wealth investors fulfil a public or social function, since they benefit the home population as a whole. 
However, this function will unlikely qualify under the legislation of source States. Furthermore, foreign 
sovereign wealth investors are not prohibited from distributing profits to its owner. It is, thus, very unlikely 
that foreign sovereign wealth investors will meet the conditions imposed by source States on resident not-for-
profit organizations. As a result, having regard to the purpose of and taking into account the relevant 
distinguishing criteria established by a national tax measure in question, a foreign sovereign wealth investor 
is very likely not objectively comparable to resident not-for-profit organizations. 
(5) Regular corporate shareholders 
 
The fundamental freedoms have largely contributed to national tax treatment of non-resident regular 
shareholders in intra-EU/EEA situations, often resulting in the absence or reduction of source taxation on 
outbound dividends (in particular).788 Furthermore, the freedom of capital movement could require EU 
Member States to accord national tax treatment to non-EU corporate shareholders in respect of outbound 
portfolio dividends.789 When a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series of charges to 
tax or economic double taxation in a domestic situation, non-resident corporate shareholders are objectively 
comparable to resident corporate shareholders and could be entitled to similar tax treatment, provided they 
meet the relevant conditions which apply in a domestic situation. In the light of the purpose to avoid or 
mitigate economic double taxation, foreign sovereign wealth investors that are taxed by a Member State on 
income derived from that State, could be objectively comparable to regular resident corporate shareholders, 
provided they meet the relevant conditions which apply in a domestic situation. The conditions, however, 
cannot be such that they would deprive the freedoms of all effectiveness, such as requiring a legal form 
unknown to the legal systems of other States. In the author’s view, based on Emerging Markets Series, the rule 
which prohibits requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems of other States should apply without 
distinction between EU Member States and third countries. It does not matter when foreign sovereign wealth 
investors are not taxed in their home State, since, according to settled case law:  
 
“(…) it is solely because of the exercise by [a Member State] of its power to tax that, irrespective of any 
taxation in another non-Member State or [another Member State], a risk of a series of charges to tax 
or economic double taxation may arise, [the freedom of establishment and the freedom of capital 
movement] obliges that [first-mentioned] Member State, which establishes a tax exemption, with 
regard to dividends paid to resident traders by companies which are also resident, to accord 
equivalent treatment to dividends paid to traders established in non-Member States [and other 
Member States]”790 
 
Based on the above analysis, a foreign sovereign wealth investor could very well be objectively comparable to 
regular resident corporate shareholders and entitled to similar tax treatment. In fact, foreign sovereign wealth 
                                                             
786 CJEU, 14 September 2006, Case C-386/04 (Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer), Para. 40. 
787 See Section 2.3.6. 
788 CJEU, 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta); CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-
17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale).  
789 By analogy, CJEU, 10 February 2011, Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 (Haribo Lakritzen and Österreichische 
Salinen), Para. 50; CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 39. 
790 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 59, in relation to non-Member States. Similarly, 
CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), Para. 70, in relation 
to Member States. 
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investors might already have received national treatment as a result of the fundamental freedoms (notably in 
EU Member States, based on the freedom of capital movement).  
(6) Individuals 
 
The author would not expect a foreign sovereign wealth investor to be objectively comparable to resident 
individuals, simply because of their difference in nature. This difference in nature between legal entities and 
individuals has resulted in separate tax regimes for each group.  
 
To conclude, State entities or regular corporate shareholders are likely the best candidates in terms of 
objective vertical comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. If a foreign sovereign wealth 
investor is comparable to both a regular resident corporate shareholder and a resident State entity, and both 
are taxed differently, it seems reasonable that a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be entitled to the 
most favourable tax treatment. It is unlikely that a foreign sovereign wealth investor is objectively comparable 
to any of the remaining categories of residents, essentially because the tax treatment of these other categories 
of residents is based on a different rationale, such as achieving neutrality between directly investing and 
indirectly investing or their social importance, as expressed in the relevant distinguishing criteria.  
 
6.3.3.3.2 Horizontal comparability  
 
A foreign sovereign wealth investor may be able to rely on the fundamental freedoms vis-à-vis Member States, 
if it is treated less favourably than other objectively comparable non-resident investors, including other 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. In the author’s view, the framework for vertical comparability (Section 
6.3.3.1 of this chapter) should be applied as much as possible to assess horizontal comparability of investors 
in outbound situations. Importantly, horizontal comparability seems confined to intra-EU/EEA situations,791 
and should not apply in case of tax treaty benefits. Within these limitations, this means that horizontal 
comparability should be examined by having regard to the purpose of and taking into account the relevant 
distinguishing criteria established by the national tax measure in question. Horizontal comparability is a new, 
unexplored and interesting area of European law. Therefore, a first general analysis for foreign sovereign 
wealth investors is made below, relying on information from Section 3.2. But before doing so, the author 
would like to make a general remark. In many Member States, the tax treatment of non-resident investors has 
been and continues to be impacted, often in their favour, by the fundamental freedoms as a result of vertical 
comparability. In its turn, and as the analysis below will show, the impact vertical comparability has had on 
the tax treatment of non-resident investors could have an impact on the outcome of the horizontal 
comparability analysis.  
 
(1) Other foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident State entities 
 
In many States, the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident State entities) 
follows the regular source taxation under domestic tax law. However, some States accord unilateral tax-
exemptions (or tax reductions) to such non-residents, often with reference to sovereign immunity (Chapter 
4), motivated by international attractiveness and/or based on reciprocity. Especially when an individual 
Member State relies on reciprocity, it is not unlikely that foreign sovereign wealth investors (or other non-
resident State entities) from different States receive a different tax treatment under the national tax laws of 
that Member State. In the author’s view, a Member State should not be protected by reciprocity under national 
tax law, because this would deprive the freedoms of their practical effect. Therefore, when reciprocity did not 
                                                             
791 Which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU has no universal scope when it comes to 
horizontal comparability. 
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find its way into a tax treaty, foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident State entities) from 
different States could be objectively comparable under the freedoms in an intra-EU/EEA context.     
  
(2) Non-resident collective investment vehicles 
 
Investment income of non-resident CIVs could be subject to regular source taxation. In order to achieve 
neutrality between investing directly and investing through a CIV in an international setting, many Member 
States have included special provisions in tax treaties. However, these treaty provisions are irrelevant for the 
horizontal comparability analysis, because the prohibition of horizontal discrimination should not apply in a 
tax treaty context. In many Member States, the tax treatment of non-resident CIVs has been impacted by the 
fundamental freedoms as a result of vertical comparability.792 The impact is often such that a Member State 
will impose conditions on non-resident CIVs that are similar or comparable to those imposed on resident 
CIVs, for example regarding the plurality of investors, distribution policy and the types of assets to be invested 
in. Foreign sovereign wealth investors are unlikely to meet the relevant conditions imposed on non-resident 
CIVs. For instance, a foreign sovereign wealth investor will not meet a condition regarding plurality of 
investors, since it has one single (ultimate) shareholder only, namely the owner-State. It is, therefore, unlikely 
that foreign sovereign wealth investors will be objectively comparable to non-resident CIVs.    
 
(3) Non-resident pension funds 
 
Many pension funds are tax-exempt in their residence State. As a result, source taxation imposed by Member 
States on such pension funds as non-residents represents a net cost to them (such pension funds cannot credit 
foreign taxes). This could distort neutrality with respect to the investment location. That is, pension funds 
could favour domestic investments over foreign investments. In order to promote neutrality, many Member 
States have agreed in their tax treaties not to impose source taxation on (certain items of) investment income 
of a non-resident pension fund in their bilateral relationship, usually on a reciprocity basis. However, these 
treaty provisions are irrelevant for the horizontal comparability analysis, because the prohibition of 
horizontal discrimination should not apply in a tax treaty context. The national tax legislation of Member 
States could have been impacted by the fundamental freedoms as a result of vertical comparability.793 The 
impact could have been such that a Member State unilaterally accords a tax-exemption to non-resident 
pension funds. European law allows to impose conditions on non-resident pension funds that are similar or 
comparable to those imposed on resident pension funds, notably the aim to facilitate and organize private 
retirement saving plans. However, the conditions cannot be such that they would deprive the freedoms of all 
effectiveness, such as requiring a legal form unknown to the legal systems of other States, or requiring full 
compliance with local pension fund regulations. Sovereign wealth investors will unlikely meet these 
conditions, simply because they do not facilitate and organize private retirement saving plans. Therefore, 
foreign sovereign wealth investors will unlikely be objectively comparable to non-resident pension funds.  
 
(4) Non-resident not-for-profit organizations 
 
The analysis in relation to non-resident not-for-profit organizations is similar to the analysis above in respect 
of non-resident pension funds. Thus, foreign sovereign wealth investors will unlikely be objectively 
comparable to non-resident not-for-profit organizations. 
                                                             
792 CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest); CJEU, 10 May 2012, Joined Cases C-338/11 to C-
347/11 (Santander Asset Management); CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series); G. Hippert, 
“The TFEU Eligibility of Non-EU Investment Funds Subjected to Discriminatory Dividend Withholding Taxes” (2016) 25 
EC Tax Review 77. 
793 See Section 6.3.3.1. 
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(5) Non-resident regular corporate shareholders 
The fundamental freedoms have largely contributed to national tax treatment of non-resident regular 
shareholders in intra-EU/EEA situations, often resulting in the absence or reduction of source taxation on 
outbound dividends (in particular).794 When a Member State has a system for preventing or mitigating a series 
of charges to tax or economic double taxation in a domestic situation, non-resident corporate shareholders 
are objectively comparable to resident corporate shareholders and could be entitled to similar tax treatment, 
provided they meet the relevant conditions which apply in a domestic situation.795 In the light of the purpose 
to avoid or mitigate economic double taxation, foreign sovereign wealth investors could be objectively 
comparable to non-resident regular corporate shareholders in intra-EU/EEA situations, provided they meet 
the relevant conditions which apply to non-resident regular corporate shareholders. In fact, foreign sovereign 
wealth investors might already have received similar horizontal treatment as a result of the impact of vertical 
comparability. The fact that a foreign sovereign wealth investor is not taxed in its home State, and non-
resident corporate shareholders could be taxed in their home State, is, in principle, irrelevant for the 
comparability analysis. 
(6) Non-resident individuals 
The author would not expect a foreign sovereign wealth investor to be objectively comparable to non-resident 
individuals, simply because of their difference in nature. This difference in nature between legal entities and 
individuals has resulted in separate tax regimes for each group.  
To conclude, non-resident regular corporate shareholders or other foreign sovereign wealth investors (and 
non-resident State entities) are likely the best candidates in terms of objective horizontal comparability with a 
foreign sovereign wealth investor in intra-EU/EEA situations. It is unlikely that a foreign sovereign wealth 
investor is objectively comparable to any of the other categories of non-residents. These outcomes are in line 
with the outcomes in the context of vertical comparability, because horizontal comparability is to a large 
extent influenced by vertical comparability. In the context of vertical comparability, the freedoms have 
impacted the tax treatment of non-residents by Member States, and they prescribe, in principle, to impose 
conditions on non-residents that are similar or comparable to those imposed on residents. As a result, when a 
non-resident is comparable to a category of residents, it will often be comparable to the same category of non-
residents.  
6.3.4 Steps (3)-(5): Justification test 
 
6.3.4.1 Relevant justification grounds 
  
To date, the CJEU has only accepted a limited number of justification grounds for different tax treatment of 
comparable situations.796 Regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors, the following justifications could be 
relevant: (i) the need to prevent international tax avoidance,797 (ii) the need to protect a balanced allocation of 
taxing powers, (iii) the need to safeguard fiscal coherence,798 and (iv) the need for effective fiscal 
                                                             
794 CJEU, 8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta); CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-
17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale).  
795 By analogy, CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), 
Paras. 56-57. 
796 B. Terra & P. Wattel, European Tax Law, 6th edn., (Deventer: Kluwer, 2012), pp. 42-44. 
797 For example, CJEU, 12 September 2006, Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes). 
798 For example, CJEU, 28 January 1992, Case C-204/90 (Bachmann). 
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supervision.799 The first three justification grounds should not apply any differently to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors than to other non-resident investors, and do not give rise to any particularities regarding 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. The fourth justification ground is in particular relevant for third country 
situations (which can only be examined in the light of Art. 63(1) TFEU), and, in the author’s view, its 
application to foreign sovereign wealth investors shows that a refinement of this justification ground is 
appropriate. The focus will, therefore, be on the need for effective fiscal supervision. 
 
6.3.4.2 Need for effective fiscal supervision in relation to third States 
 
With respect to Art. 63(1) TFEU, the CJEU has held that capital movements between EU Member States and 
third States take place in a ‘different legal context’.800 Because of this different legal context, restrictions on 
capital movements between EU Member States and third States may be justified where they would not be 
justified in an intra-Union situation.801 For one thing, the framework of EU Directive 2011/16/EU on 
administrative cooperation between EU Member States in the field of taxation, which provides for the 
exchange of information, does not apply to third States. The CJEU has ruled that restrictions on capital 
movements to and from third States are justified – based on the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision – in case: (i) the national tax measure at issue imposes conditions for obtaining a tax 
advantage,802 (ii) compliance with these conditions can only be verified by obtaining 
confirmation/information from the competent authorities of a third State, and (iii) that third State is not 
obliged under an agreement to exchange the information required for tax purposes.803 In such circumstances, 
the CJEU rules out a priori the possibility that the taxpayer resident in a third State himself can provide the 
relevant information.804 The reason behind ruling out such possibility seems that an EU Member State cannot 
verify the correctness of the information received from a taxpayer in the absence of an appropriate exchange 
of information mechanism. Apparently, only information or confirmation received from the (competent) 
authorities of a third State is presumed to be correct. It should be noted that this justification ground is 
becoming less significant, since the international developments against base erosion and profit shifting have 
resulted in an overall increase of applicable exchange of information frameworks between EU Member States 
and third countries.805 
 
6.3.4.3 Application to foreign sovereign wealth investors from third States 
 
In the author’s opinion, the application to foreign sovereign wealth investors of the justification ground 
regarding the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal supervision shows that a refinement of this 
justification ground is appropriate. The mere absence of the obligation for a third State to exchange 
information to an EU Member State cannot rule out a priori the possibility to demonstrate to that EU Member 
State that the conditions for obtaining a tax advantage have been satisfied. Even in the absence of an existing 
obligation to exchange information, a third State could still be (very much) willing to voluntarily provide the 
                                                             
799 E. Nijkeuter, “Exchange of Information and the Free Movement of Capital between Member States and Third 
Countries” (2011) 20 EC Tax Review 232. 
800 CJEU, 18 December 2007, Case C-101/05 (Skatteverket v. A), Para. 36. 
801 Ibid., Para. 37. 
802 These conditions cannot, of course, be discriminatory or restrictive themselves, e.g. CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-
190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 67.  
803 CJEU, 10 February 2011, Joined Cases C-436/08 and C-437/08 (Haribo Lakritzen and Österreichische Salinen), Para. 
131 and case law cited; CJEU, 19 July 2012, Case C-48/11 (Veronsaajien oikeudenvalvontayksikkö v. A Oy), Para. 36; 
CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 84. 
804 CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 85. 
805 For example, as on 24 January 2018, one hundred seventeen jurisdictions, including all EU Member States, participate 
in the OECD’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, providing a legal basis for 
the exchange of information between States. 
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necessary information to an EU Member State regarding a taxpayer; particularly so in relation to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors that reside in the owner-State/third State, because a reduction of taxation in an EU 
Member State would benefit that third State. An EU Member State should trust that the information 
voluntarily provided by the owner-State is accurate and reliable, based on the international law principle of 
mutual trust, also in the absence of an information exchange instrument. In such circumstances, it would not 
be appropriate for an EU Member State to successfully rely on the need for effective fiscal supervision. 
Admittedly, the CJEU may have recently introduced the refinement mentioned above. In SECIL, it held that, if:  
 
“(…) the legislation of a Member State makes a more advantageous tax system dependent on the 
satisfaction of requirements, compliance with which can be verified only by obtaining information 
from the competent authorities of a non-member State, it is, in principle, legitimate for that Member 
State to refuse to grant that advantage if, in particular, because that non-member State is not under 
any obligation pursuant to a convention or agreement to provide information, it proves impossible to 
obtain such information from that non-member State”806 (Italics added).  
 
Based on this decision, it could be argued that a Member State cannot rely on the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary 
information.807 
 
6.4. State aid and foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
6.4.1 General aspects 
 
If a domestic measure constitutes unlawful State aid, the EC or EFTA Surveillance Authority will order a 
Member State to recover the aid, including interest, from the beneficiary, so that the advantage enjoyed over 
its competitors on the market is forfeited, and the situation prior to payment of the aid is restored. 808 
However, under the de minimis rule, aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking is not considered to 
have satisfied the State aid criteria if it does not exceed EUR 200,000 over any period of three fiscal years.809 
The recovery of State aid is limited to a period of ten years.810 With respect to existing aid, such as aid which 
existed prior to the entry into force of the TFEU or EEA Agreement in the respective Member State,811 which is 
not or no longer compatible with the internal market, the EC or EFTA Surveillance Authority will issue a 
recommendation proposing appropriate measures to the Member State concerned, such as amendments to or 
abolition of the aid scheme.812 
 
The TFEU and EEA Agreement provide for specific exceptions to the application of State aid rules. Art. 107(2) 
TFEU and Art. 61(2) EEA Agreement list aid that is disregarded for State aid purposes, such as: (i) aid having a 
                                                             
806 CJEU, 24 November 2016, Case C-464/14 (SECIL), Para. 64.  
807 J. van Eijsden, B. Kiekebeld & D. Smit (eds.), Nederlands belastingrecht in Europees perspectief, 2nd edn., (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2014), pp. 197-198. 
808 For example, CJEU, 15 December 2005, Case C-148/04 (Unicredito Italiano), Para. 113 and case law cited. 
809 Art. 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, Official Journal of the European Union, 
Vol. 56, L 352, 24 December 2013; Art. 63 EEA Agreement in conjunction with Annex XV of the EEA Agreement. 
810 Art. 17(1) of the Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of 
Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘Procedural Regulation’), Official Journal of the 
European Union, Vol. 58, L 248, 24 September 2015, p. 9; Art. 15(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between 
the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. 
811 Art. 1(b) of the Procedural Regulation; Art. 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on 
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. 
812 Art. 22 of the Procedural Regulation; Art. 18 of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the 
Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. 
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social character, granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination 
related to the origin of the products concerned, and (ii) aid to make good the damage caused by natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences. Art. 107(3) TFEU and Art. 61(3) EEA Agreement provide for exceptions 
which the EC or EFTA Surveillance Authority could consider as not constituting State aid, such as: (i) aid to 
promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is 
serious underemployment, in view of their structural, economic and social situation, (ii) aid to facilitate the 
development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely 
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest, (iii) aid to promote culture and 
heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EU to an 
extent that is contrary to the common interest, and (iv) other categories of aid as may be specified by decision 
of the Council on a proposal from the EC or the EEA Joint Committee. The EC has adopted a regulation,813 
known as the General Block Exemption Regulation,814 which permits certain specific categories of State aid 
and exempts Member States from the requirement of prior notification to the EC.815 This regulation, which is 
also applied by the EFTA Surveillance Authority,816 contains detailed (and sometimes complex) rules and 
imposes general and specific conditions – in particular regarding eligible categories, beneficiaries, maximum 
aid and eligible expenses – aimed at ensuring that the exemptions have a limited effect on trade and 
competition. The eligible categories include aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, aid for research and 
development and innovation, aid for local infrastructure, investment aid for regional airports and investment 
aid for ports.817 In addition, based on Art. 106(2) TFEU and Art. 59(2) EEA Agreement, aid granted to an 
undertaking entrusted by a Member State with the operation of services of general economic interest may 
also be compatible with State aid rules.  
 
6.4.2 Constitutive elements 
 
Art. 107(1) TFEU provides: 
 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.” 
 
Art. 61(1) EEA Agreement contains similar wording. 
From their wording and from case law it follows that Art. 107(1) TFEU and Art. 61(1) EEA Agreement, in 
principle, prohibit:  
 
(i) an advantage;  
(ii) granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever; 
(iii) which is selective in that it favours certain undertakings or the production of certain goods; 
(iv) which cannot be justified by the inner logic of the system; and  
                                                             
813 Based on Art. 108(4) TFEU. 
814 Commission Regulation No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal 
market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 57, L 187, 26 
June 2014, p. 1; Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/1084 of 14 June 2017 amending Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 as 
regards aid for port and airport infrastructure, notification thresholds for aid for culture and heritage conservation and 
for aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, and regional operating aid schemes for outermost 
regions and amending Regulation (EU) No 702/2014 as regards the calculation of eligible costs, Official Journal of the 
European Union, Vol. 60, L 156, 20 June 2017, p. 1. 
815 Art. 107(3) TFEU. 
816 Art. 63 EEA Agreement in conjunction with Annex XV of the EEA Agreement. 
817 Art. 1(1) General Block Exemption Regulation. 
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(v) which distorts or threatens to distort competition, and trade between Member States.  
 
6.4.2.1 Advantage 
 
An advantage is any economic benefit resulting from State intervention.818 This is assessed by comparing the 
financial situation of an undertaking with and without State intervention. An advantage can be a positive 
economic advantage, but also any mitigation of charges normally included in the budget of an undertaking,819 
such as taxes, as they are similar in character and have the same effect.820 
 
Direct beneficiaries are entities to which State resources are directly ‘transferred’. However, a measure can 
also confer an advantage on entities to which State resources are not directly transferred (indirect 
beneficiaries).821 An indirect advantage is present if a measure indirectly benefits (a group of) identifiable 
entities; general secondary economic effects do not constitute State aid.822 In this respect, case law in the 
context of CIVs indicates that: (i) external asset managers of such vehicles, and (ii) potential EU/EEA targets 
(EU/EEA investment opportunities) are potential indirect beneficiaries.823  
 
6.4.2.2 State resources 
 
A ‘shortfall’ in tax revenue normally accruing to the budget, due to tax exemptions or reductions granted by an 
EU Member State/EEA-EFTA State, fulfils this condition.824 
 
6.4.2.3 Undertaking (and economic activity) 
 
According to settled case law, the concept of undertaking covers “any entity engaged in economic activity, 
regardless of the legal status of the entity or way in which it is financed”.825 In that respect, it does not matter 
whether an entity is part of the State or structured as a separate legal body, as long as it carries on economic 
activities.826 It is possible that several separate legal entities are considered to form one economic unit based 
on a controlling share and other functional, economic and organic links.827 Such an economic unit is treated as 
an undertaking for State aid purposes.  
 
An economic activity is broadly defined as “any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given 
market”.828 For the meaning of the term economic activity in State aid matters, the EC refers to EU case law in 
                                                             
818 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 66 and case law referred to in footnote 99. The EFTA Surveillance Authority 
has adopted similar guidelines. 
819 Ibid., Paras. 67-68 and case law referred to in footnotes 100 to 109. 
820 EFTA Court, 10 May 2011, Joined Cases E-4/10, E-6/10 and E-7/10 (Principality of Liechtenstein et. al), Para. 69.   
821 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 115 and case law referred to in footnotes 178 to 180. 
822 Ibid., Para. 115 and case law referred to in footnote 78. 
823 Court of First Instance, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management). 
824 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 51 and case law referred to in footnote 78. 
825 CJEU, 23 April 1991, Case C-41/90 (Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH), Para. 21; CJEU, 22 January 
2002, Case C-218/00 (Cisal di Battistello Venanzio & C. Sas), Para. 22 and case law cited. 
826 CJEU, 16 June 1987, Case 118/85 (Commission v. Italy), Paras. 8-10; CJEU, 18 March 1997, Case C-343/95 (Servizi 
Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA), Para. 17. 
827 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 11 and case law referred to in footnote 8. 
828 CJEU, 1 July 2008, Case C-49/07 (Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE)), Para. 22. 
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the field of VAT, from which it can be derived that the “simple acquisition and the mere sale of shares”829 and 
other negotiable securities does not constitute an economic activity, basically because any returns are merely 
the fruits of the (passive) ownership of an asset and are not the product of any economic activity.830 From the 
State aid decision in Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA it can be derived that even the holding of controlling 
shareholdings is “insufficient to characterise as economic an activity (…), when it gives rise only to the 
exercise of the rights attached to the status of shareholder or member, as well as, if appropriate, the receipt of 
dividends, which are merely the fruits of the ownership of an asset.”831 However, this is different when the 
owner of a controlling shareholding in an undertaking actually exercises that control by involving itself 
(directly or indirectly) in the management of that company. In such case, the owner must be regarded as 
taking part in that company’s economic activity and itself be considered as an undertaking (economic unit 
approach).832 In the author’s view, it cannot a contrario be derived from this decision that non-controlling 
shareholdings can never amount to an economic activity. An investor and a non-controlling shareholding in a 
company may not be considered to form an economic unit, but an investor with a non-controlling 
shareholding in a company could still be involved in the management of that company. It cannot be excluded 
that such active investors with non-controlling shareholdings must themselves be regarded as conducting an 
economic activity for State aid purposes. This would also be more in line with the concept of economic activity 
in the context of VAT and the freedom of establishment. For VAT purposes, being directly or indirectly 
involved in the management of a company is sufficient to constitute an economic activity, without the need to 
have a controlling shareholding.833 Transactions carried out in the course of a business trading in securities 
can also constitute an economic activity for VAT purposes.834 In the context of the freedom of establishment, 
in order to constitute an economic activity, it is even sufficient that a shareholding enables a national to 
exercise definite influence on the company; the Baars criterion does not appear to require that the influence is 
actually exercised.835 Nor does it necessarily require the presence of a controlling (more than 50%) 
shareholding.  
 
State aid case law in the context of CIVs also indicates that the holding of non-controlling shareholdings can 
constitute an economic activity. In the State aid case Fineco Asset Management, concerning an Italian tax 
scheme for specialized CIVs, the EC relied on case law dealing with the VAT status of open-ended investment 
companies (societés d’investissement à capital variable) (‘SICAVs’) in Luxembourg to demonstrate that the 
investment vehicles performed economic activities and therefore constituted undertakings. According to that 
VAT case law (BBL),836 the activities of SICAVs – which consisted of raising of capital from the public, 
purchasing of shares, and assembling and managing transferable securities on behalf of the subscribers for a 
fee – constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the VAT Directive, because they go “beyond the 
compass of the simple acquisition and the mere sale of securities” and aim “to produce income on a continuing 
basis.” The Court of First Instance (‘CFI’) did not dismiss the EC’s reference to this VAT case law for State aid 
purposes, but it indicated that the EC’s demonstration that the investment vehicles qualify as undertakings 
“may in some aspects appear questionable or ambiguous” and “must not be read out of context but in the light 
of the [EC’s] contested decision as a whole and its enacting terms”.837 In Fineco Asset Management, the CFI 
acknowledged that investment vehicles – which typically hold non-controlling shareholdings – might qualify 
                                                             
829 CJEU, 21 October 2004, Case C-8/03 (BBL), Para. 38.  
830 Ibid.; CJEU, 29 April 2004, Case C-77/01 (EDM), Para. 57 (and case law cited); CJEU, 12 January 2017, Case C-28/16 
(MVM Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt.), Para. 31. 
831 CJEU, 10 January 2006, Case C-222/04 (Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA), Para. 111. 
832 Ibid., Paras. 112-113. 
833 CJEU, 12 January 2017, Case C-28/16 (MVM Magyar Villamos Művek Zrt.), Paras. 32-33 and case law cited. 
834 CJEU, 21 October 2004, Case C-8/03 (BBL), Para. 41 and case law cited. 
835 F. Pötgens & M. Straathof, “Establishment and Substance of Intermediate and Other Holding Companies from an EU 
Law Perspective” (2016) 44 Intertax 608, p. 619. 
836 CJEU, 21 October 2004, Case C-8/03 (BBL), Paras. 42-43. 
837 CFI, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management), Para. 96. 
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as undertakings themselves.838 It did not, however, indicate how this must be determined. In literature, it has 
been suggested that the qualification of CIVs as undertakings themselves “will depend on what kind of 
investment activities they carry on themselves and on whether or not they themselves are to be considered 
relatively passive investors.”839 This basic distinction between passive investors – involved in the simple 
acquisition and sale of assets – and active investors – performing activities that go beyond the compass of the 
simple acquisition and sale of assets – indeed seems to be relevant for State aid purposes. Whether an 
investor qualifies as active or passive depends on the facts and circumstances, but an investor that holds a 
controlling shareholding in an undertaking and actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or 
indirectly) in the management of that company must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and 
therefore as an undertaking.  
 
In VAT case law, the definition of economic activity is broadly interpreted. In EDM, the CJEU pointed out that 
the granting of interest bearing loans by a holding company to companies in which it holds shares, as well as 
placements in bank deposits or securities, such as treasury notes or certificates of deposit, constitute 
economic activities for VAT purposes, because the interest income is not merely the fruit of simple ownership 
of the asset, but the consideration for making capital available for the benefit of somebody else.840 Although 
the CFI did not dismiss the EC’s reference in Fineco Asset Management to VAT case law for the interpretation 
of the term economic activity in relation to investment vehicles, it is unclear whether the broad interpretation 
of the concept of economic activity in EDM – where interest bearing loans and placements in bank deposits 
and securities were classified as economic activities – would similarly apply in a State aid context.    
 
With respect to activities performed by States (directly or through a separate legal body), a further distinction 
must be made between “a situation where the State acts in the exercise of official authority [directly or 
through a separate legal body] and that where it carries on economic activities of an industrial or commercial 
nature by offering goods or services on the market”.841 This distinction is relevant because for State aid 
purposes “the conduct of the State can never be compared to that of an operator or private investor in a 
market economy”.842 When a State is considered to exercise its public powers, no economic activity and 
therefore no undertaking is considered present, and the State aid rules do not apply. Case law indicates that 
an activity is part of State conduct if it forms part of the essential functions of the State or if it is connected to 
such functions by its nature, its aim and the rules to which the activity is subject.843 According to the EC’s 
Notice on State aid, in general, activities performed by States which intrinsically form part of the prerogatives 
of official authority are not economic activities, such as: (a) the army or the police, (b) air navigation safety 
and control, (c) maritime traffic control and safety, (d) anti-pollution surveillance, (e) the organization, 
financing and enforcement of prison sentences, and (f) the development and revitalization of public land by 
public authorities.844 
 
                                                             
838 CFI, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management), Para. 150 and Para. 153.  
839 R. Luja, “Fiscal Autonomy, Investment Funds and State Aid: A Follow-Up” (2009) 47 European Taxation. 
840 CJEU, 29 April 2004, Case C-77/01 (EDM), Paras. 65-70. 
841 CJEU, 18 March 1997, Case C-343/95 (Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA), Para. 16. 
842 CFI, 17 December 2008, Case T-196/04 (Ryanair v. European Commission), Para. 85; General Court, 11 September 
2012, Case T-565/08 (Corsica Ferries France v. European Commission), Para. 79. 
843 CJEU, 19 January 1994, Case C-364/92 (SAT/Eurocontrol), Para. 30: “[t]aken as a whole, Eurocontrol’s activities, by 
their nature, their aim and the rules to which they are subject, are connected with the exercise of powers relating to the 
control and supervision of air space which are typically those of a public authority. They are not of an economic nature 
justifying the application of the Treaty rules of competition”; CJEU, 18 March 1997, Case C-343/95 (Servizi Ecologici 
Porto di Genova SpA), Paras. 22-23. 
844 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 17 and case law and EC decisions cited in footnotes 16 to 22. 
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In a somewhat similar context, the CJEU explained in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania that 
educational services do not constitute an economic activity if provided by institutions which are integrated 
into a public education system and financed, mainly or fully, by the State. According to the court, in such case, 
“the State is not seeking to engage in gainful activity, but is fulfilling its social, cultural and educational 
obligations towards its population”.845 In contrast, educational activities which are essentially financed by 
private funds do classify as economic activities, because the aim is to offer a service against remuneration.846 
Therefore, the presence of a remuneration strongly indicates the presence of an economic activity for State 
aid purposes.847 The element of remuneration was also decisive, or at least very important, in the VAT cases 
BBL (concerning CIVs) and EDM (concerning financing activities of a holding company).    
 
6.4.2.4 Selectivity and justification 
 
When a measure benefits one or more identified undertakings, selectivity is normally given.848 However, in 
more complex situations, when a measure benefits all undertakings fulfilling certain conditions, a three-step 
analysis should normally be taken. As a first step, the reference system must be identified. According to the 
EC’s Notice on State aid, the “(…) reference system is composed of a consistent set of rules that generally apply 
– on the basis of objective criteria – to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined by its objective. 
Typically, those rules define not only the scope of the system, but also the conditions under which the system 
applies, the rights and obligations of undertakings subject to it and the technicalities of the functioning of the 
system.”849 In direct tax cases, the reference system typically is the general tax regime,850 although a different 
reference system in a particular situation, such as a special tax regime or a tax treaty851, cannot a priori be 
excluded. As a second step, it needs to be determined whether a measure favours certain undertakings in 
derogation from the reference system as compared to other undertakings “which are in a legal and factual 
situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure at issue.”852 A similar 
substantive approach regarding comparability is followed in free movement cases (Section 6.3.3.1 of this 
chapter); the State aid rules are, therefore, the ‘flip side’ of the fundamental freedoms.853 It should be noted, 
                                                             
845 CJEU, 27 June 2017, Case C-74/16 (Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania), Para. 50 and case law cited. 
846 Ibid., Para. 48 and case law cited. 
847 J. Luts, “Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania: Tax Exemption for Education Services by Religious 
Congregation Not Sacrosanct from State Aid Perspective” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 292, p. 297-298. 
848 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 126 and case law cited in footnote 196. 
849 Ibid., Para. 133. 
850 CJEU, 15 December 2005, Case C-148/04 (Unicredito Italiano), Para. 50; EC, 12 May 2010, State Aid No. N131/2009 
- Finland - Residential Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Scheme, C(2010) 2974 final, Paras. 24-25; EC, 9 July 2014, 
State aid SA.25338 (2014/C, ex E 3/2008, CP 115/2004 and CP 120/2006) - The Netherlands - Corporate tax exemption 
for public undertakings, C(2014) 4480 final, Para. 35, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 57, C 280, 22 August 
2014; EFTA Court, 10 May 2011, Joined Cases E-4/10, E-6/10 and E-7/10 (Principality of Liechtenstein et. al), Para. 69; 
EC, 3 December 2015, State aid SA. 38945 (2015/C) (ex 2015/NN) - Luxembourg - Alleged aid to McDonald’s, C(2015) 
8343 final, Para. 69, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 59, C 258, 15 July 2016. 
851 J. Vleggeert, “Dutch CV-BV Structures: Starbucks-Style Tax Planning and State Aid Rules” (2016) 70 Bulletin for 
International Taxation 3. 
852 For example, CFI, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management), Para. 148. See also CJEU, 21 December 
2016, Cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P (World Duty Free Group), Para. 54 and case law cited. 
853 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 2 July 2009, Case C-169/08 (Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione 
Sardegna), Paras. 133-134; P. Wattel, “Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy Competition and Abuse Control in 
Direct Tax Matters” (2013) 5 World Tax Journal 128, p.130; Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 28 July 2016, Cases 
C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P (World Duty Free Group), Para. 137; Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, 21 April 2016, Case 
C-270/15 P (Kingdom of Belgium v Commission), Para. 29, expresses this eloquently: “There is no doubt that the heart of 
the selectivity test is establishing the ‘reference framework’. However, as far as the relationship between its textual 
expression and its genuine content are concerned, that heart reminds one of a Russian doll: only by opening the external 
layer does one see that the key notion is in fact that of discrimination. And again, hidden further within the notion of 
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however, that the implications of tax treaties for the selectivity test under State aid rules are currently less 
clear.854 If a measure does favour certain undertakings that are in a comparable legal and factual situation, the 
third, and final, step is to determine whether the derogation is justified by the nature or general scheme of the 
(reference) system. In addition, a measure should be proportionate as regards the objective being pursued. 
Examples of justification grounds in the field of direct taxation according to the EC include the need to fight 
tax evasion, the principle of tax neutrality (as regards collective investment funds), the progressive nature of 
income tax and its redistribution purpose, as well as the need to avoid double taxation.855 Measures of purely 
general application that do not favour certain undertakings only, do not fall within the scope of Art. 107(1) 
TFEU.856 
 
6.4.2.5 Effect on trade and competition 
 
The EC is not required to demonstrate that a measure has a real effect on competition, and on trade between 
Member States, but only that a measure is liable to do so.857 The effect on trade and competition, however, 
cannot be merely hypothetical or presumed. According to settled case law, a measure will be regarded to be 
liable to affect competition, and trade between Member States, “when State financial aid strengthens the 
position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-[Union] trade”.858 
Furthermore, there is no requirement that the beneficiary undertaking itself be involved in intra-Union 
trade.859 In Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, concerning a domestic undertaking not involved in intra-Union 
trade, it was held that a measure is liable to affect trade between Member States when it may have helped “to 
maintain or increase domestic activity, with the result that undertakings established in other Member States 
(…) [may have had] less chance of penetrating the market of the Member State concerned.”860 
 
6.4.3 EC decision on the former Dutch corporate income tax regime for public enterprises and the Belgian 
and French corporate income tax regime for State-owned ports 
 
In the context of State aid and source State taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, it could be helpful 
to look at the EC’s reasoning in its provisional decision on the former Dutch corporate income tax regime for 
Dutch public enterprises. This regime, which was abolished on 1 January 2016 as a direct result of this 
decision, granted tax exemptions for (many) Dutch public enterprises carrying out economic activities, 
including enterprises of the Dutch State and legal entities wholly-owned by the Dutch State. The EC argued 
that the tax-exemptions disturbed the level-playing field between Dutch public enterprises performing 
economic activities on the European market in comparison to Dutch private companies.861 According to the 
EC, the former Dutch corporate income tax regime for Dutch public enterprises constituted State aid, because: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
discrimination is comparability. Thus, when searching for the genuine content of selectivity, one arrives at the notion 
intimately known from other areas of EU law: comparability.” 
854 R. Luja, “Tax Treaties and State Aid: Some Thoughts” (2004) 44 European Taxation 234; L. De Broe, “Can Tax 
Treaties Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228. 
855 Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 262, 19 July 2016, Para. 139. 
856 Ibid., Para. 118. 
857 CJEU, 15 December 2005, Case C-148/04 (Unicredito Italiano), Para. 54 and case law cited. 
858 CFI, 15 June 2000, Joined Cases T-298/97, T-312/97, etc. (Mauro Alzetta), Para. 81; CFI, 4 April 2001, Case T-288/97 
(Regione autonoma Friuli-Venezia Giulia), Para. 41. 
859 CJEU, 10 January 2006, Case C-222/04 (Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA), Para. 143. 
860 Ibid. 
861 EC, 9 July 2014, State aid SA.25338 (2014/C, ex E 3/2008, CP 115/2004 and CP 120/2006) - The Netherlands - 
Corporate tax exemption for public undertakings, C(2014) 4480 final, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 57, C 
280, 22 August 2014. 
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(i) the measure provided an advantage to those public undertakings benefiting from the 
exemption, as it reduced the charges normally included in the operating costs of an undertaking 
carrying out economic activities;862 
 
(ii) although the tax-exemption did not involve a transfer of State resources, it was funded by State 
resources as the Dutch authorities forgone revenue, while it placed those public undertakings to 
whom the exemption applied in a better position;863 
 
(iii) the measure granted a selective advantage to public undertakings carrying out economic 
activities and constituted a derogation from the general corporate income tax regime; 
 
(iv) the tax-exemption distorted or threatened to distort competition and trade between 
Member States, as it applied to public undertakings which were and may have been involved in 
intra-Union trade;  
 
(v) the derogation from the general corporate income tax regime could be justified by the inner 
logic of the (Dutch) corporate tax regime, which is to tax profits. 
 
The EC has followed a similar line of reasoning in its provisional decisions on the Belgian and French 
corporate income tax regime for State-owned ports.864 
6.4.4 Could preferential tax treatment accorded to a sovereign wealth investor constitute State aid? 
 
6.4.4.1 Preferential tax treatment 
 
To begin with, a tax measure cannot constitute State aid if it does not distinguish between (groups of) 
investors. For purposes of the State aid analysis below, it is, therefore, assumed that a Member State either 
accords:  
 
(i) preferential tax treatment to a foreign sovereign wealth investor over (resident or non-resident) 
private investors in derogation from the general tax regime; or  
(ii) preferential tax treatment to a foreign sovereign wealth investor over other foreign sovereign wealth 
investors (or non-resident State entities) in derogation from the general tax regime.  
 
Such preferential tax treatment of a foreign sovereign wealth investor can be achieved through domestic 
legislation, administrative practice or specific tax treaty provisions (in this respect, reference is made to 
Approaches (2) through (5)865).866 It is clear that such preferential tax treatment provides an advantage to a 
                                                             
862 Similarly, Capobianco, A. & Christiansen, H., “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and 
Policy Options” (2011), OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 1, p. 5, available at: <http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/competitive-neutrality-and-state-owned-enterprises_5kg9xfgjdhg6-en>. 
863 CJEU, 15 March 1994, Case C-387/92 (Banco de Crédito Industrial SA), Para. 14.  
864 EC, 8 July 2016, State aid SA.38393 (2016/C) (ex 2015/E) - Ports taxation in Belgium, Official Journal of the European 
Union, Vol. 59, C 302, 19 August 2016, p. 5; EC, 8 July 2016, State aid SA.38398 (2016/C) (ex 2015/E) - Ports taxation in 
France, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 59, C 302, 19 August 2016, p. 23. 
865 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
866 Although there is currently no State aid case law dealing with the issue of the relationship between State aid and tax 
treaties, communis opinio in literature seems that specific tax treaty provisions could indeed constitute State aid. See R. 
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foreign sovereign wealth investor and is funded through State resources. The analysis below is a first general 
analysis in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, aimed at identifying potential issues in the 
complex area of State aid. 
 
6.4.4.2 Foreign sovereign wealth investor as a direct beneficiary 
 
A foreign sovereign wealth investor that has a separate legal personality is itself a direct beneficiary of a 
source State tax measure which results in preferential tax treatment. In case of a foreign sovereign wealth 
investor without legal personality, the owner-State or central bank that has a corporate form,867 can be 
considered the direct beneficiary of such a tax measure. In such cases, the first two State aid conditions are 
satisfied. The remaining three constitutive elements of State aid in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors are analysed below. However, before doing so, the issue of State aid recovery and sovereign 
immunity will be touched upon briefly.  
 
6.4.4.2.1 State aid recovery and sovereign immunity 
 
Property of foreign sovereign wealth investors can enjoy immunity from measures of constraint in civil cases. 
In Section 4.5, it was concluded that it cannot be excluded that such immunity would also apply in tax cases. 
The question arises whether immunity from measures of constraint could prevent a Member State to recover 
unlawful fiscal State aid from a foreign sovereign wealth investor. If a foreign sovereign wealth investor has 
received unlawful fiscal State aid, the EC will order a Member State to take all necessary measures to recover 
this aid,868 including interest, so that the advantage enjoyed over competitors on the market is forfeited, and 
the situation prior to payment of the aid is restored. In the event that a foreign sovereign wealth investor 
refuses to repay the aid, the respective Member State is left with the ultimum remedium of seeking 
enforcement measures to be taken against property of that foreign sovereign wealth investor, or possibly the 
foreign-owner State,869 to satisfy its claim. This property could be situated in the respective Member State 
itself, but also in other States. A State would be prevented from taking enforcement measures if property of a 
foreign sovereign wealth investor would enjoy immunity from such measures. The EC shall not require 
recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Union law.870 It is unclear whether 
immunity from measures of constraint, as an element of the customary international law principle of 
sovereign immunity, can be regarded as a general principle of Union law. Depending on the answer to that 
question, immunity from measures of constraint could prevent a Member State to recover fiscal State aid 
granted to a foreign sovereign wealth investor.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Luja, “Tax Treaties and State Aid: Some Thoughts” (2004) 44 European Taxation 234; L. De Broe, “Can Tax Treaties 
Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228. 
867 See Section 2.8. 
868 Art. 16(1) of the Procedural Regulation. 
869 Under many legal instruments, foreign States and entities of foreign States are shielded against so-called ‘cross-
execution’. For example, Art. 19(c) UNCSI 2004 provides that post-judgment measures of constraint can only be taken 
against property which has a connection with the entity against which the proceeding was directed. Therefore, if a creditor 
(such as a source State) has a claim against an SWF of a foreign State, the assets of that foreign State would be shielded 
against any post-judgment measures of execution, and vice versa. However, the issue of cross-execution has not yet been 
settled in State practice. See A, van Aaken, Blurring Boundaries Between Sovereign Acts and Commercial Activities. A 
Functional View on Regulatory Immunity and Immunity from Execution (March, 2013), Working Paper No. 2013-17, Law 
& Economics Research Paper Series, U. St. Gallen Law School, pp. 34-36.  
870 Art. 16(1) of the Procedural Regulation. 
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6.4.4.2.2 Undertaking (and economic activity)  
 
From the discussion in Section 6.4.2.3, it follows that investors involved in the simple acquisition and sale of 
assets – i.e. passive investors – are not regarded to perform an economic activity and conduct an undertaking 
for State aid purposes. On the other hand, investors performing activities that go beyond the compass of the 
simple acquisition and sale of assets – i.e. active investors – do seem to qualify as an undertaking. Whether an 
investor qualifies as active or passive depends on the facts and circumstances, but an investor that holds a 
controlling shareholding in an undertaking and actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or 
indirectly) in the management of that company must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and 
therefore as an undertaking. 
 
From the discussion in Section 6.4.2.3 it appears that the concept of economic activity is broadly interpreted 
in VAT case law, and could also include passive investment activities. VAT case law points out that the 
granting of interest bearing loans, as well as placements in bank deposits or securities, such as treasury notes 
or certificates of deposit, constitute economic activities for VAT purposes, because the interest income is not 
merely the fruit of simple ownership of the asset, but the consideration for making capital available for the 
benefit of somebody else. If such a broad interpretation of the concept of economic activity, which clearly 
encompasses passive activities, would similarly apply for State aid purposes, it is clear from Section 2.9 that 
many foreign sovereign wealth investors would be considered to conduct an undertaking. However, although 
the CFI did not dismiss the EC’s reference in Fineco Asset Management to VAT case law for the interpretation 
of the term economic activity in relation to investment vehicles, it is unclear whether the granting of interest 
bearing loans, or placements in bank deposits or securities, would constitute an economic activity for State aid 
purposes. VAT case law also indicates that transactions carried out in the course of a business trading in 
securities can constitute an economic activity. This could fit the description above of active investors, but it is 
unclear what is required to be regarded as a business trading in securities.  
 
The concept of economic activity for State aid purposes in relation to investors needs to be further 
crystallized, and its relationship with VAT case law (and other areas of European law) needs to be clarified. If 
this concept would be similar for State aid purposes and VAT purposes and therefore encompass passive 
investment activities, such as the granting of interest bearing loans, or placements in bank deposits or 
securities, the investment activities of many foreign sovereign wealth investors would constitute economic 
activities. Otherwise, foreign sovereign wealth investors would seem to qualify as an undertaking when 
performing activities that go beyond the compass of the simple acquisition and sale of assets, which depends 
on the facts and circumstances. An investor that holds a controlling shareholding in an undertaking and 
actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or indirectly) in the management of that company 
must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and therefore as an undertaking. Based on the above, it is 
not unlikely that a foreign sovereign wealth investor performs economic activities and conducts an 
undertaking for State aid purposes.   
 
With respect to activities performed by States (directly or through a separate legal body), a further distinction 
must be made between acts in the exercise of official authority and the pursuit of economic activities of an 
industrial or commercial nature. This distinction is relevant because acts in the exercise of official authority 
can never constitute State aid. All case law dealing with this issue is concerned with the classification of 
activities of the Member State (performed directly or through a separate legal body) that has granted the 
alleged aid. It is not concerned with the activities performed by foreign (Member) States. Given this difference, 
it is unclear to the author whether this distinction between governmental activities and commercial activities 
would similarly apply to activities of foreign Member States, or even third States. In many cases, this question 
has no practical relevance, because the activities of bodies that enjoy prerogatives of official authority (i.e. 
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bodies that exercise an activity typical of public authority)871 often do not extend beyond the territory of their 
home State. However, this question could become relevant in relation foreign sovereign wealth investors, 
because they are engaged in cross-border investments. Although the wording of the case-law does not 
indicate that the distinction between acts in the exercise of official authority and economic activities of an 
industrial or commercial nature should not similarly apply to foreign Member States, or even third States, the 
outcome would probably be that investment activities of foreign sovereign wealth investors do not classify as 
acts in the exercise of official authority, because they can be performed by private (profit-making) investors 
as well. Indeed, the CJEU has held that “the fact that an activity may be exercised by a private undertaking 
amounts to further evidence that the activity in question may be described as a business activity.”872  
 
The fact that the activities of sovereign wealth investors are entirely financed by a State, and probably not 
being remunerated, does not mean that such investors cannot perform economic activities, in the author’s 
view. In Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, this particular element was, in essence, decisive in 
classifying educational services as economic activities or not, because a service was only remunerated if the 
institutions were financed by private funds, rather than public funds. However, the issue of classifying 
activities of foreign sovereign wealth investors is of a different nature and takes place in a different context, 
since sovereign wealth investors invest instead of offering (educational) services. Based on the analysis above, 
sovereign wealth investors, although entirely financed by a State, and probably not being remunerated, could 
still qualify as active investors and therefore as undertakings. 
 
6.4.4.2.3 Selectivity and justification  
 
A measure is selective if it favours certain undertakings as compared to other undertakings that are in a legal 
and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure (reference 
system) at issue. A similar substantive approach regarding comparability is followed in free movement cases; 
the State aid rules are, therefore, the ‘flip side’ of the fundamental freedoms. As noted before, however, the 
implications of tax treaty benefits for the selectivity test under State aid rules are currently less clear. To date, 
this issue has not reached the CJEU. It would be consistent with the free movement cases D.873 and Riskin & 
Timmermans,874 if a tax treaty benefit accorded to a non-resident investor from one State, but not to a non-
resident investor from another State (i.e. horizontal comparability), would not be considered selective for 
State aid purposes.875 If the CJEU would reach the opposite conclusion under the State aid rules, the overall 
balance of a Member State’s tax treaties could likewise be upset. The judgment in the State aid case 
Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania does not have to set aside D. and Riskin & Timmermans. This 
case did not involve a benefit on the basis of a tax treaty, but it concerned a tax-exemption accorded by Spain 
to an establishment of the Catholic Church pursuant to an order of the Ministry of Finance that was based on a 
non-tax treaty between Spain and the Holy See. The CJEU seemed to have avoided the issue of the relationship 
between a treaty and State aid law by assuming that the order of the Ministry was the cause of the aid, rather 
                                                             
871 This terminology is derived from the Opinion of Advocate General Cosmas, 10 December 1996, Case C-343/95 
(Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA), Para. 41. 
872 CJEU, 24 October 2002, Case C-82/01 P (Aéroports de Paris), Para. 82. See further, in the context of the VAT status of 
bodies governed by public law, CJEU, 19 January 2017, Case C-344/15 (National Roads Authority), Para. 39: “(…) what 
is envisaged here is the situation in which bodies governed by public law engage in activities which may also be engaged 
in, in competition with them, by private economic operators. The aim is to ensure that those private operators are not 
placed at a disadvantage because they are taxed while those bodies are not (…)”. 
873 CJEU, 5 July 2005, Case C-376/03 (D.), Paras. 53-63. 
874 CJEU, 30 June 2016, Case C-176/15 (Riskin & Timmermans), Paras. 29-35. 
875 L. De Broe, “Can Tax Treaties Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228, p. 230. 
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than the treaty between Spain and the Holy See.876 Advocate General Kokott was of the view that the tax 
benefit embedded in the treaty between Spain and the Holy See could be selective.877 In the author’s view, the 
tax benefit embedded in this non-tax treaty is “a rather specific phenomenon”878. Furthermore, since this case 
did not concern a tax treaty benefit, the judgment in Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania does not 
have to set aside D. and Riskin & Timmermans. Of course, the judgment in D. and Riskin & Timmermans can be 
criticized from the perspective of an internal market without borders and with free competition.879 
 
A tax treaty benefit accorded by a Member State to particular non-resident investors could also result in more 
favourable treatment as compared to resident investors of that Member State (i.e. reverse comparability). This 
issue has not been dealt with under the freedoms, because the freedoms do not prohibit reverse 
discrimination. This may be an argument to use the State aid instrument in situations concerning reverse 
discrimination. On the other hand, the reasoning that tax treaty benefits are an integral part of a tax treaty and 
contribute to the overall balance of mutual relations between two States, applies similarly vis-à-vis a Member 
State which treats its residents less favourably than its non-residents pursuant to tax treaty benefits accorded 
to those non-residents.  
 
It remains to be seen how the CJEU will deal with the issue of the relationship between tax treaty benefits and 
State aid law. The fact remains that the State aid rules are not identical to the fundamental freedoms. 
Differences are, therefore, possible, and it cannot be excluded that tax treaty benefits could be selective. 
 
In addition, based on Sopora,880 non-treaty benefits that favour particular non-resident investors as compared 
to other non-resident investors, could be selective. Different from horizontal comparability under the 
freedoms, horizontal comparability under the State aid rules is not limited to intra-EU/EEA situations.  
 
A tax benefit can only be selective if it favours economic operators relative to other economic operators which 
are comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system. The reference system is driven 
by the taxpayers that claim to be discriminated against.881 In case of an alleged reverse discrimination, 
whether by means of a tax treaty or not, this means that the reference system should be a Member State’s 
domestic tax system.882 It also means that the general analysis in Section 6.3.3.3.1 above can be used, 
indicating that State entities or regular corporate shareholders are likely the best candidates in terms of 
vertical comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. In case of an alleged horizontal discrimination, 
a distinction needs to be made between a tax treaty benefit and a tax benefit under domestic law. For the 
                                                             
876 CJEU, 27 June 2017, Case C-74/16 (Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania), Para. 69; J. Luts, 
“Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania: Tax Exemption for Education Services by Religious Congregation Not 
Sacrosanct from State Aid Perspective” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 292. 
877 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 16 February 2017, Case C-74/16 (Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia 
Betania), Para. 71: “Under the ‘general system’ concerned in this case, in Spain, a tax in favour of the municipality is 
levied on all constructions, installations and works. The fact that under the 1979 Agreement [between Spain and the Holy 
See] only the Catholic Church does not have to pay this tax constitutes an advantage for it which puts it in a better 
financial position than other economic operators, to the extent to which it is economically and therefore entrepreneurially 
active. In no way is it an advantage founded on a general measure applicable without distinction to all economic operators 
and available to anyone satisfying the conditions for it to be granted.” 
878 Similarly, R. Luja, Case note on Case C-74/16 (Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania), Highlights & 
Insights on European Taxation 2017/260. 
879 For different views on this case, see D. Weber, “Most-Favoured-Treatment under Tax Treaties Rejected in the 
European Community: Background and Analysis of the D Case: A proposal to include a most-favoured-nation clause in 
the EC Treaty” (2005) 33 Intertax 429; A. de Graaf & G. Janssen, “The implications of the judgment in the D case: the 
perspective of two non-believers” (2005) 14 EC Tax Review 173. 
880 CJEU, 24 February 2015, Case C-512/13 (Sopora). 
881 L. De Broe, “Can Tax Treaties Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228, p. 229. 
882 Ibid. 
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second, the reference system should a Member State’s domestic tax system, so that the general analysis in 
Section 6.3.3.3.2 above can be relied upon. This analysis indicates that non-resident regular corporate 
shareholders or other foreign sovereign wealth investors (and non-resident State entities) are likely the best 
candidates in terms of horizontal comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. In case of an alleged 
horizontal discrimination based on a tax treaty, the tax treaty as a whole or a particular tax treaty provision 
should be the reference system.883 In the author’s view, the distinction made in both the OECD and UN MTC 
between, for example, portfolio dividends and non-portfolio dividends is not selective, or can be justified, 
because it reflects a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights that can be considered a part of the general 
tax system of a State.884 Following this line of thought would mean that the more special a tax treaty benefit 
becomes, the greater the chance it no longer reflects a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights, and could 
be considered selective.885 In her Opinion to Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania, Advocate 
General Kokott also used the limited scope of the treaty benefit as an indication for selectivity.886 In fact, the 
more special a tax treaty benefit becomes, the greater the chance it has nothing to do with the allocation of 
taxing rights and it has more to do with attracting investments from particular investors. Therefore, special 
tax treaty benefits which favour a sovereign wealth investor as compared to other non-resident investors, 
may be selective in some cases, but not in others.  
 
A selective measure does not constitute State aid if it is justified by the nature or general scheme of the 
(reference) system (see also above). A tax measure aimed at attracting capital from (some) foreign sovereign 
wealth investors should not meet this justification test. Member States which accord preferential tax 
treatment to a foreign sovereign wealth investor, should bring forward other arguments to demonstrate that a 
particular selective tax measure is justified by the nature or general scheme of the (reference) system. For 
instance, a State could argue that a tax-exemption accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor is 
motivated by the sovereign immunity principle, which forms a part of the general tax scheme, as a result of 
which governmental activities are immune from its taxing jurisdiction. However, this argument must, in any 
case, be rejected if the tax-exemption is not truly motivated by sovereign immunity. In this regard, reference is 
made to Section 4.3.2 where it was argued that the tax-exemptions accorded to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors by Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. seem to be motivated by other reasons than sovereign 
immunity, such as international attractiveness.    
 
In any case, the selective advantage needs to be more than the de minimis threshold of EUR 200,000 over any 
period of three fiscal years.   
 
6.4.4.2.4 Effect on trade and competition 
 
It is obvious that preferential tax treatment of a foreign sovereign wealth investor is liable to improve its 
competitiveness position, thus to distort competition with other investors. However, it is less clear whether 
preferential tax treatment of a foreign sovereign wealth investor is liable to affect trade between Member 
States. On the one hand, it could be argued that (foreign sovereign wealth) investors are not involved in any 
trade, because they do not offer goods and services, but only invest money, so that a selective tax benefit 
accorded by a Member State to (foreign sovereign wealth) investors, although liable to affect competition, is 
                                                             
883 Ibid., p. 230-231. 
884 Cf. CJEU, 12 May 1998, Case C-336/96 (Gilly), Para. 31, where it was held, in the context of the fundamental 
freedoms that, “in the allocation of fiscal jurisdiction, (…) it [is not] unreasonable for the Member States to base their 
agreements on international practice and the model convention drawn up by the OECD.” 
885 Similarly, R. Luja, “Tax Treaties and State Aid: Some Thoughts” (2004) 44 European Taxation 234; E. Raingeard, The 
Relationship Between EC Law and International Tax Law, European Academic Tax Thesis Award, 2009, p. 28. 
886 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 16 February 2017, Case C-74/16 (Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia 
Betania), Para. 71. 
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not liable to affect trade between Member States. And even if foreign sovereign wealth investors are involved 
in any trade, it could be argued that the benefit has no major effect on trade between Member States, since 
most foreign sovereign wealth investors are based outside the Member States. On the other hand, there is no 
requirement that the beneficiary undertaking itself be involved in intra-Union trade.887 In Cassa di Risparmio 
di Firenze SpA, concerning an Italian banking foundation not involved in intra-Union trade, it was held that a 
measure is liable to affect trade between Member States when it may have helped “to maintain or increase 
domestic activity, with the result that undertakings established in other Member States (…) [may have had] 
less chance of penetrating the market of the Member State concerned.”888 Based on this consideration, it could 
be argued that a selective tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor, although itself not 
involved in intra-Union trade, may have helped to maintain or increase domestic activity and may have given 
undertakings of other Member States less chance of investing in and penetrating the market of the Member 
State which offered the tax benefit. In Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA, the court also observed, in the context 
of affecting trade between Member States, that the tax advantage in that case could “strengthen, in terms of 
financing and/or funding, the position of the economic unit”.889 It could, therefore, also be argued that, when 
an investor is considered to form one economic unit with its controlling shareholding in an undertaking, the 
tax benefit is liable to benefit the economic unit as a whole, which may affect trade between Member States if 
at least part of the unit is involved in intra-Union trade. It could, furthermore, be argued that a selective tax 
benefit accorded to foreign sovereign wealth investors, whether located inside or outside the Member States, 
is still potentially liable to affect trade between Member States as it could result in higher demand for assets 
(target companies) located in the respective Member State, increased liquidity and/or favourable financing 
conditions, thus strengthening the position of domestic economic operators compared with economic 
operators of other Member States. In the situations described above, the effect of the aid on intra-Union trade 
may be “less immediate and even less discernible”, which could require a “greater effort to state reasons on 
the part of the [European] Commission”.890  
 
Although surrounded with uncertainty, in particular in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors that are 
based outside the Member States, it cannot, in the author’s view, be excluded that preferential tax treatment 
of a foreign sovereign wealth investor, whether located inside or outside the Member States, would be 
regarded as being liable to affect trade between Member States. In this respect, it is noted that the magnitude 
of the aid on trade between the Member States has no impact on the amount of aid to be recovered. The 
recovery is aimed at restoring the situation prior to payment of the aid. According to settled fiscal State aid 
case law, this means that transactions must be subject to the tax treatment that would have applied in the 
absence of the unlawful fiscal aid.891 Therefore, the “calculation of the aid (…) simply involves determining the 
sum owing to the [Member] State which has not been collected and does not require complex assessments of 
an economic nature, or, in principle, an analysis of the conditions of competition on the market in question or 
of the conduct of the operators concerned on that market.”892 
 
6.4.4.3 Indirect beneficiaries  
 
If a foreign sovereign wealth investor does not conduct an undertaking, preferential tax treatment granted to 
a foreign sovereign wealth investor might constitute an indirect advantage and State aid for other natural or 
                                                             
887 CJEU, 10 January 2006, Case C-222/04 (Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA), Para. 143. 
888 Ibid. 
889 Ibid., Para. 145 (second indent). 
890 CJEU, 30 April 2009, Case 494/06 P (Wam SpA), Para 62. 
891 CJEU, 21 December 2016, Joined Cases C-164/15 P and C-165/15 P (Aer Lingus & Ryanair), Para. 93 and case law 
cited. 
892 Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, 5 July 2016, Joined Cases C-164/15 P and C-165/15 P (Aer Lingus & 
Ryanair), Para. 66. 
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legal persons.893 In this regard, State aid case law in the context of CIVs indicates that: (i) external asset 
managers of foreign sovereign wealth investors and (ii) potential EU/EEA targets (EU/EEA investment 
opportunities) are potential indirect beneficiaries.894 
 
6.4.4.3.1 External asset managers  
 
External asset managers are indirect beneficiaries of a measure if that measure inevitably leads to an increase 
of their fees.895 This could be so, for example, when the fee depends on the amount of assets under the 
management and this amount has increased as a result of a measure. A measure could also lead to an increase 
in fees when the fees depend on the net return on investment. A preferential tax measure accorded to a 
foreign sovereign wealth investor could lead to an increase in fees for their external asset managers, which 
could constitute State aid if the remaining conditions are satisfied, but only if the aid would exceed EUR 
200,000 per undertaking over any period of three fiscal years.896 
 
6.4.4.3.2 Investment targets 
 
EU/EEA investment targets are indirect beneficiaries of a preferential tax measure accorded to a foreign 
sovereign wealth investor if that measure has led to higher demand (and liquidity) for them.897 However, any 
such (indirect) benefit is not selective, hence no State aid for such targets, if the preferential tax measure 
applies to investments (targets) in general and not to specific undertakings, sectors or industries, so that it 
could benefit targets (companies) in general. There is a tension between the consideration in Section 3.6.2 in 
the context of international attractiveness to accord special tax treatment to a foreign sovereign wealth 
investor only for investments that no, or at least few, others are willing to make, and the selectivity issue 
regarding indirect beneficiaries. Even if an indirect benefit is selective, all or part of the aid granted to 
individual indirect beneficiaries might fall within the scope of the rules on de minimis aid.  
 
With respect to the recovery of aid, it is noted that indirect beneficiaries could be required to pay to a Member 
State an amount not corresponding to the actual benefit they have indirectly derived from the aid measure. In 
Fineco Asset Management, the court ordered the indirect beneficiaries (i.e. the investment vehicles and the 
fund managers) to pay to the Italian Republic an amount corresponding to the tax reduction enjoyed by the 
direct beneficiaries (i.e. the investors) of the aid, because only then the situation prior to payment of the aid 
could be restored.898 
 
6.4.4.4 Conclusion 
 
Although uncertain in many situations, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates, in the author’s view, that 
preferential tax treatment accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor by a Member State could constitute 
(unlawful) State aid for such an investor, regardless of whether it resides inside or outside the Member States. 
The three key elements involved are: (i) whether a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be regarded to 
perform an economic activity and therefore to conduct an undertaking, (ii) whether a tax benefit accorded to 
                                                             
893 CFI, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management), Para. 127 and case law cited. 
894 Ibid. 
895 Ibid., Para. 143. 
896 Art. 3 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, Official Journal of the European Union, 
Vol. 56, L 352, 24 December 2013, p. 1; Art. 15(1) of Part II of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on 
the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. 
897 CFI, 4 March 2009, Case T-445/05 (Fineco Asset Management), Paras. 159 et seq. 
898 Ibid., Paras. 198-204. 
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a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be regarded as selective, and (iii) whether a tax benefit accorded to 
a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be liable to affect trade between Member States.  
 
If the concept of economic activity would be similar for State aid and VAT purposes, and therefore comprise 
passive investment activities, such as the granting of interest bearing loans, or placements in bank deposits or 
securities, the investment activities of many foreign sovereign wealth investors would constitute economic 
activities. Otherwise, foreign sovereign wealth investors would seem to qualify as an undertaking when 
performing activities that go beyond the compass of the simple acquisition and sale of assets (i.e. active 
investors). This depends on the facts and circumstances. However, an investor that holds a controlling 
shareholding in an undertaking and actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or indirectly) in 
the management of that company, must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and therefore as an 
undertaking.  
 
The selectivity test under State aid rules is, in principle, similar to the comparability approach in free 
movement cases; the State aid rules are, therefore, the ‘flip side’ of the fundamental freedoms. A tax benefit 
can only be selective if it favours economic operators relative to other economic operators which are 
comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system. The reference system is driven by 
the taxpayers that claim to be discriminated against. Although the State aid rules follow the comparability 
approach in free movement cases, the implications of tax treaty benefits are currently less clear. Therefore, it 
cannot be excluded that tax treaty benefits which favour a sovereign wealth investor over other investors, will 
be considered selective by the CJEU in a State aid context. 
 
The question whether a tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be liable to affect 
trade between Member States arises in particular in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors that are 
based outside the Member States. It could, for example, be argued that a selective tax benefit accorded to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors, whether located inside or outside the Member States, is still potentially 
liable to affect trade between Member States, as it could result in higher demand for assets (target companies) 
located in the respective Member State, increased liquidity and/or favourable financing conditions, and thus 
strengthening the position of domestic economic operators compared with economic operators of other 
Member States, or it could maintain or increase domestic activity.  
 
Member States wishing to introduce new or change existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth 
investors could consider notifying the EC respectively the EFTA Surveillance Authority in case of doubt as 
regards to the application of the State aid rules. 
 
In addition, a preferential tax measure accorded by Member States to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
which are not undertakings themselves could amount to State aid for external asset managers (as indirect 
beneficiaries), if that measure inevitably leads to an increase of their fees, but only if it would exceed EUR 
200,000 per undertaking over any period of three fiscal years. Although a preferential tax measure accorded 
to foreign sovereign wealth investors by Member States could also benefit EU/EEA investment targets 
through higher demand and liquidity, any such (indirect) benefit is not selective, and hence no State aid for 
such targets, if that measure applies to targets in general and not just to specific undertakings, sectors or 
industries. 
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6.5. Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive 
 
6.5.1 Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
6.5.1.1 Main features 
 
In essence, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive abolishes the taxation899 of outbound profit distributions 
(dividends) from a subsidiary of one EU Member State to its parent company in another EU Member State,900 
and eliminates double taxation on inbound dividends in the EU Member State of the parent company. To that 
end, key conditions to be satisfied include: 
 
- the parent and subsidiary are a company of an EU Member State as listed in the Annex to the 
directive; 
- the parent and subsidiary are resident for tax purposes in an EU Member State according to the 
national tax laws of that Member State, and cannot be considered a resident outside the EU pursuant 
to a tax treaty with a third country; 
- the parent and subsidiary are subject to one of the taxes listed in the Annex to the directive, without 
being exempt and without the possibility of an option to be exempt; 
- the parent holds at least 10% of the capital of the subsidiary; and 
- anti-abuse rules do not apply.  
 
6.5.1.2 Some comments regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
As explained in Section 2.8, foreign sovereign wealth investors can take a number of different legal forms, 
such as separate legal entities under public law, as well as separate legal entities under company law. The 
focus in the Annex is on a wide range of legal forms under company law, whereas legal forms under public law 
may not qualify. However, since the vast majority of SWFs reside outside the EU,901 the (potential) application 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is often limited to SWEs (of SWFs) that have been established under the 
laws of an EU Member State. And if these EU based SWEs will have a separate legal personality, their legal 
form will generally be listed in the Annex, and they will be entitled to the benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive if the remaining conditions are satisfied. These conditions will not be satisfied if the SWE has been 
set-up with the main purpose or one of the main purpose of obtaining the benefits of the directive.902    
 
6.5.2 Interest & Royalties Directive 
 
6.5.2.1 Main features 
 
In essence, the Interest & Royalties Directive aims to avoid juridical double taxation903 and abolishes the 
taxation of outbound interest and royalty payments from a company of one EU Member State to an associated 
company of another EU Member State904. To that end, key conditions to be satisfied include: 
                                                             
899 The directive refers to ‘withholding tax’, but contains no definition of this term. The CJEU uses a substantive definition 
of ‘withholding tax’: “(…) every tax on income received by a parent company from a subsidiary established in another 
Member State, the chargeable event being the payment of dividends or of any other income from shares, where the taxable 
amount is the income from those shares and the taxable person is the holder of those shares.” (CJEU, 12 December 2006, 
Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), Para. 109). This definition can also include taxes levied by 
assessment. 
900 The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Art. 1) also covers certain situations involving permanent establishments. 
901 See Section 2.5. 
902 Art. 1(2)-(3) Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
903 CJEU, 21 July 2011, Case C-397/09 (Scheuten Solar Technology GmbH), Para. 28. 
  
165 
 
 
- the debtor and the recipient are a company of an EU Member State as listed in the Annex to the 
directive; 
- the debtor and the recipient are resident for tax purposes in an EU Member State according to the 
national tax laws of that Member State, and cannot be considered a resident outside the EU pursuant 
to a tax treaty with a third country; 
- the debtor and the recipient are subject to one of the taxes listed in the Annex to the directive, without 
being exempt; 
- the debtor and the recipient are associated companies, which means that either (i) the recipient 
directly holds at least 25% of the capital (or voting rights) of the debtor, or vice versa, or (ii) a third 
company directly holds at least 25% in both the debtor and the recipient; 
- the recipient is the beneficial owner of the interest or royalties; and 
- (other) anti-abuse rules do not apply.    
 
In November 2011, the EC proposed to amend the Interest & Royalties Directive. Key elements of this 
proposal were to: (i) extend the currently limited list of qualifying entities in line with the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, (ii) replace the 25%-threshold by a 10%-threshold that also covers indirect holdings, and (iii) not 
require a tax-exemption on outbound interest and royalty payments if the payments are exempt from 
corporate income tax in the Member State of the recipient.905 On 26 and 30 May 2017, the Maltese Presidency 
proposed compromise texts, but no agreement could be reached among the Member States.906 Therefore, this 
file is still pending. 
 
6.5.2.2 Some comments regarding foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
The comments made above in respect of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive largely apply to the Interest & 
Royalties Directive as well. However, given the (far) more limited list of qualifying legal forms under the 
Interest & Royalties Directive, chances that EU based SWEs will have a legal form that is not listed in the 
Annex could be greater.  
 
6.6. Impact of European law on achieving neutrality (efficiency), equity (fairness) and international 
attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
In this section, it will be examined what impact European law could have on source States’ ability to achieve 
(or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international attractiveness), and to freely 
implement an approach to the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. For the sake of convenience, the 
different approaches as identified in Chapter 3, and their relationship with the tax policy objectives, are 
repeated below: 
 
(1) taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative 
practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
904 The Interest & Royalties Directive (Art. 1) also covers certain situations involving permanent establishments. 
905 Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made 
between associated companies of different Member States (COM(2011) 714 final). 
906 ECOFIN Report to the European Council on Tax issues, 10397/17, 16 June 2017, pp. 9-11. 
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(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
 
 
 
6.6.1 Neutrality (efficiency) 
 
6.6.1.1 Capital export neutrality 
 
Foreign sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in their residence State.907 Source State taxation of 
tax-exempt non-resident investors could distort neutrality with respect to the investment location, i.e. it could 
result in tax-exempt investors favouring domestic investments over foreign investments.908 In order to 
promote export neutrality (from a residence State perspective), a Member State could consider to exempt 
from source taxation investment income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-
resident tax-exempt investors. It could accord such treatment unilaterally – i.e. Approaches (2) and (3) – or 
through tax treaties – i.e. Approaches (4) and (5).  
 
Primary European law 
 
According tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to resident investors – i.e. reverse 
discrimination – is not prohibited by the fundamental freedoms.909 It could, however, constitute (unlawful) 
State aid, even when this different treatment is based on a tax treaty, but a State aid risk will probably be 
limited to active foreign sovereign wealth investors.910 In the event of State aid, the Member State would need 
to recover the aid granted. Thus, the State aid rules could, under circumstances, restrict Member States’ ability 
to promote CEN. 
 
According unilateral tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to comparable other non-
resident investors, could constitute horizontal discrimination under the freedoms in intra-EU/EEA situations 
(but unlikely in non-EU/EEA situations).911 In that case, other non-resident investors would be entitled to the 
tax-exemptions as well. According unilateral tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to 
comparable other non-resident investors, could also constitute (unlawful) State aid, even in non-EU/EEA 
                                                             
907 See Section 2.10 and Section 3.2.1.2. 
908 See Section 3.4.2.2. 
909 See Section 6.3.2.1. 
910 See Section 6.4.4.2.2 and Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
911 See Section 6.3.3.3.2. 
(CEN) (CIN) (inter-nation) (inter-taxpayer)
√ X X X √
International 
attractiveness
X √
X √
X
√
X
Neutrality Equity
√ √
X
Approach (1) X √
Approach (2) √ X X
Approach (5)
Approach (4) √
Approach (3) √ X
X X
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situations, but this risk will probably be limited to active foreign sovereign wealth investors.912 In the event of 
State aid, other non-resident investors would not be entitled to the tax-exemptions, but the Member State 
would need to recover the aid granted. Thus, the freedoms as well as the State aid rules could, under 
circumstances, restrict Member States’ ability to promote CEN through Approaches (2) and (3). 
 
In contrast, according tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors through tax treaties but not to 
non-resident investors from other States, or from the same State, should not constitute horizontal 
discrimination under the freedoms, not even in intra-EU/EEA situations.913 It may, however, constitute 
(unlawful) State aid under rather strict circumstances.914 Thus, primary European law may restrict Member 
States’ ability to promote CEN through Approaches (4) and (5). 
 
Secondary EU law 
 
If the conditions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive are satisfied, an EU 
Member State is obliged to tax-exempt outbound dividend, interest and royalty payments between affiliated 
entities in cross-border intra-EU situations. These directives have no (negative) impact on EU Member States’ 
ability to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors.  
 
6.6.1.2 Capital import neutrality 
 
CIN requires equal treatment of investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source 
State, which implies a territorial (or source-based) tax system; in other words, a tax system which exempts 
foreign sourced income and treats domestic sourced income of resident and non-resident investors in the 
same way.915  
 
Primary European law 
 
In principle, neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, prohibit a Member State from 
implementing a (territorial based) tax system which would promote CIN by adopting equal treatment of 
investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source State, irrespective of their place of 
residence and characteristics.916 Thus, primary European law has no (negative) impact on Member States’ 
ability to promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1). In fact, the fundamental freedoms even contribute to 
CIN to the extent that they require similar source State taxation between non-resident investors and resident 
investors (vertical comparison), and among non-resident investors (horizontal comparison). They would only 
do so if investors are held to be objectively comparable (and a different treatment cannot be justified), which 
is determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax measure at issue, 
and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State as imposed on its 
residents.917 Although it was argued that State entities or regular corporate shareholders are likely the best 
candidates in terms of objective vertical comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor,918 many 
                                                             
912 See Section 6.4.4.2.2 and Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
913 See Section 6.3.3.2. 
914 See Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
915 See Section 3.4.3.1. 
916 It should, however, be noted that the freedom of establishment would require a Member State of a parent company to 
take into account “definitive losses” of a foreign subsidiary of another Member State under rather strict conditions, also 
known as the Marks & Spencer exception or the “final losses” doctrine. See CJEU, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03 
(Marks & Spencer), Para. 55; as specified in subsequent case law, such as CJEU 3 February 2015, Case C-172/13 
(European Commission v. United Kingdom).  
917 See Section 6.3.3.1. 
918 See Section 6.3.3.3. 
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other non-resident investors will be held incomparable to any resident investor under this test. In such cases, 
the fundamental freedoms do not enforce equal treatment. In this respect, it is noted that, due to its universal 
scope, the freedoms of capital movement in the TFEU has greater potential to contribute to CIN than its 
counterpart in the EEA Agreement.   
 
As regards horizontal comparability, the impact of the fundamental freedoms seems further confined to intra-
EU/EEA situations,919 and horizontal comparability should not apply in case of tax treaty benefits.920 The State 
aid rules could (effectively) also contribute to CIN to the extent that these rules prohibit different taxation of 
non-resident investors and resident investors (vertical comparability), or among non-resident investors 
(horizontal comparability). However, since the selectivity test under State aid rules seems similar to the 
comparability approach in free movement cases,921 it is possible that non-resident investors are held not to be 
objectively comparable to any resident investor, or to any other non-resident investor. Different from the 
fundamental freedoms, horizontal comparability under the State aid rules is not limited to intra-EU/EEA 
situations. To conclude, both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules could contribute to CIN to a 
certain extent, but they may still allow various situations which are in conflict with CIN. 
 
Secondary EU law 
 
If the conditions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive are satisfied, an EU 
Member State is obliged to tax-exempt outbound dividend, interest and royalty payments between affiliated 
entities in cross-border intra-EU situations. This could give rise to preferential tax treatment of (some) EU 
based foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other EU based non-resident investors) over other investors. 
An EU Member State wishing to promote CIN by introducing equal treatment between investors could be 
required to reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of EU based foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and other non-resident investors. However, its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU Member State to follow the second route (increase), as 
opposed to the first route (reduction), while the first route may not always be realistic from a revenue 
perspective. Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to promote CIN, and to 
implement Approach (1). 
 
6.6.2 Equity (fairness) 
 
6.6.2.1 Inter-taxpayer equity 
 
The benefit theory, which, unlike the ability-to-pay theory, is also relevant for the taxation of non-residents, 
requires that each taxpayer should pay tax in accordance with its level of benefit from governmental goods 
and services.922 From this general rule, three, more practical, rules of thumb were derived which are relevant 
for the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, from a source State perspective.923 The first rule is that 
a source State should generally not tax non-resident investors less favourably than resident investors when 
performing the same investment activities in and earning the same level of income from that source State. It 
may, in such circumstances, even require non-resident investors to be taxed more favourably than resident 
investors. The second rule is that a source State should treat and tax all non-resident investors as equals when 
they perform the same investment activities in and earn the same level of income from that source State (i.e. 
                                                             
919 Which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU has no universal scope when it comes to 
horizontal comparability. 
920 See Section 6.3.3.2. 
921 See Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
922 See Section 3.5.2.1. 
923 See Section 3.5.2.2. 
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horizontal non-discriminatory treatment). The third rule, which applies to both the first and second rule, is 
that forgoing taxation would not make sense from a benefit perspective, since residents and non-residents 
that perform investment activities in the source State always benefit from public goods and services to some 
extent.  
 
Primary European law 
 
The analysis regarding inter-taxpayer equity in the light of primary European law is similar to the analysis 
above in respect of CIN, but needs to be completed for the situation in which the benefit principle would 
prescribe foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors) to be taxed more favourably 
than resident investors (i.e. the first rule). More favourable treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors 
(and other non-resident investors) over resident investors is not prohibited by the fundamental freedoms, 
since the freedoms do not prohibit reverse discrimination,924 but it may constitute (unlawful) State aid. 
However, this State aid risk will probably be limited to active foreign (sovereign wealth) investors. Thus, 
primary European law could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-taxpayer equity, but only if the 
benefit principle would prescribe foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors) to be 
taxed more favourably than resident investors. This conclusion has no impact on Member States’ ability to 
implement Approach (1)925 though because this approach is concerned with the relationship among non-
resident investors, rather than the relationship between non-resident and resident investors. Thus, primary 
European law, notably the State aid rules, could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-taxpayer 
equity, but this conclusion does not impact Approach (1). 
 
Secondary EU law 
 
The analysis regarding inter-taxpayer equity in the light of secondary EU law is similar to the analysis above 
in respect of CIN, but the following should be added regarding the third rule. At first sight, the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive both seem to conflict with the essence of the benefit 
principle, i.e. that everyone should pay tax in accordance with its benefit from public goods and services. 
However, in the author’s view, this does not necessarily apply to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. As explained 
in Chapter 3, taxation of (undistributed) profits at the level of the subsidiary is effectively at the expense of the 
shareholder/investor. It can, therefore, be argued that the application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to 
outbound dividend payments between affiliated entities in cross-border intra-EU situations does not 
necessarily contradict the benefit principle926 (unless the benefit principle would require additional taxation 
on outbound dividends). This cannot be said about the Interest & Royalties Directive. Arm’s length interest 
and royalties generally reduce the tax base in the source State, and the abolition of source State taxation on 
deductible outbound interest and royalty payments in cross-border intra-EU situations leaves the source 
State empty-handed. This outcome would conflict with the benefit principle, because the creditor/investor 
has benefitted from public goods and services, at least to some extent. Based on the above, the Interest & 
Royalties Directive seems to impose greater restrictions on an EU Member State to implement the benefit 
principle than the Parent-Subsidiary Directive would do.  
 
                                                             
924 See Section 6.3.2.1. 
925 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
926 Similarly, E. Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models (2001), Dongen: Mr. Eric 
C.C.M. Kemmeren/Pijnenburg vormgevers, uitgevers, p. 218, available at: 
<https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/439888/87428.pdf>. 
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6.6.2.2 Inter-nation equity 
 
Under inter-nation equity, non-resident investors from the same State that perform the same (investment) 
activities in a source State should be treated alike in that source State.927 A different treatment of non-resident 
investors from different States can be justified on redistribution grounds only.928 The concept of inter-nation 
equity is, to a large extent, associated with the concept of horizontal comparability.  
 
Primary European law 
 
In principle, neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, impose restrictions on a Member State 
to treat non-resident investors from the same State that perform the same (investment) activities in a source 
State alike. Thus, primary European law has no impact on Member States’ ability to achieve inter-nation 
equity, and to implement Approach (1) if it would not be required to treat non-resident investors from 
different States differently, based on redistribution grounds. In fact, the fundamental freedoms could even 
contribute to inter-nation equity to the extent that they require similar source State taxation between non-
resident investors from the same State (horizontal comparability). Although Sopora929 was concerned with 
non-resident workers from different States, the author does not see why the concept of horizontal 
comparability would apply any differently to non-residents from the same State.930 The fundamental 
freedoms would, therefore, require equal source State taxation between non-resident investors from the same 
State, provided they are held to be objectively comparable (and a different treatment cannot be justified), 
which is determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax measure at 
issue, and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State.931 The scope of the 
prohibition of horizontal discrimination under the fundamental freedoms seems further confined to intra-
EU/EEA situations,932 and should not apply to tax treaty benefits.933 The State aid rules could (effectively) also 
contribute to inter-nation equity to the extent that they prohibit different taxation among non-resident 
investors from the same State (horizontal comparability). The selectivity test under State aid rules is similar 
to the comparability approach in free movement cases.934 However, the scope of horizontal comparability 
under the State aid rules is not limited to intra-EU/EEA situations, but it will probably be limited to active 
investors. Based on the above, both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules could contribute to 
inter-nation equity to a certain extent, but they may still allow various situations which are in conflict with 
this concept.  
 
From the discussion above, it is now also clear that both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules 
could impose restrictions on a Member State if inter-nation equity would require to treat non-resident 
investors from different States differently, based on redistribution grounds. However, as discussed, in the 
context of horizontal comparability, the impact of the fundamental freedoms seems confined to intra-EU/EEA 
situations, is limited to non-treaty benefits, and is further limited by the comparability standard. In the 
context of horizontal comparability, the impact of the State aid rules should not be confined to intra-EU/EEA 
situations and may or may not be limited to non-treaty benefits, but it does seem limited to active investors. 
Therefore, treating non-resident investors from different States differently based on redistribution grounds 
should still be achieved through tax treaties as much as possible.  
                                                             
927 See Section 3.5.3.2. 
928 Ibid. 
929 CJEU, 24 February 2015, Case C-512/13 (Sopora). 
930 See Section 6.3.3.2. 
931 See Section 6.3.3.3.2. 
932 Which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU has no universal scope when it comes to 
horizontal comparability. 
933 See Section 6.3.3.2. 
934 See Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
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To conclude, primary European law could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-nation equity, but 
only if inter-nation equity would require to treat non-resident investors from different States differently, 
based on redistribution grounds. To limit the impact as much as possible, different treatment of non-resident 
investors from different States should be achieved through tax treaties as much as possible. Whereas both the 
fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-nation 
equity, this conclusion has no impact on Member States’ ability to implement Approach (1)935 though because 
this approach implies equal treatment between non-resident investors from different States (as opposed to 
different treatment). 
 
Secondary EU law 
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could result in different tax burdens for 
non-resident investors from the same EU Member State, which could be in conflict with inter-nation equity. 
Source States wishing to promote inter-nation equity by introducing equal treatment between non-resident 
investors from the same State could be required to reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of EU 
based foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors). However, its obligations under 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU Member State to follow the 
second route (increase), as opposed to the first route (reduction), while the first route may not always be 
realistic from a revenue perspective. Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to 
achieve inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1).  
 
6.6.3 International attractiveness 
 
In order to enhance international attractiveness, a Member State could consider to accord (a general or 
specific) tax-exemptions or reductions to (one or more) foreign sovereign wealth investors.936 It could accord 
such treatment unilaterally – i.e. Approaches (2) and (3) – or through tax treaties – i.e. Approaches (4) and 
(5).937 
 
Primary European law 
 
The analysis regarding international attractiveness in the light of primary European law is similar to the 
analysis above in respect of CEN, but is repeated below for the sake of convenience. 
 
According tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to resident investors – i.e. reverse 
discrimination – is not prohibited by the fundamental freedoms.938 It could, however, constitute (unlawful) 
State aid, even when this different treatment is based on a tax treaty, but a State aid risk will probably be 
limited to active foreign sovereign wealth investors.939 In the event of State aid, the Member State would need 
to recover the aid granted. Thus, the State aid rules could, under circumstances, restrict Member States’ ability 
to promote international attractiveness. 
                                                             
935 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
936 See Section 3.6.2. 
937 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
938 See Section 6.3.2.1. 
939 See Section 6.4.4.2.2 and Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
  
172 
 
  
According unilateral tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to 
comparable other non-resident investors, could constitute horizontal discrimination under the freedoms in 
intra-EU/EEA situations (but unlikely in non-EU/EEA situations).940 In that case, other non-resident investors 
would be entitled to the tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) as well. According unilateral tax-exemptions (or 
tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to comparable other non-resident investors, 
could also constitute (unlawful) State aid, even in non-EU/EEA situations, but this risk will probably be 
limited to active foreign sovereign wealth investors.941 In the event of State aid, other non-resident investors 
would not be entitled to the tax-exemptions (or tax reductions), but the Member State would need to recover 
the aid granted. Thus, the freedoms as well as the State aid rules could, under circumstances, restrict Member 
States’ ability to promote international attractiveness through Approaches (2) and (3). 
 
In contrast, according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors through tax 
treaties but not to non-resident investors from other States, or from the same State, should not constitute 
horizontal discrimination under the freedoms, not even in intra-EU/EEA situations.942 It may, however, 
constitute (unlawful) State aid under rather strict circumstances.943 Thus, primary European law may restrict 
Member States’ ability to promote international attractiveness through Approaches (4) and (5). 
 
Secondary EU law 
 
If the conditions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive are satisfied, an EU 
Member State is obliged to tax-exempt outbound dividend, interest and royalty payments between affiliated 
entities in cross-border intra-EU situations, which could enhance international attractiveness in relation to EU 
based foreign sovereign wealth investors. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive 
have no (negative) impact on EU Member States’ ability to promote international attractiveness in relation to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors through Approaches (2) to (5) (i.e. they do not impose restrictions on EU 
Member States to do so). 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter considered the (possible) implications of European law for source State taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. Based on these implications, it was examined what impact European law could 
have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and 
international attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors944. 
 
The (possible) key implications of European law for source State taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors are the following:  
 
(1) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment do not prohibit reverse 
discrimination: a Member State is allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor more favourably 
than resident investors. However, the State aid rules could prohibit reverse discrimination, even if 
more favourable treatment of non-residents is achieved through a tax treaty. 
                                                             
940 See Section 6.3.3.3.2. 
941 See Section 6.4.4.2.2 and Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
942 See Section 6.3.3.2. 
943 See Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
944 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
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(2) The freedom of establishment in both the TFEU and EEA Agreement does not apply to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors not formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and not having 
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business in a Member State. The 
scope of the freedom of capital movement enshrined in the EEA Agreement is limited to residents of 
the EU Member States/EEA-EFTA States. However, importantly, the TFEU accords universal 
territorial and personal scope to the freedom of capital movement, although certain restrictions which 
already existed before 1994 in relation to third countries may be allowed under the grandfathering 
rule. The precise implications of this standstill provision for the taxation of inbound portfolio 
investments from third countries are currently uncertain. As noted, most sovereign wealth investors 
reside in third countries.    
(3) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment prohibit vertical discrimination: a 
Member State is not allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor less favourably than resident 
investors, but only if their situations are objectively comparable. Objective comparability is 
determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax measure at 
issue, and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State as imposed on 
its residents. A similar substantive approach regarding comparability is followed for State aid 
purposes (selectivity test); the State aid rules are, therefore, the ‘flip side’ of the fundamental 
freedoms. It was argued that State entities or regular corporate shareholders are likely the best 
candidates in terms of objective vertical comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. 
(4) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment may also prohibit horizontal 
discrimination, in which case a Member State would not be allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth 
investor less favourably than an objectively comparable other foreign sovereign wealth investor or 
other non-resident investor. In the author’s view, the framework for vertical comparability should be 
applied as much as possible to assess horizontal comparability of investors in outbound situations. 
Importantly, the prohibition of horizontal discrimination under the freedoms seems to be limited to 
intra-EU/EEA situations (Haribo and Salinen and Sopora),945 and should not apply in case of tax treaty 
benefits (D. and Riskin & Timmermans). The framework for horizontal comparability under the State 
aid rules and the freedoms seems similar, although horizontal comparability under the former is not 
limited to intra-EU/EEA situations and may or may not apply in case of tax treaty benefits. It was 
argued that other foreign sovereign wealth investors (and non-resident State entities) or non-resident 
regular corporate shareholders are likely the best candidates in terms of objective horizontal 
comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. These outcomes are in line with the outcomes 
in the context of vertical comparability, because horizontal comparability is to a large extent 
influenced by vertical comparability. 
(5) Although uncertain in many situations, it cannot, in the author’s view, be excluded that preferential 
tax treatment accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor by a Member State could constitute 
(unlawful) State aid for such an investor, regardless of whether it resides inside or outside Member 
States. The three key elements involved are: (i) whether a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be 
regarded to perform an economic activity and therefore to conduct an undertaking, (ii) whether a tax 
benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be regarded as selective, and (iii) 
whether a tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be liable to affect trade 
between Member States.  
If the concept of economic activity would be similar for State aid and EU VAT purposes, and 
therefore encompass passive investment activities, such as the granting of interest bearing loans, or 
placements in bank deposits or securities, the investment activities of many foreign sovereign wealth 
investors would constitute economic activities. Otherwise, foreign sovereign wealth investors would 
                                                             
945 Which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU has no universal scope when it comes to 
horizontal comparability. 
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seem to qualify as an undertaking when performing activities that go beyond the compass of the 
simple acquisition and sale of assets (i.e. active investors). This depends on the facts and 
circumstances. However, an investor that holds a controlling shareholding in an undertaking and 
actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or indirectly) in the management of that 
company, must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and therefore as an undertaking.  
A tax benefit can only be selective if it favours economic operators relative to other economic 
operators which are comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system. The 
reference system is driven by the taxpayers that claim to be discriminated against. Although the State 
aid rules follow the comparability approach in free movement cases, the implications of tax treaty 
benefits are currently less clear. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that tax treaty benefits which favour 
a sovereign wealth investor over other investors, will be considered selective by the CJEU.  
The question whether a tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be 
liable to affect trade between Member States arises in particular in relation to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors that are based outside the Member States. It could, for example, be argued that a 
selective tax benefit accorded to foreign sovereign wealth investors, whether located inside or outside 
the Member States, is still potentially liable to affect trade between Member States, as it could result in 
higher demand for assets (target companies) located in the respective Member State, increased 
liquidity and/or favourable financing conditions, and thus strengthening the position of domestic 
economic operators compared with economic operators of other Member States, or it could maintain 
or increase domestic activity.  
Member States wishing to introduce new or change existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign 
sovereign wealth investors could consider notifying the EC respectively the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority in case of doubt as regards to the application of the State aid rules. 
(6) In addition, a preferential tax measure accorded by a Member State to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors which are not undertakings could amount to State aid for external asset managers (as 
indirect beneficiaries). Although a preferential tax measure accorded to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors by Member States could also benefit EU/EEA investment targets through higher demand 
and liquidity, any such (indirect) benefit is not selective, and hence no State aid for such targets, if that 
measure applies to targets in general and not just to specific undertakings, sectors or industries. 
(7) Foreign sovereign wealth investors, in particular SWEs established under the laws of an EU Member 
State, could be entitled to the benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties 
Directive. It is noted that these directives do not apply to EEA-EFTA States. 
 
These key implications could have the following impact on the ability of Member States (as source States) to 
achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors: 
 
Capital import neutrality 
 
Neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, prohibit a Member State from implementing a 
(territorial based) tax system that would promote CIN by adopting equal treatment of investors that perform 
the same level of investment activities in a source State, irrespective of their place of residence and 
characteristics. Thus, neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, have a (negative) impact on 
the ability of Member States to promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1)946.  
 
However, its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could 
restrict an EU Member State to promote CIN and achieve equal taxation, by increasing the current level of 
                                                             
946 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
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taxation of EU based foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors. Thus, secondary EU 
law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1)947. 
 
Inter-taxpayer equity 
 
The State aid rules, but not the fundamental freedoms, could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-
taxpayer equity, but only if the benefit principle would prescribe foreign sovereign wealth investors (and 
other non-resident investors) to be taxed more favourably than resident investors (i.e. reverse 
discrimination). This conclusion has no impact on Member States’ ability to implement Approach (1)948 
though because this approach is concerned with the relationship among non-resident investors, rather than 
the relationship between non-resident and resident investors. 
 
Its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU 
Member State to promote inter-taxpayer equity and increase the current level of taxation of EU based foreign 
sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors) paying too little from a benefit perspective. 
Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to achieve inter-taxpayer equity, and to 
implement Approach (1). 
 
Inter-nation equity  
 
Both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-
nation equity, but only if inter-nation equity would require to treat non-resident investors from different 
States differently, based on redistribution grounds (i.e. horizontal discrimination). To limit the impact as 
much as possible different treatment of non-resident investors from different States should be achieved 
through tax treaties as much as possible. Whereas both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules 
could restrict Member States ability to achieve inter-nation equity, this conclusion has no impact on Member 
States’ ability to implement Approach (1) though because this approach implies equal treatment between 
non-resident investors from different States (as opposed to different treatment).  
 
Its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU 
Member State to promote inter-nation equity and achieve equal taxation between non-resident investors from 
the same EU Member State, by increasing the current level of taxation of EU based foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and other non-resident investors. Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s 
ability to achieve inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1)949.  
 
Capital export neutrality & International attractiveness  
 
According tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to resident investors – i.e. reverse 
discrimination – is not prohibited by the fundamental freedoms. It could, however, constitute (unlawful) State 
aid, even if this different treatment is based on a tax treaty, but a State aid risk will probably be limited to 
active foreign sovereign wealth investors. Thus, the State aid rules could, under circumstances, restrict 
Member States’ ability to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors and to promote 
international attractiveness.  
 
                                                             
947 Ibid. 
948 Ibid. 
949 Ibid. 
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According unilateral tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to 
comparable other non-resident investors – i.e. Approaches (2) and (3)950 – could constitute horizontal 
discrimination under the freedoms in intra-EU/EEA situations (but unlikely in non-EU/EEA situations), as 
well as State aid, even in non-EU/EEA situations. However, the State aid risk will probably be limited to active 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. Thus, the freedoms as well as the State aid rules could, under 
circumstances, restrict Member States’ ability to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and to promote international attractiveness through Approaches (2) and (3)951.  
 
In contrast, according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors through tax 
treaties but not to non-resident investors from other States, or from the same State – i.e. Approaches (4) and 
(5)952 – should not constitute horizontal discrimination under the freedoms, not even in intra-EU/EEA 
situations. It may, however, constitute (unlawful) State aid under rather strict circumstances. Thus, primary 
European law may restrict Member States’ ability to promote CEN and international attractiveness through 
Approaches (4) and (5)953. 
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive have no (negative) impact on an EU 
Member State’s ability to promote CEN or international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors through Approaches (2) to (5)954. 
 
The impact European law could have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) neutrality, equity and 
international attractiveness, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors, is summarized in the table below. 
 
                                                             
950 Approaches (2) and (3) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
951 Ibid. 
952 Approaches (4) and (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
953 Ibid. 
954 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
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(CEN) (CIN) (inter-taxpayer) (inter-nation)
fundamental freedoms
State aid rules
Directives
*
**
Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
But probably limited to active  foreign sovereign wealth investors.
(not applicable to EEA-
EFTA States)
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) to (5)**
No (negative) impact Could restrict inter-
taxpayer equity if it 
would be required to 
treat non-resident 
investors more 
favourably than resident 
investors, but do not 
restrict Approach (1) 
though
Could restrict inter-
nation equity if it would 
be required to treat non-
resident investors from 
different States 
differently based on 
redistribution grounds, 
but do not restrict 
Approach (1) though
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) to (5)**
No (negative) impact Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
No (negative) impact
European (Union) law
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) and (3), 
but not Approaches (4) 
and (5)
No (negative) impact No impact Could restrict inter-
nation equity if it would 
be required to treat non-
resident investors from 
different States 
differently based on 
redistribution grounds, 
but do not restrict 
Approach (1) though
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) and (3), 
but not Approaches (4) 
and (5)
No (negative) impact
Neutrality Equity International 
attractiveness
Sovereign immunity No (negative) impact No (negative) impact Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
No (negative) impact
OECD/UN MTC based 
treaties
No (negative) impact Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
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Chapter 7 
 
The Framework Applied to The Netherlands 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the conceptual framework developed in this study regarding foreign sovereign wealth 
investors will be applied to the Netherlands, as an illustration.955 The Netherlands has been selected for 
several reasons. First, as will become apparent in this chapter, the primacy of Dutch international tax policy in 
relation to sovereign wealth investors is international attractiveness. This policy has found its way into Dutch 
tax treaties; the Netherlands has concluded several tax treaties containing favourable provisions for sovereign 
wealth investors, and Dutch tax (treaty) policy, as well as Dutch tax treaties, are approved by Dutch 
parliament. Second, the Netherlands is an OECD Member State, as well as an EU Member State, which means 
that the international law analysis will have to be considered in full. Third, the application of the framework 
requires in-depth knowledge of a tax system and a certain level of information. The author is familiar with 
Dutch tax law, whereas political decision-making in the Netherlands happens in a transparent way, and tax 
policy information, legislative information and other relevant information is publicly available. 
 
Given the primacy of international attractiveness as a Dutch tax policy objective in relation to sovereign 
wealth investors, the conceptual framework is primarily used in this chapter to answer the following 
question: What impact, if any, does international law have on the Netherlands’ ability to achieve (or promote) 
international tax attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors?  
 
Section 7.2 will first discuss the leading Dutch international tax policy principles in general, and identify the 
leading Dutch tax policy principle(s) applicable to foreign sovereign wealth investors in particular. This will 
be followed by some remarks on the impact of the sovereign immunity principle and OECD MTC based 
treaties in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4. In Section 7.5, the impact of European law on the ability of the 
Netherlands to pursue international attractiveness in relation to sovereign wealth investors will be 
considered, by focusing on the application of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act (1969) (‘DCITA 1969’), the 
Dutch Dividend Withholding Tax Act (1965) (‘DDWTA 1965’) and Dutch tax treaties, as in force on 1 January 
2018. Section 7.6 will end this chapter with its conclusions. 
 
7.2. Dutch international tax policy considerations 
 
The Netherlands has a small and open economy with a big foreign market. Therefore, the tax competitiveness 
position of the Netherlands vis-à-vis other relevant States is constantly monitored.956 Tax treaties concluded 
by the Netherlands stimulate international activities of Dutch enterprises (outbound investments) and 
contribute to an attractive investment climate, economic growth and employment in the Netherlands 
(inbound investments).957 According to the memorandum on Dutch tax treaty policy (2011), at least four 
important considerations play a role for entering into a tax treaty with another State.958 First, the structure of 
the tax system of the other State and its interaction with the Dutch tax system. This also involves an analysis 
                                                             
955 As the constituent country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, excluding the Caribbean island territories. 
956 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 76, pp. 15-16.  
957 Ibid., p. 16. 
958 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
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of the tax treaty network of the other State. Second, the nature and the extent of the economic relations 
between the Netherlands and the other State. The effect of concluding a tax treaty on these existing economic 
relations and the expected future impact will be considered. The conclusion of a tax treaty can also serve a 
specific economic goal, such as facilitating foreign outbound investments by Dutch pension funds or 
facilitating foreign inbound investments by foreign sovereign wealth investors. Third, the competitiveness 
position of Dutch employees, businesses and investors in the other State. Finally, economic, political or 
diplomatic factors may make it desirable to enter into a tax treaty with another State. In this respect, the 
memorandum notes that honouring the wish of another State to conclude a tax treaty can (also) solve a 
bilateral political or diplomatic issue. 
 
Dutch international tax policy contains elements of both CEN and CIN. With respect to ‘passive’ (portfolio) 
income, such as portfolio dividends, interest and royalties, the underlying policy is CEN, whereas CIN is 
followed as regards ‘active’ (business) income. These policy principles are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
applied to both resident and non-resident investors, and produce the following general picture. For Dutch 
resident investors with ‘passive’ income, the policy of CEN means that the aim is to include passive foreign 
income in the Dutch tax base and allow foreign taxes to be credited against the Dutch tax. For Dutch resident 
investors with ‘active’ income, the policy of CIN means that active foreign income is exempt from Dutch 
taxation and active income from Dutch activities is taxed. As regards non-resident investors, it should be 
noted upfront that currently the Netherlands does not levy a withholding tax on interest or royalties, but it 
does levy a withholding tax on dividends.959 The absence of a withholding tax on interest and royalties has, 
among others, been motivated with reference to CEN, which may raise eyebrows,960 but the better 
explanation seems to be the wish to stimulate the free movement of funds and to attract know-how.961 On the 
other hand, dividends paid by Dutch companies to non-resident investors are, in principle, subject to Dutch 
dividend withholding tax at a rate of 15%. However, in keeping with CIN, Dutch tax treaty policy is not to tax 
non-resident companies in respect of dividends derived from shareholdings in Dutch companies of at least 
10%.962 For tax treaty policy purposes, the threshold of 10% is the distinction between ‘active’ income and 
‘passive’ income, as far as corporate shareholders are concerned (dividends paid to non-resident individuals 
are always considered passive income). Because dividends are paid out of local profits that have already been 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax, this tax-exemption for non-resident companies achieves – in 
accordance with CIN – equal treatment with Dutch resident corporate investors, i.e. both being subject to 
Dutch tax on Dutch sourced active income only. In case of ‘passive’ portfolio dividends (i.e. shareholdings of 
less than 10%), non-resident companies are, in principle, not entitled to an exemption or reduction of Dutch 
dividend withholding tax under tax treaties. Basically, the Netherlands finds that in this situation the other 
State should grant a credit for the Dutch dividend withholding tax, like the Netherlands does in the reversed 
situation, based on the principle of CEN. As will be discussed in this section and in the following sections, a 
number of exceptions apply to the general picture outlined above, both under bilateral tax treaties and 
domestic tax law. The exceptions under bilateral tax treaties are often motivated by international 
attractiveness, whereas the exceptions under domestic tax law are often the result of EU law. 
 
The Netherlands is very much aware of the (increasing) significance of foreign sovereign wealth investors in 
the global economy. The memorandum on Dutch tax treaty policy (2011) recognizes sovereign wealth 
                                                             
959 However, on 10 October 2017, the new Dutch government announced the plan to abolish the dividend withholding tax, 
except in cases of abusive situations and in relation to low tax jurisdictions, and to introduce a withholding tax on interest 
and royalties in cases of abusive situations and in relation to low tax jurisdictions. Regeerakkoord 2017-2021, Vertrouwen 
in de toekomst (10 October 2017), pp. 35-36 & pp. 67-68. 
960 See the discussion in Section 3.4.2, where it was argued that CEN is not concerned with source taxation of non-
residents. 
961 Uitgangspunten van het beleid op het terrein van het internationaal fiscaal (verdragen)recht, Tweede Kamer, 1997-
1998, 25 087, No. 4, p. 44 & pp. 46-47. 
962 Ibid., pp. 39-41. 
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investors as important capital providers in the global economy963 and welcomes their investments into the 
Netherlands.964 It even pronounces the ambition of the Netherlands to become a regional investment centre 
for sovereign wealth investors through its tax treaty policy and the existing Dutch financial and tax 
infrastructure.965 It also notes that good fiscal relations with countries that are rich in oil and gas, could give 
business opportunities to Dutch companies. The parts of the memorandum that deal with sovereign wealth 
investors strongly resemble parts of an earlier non-tax memorandum (2008) on sovereign wealth investors 
from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.966 One of the conclusions of this non-tax 
memorandum was that investments of sovereign wealth investors bring, or could bring, important economic 
benefits to the Netherlands, among others because these investors generally appear to be stable, long-term 
shareholders.967 Another conclusion was that investments by sovereign wealth investors were not politically 
motivated, and that the public interests of the Netherlands were sufficiently protected through the existing 
legal framework.968 Nonetheless, some additional non-tax measures were announced to optimize the level of 
protection. It was also concluded that investments of sovereign wealth investors in the Netherlands could 
improve access of Dutch companies to the home markets of these investors.969 It was, furthermore, noted that 
the Netherlands can benefit if assets of sovereign wealth investors are managed in the Netherlands.970 In line 
with specific Dutch tax treaty policy regarding sovereign wealth investors, but in deviation from general 
Dutch tax treaty policy, sovereign wealth investors of tax treaty partners of the Netherlands are very often 
entitled to an exemption or reduction of Dutch source taxation on dividends. In this respect, reference is made 
to the Dutch tax treaties discussed in the Appendix. In addition, sovereign wealth investors which do not 
benefit from an exemption of Dutch source taxation on portfolio dividends under a tax treaty, may be entitled 
to a full refund under Dutch tax law, as will discussed in more detail in Sections 7.5.3.3 and 7.5.3.4 below. The 
extension of the Dutch refund regime to portfolio investors from third countries in 2012 was motivated by EU 
law (the freedom of capital movement), and by increasing the attractiveness for non-resident pension funds 
and foreign sovereign wealth investors.971 Based on the above, it can be concluded that the primacy of Dutch 
international tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors is international attractiveness.  
 
The tax-exemptions or reductions accorded to sovereign wealth investors by the Netherlands, in particular 
those accorded through tax treaties, are most often aimed at attracting investments. With respect to the tax 
treaty between the Netherlands and the U.A.E.,972 the Netherlands furthermore argued that the tax-exemption 
for dividends paid to sovereign wealth investors was necessary to protect the Netherlands’ competitiveness 
position vis-à-vis other source States, including Belgium and Austria.973 It follows from the discussion of the 
Dutch tax rules in this chapter and the discussion of the Dutch tax treaties in the Appendix, that some of the 
tax treaty based exemptions accorded to sovereign wealth investors are (far) more generous as compared to 
general Dutch tax treaty policy and Dutch domestic tax law. Notably, sovereign wealth investors from the 
U.A.E., Oman and Norway are entitled to a wide and general exemption of Dutch taxation on dividends under 
the tax treaty. With regard to these and other tax treaties, there is no publicly available information indicating 
that attention was paid to the other international tax policy principles and objectives. This may come as a 
surprise, in particular because tax-exemptions or reductions accorded through tax treaties could conflict with 
                                                             
963 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 33. 
964 Ibid., p. 76. 
965 Ibid. 
966 Sovereign Wealth Funds; gezamenlijke notitie ministeries van Financiën en Economische Zaken, Tweede Kamer, 2007-
2008, 31 350, No. 1. 
967 Ibid., p. 25. 
968 Ibid. pp. 38-39. 
969 Ibid., p. 20. 
970 Ibid., p. 8. 
971 Tweede Kamer, 2011-2012, 33 003, No. 3, p. 38 & p. 113. 
972 See Section A.3.2. 
973 Tweede Kamer, 2009-2010, 32 346, No. 3, p. 6. 
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inter-taxpayer equity (benefit principle). The analysis in Section 3.7 indicates that inter-taxpayer equity, as an 
expression of the fundamental value of fairness, should be an important international policy principle in every 
democracy under the rule of law. In the context of international attractiveness, the importance of inter-
taxpayer equity does not mean that a tax incentive should be rejected per se. It means that a tax incentive 
must serve a legitimate – i.e. ‘rationally defensible’ – purpose. Ultimately, the tax legislator of each individual 
sovereign State, therefore, has to weigh and balance the principle of inter-taxpayer equity and any other 
conflicting tax policy principle or objective it wishes to implement. Although this is not an exact measurement, 
it should be done in a transparent way, based on rational, convincing arguments, and its ultimate outcome 
may depend on various factors – such as the size and nature of the economy, public interests, societal values 
as well as tax policy choices of other States – and may change over time. Admittedly, the memorandum on 
Dutch tax treaty policy (2011) and the non-tax memorandum on sovereign wealth investors (2008) have both 
been discussed with Dutch parliament, and Dutch tax treaties are approved by, and increasingly discussed in, 
Dutch parliament. In addition, it is true that favourable tax treaty provisions are an integral part of the entire 
tax treaty and contribute to the overall balance of mutual relations between two States. Nevertheless, given 
the tension with inter-taxpayer equity, a separate, more detailed and in-depth analysis – ex ante – for each 
favourable tax treaty provision regarding sovereign wealth investors would have been appropriate, in the 
author’s view. Indeed, as indicated in Chapter 2, sovereign wealth investors are in many ways not a 
homogeneous group. In addition, the Netherlands does not get (any meaningful) direct tax benefits in return 
when sovereign wealth investors reside in States that do not levy (corporate) income tax (Norway being an 
exception). (Why) is it likely that these favourable tax treaty provisions will attract additional investments 
which will benefit the Dutch economy? Why are these tax treaty benefits not available to other investors? 
(Why) is it likely that tax treaties concluded with States that are home to sovereign wealth investors will 
improve access of Dutch companies to the home markets of these investors? Is there any relevant data 
available on the impact of existing tax treaties? After all, proper tax policy requires that the effect of tax 
incentives are properly evaluated. This economic information can be used for the benefit of future policy 
decisions, such as the inclusion of special provisions in future tax treaties. Why are these favourable tax treaty 
provisions designed as a general tax-exemption, rather than more specific tax-exemptions directed at 
industries or sectors where capital is/was scarcely available, such as small and medium-sized enterprises, 
start-ups and other companies with high-risk profiles?974/975 An additional reason why a separate, more 
detailed and in-depth analysis for each favourable tax treaty provision for sovereign wealth investors would 
have been appropriate, is that tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty 
enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time.       
 
7.3. Sovereign immunity 
 
The issue of the application of the sovereign immunity principle to taxation was raised in Dutch parliament in 
2015 during the legislative process on the new corporate tax regime for public enterprises 
(overheidsondernemingen). This regime will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.5.2.2 below. According to 
the Dutch government, the Netherlands follows the restrictive immunity theory, and applies this theory in tax 
matters as well, meaning that governmental acts of foreign States will enjoy immunity from Dutch (corporate 
income) taxation.976 The new corporate tax regime contains a specific tax-exemption for income from 
activities involving the exercise of a public function or public authority, which can also apply to foreign public 
enterprises. Based on this tax-exemption, the Dutch government indicated that the tax rules for foreign public 
enterprises do not conflict with the sovereign immunity principle. It should be noted that the scope of this tax-
exemption will be limited in practice, because it does not apply to activities which are being exercised in 
                                                             
974 See Section 3.6.  
975 It should be noted that, in a State aid context, tax benefits aimed at specific undertakings, sectors or industries could be 
selective. See Section 6.4.4.3.2. 
976 Eerste Kamer, 2014-2015, 34 003, No. D, p. 20. 
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competition with private undertakings. In Chapter 4, it was concluded that source States are not obliged 
under customary international law to accord any immunity from income taxation to foreign States or foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. On the other hand, there is no rule of customary international law prohibiting a 
source State from doing so. Therefore, the sovereign immunity principle has (had) no (negative) impact on the 
ability of the Netherlands to promote international attractiveness in relation to (one or more) foreign 
sovereign wealth investors.  
 
7.4. OECD MTC based treaties 
 
Dutch tax treaties are based on the OECD MTC. In Chapter 5, it was concluded that OECD MTC based treaties 
have no (negative) impact on source States’ ability to pursue international attractiveness in relation to (one or 
more) foreign sovereign wealth investors.  
In Section 5.7.3, it was noted that, nowadays, many tax treaties are (also) concluded for a specific 
economic purpose. Sovereign wealth investors of tax treaty partners of the Netherlands are very often entitled 
to a generous exemption or reduction of Dutch source taxation on dividends, in deviation from entitlements 
under domestic law and from a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights as expressed in the OECD and UN 
MTC, as well as general Dutch tax treaty policy.977 As indicated, these tax-exemptions or reductions are most 
often aimed at attracting investments. 
 
7.5. European law 
 
7.5.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, the following situations were identified where European law could restrict the ability of Member 
States to enhance international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors: 
 
(1) according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) under domestic law to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors, but not to comparable other non-resident investors; because this could constitute 
horizontal discrimination under the freedoms in intra-EU/EEA situations.978  
 
(2) according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) under domestic law or a tax treaty to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, but not to comparable resident investors; because this could constitute State aid in 
relation to active investors, even in third country situations.979 
 
(3) according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) under domestic law or a tax treaty to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, but not to comparable other non-resident investors; because this could constitute 
State aid in relation to active investors, even in third country situations.980 
 
Below, it will be examined whether one or more of these situations exist in the Netherlands. To that end, it is 
first necessary to analyse in more detail how sovereign wealth investors and other investors are treated in the 
Netherlands under domestic tax legislation. In case of differences in treatment, it will then be examined 
whether sovereign wealth investors could be objectively comparable to other investors, or whether the 
standstill provision of Art. 64(1) TFEU or a justification ground could apply in the context of the freedom of 
capital movement. The focus will be on the application of the DCITA 1969 in Section 7.5.2 and the DDWTA 
                                                             
977 See the Dutch tax treaties discussed in the Appendix. 
978 See Section 6.3.3.3.2. 
979 See Section 6.4.4.2. 
980 See Section 6.4.4.2. 
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1965 in Section 7.5.3, as in force on 1 January 2018. In Section 7.5.4, pursuing international attractiveness 
through tax treaties is considered. 
 
7.5.2  Dutch corporate income tax regime 
 
7.5.2.1 Introduction 
 
Entities resident in the Netherlands and listed in Art. 2(1) DCITA 1969 are, in principle, subject to Dutch 
corporate income tax on their worldwide profits. Art. 2(1) DCITA 1969 includes legal persons of private law, 
such as private companies limited by shares (besloten vennootschappen), public limited companies (naamloze 
vennootschapen), associations and foundations, as well as non-transparent limited partnerships. Unlike 
private companies limited by shares and public limited companies, associations and foundations are only 
subject to corporate income tax to the extent that they carry on a business enterprise.981 Art. 2(1)(g) DCITA 
1969 refers to legal persons of public law (publiekrechtelijke rechtspersonen). Similar to associations and 
foundations, legal persons of public law are subject to corporate income tax to the extent that they carry on a 
business enterprise.982 In relation to the Dutch State, business enterprises within each Ministry are together 
subject to corporate income tax.983 
 
Entities resident outside the Netherlands and listed in Art. 3(1) DCITA 1969 are subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax on their Dutch income as referred to in Arts. 17 and 17a DCITA 1969 only. Art. 3(1) DCITA 1969 
includes foreign body corporates (rechtspersonen). Dutch income typically includes profits from a Dutch 
permanent establishment, income from Dutch immovable property, as well as income from shareholdings in 
Dutch resident companies of at least 5% in abusive situations. Associations and foundations established under 
foreign law as well as foreign legal persons of public law with Dutch income, are only subject to Dutch 
corporate income tax insofar as they carry on a business enterprise.  
 
7.5.2.2 Public enterprises 
 
Until 1 January 2016, the tax liability of legal persons of public law (directe overheidsbedrijven) and legal 
persons of private law owned/controlled by a legal person of public law (indirecte overheidsbedrijven) was 
limited to income from certain listed activities, which included farms, industrial undertakings, mining 
undertakings and transport undertakings.984 In addition, certain entities owned/controlled by a legal person 
of public law were expressly mentioned as being subject to Dutch corporate income tax.985 This regime was 
abolished in response to the decision of the EC that it constituted existing State aid.986  
 
As from 1 January 2016, a new corporate tax regime applies to legal persons of public law and legal persons of 
private law owned by a legal person of public law. Since then, legal persons of public law are subject to Dutch 
corporate income tax insofar as they carry on a business enterprise (publiekrechtelijke overheidslichamen c.q. 
directe overheidsondernemingen).987 This rule mutatis mutandis applies to foreign legal persons of public 
law,988 while the tax liability of such non-resident entities is further limited to Dutch income as referred to in 
                                                             
981 Art. 2(1)(e) DCITA 1969. 
982 Art. 2(1)(g) DCITA 1969. 
983 Art. 2(2) DCITA 1969. 
984 Art. 2(3) (old) DCITA 1969. 
985 Art. 2(7) (old) DCITA 1969. 
986 Section 6.4.3. 
987 Art. 2(1)(g) DCITA 1969. 
988 Art. 3(3) DCITA 1969. 
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Arts. 17 and 17a DCITA 1969.989 In relation to the Dutch State, business enterprises within each Ministry are 
together subject to corporate income tax.990 A business enterprise requires the existence of an organization of 
labour and capital, which participates in economic traffic with the purpose of making profit. On the other 
hand, legal persons of private law which are owned/controlled by a legal person of public law 
(privaatrechtelijke overheidslichamen c.q. indirecte overheidsondernemingen) are, as a general rule, subject to 
the ordinary rules applicable to legal persons of private law, as discussed in Section 7.5.2.1. For example, a 
Dutch private company limited by shares and owned by a legal person of public law is taxable on its 
worldwide income, whereas a Dutch foundation controlled by a legal person of public law is taxable to the 
extent that it carries on a business enterprise. This rule mutatis mutandis applies to foreign legal persons of 
private law owned by a foreign legal person of public law, while the tax liability of such non-resident entities 
is further limited to Dutch sourced income. The rationale behind the different tax principles applicable to legal 
persons of public law, on the one hand, and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law, 
on the other, is that legal persons of public law, unlike legal persons of private law (except for associations 
and foundations), usually lack the purpose of making profit.991 
 
The new regime contains tax-exemptions for income from activities as listed in Arts. 8e and 8f DCITA 1969. 
Art. 8e DCITA 1969 is directed at legal persons of public law, whereas Art. 8f DCITA 1969 is directed at legal 
persons of private law owned/controlled by a legal person of public law. The income-based tax-exemptions 
provided in Art. 8e DCITA 1969 only become relevant if the legal person of public law carries on a business 
enterprise. The purpose of Arts. 8e and 8f DCITA 1969 is to achieve (more) tax neutrality in the choice 
between conducting activities by means of a legal person of public law or a legal person of private law.992 The 
activities listed in these provisions include activities performed for the legal person of public law itself, and 
activities performed between a legal person of public law and a legal person of private law owned by that 
legal person of public law (i.e. internal activities). Also listed are activities involving the exercise of a public 
function or public authority. Such activities can also be exercised by legal persons of private law which are 
owned/controlled by a legal person of public law. However, income from activities involving the exercise of a 
public function or public authority is not tax-exempt if they are being exercised in competition with private 
undertakings (in order not to disturb the level-playing field993). The tax-exemptions provided in Arts. 8e and 
8f DCITA 1969 apply by analogy to foreign legal persons of public law and foreign legal persons of private law 
owned by a foreign legal person of public law.994 
 
7.5.2.3 Collective investment vehicles 
 
7.5.2.3.1 Fiscale beleggingsinstelling (fiscal investment institution) 
 
The tax regime for fiscale beleggingsinstellingen (fiscal investment institutions (‘FBIs’)) came into existence in 
1969 and has been modified often since then. FBIs are investment vehicles. The relevant rules are contained 
in Art. 28 DCITA 1969 and in a decree (Besluit beleggingsinstellingen).995 The original purpose of the tax 
regime for FBIs was to facilitate collective investment by individuals (portfolio investors) in order to benefit 
                                                             
989 Art. 3(1) DCITA 1969. 
990 Art. 2(2) DCITA 1969. 
991 Tweede Kamer, 2014-2015, 34 003, No. 3, p. 9. 
992 Ibid., p. 15. 
993 Ibid., p. 47. 
994 Eerste Kamer, 2014-2015, 34 003, No. D, p. 20; Art. 18(1) DCITA 1969. 
995 For a more detailed description of the tax regime for FBIs, see H. Vermeulen, Het regime voor de fiscale 
beleggingsinstelling, 3rd edn., (Deventer: Kluwer, 2012). 
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from risk diversification and achieve higher returns.996 However, nowadays, the tax regime for FBIs is not 
only open to individuals (portfolio investors), but also to corporate investors (entities), even to single ones.  
 
FBIs are liable to Dutch corporate income tax at a rate of 0%, under certain conditions.997 A key feature of this 
regime is the obligation to distribute most profits to the participants within a short timeframe.998 It is not 
required that the entity has a legal or statutory obligation to distribute most profits within a short timeframe; 
it suffices that the entity actually distributes profits within this timeframe.999 The distribution requirement 
does not apply to gains from the alienation of assets if they are allocated to a re-investment reserve.1000 The 
0% rate and the distribution requirement express that FBIs are merely intermediaries and that the aim of the 
regime is to achieve, as much as possible, tax neutrality for portfolio investors between investing directly and 
investing indirectly through an FBI,1001 or at least to achieve taxation at the level of the investors.1002 In order 
to achieve this aim, dividend distributions by an FBI are, in principle, subject to 15% Dutch dividend 
withholding tax (but may, under Art. 11a DDWTA 1965, be reduced with dividend withholding tax and foreign 
tax on income derived by the FBI itself). Therefore, Art. 28 DCITA 1969 cannot be seen separately from the 
levy of Dutch dividend withholding tax. The statutory purpose and the actual activities of FBIs must be limited 
to (passively) investing funds (beleggen van vermogen).1003 
 
Art. 28 DCITA 1969 imposes certain shareholders requirements, depending on whether the FBI qualifies as a 
‘listed/regulated’ FBI or as a ‘non-listed/non-regulated’ FBI. As regards ‘listed/regulated’ FBIs, a resident or 
non-resident single individual is not allowed to hold an interest in the FBI of 25% or more, while a resident or 
non-resident entity which is subject to a profit tax is not allowed to own a shareholding in the FBI of 45% or 
more.1004 Corporate participants which are not subject to a profit tax fall outside the scope of this restriction. 
Such resident and non-resident corporate participants are, therefore, allowed to hold an interest in a 
‘listed/regulated’ FBI of more than 45%. With respect to ‘non-listed/non-regulated’ FBIs, a resident or non-
resident single individual is never allowed to own a shareholding in the FBI of 5% or more.1005 In addition, at 
least 75% of the shares of the ‘non-listed/non-regulated’ FBI must be held – together or alone – by: (i) 
resident or non-resident individuals, (ii) resident and non-resident corporate entities which are not subject to 
a profit tax,1006 and (iii) ‘listed/regulated’ FBIs.1007 Therefore, participants which are subject to a profit tax 
cannot hold more than 25% in a ‘non-listed/non-regulated’ FBI. On the other hand, corporate participants 
which are not subject to a profit tax are allowed to own a shareholding in such an FBI of more than 75%.   
 
The FBI regime is open to Dutch resident besloten vennootschappen, naamloze vennootschappen, open fondsen 
voor gemene rekening (‘non-transparent’ funds for joint account), as well Dutch resident foreign law 
equivalents established under the laws of an EU Member State or entitled to non-discriminatory treatment 
under a tax treaty concluded by the Netherlands.1008 The FBI regime is furthermore open to such foreign law 
                                                             
996 Tweede Kamer, 2000-2001, 27 466, No. 3, pp. 4-5. 
997 Art. 9 Besluit beleggingsinstellingen. 
998 Art. 28(2)(b) DCITA 1969. 
999 Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03954, BNB 2017/86, Para. 7.14. 
1000 Art. 4 Besluit beleggingsinstellingen. 
1001 Tweede Kamer, 1989-1990, 20 701, No. 9, p. 9; Tweede Kamer, 2000-2001, 27 466, No. 3, pp. 4-5; Hoge Raad, 10 
July 2015, No. 14/03956, BNB 2015/203. 
1002 Hoge Raad, 18 December 1991, No. 27 362, BNB 1992/288. 
1003 Art. 28(2) DCITA 1969. 
1004 Art. 28(2)(c) DCITA 1969. In case of tax transparent entities this condition needs to be tested at the upper level. 
1005 Art. 28(2)(d)(1˚) DCITA 1969. 
1006 In case of tax transparent entities this condition needs to be tested at the upper level. 
1007 Art. 28(2)(d)(2˚) DCITA 1969.  
1008 Art. 28(2) DCITA 1969. 
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equivalents resident outside the Netherlands, but with a Dutch permanent establishment, provided they meet 
the conditions of Art. 28 DCITA 1969, including the distribution requirement.1009 
 
7.5.2.3.2 Vrijgestelde beleggingsinstelling (tax-exempt investment institution) 
 
On 1 January 2007, a new tax regime for CIVs was introduced in Art. 6a DCITA 1969, to improve the 
competitiveness for this industry, namely the vrijgestelde beleggingsinstelling (tax-exempt investment 
institution (‘VBI’)). The tax regime for VBIs exists alongside the tax regime for FBIs. Art. 6a DCITA 1969 
provides for an entity-based exemption from Dutch corporate income tax for investment entities, the purpose 
and actual activities of which consist of collective investment in financial instruments, as defined, and which 
operate on the principle of risk-spreading. Furthermore, the tax regime for VBIs is limited to open-ended 
vehicles, i.e. vehicles with units which are, at the request of holders, repurchased or redeemed out of those 
vehicles’ assets. The definition of investment vehicles in Art. 6a(3) DCITA 1969 and the foregoing imply that 
the tax regime for VBIs is open for vehicles which perform asset management for a group of investors, rather 
than asset management for individual investors (individueel vermogensbeheer).1010  
 
The VBI regime is open to Dutch resident naamloze vennootschappen and open fondsen voor gemene rekening 
(‘non-transparent’ funds for joint account), as well Dutch resident foreign law equivalents established under 
the laws of an EU Member State or entitled to non-discriminatory treatment under a tax treaty concluded by 
the Netherlands.1011 The VBI regime is furthermore open to such foreign law equivalents resident outside the 
Netherlands, but with a Dutch permanent establishment, provided they meet the conditions of Art. 6a DCITA 
1969, including the requirement to perform asset management for a group of investors and the requirement 
to be open-ended.1012 
 
7.5.2.4 Pension funds 
 
Based on Art. 5(1)(b) DCITA 1969, entities which for at least 90% aim to facilitate – in short – retirement 
saving plans for employees under a regulated pension scheme, are subjectively exempt from Dutch corporate 
income tax in respect of activities directly related to this purpose. This entity related tax-exemption is based 
on the idea that pension funds, by their nature, do not make profits, because profits de facto benefit the 
participants.1013 Another reason is that pension funds fulfil an important social function.1014 Non-resident 
pension funds can similarly be entitled to this tax-exemption, provided that the non-resident pension funds 
implements a pension regulation which, by its nature and scope, is similar to a Dutch pension regulation.1015     
 
7.5.2.5 Not-for-profit organizations 
 
Resident entities which did not aim to earn profit, and which either represented an interest of the community 
(algemeen maatschappelijk belang) or furthered a social cause (sociaal belang), could have been subjectively 
exempt from Dutch corporate income tax, under certain conditions.1016 However, this entity-based tax-
exemption was abolished on 1 January 2012. Since then, not-for-profit organizations are in principle governed 
by the general rules as discussed in Section 7.5.2.1. Since not-for-profit organizations typically take the legal 
                                                             
1009 Eerste Kamer, 2006-2007, 30 533, No. C, p. 4; Art. 28(2) DCITA 1969. 
1010 Decree of 10 March 2008, No. CPP2008/291M, BNB 2008/141. 
1011 Art. 6a(2) DCITA 1969. 
1012 Ibid. 
1013 Tweede Kamer, 2003-2004, 29 210, No. 3, p. 23. 
1014 Ibid. 
1015 Art. 5(3)(a) DCITA 1969. 
1016 Art. 6 (old) DCITA 1969. 
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form of an association or foundation, they will only be subject to Dutch corporate income tax insofar as they 
carry on a business enterprise. A business enterprise requires the existence of an organization of labour and 
capital, which participates in economic traffic with the purpose of making profit.   
 
7.5.2.6 Application to foreign sovereign wealth investors and comparison to other investors 
 
From the discussion of the DCITA 1969, it is clear that different categories of investors are governed by 
different corporate income tax rules, which could result in different taxation. The conditions imposed on a 
category of resident investors generally apply to the same category of non-resident investors in a similar way 
(notwithstanding the different territorial scope of the tax liability between residents and non-residents). 
Below, the application of the DCITA 1969 to sovereign wealth investors will be analysed, and it will be 
examined whether (or not) sovereign wealth investors could be objectively comparable to other investors in 
the context of the DCITA 1969. It is noted that the Netherlands has no SWF itself. As explained in Chapter 6, 
comparability is determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax 
measure at issue, and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation. This comparability 
standard is relevant under the freedoms and State aid rules, for both vertical and horizontal comparability. 
However, unlike the State aid rules, the freedoms do not prohibit reverse discrimination. Furthermore, unlike 
the State aid rules, the prohibition of horizontal discrimination under the freedoms should not apply in case of 
tax treaty benefits and seems further confined to intra-EU/EEA situations. The application of the State aid 
rules is, in any case, limited to undertakings.  
 
7.5.2.6.1 Tax regime for public enterprises  
 
Based on the new tax regime for public enterprises, sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets 
within the State, being a legal person of public law (buitenlands publiekrechtelijk overheidslichaam), are 
subject to Dutch taxation on their Dutch income as referred to in Arts. 17 and 17a DCITA 1969, but only to the 
extent that they carry on a business enterprise. The same rule applies to sovereign wealth investors 
established as a separate legal person of public law. A business enterprise requires the existence of an 
organization of labour and capital, which participates in economic traffic with the purpose of making profit. 
Active investors are more likely to meet these criteria than passive investors. Even if sovereign wealth 
investors established as or within a legal person of public law carry on a business enterprise, Dutch income 
derived from activities listed in Art. 8e DCITA 1969 is exempt from Dutch corporate income tax. Art. 8e DCITA 
1969, most notably, exempts income from activities involving the exercise of a public function or public 
authority, unless such activities are being exercised in competition with private undertakings (in order not to 
disturb the level-playing field).1017 In the author’s view, the investment activities of sovereign wealth 
investors should not be covered by this particular tax-exemption, even if they are connected to the exercise of 
a public function or public authority, because such activities are being exercised in competition with private 
undertakings.   
 
Sovereign wealth investors established as a legal person of private law referred to in Art. 3(1) DCITA 1969 
(buitenlands privaatrechtelijk overheidslichaam), are subject to Dutch corporate income tax on their Dutch 
income similar to regular non-resident corporate investors, except for Dutch income derived from activities 
listed in Art. 8f DCITA 1969. Similar to Art. 8e DCITA 1969, Art. 8f DCITA 1969 exempts, most notably, income 
                                                             
1017 Cf. CJEU, 24 October 2002, Case C-82/01 P (Aéroports de Paris), Para. 82: “(…) the fact that an activity may be 
exercised by a private undertaking amounts to further evidence that the activity in question may be described as a business 
activity.”; CJEU, 19 January 2017, Case C-344/15 (National Roads Authority), Para. 39: “(…) what is envisaged here is 
the situation in which bodies governed by public law engage in activities which may also be engaged in, in competition 
with them, by private economic operators. The aim is to ensure that those private operators are not placed at a 
disadvantage because they are taxed while those bodies are not (…)”. 
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from activities involving the exercise of a public function or public authority, unless such activities are being 
exercised in competition with private undertakings. As explained, this particular tax-exemption should, in the 
author’s view, not apply to investment activities of sovereign wealth investors, because they are being 
exercised in competition with private undertakings.   
 
The new tax regime for public enterprises accords different tax treatment between sovereign wealth 
investors, depending on the legal form and activities of these investors. In the author’s view, this different 
treatment does not constitute horizontal discrimination under the freedoms, nor does it constitute State aid. 
The rationale behind the different tax principles applicable to legal persons of public law, on the one hand, 
and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law, on the other, is that legal persons of 
public law, unlike legal persons of private law (except for associations and foundations), usually lack the 
purpose of making profit.1018 It is, therefore, reasonable to distinguish between business activities and other 
activities of legal persons of public law, and to apply this distinction mutatis mutandis to foreign legal persons 
of public law, but not to foreign legal persons of private law (owned by a foreign legal person of public law). 
Admittedly, Arts. 8e and 8f DCITA 1969 could increase the difference in tax treatment between legal persons 
of private law owned by a legal person of public law and those not owned by a legal person of public law, but 
these exemptions reflect that the first mentioned entities can closely resemble a legal person of public law. 
Based on the rationale behind the different tax principles, (sovereign wealth) investors established as or 
within a legal person of public law should, in principle, not be objectively comparable to (sovereign wealth) 
investors established as a legal person of private law (owned by a legal person of public law). In contrast, 
(sovereign wealth) investors established as or within a legal person of public law should be objectively 
comparable to other legal persons of public law, whereas (sovereign wealth) investors established as a legal 
person of private law (owned by a legal person of public law) should be objectively comparable to other 
similar legal persons of private law.1019  
 
7.5.2.6.2 Tax regimes for collective investment vehicles 
 
The DCITA 1969 contains two separate tax regimes for CIVs, namely the FBI regime and the VBI regime. Both 
regimes are open to certain non-resident entities established under foreign law with a Dutch permanent 
establishment, provided they meet the conditions of Art. 28 DCITA 1969 respectively Art. 6a DCITA 1969, as 
also imposed on resident entities. In the author’s view, sovereign wealth investors with a Dutch permanent 
establishment will unlikely qualify for the FBI regime if only because they will unlikely meet the key 
requirement to distribute most profits within a short timeframe. Failing the distribution requirement was 
reason for the Dutch Supreme Court to conclude, in 2013, that a Luxembourg resident CIV was not objectively 
comparable to a Dutch FBI, in the context of the DDWTA 1965.1020 In March 2017, the Dutch Supreme Court 
decided to refer a number of questions to the CJEU in two cases, again in the context of the DDWTA 1965, 
including the subsidiary question whether its decision in 2013 is (still) compatible with EU law.1021 The 
highest court still thinks it does,1022 but nevertheless has some doubt, in particular because a Danish court has 
referred questions to the CJEU in an apparently similar case.1023 In the author’s view, there is no reason for 
this doubt. The author agrees with Wattel,1024 Vleggeert1025 and Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch1026 that, based 
                                                             
1018 Tweede Kamer, 2014-2015, 34 003, No. 3, p. 9. 
1019 Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch, 12 October 2017, No. 14/00640-00645, V-N 2017/57.9. 
1020 Hoge Raad, 15 November 2013, No. 12/01866, BNB 2014/20. 
1021 Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03954, BNB 2017/86; Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03955, BNB 2017/87. 
1022 Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03954, BNB 2017/86, Paras. 7.4.2 & 7.12. 
1023 Request for a preliminary ruling from the Østre Landsret (Denmark) lodged on 5 September 2016 – Fidelity Funds v 
Skatteministeriet (Case C-480/16). 
1024 Opinion of the Dutch Advocate General P. Wattel, 9 November 2016, BNB 2017/86, Para. 5.44. 
1025 J. Vleggeert, Case note on Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03954, Nederland Tijdschrift voor Fiscaal Recht 
2017/686. 
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on constant EU case law and taking into account the purpose of the FBI regime and the relevant conditions, a 
foreign entity that does not satisfy the distribution requirement is, for that reason alone, not objectively 
comparable to a Dutch FBI. In addition, sovereign wealth investors may fail the statutory purpose 
requirement, and may not be objectively comparable to a Dutch FBI because they are not required to withhold 
Dutch dividend withholding tax. The fact that a Luxembourg investment fund was not required to withholding 
Dutch dividend withholding tax was reason for the Dutch Supreme Court to conclude, in 2015, that this fund 
was not objectively comparable to a Dutch FBI.1027 However, the court is also not sure whether this decision is 
(still) compatible with EU law, in particular because of the questions referred to the CJEU by a Danish court. 
Therefore, in March 2017, the Dutch Supreme Court requested the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on this 
matter as well.1028  
 
Sovereign wealth investors with a Dutch permanent establishment will not be entitled to the VBI regime, 
because they perform asset management for an individual investor (individueel vermogensbeheer) and they 
are not open-ended.  
 
Based on the above, sovereign wealth investors will unlikely be comparable to resident and non-resident FBIs 
and VBIs, based on the purpose of the national tax measure and taking into account the relevant 
distinguishing criteria. 
 
7.5.2.6.3 Tax regime for pension funds           
 
Dutch resident entities as well as non-resident entities which for at least 90% aim to facilitate – in short – 
retirement saving plans for employees under a regulated pension scheme, are subjectively exempt from Dutch 
corporate income tax in respect of activities directly related to this purpose. Sovereign wealth investors 
should not meet this requirement, simply because they do not facilitate retirement saving plans for employees 
under a (comparable) regulated pension scheme. This should also apply to sovereign wealth investors that 
have been set-up to cover for expected future deficits of the social security system as a result of an ageing 
population. These sovereign wealth investors could be regarded as SPRFs (sovereign pension reserve 
funds).1029 However, because SPRFs are entirely government-funded, have no superannuation liabilities, and 
individuals have no specified entitlement to future payments (i.e. SPRFs have no members/participants),1030 
they do not facilitate retirement saving plans for employees under a regulated pension scheme that is 
comparable to a Dutch one, in the author’s view. As a result, sovereign wealth investors should not be 
comparable to resident and non-resident pension funds, based on the purpose of the national tax measure and 
taking into account the relevant distinguishing criteria. 
 
7.5.2.6.4 Not-for-profit organizations 
 
Not-for-profit organizations are in principle governed by the general rules as discussed in Section 7.5.2.1. 
Since not-for-profit organizations typically take the legal form of an association or foundation, they will only 
be subject to Dutch corporate income tax insofar as they carry on a business enterprise. A business enterprise 
requires the existence of an organization of labour and capital, which participates in economic traffic with the 
purpose of making profit. From the discussion in Section 2.8, it follows that sovereign wealth investors do not 
take the legal form of an association or foundation. And unlike not-for-profit organizations, sovereign wealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
1026 Gerechtshof ’s-Hertogenbosch, 24 November 2017, No. 16/03761-03770, V-N Vandaag 2017/2851. 
1027 Hoge Raad, 10 July 2015, No. 14/03956, BNB 2015/203. 
1028 Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03954, BNB 2017/86; Hoge Raad, 3 March 2017, No. 16/03955, BNB 2017/87. 
1029 See the discussion in Section 2.3.4.2. 
1030 See <http://www.futurefund.gov.au/about-us> and <https://www.nzsuperfund.co.nz/nz-super-fund-explained/purpose-
and-mandate>   
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investors aim to make profit. Therefore, sovereign wealth investors should not be objectively comparable to 
not-for-profit organizations. 
 
7.5.2.6.5 Tax regime for regular corporate investors 
 
Under the new corporate tax regime for public enterprises, sovereign wealth investors established as or 
within a legal person of public law are subject to Dutch corporate income tax insofar as they carry on a 
business enterprise. These sovereign wealth investors are, therefore, not taxed like a regular investor. In 
contrast, sovereign wealth investors established as a legal person of private law as referred to in Art. 3(1) 
DCITA 1969, are subject to Dutch corporate income tax similar to a regular corporate investor. As explained 
above, the rationale behind these different tax principles is that legal persons of public law, unlike legal 
persons of private (except for associations and foundations), usually lack the purpose of making profit. Based 
on this, it was argued that (sovereign wealth) investors established as or within a legal person of public law 
should, in principle, not be objectively comparable to (sovereign wealth) investors established as a legal 
person of private law (owned by a legal person of public law). In contrast, (sovereign wealth) investors 
established as a legal person of private law (owned by a legal person of public law) should be objectively 
comparable to other similar legal persons of private law. 
 
7.5.2.6.6 Tax regime for individuals 
 
Income or a fixed rate of return on the value of assets of Dutch resident individuals would be subject to Dutch 
personal income tax. The author would not expect sovereign wealth investors to be objectively comparable to 
Dutch resident individuals, simply because of their difference in nature.  
 
7.5.2.7 Conclusion 
 
The Dutch corporate income tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors is determined by their legal 
form and their activities. Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a legal person of public law are 
governed by the rules of the DCITA 1969 that apply (by analogy) to Dutch resident legal persons of public law, 
whereas sovereign wealth investors established as a legal person of private law are governed by the rules that 
apply (by analogy) to similar Dutch resident legal persons of private law. As a result, the former are only 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax on Dutch income insofar as they carry on a business enterprise, 
whereas the latter are subject to Dutch corporate income tax on Dutch income regardless of whether they 
carry on a business enterprise. This treatment could result in differences among sovereign wealth investors, 
as well as differences between sovereign wealth investors, on the one hand, and other categories of resident 
investors, on the other. These differences in tax treatment should, however, not be in conflict with European 
law, since it concerns situations which are not objectively comparable within the framework of the DCITA 
1969, essentially because the different tax treatment is based on a different rationale, as reflected in the 
distinguishing criteria applicable to each category. Indeed, in the context of the DCITA 1969, sovereign wealth 
investors established as or within a legal person of public law should only be objectively comparable to other 
legal persons of public law, whereas sovereign wealth investors established as a legal person of private law 
should only be objectively comparable to other similar legal persons of private law. Therefore, the current 
Dutch corporate income tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors is in accordance with European 
law. However, the comparability analysis indicates that, if the Netherlands wishes to increase international 
attractiveness for sovereign wealth investors in the future, by means of the DCITA 1969, the fundamental 
freedoms could impose restrictions in intra-EU/EEA situations (because this could constitute horizontal 
discrimination), whereas the State aid rules could impose restrictions in both intra-EU/EEA and third country 
situations (because this could constitute reverse and horizontal discrimination). 
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7.5.3 Dutch dividend withholding tax regime 
 
7.5.3.1 Introduction 
 
Based on the DDWTA 1965, dividends paid by a company resident in the Netherlands are, in principle, subject 
to 15% withholding tax.1031 In domestic situations, this withholding tax has the character of an advance levy 
and can be offset against the Dutch corporate (and personal) income tax due by the Dutch 
shareholder/recipient. Where the amount of corporation income tax is not sufficient to offset the amount of 
dividend withholding tax, the excess dividend withholding tax will be reimbursed.1032 In cross-border 
situations, Dutch dividend withholding tax can, however, be a final levy for foreign shareholders/recipients. 
The DDWTA 1965 provides for an exemption regime and a refund regime, which could both apply to domestic 
and cross-border situations. Both regimes are discussed below. However, before doing so, it is noted that FBIs, 
VBIs and their foreign law equivalents, as shareholders/recipients, are never entitled to an exemption or 
refund of dividend withholding tax. With respect to FBIs, this is, in essence, because dividend withholding tax 
to be withheld by FBIs, as dividend distributors, may, under Art. 11a DDWTA 1965, be reduced with dividend 
withholding tax and foreign tax on income derived by the FBI. With respect to VBIs, this is because VBIs, as 
dividend distributors, have no obligation to withhold dividend withholding tax.1033 
 
The new Dutch government has announced the plan to abolish the DDWTA 1965 as from 1 January 2020, 
except in cases of abusive situations and in relation to low tax jurisdictions.1034  
 
7.5.3.2 The dividend withholding tax exemption regime (Art. 4 DDWTA 1965) 
 
Art. 4 DDWTA 1965 provides for an exemption to withhold Dutch dividend withholding tax in domestic 
situations and intra-EU/EEA situations, under certain conditions. As from 1 January 2018, the withholding 
exemption was extended to shareholders from third countries, under certain conditions, basically to further 
reduce tax barriers within international groups.1035  
 
In domestic situations, the exemption to withhold Dutch dividend withholding tax can be applied if the 
participation exemption regime1036 (or credit regime1037) applies. This means, in essence, that the shareholder 
must be a resident company subject to Dutch corporate income tax and own a shareholding of at least 5%. 
Thus, resident entities which are subjectively exempt from Dutch corporate income tax, such as pension 
funds, are not entitled to the exemption from Dutch dividend withholding tax.  
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, based on Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965, the exemption to withhold dividend withholding 
tax applies in relation to shareholders which are resident of an EU Member State or EEA-EFTA State according 
to the tax legislation of that State, provided the participation exemption regime (or credit regime) would have 
applied if the non-resident shareholder had been tax resident in the Netherlands (and in the absence of 
abuse). This means, in essence, that the EU/EEA shareholder would have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if it had been tax resident in the Netherlands, and must own a shareholding in a Dutch resident 
                                                             
1031 Art. 1(1) DDWTA 1965. 
1032 Art. 25 DCITA 1969. 
1033 Art. 1(4) DDWTA 1965. 
1034 Regeerakkoord 2017-2021, Vertrouwen in de toekomst (10 October 2017), pp. 35-36 & p. 68. 
1035 Tweede Kamer, 2017-2018, 34 788, No. 3, pp. 2-3. 
1036 Art. 13 DCITA 1969. 
1037 Art. 13aa DCITA 1969. 
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company of at least 5%.1038 Thus, non-resident entities which would have been subjectively exempt from 
Dutch corporate income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are not entitled to the exemption 
from Dutch dividend withholding tax. This dividend withholding tax exemption in intra-EU/EEA situations is 
based on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, and its design has been influenced by decisions of the CJEU.1039  
 
As from 1 January 2018, the withholding exemption, under conditions similar to intra-EU/EEA situations, 
applies in relation to shareholders from third countries, provided they are tax resident in a country with 
which the Netherlands has concluded a tax treaty containing a dividend article.1040 
 
7.5.3.3 The dividend withholding tax refund regime (Arts. 10 and 10a DDWTA 1965) 
 
Arts. 10 and 10a DDWTA 1965 provide for a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax to shareholders falling 
within one of the following three categories, under certain conditions: (1) resident and non-resident entities 
which are not subject to corporate income tax, (2) legal persons of public law, as well as legal persons of 
private law owned by a legal person of public law, and (3) non-resident individuals and non-resident entities 
faced with an amount of dividend withholding tax that is higher than the amount of Dutch tax that would have 
been due if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands. The refund regime has to a large extent been 
influenced by EU law, and applies to both intra-EU/EEA and third country situations. The different provisions 
of the refund regime are discussed in more detail below. 
 
7.5.3.3.1 Entities which are not subject to corporate income tax 
 
In domestic situations, resident entities which are not subject to Dutch corporate income tax, such as pension 
funds, are not entitled to an exemption from dividend withholding tax. Such entities are not able to offset the 
dividend withholding tax against corporate income tax, and the dividend withholding tax loses its function as 
an advance levy.1041 Without further regulation, the dividend withholding tax would become a final levy for 
such tax-exempt resident investors. Art. 10(1) DDWTA 1965, therefore, entitles these residents to a full 
refund. 
 
As from 1 January 2007, based on EU law, this refund regime for tax-exempt entities was extended to entities 
resident in other EU Member States. As from 1 January 2010, the refund regime was also applied to Norway 
and Iceland. One year later, the refund regime for tax-exempt entities was further extended to entities 
resident in Liechtenstein. In intra-EU/EEA situations, based on Art. 10(2) DDWTA 1965, a non-resident entity 
is entitled to a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax, if that entity: (i) is not subject to a profit tax in its 
country of residence, and (ii) would also not have been subject to Dutch corporate tax if it had been tax 
resident in the Netherlands. The requirement of not being subject to a profit tax locally is not in accordance 
with European law, in the author’s view.1042 
 
                                                             
1038 The exemption can also be applied to non-resident corporate taxpayers with a Dutch permanent establishment, 
provided the shares can be allocated to that permanent establishment. 
1039 For example, CJEU, 11 June 2009, Case C-521/07 (European Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands); CJEU, 18 
June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property Fininvest). 
1040 Art. 4(2)(a)(2˚) DDWTA 1965. 
1041 Cf. Hoge Raad, 15 November 2013, No. 12/01866, BNB 2014/20. 
1042 CJEU, 12 December 2006, Case C-374/04 (Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation), Para. 70; CJEU, 
8 November 2007, Case C-379/05 (Amurta), Para. 39; CJEU, 18 June 2009, Case C-303/07 (Aberdeen Property 
Fininvest), Para. 51 and 54; CJEU, 10 April 2014, Case C-190/12 (Emerging Markets Series), Para. 59; Similarly, J. van 
Eijsden, B. Kiekebeld & D. Smit (eds.), Nederlands belastingrecht in Europees perspectief, 2nd edn., (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2014), p. 195. 
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As from 1 January 2012, the refund regime for tax-exempt entities applies to entities resident in third 
countries as well. This extension was motivated by the freedom of capital movement, and by increasing the 
attractiveness for non-resident pension funds and sovereign wealth investors.1043 In addition to the 
conditions which apply in intra-EU/EEA situations, based on Art. 10(3) DDWTA 1965, entities resident in 
third countries will only be entitled to a refund, if: (iii) they are resident of a country with which sufficient 
means for the exchange of information are available, and (iv) the dividend qualifies as a return on a ‘portfolio 
investment’1044 as meant in Arts. 63 and 64 TFEU. In the author’s view, the third requirement needs to be 
refined. In Section 6.3.4.3, it was argued that a Member State should not be able rely on the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary 
information. 
 
7.5.3.3.2 Legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public 
law 
 
Due to the new corporate income tax regime for public enterprises, many legal persons of public law, and 
legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law, became subject to Dutch corporate income 
tax, as from 1 January 2016. However, income derived by such investors may be exempt from corporate 
income tax under Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969.1045 Without any further regulation, many such investors would 
not have been entitled to a refund of dividend withholding tax under Art. 10 DDWTA 1965, even if the 
dividend income would be exempt from corporate income tax under Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969. In such cases, 
legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of public law would 
(eventually) have received back, as part of the corporate income tax assessment procedure, any dividend 
withholding tax that could not be offset, but this would have resulted in a cash flow disadvantage compared to 
the situation prior to 1 January 2016.1046 Therefore, as from 1 January 2016, Art. 10(5) DDWTA 1965 provides 
for a refund of dividend withholding tax to legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned 
by a legal person of public law which are subject to Dutch corporate income tax, provided the withholding tax 
relates to dividend income that is exempt from corporate income tax under Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969. This 
refund regime for legal persons of public law, and legal persons of private law owned by a legal person of 
public law, can also apply in intra-EU/EEA and third country situations.   
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, legal persons of public law, and legal persons of private law owned by a legal 
person of public law, are entitled to a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax, if: (i) the dividend income is 
not included in the taxable profit in the other State, and (ii) the dividend income would also not have been 
taxed pursuant to Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969 if the entity had been tax resident in the Netherlands.  
 
In third country situations, these two conditions apply mutatis mutandis, supplemented by the requirements 
that: (iii) the entity is a resident of a country with which sufficient means for the exchange of information are 
available,1047 and (iv) the dividend qualifies as a return on a ‘portfolio investment’1048 as meant in Arts. 63 and 
64 TFEU.  
 
 
                                                             
1043 Tweede Kamer, 2011-2012, 33 003, No. 3, p. 38 & p. 113. 
1044 The concept of portfolio investment and direct investment was discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.2. 
1045 Arts. 8e and 8f DCITA 1969 were discussed in Section 7.5.2.6.1. 
1046 Tweede Kamer, 2014-2015, 34 220, No. 3, p. 5. 
1047 In Section 6.3.4.3, it was argued that a Member State should not be able rely on the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary information. 
1048 The concept of portfolio investment and direct investment was discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.2. 
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7.5.3.3.3  Non-resident individuals and non-resident entities faced with a higher Dutch tax burden 
 
Art. 10a DDWTA 1965 was introduced on 1 January 2017 in response to the judgment of the CJEU in the 
joined cases Miljoen, X and Société Générale.1049 These cases concerned two non-resident individuals and one 
non-resident company who were subject to a final 15% Dutch dividend withholding tax on dividends from 
Dutch shareholdings of less than 5%. Resident individuals and resident entities are also subject to 15% 
dividend withholding tax on dividends from such shareholdings; however, the withholding tax for residents is 
not final, but can be offset against personal income tax (maximum rate of 52%) or corporate income tax 
(maximum rate of 25%). Where the amount of personal income tax or corporate income tax is not sufficient 
to offset the amount of dividend withholding tax, the excess dividend withholding tax will be reimbursed to 
residents. According to the CJEU, the freedom of capital movement prohibits national tax legislation which 
imposes a heavier final tax burden on non-residents compared to residents for the same dividends. As a 
result, the taxation at the level of a non-resident investor must be compared with the overall taxation at the 
level of a comparable resident investor. The relevant period for comparing the tax burden is the period taken 
into account for residents; usually one tax year. The CJEU furthermore held that, in comparing the tax burden, 
only expenses that are directly linked to an activity that has generated taxable income can be taken into 
account when calculating the tax burden of a comparable resident.1050 This refund regime for non-resident 
individuals and non-resident entities applies in intra-EU/EEA situations, as well as third country situations.   
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965 provides for a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax 
to an individual or entity resident in another EU Member State or EEA-EFTA State, to the extent that the 
amount of dividend withholding tax, after the application of a tax treaty, is higher than the amount of 
(corporate) income tax that would have been due if the individual or entity had been tax resident in the 
Netherlands. For non-resident entities, Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965 is relevant in intra-EU/EEA situations where 
the withholding tax exemption of Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965 does not apply. For non-resident entities, only 
expenses that are directly linked to an activity that has generated taxable income can be taken into account. It 
is noted that, because the corporate income tax rate is 25% and the dividend withholding tax rate is 15%, the 
directly linked expenses of non-resident entities would need to be more than 40% of the dividend income to 
be able to benefit from Art. 10a DDWTA 1965. Therefore, the practical relevance of Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965 
for non-resident entities is rather limited.  
 
In third country situations, based on Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965, the same condition applies, supplemented by 
the requirements that: (ii) the individual or entity is a resident of a country with which sufficient means for 
the exchange of information are available,1051 and (iii) the dividend qualifies as a return on a ‘portfolio 
investment’1052 as meant in Arts. 63 and 64 TFEU. With respect to non-resident entities that would have been 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax, the practical relevance of Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965, in 2017, seems 
limited to shareholdings in Dutch resident companies of at least 5%, because a resident for corporate tax 
purposes would have been entitled to the participation exemption regime, resulting in no corporate income 
taxation on the dividend income and, therefore, in a lower tax burden than the dividend withholding tax 
burden for the non-resident entity. In 2018, with respect to non-resident entities that would have been 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax, the practical relevance of Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965 seems even further 
limited to shareholdings in Dutch resident companies of at least 5% held by shareholders resident in a non-
tax treaty third country (due to the extension of the withholding tax regime to third countries). In case of 
shareholdings of less than 5%, the participation exemption would not have applied, so that the directly linked 
                                                             
1049 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale). 
1050 Ibid., Para. 57. 
1051 In Section 6.3.4.3, it was argued that a Member State should not be able rely on the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary information. 
1052 The concept of portfolio investment and direct investment was discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.2. 
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expenses would need to be more than 40% of the taxable dividend income to be able to benefit from Art. 10a 
DDWTA 1965. With respect to non-resident entities that would not be subject to Dutch corporate income tax, 
Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965 may apply as long as the shareholding qualifies as a ‘portfolio investment’1053. 
 
In line with EU case law,1054 a refund will not be granted if the individual or entity is entitled to a full 
deduction of the Dutch dividend withholding tax in its country of residence, pursuant to a tax treaty concluded 
between the Netherlands and the country of residence.1055 
 
7.5.3.4 Application to foreign sovereign wealth investors and comparison to other investors 
 
From the discussion of the DDWTA 1965, it is clear that different categories of investors are governed by 
different dividend withholding tax rules. Below, the application of the DDWTA 1965 to sovereign wealth 
investors and other investors will be analysed and compared. 
 
Dividend payments by Dutch resident companies to foreign sovereign wealth investors are, in principle, 
subject to 15% Dutch dividend withholding tax. The application of both the dividend withholding tax 
exemption regime and dividend withholding tax refund regime to non-resident investors, depends for an 
important part on the Dutch corporate income tax status or treatment of such entities if they had been tax 
resident in the Netherlands. This test resembles the comparability standard under the freedoms and the State 
aid rules, and produces the following picture. Non-resident investors may only be entitled to:  
 
- an exemption from Dutch dividend withholding tax if they would have been subject to Dutch 
corporate income tax, if the participation exemption would have applied, and, in relation to third 
countries, if the shareholder is resident in a tax treaty country;  
- a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax under Art. 10(2) and 10(3) DDWTA 1965 if they would 
not have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax;  
- a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax under Art. 10(5) DDWTA 1965 if they would have been 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax and if the withholding tax relates to dividend income that 
would have been exempt from corporate income tax under Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969;  
- a refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax under Art. 10a DDWTA 1965 to the extent that the amount 
of dividend withholding tax, after the application of a tax treaty, is higher than the amount of 
(corporate) income tax that would have been due if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands. 
 
The reference to the Dutch corporate income tax status or treatment applies to all categories of non-resident 
investors, including foreign sovereign wealth investors. This reference makes it necessary to compare non-
resident investors to resident investors in the context of the DCITA 1969. This exercise was already 
performed in Section 7.5.2 from the perspective of sovereign wealth investors. The outcome was that 
sovereign wealth investors can be objectively comparable to legal persons of public law, or to similar legal 
persons of private law, depending on their legal form and their activities. In the context of the DCITA 1969, 
sovereign wealth investors should not be objectively comparable to the other categories of resident investors, 
essentially because the different tax treatment is based on a different rationale, as reflected in the 
distinguishing criteria applicable to these categories. The Dutch corporate income tax treatment of sovereign 
wealth investors, if they would have been tax resident in the Netherlands, can be summarized as follows. 
Pursuant to Art. 2(1)(g) DCITA 1969, sovereign wealth investors established as or within a legal person of 
public law would have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax insofar as they carry on a business 
                                                             
1053 Ibid. 
1054 CJEU, 17 September 2015, Joined Cases C-10/14, C-14/14 and C-17/14 (Miljoen, X, Société Générale), Paras. 77-80. 
1055 Art. 10a(5) DDWTA 1965. 
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enterprise. Thus, sovereign wealth investors taking this legal form, would not be subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they do not carry on a business enterprise, and vice versa. On the other hand, sovereign wealth 
investors established as a legal person of private law as referred to in Art. 2(1) DCITA 1969, would have been 
subject to Dutch corporate income tax, similar to regular corporate investors, regardless of whether a 
business enterprise is being carried on. Sovereign wealth investors will probably not be entitled to the 
exemptions provided for in Arts. 8e and 8f DCITA 1969.  
 
Withholding tax exemption regime 
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, sovereign wealth investors which would have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are entitled to an exemption from dividend 
withholding tax under Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965 in case of shareholdings in Dutch resident companies of at least 
5% and in the absence of abuse. Sovereign wealth investors which would not have been subject to Dutch 
corporate income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are not covered by Art. 4(2) DDWTA 
1965. 
 
In 2017, Art. 4 DDWTA 1965 did not apply to third country situations. This restriction in relation to third 
countries should be covered by the standstill provision, but only to the extent that it concerns direct 
investments.1056 Art. 4 DDWTA 1965 could, however, conflict with the freedom of capital movement in case of 
portfolio investments that would qualify for the participation exemption.1057 In 2018, Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965 
applies in relation to shareholders from third countries, under conditions similar to intra-EU/EEA situations, 
provided they are tax resident in a country with which the Netherlands has concluded a tax treaty containing 
a dividend article. Therefore, in third country situations, sovereign wealth investors which: (i) would have 
been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, (ii) are tax 
resident in a country with which the Netherlands has concluded a tax treaty containing a dividend article, and 
(iii) own a shareholding in a Dutch company of at least 5%, could be entitled to an exemption from Dutch 
dividend withholding tax, as from 1 January 2018, based on Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965. Art. 4 DDWTA 1965 
(new) could still conflict with the freedom of capital movement in third country, non-tax treaty situations 
involving portfolio investments that would qualify for the participation exemption. 
 
Withholding tax refund regime for non-resident entities which are not subject to corporation tax   
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, sovereign wealth investors which would not have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are entitled to a refund of dividend withholding 
tax under Art. 10(2) DDWTA 1965, and vice versa, provided they are not subject to a profit tax in their country 
of residence, and regardless of the size of the shareholding. This requirement of not being subject to a profit 
tax locally is not in accordance with EU law, in the author’s view.1058 
 
In third country situations, sovereign wealth investors which would not have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are entitled to a refund of dividend withholding 
tax under Art. 10(3) DDWTA 1965 if: (i) they are not subject to a profit tax in their country of residence, (ii) 
they are resident of a country with which sufficient means for the exchange of information are available, and 
(iii) the shareholding in a Dutch resident company qualifies as a ‘portfolio investment’1059 (i.e. shareholdings 
which do not enable the shareholder to participate effectively in the management and control of the 
                                                             
1056 Section 6.3.2.3.3. 
1057 Similarly, J. van Eijsden, B. Kiekebeld & D. Smit (eds.), Nederlands belastingrecht in Europees perspectief, 2nd edn., 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 2014), p. 192. 
1058 Ibid., p. 195. 
1059 The concept of portfolio investment and direct investment was discussed in Section 6.3.2.3.2. 
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company). As indicated in Section 7.5.3.3.1, in the author’s view, the first requirement is not in accordance 
with EU law. In addition, the second requirement needs to be refined1060. The third requirement is based on 
the standstill provision and means that the size of the shareholding could be relevant. Although being based 
on the standstill, the ‘portfolio investment’ requirement may carry the risk of constituting State aid in relation 
to Dutch resident investors, because they would be entitled to a refund in case of ‘direct investments’.  
 
Withholding tax refund regime for legal persons of public law and legal persons of private law owned by a legal 
person of public law 
 
In both intra-EU/EEA situations and third country situations, sovereign wealth investors which would have 
been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, should probably 
not be entitled to a refund of dividend withholding tax under Art. 10(5) DDWTA 1965, because the income is 
often not taxed in their country of residence1061 and/or because Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969 are unlikely 
applicable to sovereign wealth investors1062. Art. 10(5) DDWTA 1965 cannot apply to sovereign wealth 
investors which would not have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they had been tax resident in 
the Netherlands. 
 
Withholding tax refund regime for non-resident individuals and non-resident entities faced with a higher Dutch 
tax burden 
 
In intra-EU/EEA situations, sovereign wealth investors which would have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, should unlikely be entitled to a refund of dividend 
withholding tax under Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965 in case of shareholdings in Dutch companies of less than 5%, 
because directly linked expenses would need to be more than 40% of the taxable dividend income. As 
explained, in case of shareholdings of at least 5%, such sovereign wealth investors would already be covered 
by the dividend withholding exemption of Art. 4(2) DDWTA 1965. In intra-EU/EEA situations, sovereign 
wealth investors which would not have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they had been tax 
resident in the Netherlands, could also be entitled to a full refund under Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965, but they 
will likely already be entitled to a refund under Art. 10(2) DDWTA 1965 (unless they are subject to a profit tax 
in their country of residence)1063.  
 
In third country situations, sovereign wealth investors which would have been subject to Dutch corporate 
income tax if they had been tax resident in the Netherlands, may be entitled to a refund of dividend 
withholding tax under Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965, in particular in case of shareholdings in Dutch companies of 
at least 5% not covered by the withholding exemption regime. As explained, in case of shareholdings of at 
least 5%, a resident for corporate income tax purposes would have been entitled to the participation 
exemption, resulting in no corporation income taxation on the dividend income and, therefore, in a lower tax 
burden than the dividend withholding tax burden for these sovereign wealth investors. In case of 
shareholdings of less than 5%, the directly linked expenses would need to be more than 40% of the taxable 
dividend income to be able to benefit from Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965. It is noted that a shareholding of at least 
5% would still need to qualify as a ‘portfolio investment’, and the sovereign wealth investors needs to be a 
resident of a country with which sufficient means for the exchange of information are available.1064 Although 
                                                             
1060 See Section 6.3.4.3, where it was argued that a Member State should not be able rely on the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary information. 
1061 See Section 2.10. 
1062 See the discussion in Section 7.5.2.6.1. 
1063 Note that Art. 10a(1) DDWTA 1965 effectively sets aside the condition in Art. 10(2) DDWTA 1965 that a non-
resident investor should be subject to a profit tax in its country of residence. 
1064 Section 7.5.3.3.3. 
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the requirement of ‘portfolio investment’ is based on the standstill provision, it may carry the risk of 
constituting State aid in relation to Dutch resident investors, because they could have been entitled to a 
refund in case of ‘direct investments’. As explained in Section 6.3.4.3, the information exchange requirement 
needs to be refined, in the author’s view.1065 In third country situations, sovereign wealth investors which 
would not have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax could also be entitled to a full refund under Art. 
10a(2) DDWTA 1965, but they will likely already be entitled to a refund under Art. 10(3) DDWTA 1965 
(unless they are subject to a profit tax in their country of residence).1066 
 
In summary, sovereign wealth investors which would have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they 
had been tax resident in the Netherlands, are (likely) not entitled to an exemption or refund of Dutch dividend 
withholding tax under the DDWTA 1965, in the following situations: 
 
- sovereign wealth investors resident inside and outside the EU/EEA with shareholdings in Dutch 
companies of less than 5%, because the directly related expenses will unlikely account for more than 
40% of the dividend income; 
- sovereign wealth investors resident outside the EU/EEA in a non-tax treaty country and owning a 
shareholding in a Dutch company of at least 5% which qualifies as ‘direct investment’; 
- sovereign wealth investors resident outside the EU/EEA in a non-tax treaty country and owning a 
shareholding in a Dutch company of at least 5% which qualifies as ‘portfolio investment’, in case the 
sovereign wealth investor is resident of a country with which no sufficient means for the exchange of 
information are available. 
 
Sovereign wealth investors which would not have been subject to Dutch corporate income tax if they had been 
tax resident in the Netherlands, are not entitled to an exemption or refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax 
under the DDWTA 1965, in the following situations: 
 
- sovereign wealth investors resident outside the EU/EEA with shareholdings in Dutch companies of at 
least 5% which qualify as ‘direct investment’; 
- sovereign wealth investors resident outside the EU/EEA with shareholdings in Dutch companies of at 
least 5% which qualify as ‘portfolio investment’, in case the sovereign wealth investor is either 
resident of a country with which no sufficient means for the exchange of information are available, or 
entitled to a full deduction of the Dutch dividend withholding tax in its country of residence pursuant 
to a tax treaty concluded between the Netherlands and the country of residence. 
 
7.5.3.5 Conclusion 
 
In domestic situations, the withholding tax exemption and withholding tax refund apply if the dividend 
income is not taxed at the level of the Dutch shareholder, either because the shareholder is subjectively 
exempt from Dutch corporate income tax, or because the dividend income is exempt from Dutch corporate 
income tax under the participation exemption or Art. 8e or 8f DCITA 1969. In these situations, the dividend 
withholding tax has lost its function as an advance levy. Put differently, whether the dividend withholding tax 
has a function as an advance levy for entities, depends on the Dutch corporate income tax status or treatment 
of such entities. The withholding tax exemption regime and withholding tax refund regime have been 
gradually extended to non-resident investors over the years, mainly under the influence of EU law. For many 
non-resident entities, the Dutch dividend withholding tax does not function as an advance levy to be offset 
                                                             
1065 In Section 6.3.4.3, it was argued that a Member State should not be able rely on the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision if a third State would be willing to voluntarily provide the necessary information. 
1066 Note that Art. 10a(2) DDWTA 1965 effectively sets aside the condition in Art. 10(3) DDWTA 1965 that a non-
resident investor should be subject to a profit tax in its country of residence. 
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against Dutch corporate income tax, because the dividend income of many non-resident entities is not subject 
to Dutch corporate income tax. This could be an argument not to impose dividend withholding tax at all in 
such situations.  
 
The technique followed in the DDWTA 1965 is to connect the application of the exemption and refund regime 
for non-resident investors to the Dutch corporate income tax status or treatment if they would have been tax 
resident in the Netherlands. Therefore, the conclusion that was reached in Section 7.5.2.7 in the context of the 
DCITA 1969, similarly applies in the context of the DDWTA 1965: sovereign wealth investors established as or 
within a legal person of public law should be objectively comparable to other legal persons of public law, but 
not to other categories of investors, whereas sovereign wealth investors established as a legal person of 
private law should be objectively comparable to other similar legal persons of private law, but not to other 
categories of investors. However, with respect to investors resident outside the EU/EEA in a non-tax treaty 
country, the Netherlands does not accord national treatment in case of ‘direct investments’ (based on the 
standstill provision of Art. 64(1) TFEU), or in case of ‘portfolio investments’ under the conditions mentioned 
above. As a result of the technique followed in the DDWTA 1965, the dividend withholding tax treatment 
could differ among sovereign wealth investors, depending on their legal form and activities, as well as their 
place of residence and type of shareholding. It could, furthermore, result in sovereign wealth investors being 
taxed more favourably, but also less favourably, than other categories of investors, in the context of the 
DDWTA 1965. However, to the extent that these differences result from the technique of connecting to the 
DCITA 1969, they should not be in conflict with EU law, because this technique ensures that the dividend 
withholding tax treatment of non-resident investors is, in general, similar to that of resident and other non-
resident investors in similar circumstances. Such differences in treatment, therefore, concern situations which 
are not objectively comparable in the context of the DDWTA 1965.  
With respect to the remaining differences, the standstill provision (relied on in Arts. 4(2), 10(3), 10(5) 
and 10a(2) DDWTA 1965) allows the Netherlands to refuse national treatment to sovereign wealth investors 
resident in third countries, in case of ‘direct investments’. Although this may carry the risk of constituting 
State aid in relation to Dutch resident investors, because they could be entitled to an exemption or refund, it 
would have no negative impact on the ability of the Netherlands to pursue international attractiveness in 
relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors through the DDWTA 1965.  
In case of ‘portfolio investments’, the Netherlands should not, in the author’s view, be able to rely on 
the need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision if a third country would be willing to voluntarily 
provide the necessary information (Arts. 10(3), 10(5) and 10a(2) DDWTA 1965). Furthermore, the 
requirement of not being subject to a profit tax locally (relied on in Art. 10(2)-(3) DDWTA 1965) is not in 
accordance with EU law, in the author’s view. In addition, Art. 4 DDWTA 1965 (new) could conflict with the 
freedom of capital movement in third country, non-tax treaty situations involving ‘portfolio investments’ that 
would qualify for the participation exemption. All these restrictive conditions would need to be removed or 
amended, and would likely have a positive, rather than a negative impact on the international attractiveness 
of the Netherlands for foreign sovereign wealth investors.  
 
Considering the above, European law should not impose restrictions on the Netherlands to the extent that it 
currently pursues international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors through the 
DDWTA 1965. However, the comparability analysis indicates that, if the Netherlands wishes to increase 
international attractiveness for sovereign wealth investors in the future, by means of the DDWTA 1965, the 
fundamental freedoms could impose restrictions in intra-EU/EEA situations (because it could constitute 
horizontal discrimination), whereas the State aid rules could impose restrictions in both intra-EU/EEA and 
third country situations (because it could constitute reverse and horizontal discrimination). 
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7.5.4 Dutch tax treaties 
 
7.5.4.1 General 
 
In line with Dutch tax treaty policy, sovereign wealth investors of tax treaty partners of the Netherlands are 
very often entitled to an exemption or reduction of Dutch source taxation on dividends. Reference is made to 
the Dutch tax treaties discussed in the Appendix. In Chapter 6, it was concluded that tax treaty benefits 
accorded by a Member State to (one or more) foreign sovereign wealth investors and resulting in more 
favourable treatment as compared to resident investors of that Member State (i.e. reverse discrimination), 
should not constitute discrimination under the freedoms,1067 but it may constitute State aid under rather 
strict circumstances1068. The same conclusion applies in case of tax treaty benefits accorded to (one or more) 
foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to other non-resident investors (i.e. horizontal discrimination). To 
be clear, the implications of tax treaty benefits for the selectivity test under State aid rules are currently 
unclear.1069 To date, this issue has not reached the CJEU. The fact remains that the State aid rules are not 
identical to the fundamental freedoms. Differences are, therefore, possible, and it cannot be excluded that tax 
treaty benefits could be selective in a State aid context. Assuming that tax treaty benefits can indeed amount 
to State aid, application of the State aid rules would then require a sovereign wealth investor to qualify as an 
active investor.1070 It would also require such sovereign wealth investors to be treated more favourably than 
other economic operators which are comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system.  
 
7.5.4.2 Selectivity 
 
In case of reverse discrimination based on a tax treaty, Dutch domestic tax law is the reference system,1071 and 
the analysis in Sections 7.5.2.6 and 7.5.3.4 above can be used. This analysis indicates that, for Dutch tax 
purposes, sovereign wealth investors established as or within a legal person of public law should be 
objectively comparable to another legal persons of public law, whereas sovereign wealth investors 
established as a legal person of private law should be objectively comparable to other similar legal persons of 
private law. Dividends paid to such comparable resident investors may be subject to Dutch corporation 
income tax and dividend withholding tax, whereas sovereign wealth investors may be entitled to a general 
exemption of Dutch taxation on dividends pursuant to a tax treaty, for example under the tax treaties with the 
U.A.E., Oman and Norway (discussed in the Appendix). Without these general tax treaty based exemptions, 
dividends paid to sovereign wealth investors may have been subject to Dutch dividend withholding tax under 
the DDWTA 1965, as the analysis in Section 7.5.3.4 demonstrates. Therefore, general tax treaty based 
exemptions may not be justified by the nature or general scheme of the (reference) system. Nor can they be 
justified by the need to avoid international double taxation if sovereign wealth investors are not taxed in their 
home State. Instead, general tax treaty based exemptions accorded to sovereign wealth investors are most 
often aimed at attracting investments from these investors, and could, therefore, be selective. Nonetheless, 
since tax treaty provisions are generally not aimed at specific investment targets (as potential indirect 
beneficiaries),1072 the State aid rules should only come into play if these sovereign wealth investors would 
qualify as active investors, and if the tax treaty benefit would be more than the de minimis threshold of EUR 
200,000 over any period of three fiscal years. In the author’s view, it is not entirely clear how the tax treaty 
benefit should be calculated; though it would seem to make sense to take into account (non-selective) 
entitlements that exist under the DDWTA 1965. 
                                                             
1067 Section 6.3.3.2 
1068 Section 6.4.4. 
1069 See the discussion in Section 6.4.4.2.3. 
1070 Section 6.4.4.2.2. 
1071 L. De Broe, “Can Tax Treaties Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228, p. 229. 
1072 See the discussion in Section 6.4.4.3.2. 
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In case of horizontal discrimination based on a tax treaty, the tax treaty as a whole or a particular tax treaty 
provision should be the reference system.1073 In the author’s view, the more limited (defined) a tax treaty 
benefit becomes in terms of eligible persons, the greater the chance it no longer reflects a generally accepted 
allocation of taxing rights, and could be considered selective. Generous tax-exemptions accorded to sovereign 
wealth investors under tax treaties carry the risk of being selective, in particular if they are limited to (a) 
selected (group of) investors and deviate significantly from a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights as 
expressed in the OECD and UN MTC, as well as general Dutch tax treaty policy. In this regard, the tax treaties 
between the Netherlands and the U.A.E., Oman and Norway (discussed in the Appendix) catch the eye. 
Nonetheless, since tax treaty provisions are generally not aimed at specific investment targets (as potential 
indirect beneficiaries),1074 the State aid rules could typically only come into play if the relevant sovereign 
wealth investors would qualify as active investors, and if the tax treaty benefit would be more than the de 
minimis threshold of EUR 200,000 over any period of three fiscal years. In the author’s view, it is not entirely 
clear how the tax treaty benefit should be calculated; though it would seem to make sense to take into account 
(non-selective) entitlements that exist under the DDWTA 1965.  
 
The EC shall not require recovery of the aid if this would be contrary to a general principle of Union law.1075 In 
Section 6.4.4.2.1, it was noted, however, that it is unclear whether immunity from measures of constraint, as 
an element of the customary international law principle of sovereign immunity, can be regarded as a general 
principle of Union law. Depending on the answer to that question, immunity from measures of constraint 
could prevent a Member State to recover fiscal State aid granted to a foreign sovereign wealth investor.  
 
7.5.4.3 Conclusion 
 
The Netherlands mainly pursues international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors 
through tax treaties. Tax treaty based benefits accorded by the Netherlands to sovereign wealth investors, in 
deviation from (non-selective) entitlements under domestic law or from a generally accepted allocation of 
taxing rights, carry the risk of being selective, and may, therefore, constitute State aid. Thus, European law, 
notably the State aid rules, may, under rather strict circumstances, (have) impose(d) restrictions on the 
Netherlands’ ability to pursue international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
Nonetheless, the analysis in this section indicates that, if the Netherlands wishes to grant (further) tax 
benefits to (other) foreign sovereign wealth investors in the future, but not to other (comparable) investors, it 
would probably still be best to continue do so through tax treaties as much as possible. However, the 
downside of implementing a tax policy through tax treaties is that it may leave little leeway to give effect to a 
tax policy change. Tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into 
force, it will generally apply for a long period of time.   
 
7.6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the conceptual framework as developed in Chapters 3 to 6 has been applied to the 
Netherlands, as an illustration. After a review of Dutch international tax policy principles and objectives, it 
was concluded that the Netherlands largely adheres to the objective of international tax attractiveness vis-à-
vis sovereign wealth investors. This policy appears particularly from Dutch tax treaties, which often provide 
extensive tax benefits to sovereign wealth investors of the other contracting State. Given the tension with 
inter-taxpayer equity, as an expression of the fundamental value of fairness, a separate, more detailed and in-
                                                             
1073 L. De Broe, “Can Tax Treaties Confer State Aid?” (2017) 26 EC Tax Review 228, p. 230-231. 
1074 See the discussion in Section 6.4.4.3.2. 
1075 Art. 16(1) of the Procedural Regulation. 
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depth analysis for each favourable tax treaty provision regarding sovereign wealth investors would have been 
appropriate, in the author’s view. 
 
Nonetheless, given the primacy of international attractiveness as a Dutch tax policy objective in relation to 
sovereign wealth investors, the conceptual framework was primarily used in this chapter to answer the 
following question: What impact, if any, does international law have on the Netherlands’ ability to achieve (or 
promote) international tax attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? In this respect, the 
impact of the sovereign immunity principle, OECD MTC based treaties and European law was considered.  
 
Based on Chapters 4 and 5, it was concluded that neither the sovereign immunity principle, nor OECD based 
treaties concluded by the Netherlands have (had) a (negative) impact on the ability of the Netherlands to 
pursue international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors.   
 
European law should not impose restrictions on the Netherlands to the extent that it currently pursues 
international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors through the DDWTA 1965 (or 
the DCITA 1969). However, the Netherlands mainly pursues international attractiveness through tax treaties. 
Tax treaty based benefits accorded by the Netherlands to sovereign wealth investors, in deviation from (non-
selective) entitlements under domestic law or from a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights, carry the 
risk of being selective, and may, therefore, constitute State aid. Thus, European law, notably the State aid 
rules, may, under rather strict circumstances, (have) impose(d) restrictions on the Netherlands’ ability to 
pursue international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors. Nonetheless, if the 
Netherlands wishes to grant (further) tax benefits to (other) foreign sovereign wealth investors in the future, 
but not to other (comparable) investors, it would probably still be best to continue to do so through tax 
treaties as much as possible. However, the downside of implementing a tax policy through tax treaties is that 
it may leave little leeway to give effect to a tax policy change. Tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or 
unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time.   
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Chapter 8 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
8.1. Introduction to this study 
 
In more recent years, an increasing number of States have entered the marketplace looking to invest 
government funds in domestic and, even more so, foreign assets. Their investments are, more often than not, 
structured through special purpose investment funds or arrangements, known as SWFs (sovereign wealth 
funds), or investment entities owned by SWFs, known as SWEs (sovereign wealth enterprises). The total value 
of assets under the management of SWFs and SWEs – together referred to as ‘sovereign wealth investors’ in 
this study – is currently estimated at US$ 7,6 trillion (February), which is an increase from US$ 5,8 trillion as 
in March 2012 and US$ 3,9 trillion as in March 2008. This development of States acting as investors, managing 
the wealth of a nation, and competing in the marketplace with other (private) investors, raises many 
interesting questions in various fields. This study is concerned with international tax aspects of sovereign 
wealth investors. 
 
SWFs and their ‘local’ SWEs1076 are generally not taxed in their home State, whereas income (including capital 
gains) derived from another State may be taxed in that investment recipient State (“the source State”). The 
more tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor pays in a source State, the smaller the return and revenue 
available to its home State. Therefore, this study primarily focuses on international income tax aspects of 
sovereign wealth investors, from a source State perspective. But that does not mean that the tax treatment of 
sovereign wealth investors in their home State cannot be relevant to the international tax analysis of such 
investors, from the viewpoint of a source State. Thus, the home State tax treatment of sovereign wealth 
investors is also considered. 
 
In recent years, sovereign wealth investors have established themselves as an important class of investors 
and will continue to be so. They are widely regarded as a separate group of investors in various fields of law, 
including international investment law and international tax law, by academics and policymakers. Addressing 
sovereign wealth investors separately from other investor groups can essentially be traced back to the 
following developments and distinctive features. First, sovereign wealth investors own and invest extreme 
amounts of money, and their investment activity increases rapidly. They have increased in both number and 
size and will continue to look for cross-border investment opportunities in the years to come. Second, 
sovereign wealth investors are owned, controlled and funded by States. This link has not only raised political 
and security concerns in source States, but also raises questions as to the scope of the international law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Based on this doctrine, a foreign State, and its entities, can be held immune 
from the jurisdiction or enforcement power of a source State. A number of source States also apply the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity to taxation. By its nature, this doctrine cannot apply to other investor groups. 
In addition, the fact that sovereign wealth investors are owned, controlled and funded by States, means that 
the home State tax treatment of such investors is based on a different rationale, compared to the tax 
treatment accorded by home States to other groups of resident investors, such as pension funds and collective 
investment vehicles. A third reason for addressing sovereign wealth investors separately, may be found in a 
recent investment trend concerning this group of investors. Whereas sovereign wealth investors traditionally 
invested as passive investors, for example in listed shares or government bonds (portfolio investments), they 
are increasingly operating as active investors by making long-term investments, for example in real estate, 
                                                             
1076 A ‘local’ SWE of an SWF is an SWE which has been established in the same State as the SWF which owns the SWE. 
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infrastructure and private companies (direct investments). This move from traditional asset classes to 
alternative (less liquid) assets is, to a large extent, driven by the current economic environment of low 
interest rates and slow economic growth. 
 
Given the increasing significance of sovereign wealth investors and taking into account their distinctive 
features, source States may wish to introduce new tax policy, or evaluate or reconsider their existing tax 
policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors. The purpose of this study is to assist source States in doing 
so, by developing a conceptual framework. 
 
This study uses two main ingredients to develop the conceptual framework: (i) international tax policy 
principles and objectives, and (ii) international law. Basic principles and objectives often underlie a State’s 
international tax policy and its international tax rules design. A State’s international tax policy choices, and the 
underlying basic principles and objectives, may depend on various factors – such as the size and nature of its 
economy, public interests, societal values, as well as tax policy choices of other States – and may change over 
time. International tax policy principles and objectives can serve as a useful and important starting point for 
source States when introducing new tax policy or reconsidering existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign 
wealth investors. This study identifies as today’s three main ‘substantive’ attributes of international tax 
policy: (i) neutrality (efficiency), (ii) equity (fairness), and (iii) international attractiveness. It discusses and 
presents the key theoretical implications of these policy principles and objectives for the design of 
international tax rules, focusing on foreign sovereign wealth investors. This presentation is then used to 
measure approaches to source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors by their neutrality, equity and 
international attractiveness. Before being able to do so, it was necessary to consider the taxation of foreign 
sovereign wealth investors by source States, and how such taxation compared to the taxation of other investor 
groups, such as collective investment vehicles and pension funds. This comparison put things into perspective 
and is relevant for the international law analysis, the second main ingredient. 
 
International law may impact the ability of source States to achieve tax policy objectives. Because of the 
obligations it can impose on a source State in the field of taxation, international law could restrict or limit, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a source State’s sovereign power (i.e. its ability) to implement (or promote) a tax 
policy principle. So, this study examines and, sometimes, explores its possible impact on source States’ ability 
to achieve tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors. With respect to the 
international law analyses, this study considers the (possible) impact of: (1) the sovereign immunity principle, 
(2) tax treaties, and (3) European law. 
 
The approach of measuring a source State’s tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors against the 
three main ‘substantive’ attributes of international tax policy, and examining the possible impact international 
law could have on achieving tax policy objectives based on these attributes, produces the conceptual 
framework. 
 
The central question in this study is as follows:  
 
What impact, if any, does international law have on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax 
policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? 
 
This question is answered by discussing the following five sub-questions in Chapters 2 to 6: 
 
1. Who are sovereign wealth investors, why do they exist, what do they do, what (legal) forms can they 
take, and what is their home State tax status? (Chapter 2) 
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2. How do source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors (in comparison to other investors), and 
how does such taxation relate to generally accepted attributes of international tax policy? (Chapter 3) 
 
3. What impact, if any, does the sovereign immunity principle have on source States’ ability to achieve 
tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? (Chapter 4) 
 
4. What impact, if any, do tax treaties (in particular those based on the OECD and UN Model) have on 
source States’ ability to achieve tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? 
(Chapter 5) 
 
5. What impact, if any, does European law have on source States’ ability to achieve tax policy objectives 
in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? (Chapter 6) 
 
In Chapter 7, the conceptual framework as developed in Chapters 3 to 6 is applied to the Netherlands, as an 
illustration. 
 
8.2. Sovereign wealth investors 
 
A first purpose of Chapter 2 is to come to a working definition of SWFs and SWEs, to use throughout this 
study. A second purpose is to get a better understanding of sovereign wealth investors. As SWEs are merely a 
component of some SWFs, Chapter 2 mainly focuses on SWFs. The main findings are summarized below. 
 
Purpose of SWFs. Most SWFs are either established to save funds for future generations by converting non-
renewable resources into assets from which future income streams can be derived or to cover for liabilities 
that may arise from fluctuations of commodity prices. Other SWFs are established because of a projected 
shortfall in the public pension system or simply to increase the returns on reserve assets. It should be noted 
that the objectives of SWFs could be multiple, overlapping or changing over time. 
 
Definition of SWFs. No universal definition of SWFs exists. This study adopts the definition of SWFs as 
formulated by the IWG. This definition is widely-followed, has been reflected in the OECD Commentary and 
captures the common characteristics which distinguish SWFs from other groups of investors. The definition is 
as follows: 
 
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or arrangements, owned by the general 
government. Created by the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs hold, manage, or 
administer assets to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies which 
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are commonly established out of balance of 
payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal 
surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from commodity exports.” 
 
SWEs. SWFs sometimes structure investments through separate wholly-owned and controlled investment 
vehicles, known as SWEs. They do so for a variety of reasons, such as allowing greater flexibility, avoiding 
public spotlight, creating an efficient tax structure, avoiding being categorized as SWF and centralizing 
specific investment activities. SWEs can be established in the home State of an SWF or in other States. 
 
Investment trend. Mainly driven by the current economic environment of low interest rates and slow 
economic growth, sovereign wealth investors are increasingly proactive and no longer just operate as passive 
(portfolio) investors. As active investors, they increasingly make foreign direct investments including long-
term investments in real estate, infrastructure and private companies.  
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Legal forms. Sovereign wealth investors can have different legal forms and governance structures. Based on 
their legal form, they can be divided as follows: 
 
(i) Sovereign wealth investors constituted by a pool of assets within the State (which includes a 
pool of assets forming a unit within a central bank that has no separate legal personality); 
 
(ii) Sovereign wealth investors established as or within a separate legal entity other than the 
State itself (comprising SWFs and SWEs established as a separate legal entity under public 
law or company law, as well as SWFs constituted by a pool of assets within a central bank that 
has a separate legal personality); 
 
(iii) Sovereign wealth investors organized as a (legal) entity without a separate legal personality, 
such as partnerships (comprising SWEs organized in such manner).     
 
This distinction between sovereign wealth investors according to their legal form is relevant for other parts of 
this study, such as Chapter 5 (regarding the application of tax treaties) and Chapter 6 (regarding the personal 
scope of the freedom of capital movement in the EEA Agreement and the freedom of establishment). 
 
Home State tax status of sovereign wealth investors. Sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in 
their home State, because taxation of such investors is seen as superfluous. There are, however, a few 
exceptions to this rule. Since creating a level-playing field would generally not be in a home State’s own 
interest, the few home States that do impose tax on sovereign wealth investors, would either seem to be 
dealing with an agency problem, or simply use taxation as a substitute for extracting profits through 
(dividend) distributions. The tax treatment of sovereign wealth investors in their home State could be 
relevant for the international tax analysis of such investors, from a source State perspective. 
 
8.3. Tax policy considerations and approaches to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
8.3.1 Introduction 
 
Approaches to source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors 
 
The main purpose of Chapter 3 is to discuss tax policy considerations and to measure source States’ tax 
treatment of foreign sovereign wealth investors against generally accepted attributes of international tax 
policy. To that end, Chapter 3 first identifies five approaches to taxation of (some) foreign sovereign wealth 
investors by source States. They are as follows: 
 
(1) taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate 
investors. 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative 
practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
 
These approaches are referred to as Approaches (1) to (5) in this study. 
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International tax policy attributes 
 
Chapter 3 identifies as today’s three main attributes of international tax policy: (i) neutrality (efficiency), (ii) 
equity (fairness) and (iii) international attractiveness. These ‘substantive’ policy attributes should be 
distinguished from ‘procedural’ policy principles. The latter imply that: 
 
 tax laws should be clear, simple and certain; 
 tax policy should be stable, i.e. changes to the rules should be kept to a minimum, changes should be 
justified and this justification and its underlying policy should be made public, while policy shocks 
should be avoided; 
 tax policy should be practicable, in the sense that the tax liability should be easy to calculate, and easy 
and cheap to collect.  
 
A source State should also consider procedural policy principles when introducing new tax policy or 
reconsidering existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors. These policy principles are, 
however, not further considered in this study, because they do not offer insights as to how foreign sovereign 
wealth investors should be taxed (in substantive terms) from a source State perspective. 
 
Approaches (1) to (5) are measured by their neutrality, equity and international attractiveness. The meaning 
of these concepts and the main findings of this exercise are summarized below. 
 
8.3.2 Neutrality (efficiency) 
 
Tax neutrality theories are economic theories believed to increase economic efficiency and welfare. Tax 
neutrality is achieved when economic decisions are not (or, at least, as little as possible) distorted by taxation. 
In an international context, tax neutrality, known as international tax neutrality, is said to promote an efficient 
allocation of global capital, thus promoting global welfare. This study considers three international tax 
neutrality benchmarks: capital export neutrality (CEN), capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital ownership 
neutrality (CON). 
 
8.3.2.1 Capital export neutrality 
 
CEN addresses a State taxing in a residence capacity and promotes neutrality with respect to the location of 
investment. A tax system is said to achieve CEN when tax considerations do not influence a resident investor’s 
decision between investing in its home market or abroad (i.e. export neutral). This requires resident investors 
to face the same tax burden on their domestic and outbound investments. CEN implies a tax system of 
worldwide taxation with a full credit for foreign taxes (residence-based taxation). There is no consensus in 
literature on whether CEN is relevant for the taxation of non-resident investors (i.e. foreign inbound 
investments). Some authors argue that CEN implies no taxation of non-resident investors, while others argue 
that CEN appears to have nothing to do with the taxation of non-resident investors. In the present author’s 
view, CEN is as such not concerned with a State taxing in a source capacity; CEN does not tell a source State to 
tax or to forgo tax in relation to non-resident investors. In fact, ‘pure’ CEN would even require a State acting in 
a resident capacity to refund foreign source taxation to the extent it exceeds residence taxation (i.e. the 
responsibility to achieve export neutrality rests with the residence State, as opposed to the source State). 
 
Although the present author does not consider CEN as such to be concerned with the taxation of non-resident 
investors, this neutrality concept could provide an argument for a source State not to tax income derived by 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. As explained, foreign sovereign wealth investors are generally not taxed in 
their residence State. Source State taxation of tax-exempt non-resident investors could distort neutrality with 
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respect to the investment location, i.e. it could result in tax-exempt investors favouring domestic investments 
over foreign investments. In order to promote export neutrality, a source State could consider to exempt from 
source taxation investment income derived by foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident tax-
exempt investors. It could accord such treatment unilaterally or through tax treaties. 
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5), under which source States grant a general or specific tax-
exemptions to (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors, either unilaterally or through tax treaties, could be 
motivated by referring to promoting CEN. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source States tax 
foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, does not 
promote CEN, unless taxation in the same way means no taxation at all.  
 
8.3.2.2 Capital import neutrality  
 
CIN is the flipside of CEN and promotes neutrality with respect to the location of investors, rather than the 
location of investment. A tax system is said to achieve CIN when tax considerations do not influence which 
investor, that is, a resident or non-resident investor, makes which investment in one particular State (i.e. 
import neutral). CIN implies a territorial (or source-based) tax system rather than a residence-based tax 
system; in other words, a tax system which exempts foreign sourced income and treats domestic sourced 
income of resident and non-resident investors in the same way. In this respect, the characteristics of investors 
and place of residence are irrelevant. CIN simply requires equal tax treatment of investors that perform the 
same level of investment activities in a source State. There is no consensus in literature on whether CIN is 
relevant for portfolio investments, i.e. investments that give the investor little or no control over business 
activities. Some authors argue that CIN is not relevant for portfolio investments because such investments, as 
opposed to direct investments, have no, or at most a small, influence on the location of plant and equipment 
and therefore productivity. According to the present author, as explained in Section 3.4.3.1, where portfolio 
capital is not widely available, portfolio investments could also influence the location of business activity. In 
addition, the distinction between direct investment and portfolio investment, although analytically helpful, is 
not always clear in practice. For these reasons, CIN is considered in this study without distinguishing between 
direct investments and portfolio investments. 
 
In the author’s view, equal tax treatment as prescribed by CIN also requires neutrality with respect to the type 
of investment activity, e.g. an investment in loans, shares or immovable property. In other words, the decision 
to invest in e.g. loans, shares or immovable property should not be influenced by tax considerations. This 
would require investors with an equal level of investment income from a source State to face equal source 
State tax burdens, irrespective of the composition of the investment income. 
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)1077 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors cannot be explained by CIN, because they could result in different tax treatment among foreign 
sovereign wealth investors, and between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other (resident and non-
resident) investors, both individuals and companies. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source 
States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, 
could be motivated by CIN.  
  
                                                             
1077 As identified in Section 3.2.2.2. Approaches (2) to (5) are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
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8.3.2.3 Capital ownership neutrality  
 
The basic assumption underlying CON is that productivity of capital (assets) varies depending on the investor 
(owner). Tax systems satisfy CON if they do not distort ownership patterns. CON is relevant with respect to 
direct investments – active investments giving the investor influence on the business decisions and, therefore, 
productivity–, but not so much with respect to portfolio investments – passive investments not giving the 
investor influence on productivity. CON is achieved when each investor retains the same proportion of the 
before-tax return across (the candidate and alternative) investments. It does not matter when different 
investors retain different proportions of the before-tax returns, as long as each investor retains the same 
proportion across investments. Whether this standard is satisfied in an international setting, depends on the 
interplay of tax systems, the outcome of which is driven by various connected factors, such as tax rates, the 
location of investments, the location of investors and the nature of the investments. Although the theory 
behind CON is clear, it was argued that in today’s global economy, where investment assets are located in 
numerous States which may tax investors in different ways at different rates, this neutrality concept has little, 
if any, practical meaning. And so it is not further considered in this study. 
 
8.3.3 Equity (fairness)     
 
Equity is a moral concept, derived from justice (fairness), and an important tax policy principle. It has two 
main elements in a tax policy context: inter-nation equity and inter-taxpayer equity. Inter-nation equity is 
concerned with a fair (equitable) allocation of national gain (and loss) between States with respect to cross-
border activities. On the other hand, inter-taxpayer equity is concerned with a fair (equitable) allocation of tax 
obligations between taxpayers.  
 
8.3.3.1 Inter-taxpayer  
 
Inter-taxpayer equity has two main elements: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity requires 
that taxpayers who are equals pay equal amounts of tax, whereas vertical equity, in essence, requires that 
taxpayers who are not equals be taxed differently taking into account their differences. Inter-taxpayer equity, 
as an expression of the fundamental value of fairness, should be an important (international) policy principle 
in every democracy under the rule of law. 
 
Two theories have dominated discussions on inter-taxpayer equity: the ability-to-pay theory and the benefit 
theory. Under the ability-to-pay theory, each taxpayer should pay tax in accordance with its ability to pay; 
taxpayers with greater abilities should pay more tax than taxpayers with lesser abilities, while taxpayers with 
equal abilities should pay an equal amount of tax. Ability-to-pay theory in taxation has become associated 
with theories of distributive justice, i.e. the re-distribution of goods and welfare between persons within a 
society through taxation. As it was argued that the practical relevance of the ability-to-pay theory is limited to 
residents, the focus was on the benefit principle. The benefit theory, which, unlike the ability-to-pay theory, is 
relevant for the taxation of both residents and non-residents, requires that each taxpayer should pay tax in 
accordance with its level of benefit from governmental goods and services. From this general rule, three, more 
practical, rules of thumb can be derived which are relevant for the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors, from a source State perspective. The first rule is that a source State should generally not tax non-
resident investors less favourably than resident investors when performing the same investment activities in 
and earning the same level of income from that source State. It may, in such circumstances, even require non-
resident investors to be taxed more favourably than resident investors. The second rule is that a source State 
should treat and tax all non-resident investors as equals when they perform the same investment activities in 
and earn the same level of income from that source State (i.e. horizontal non-discriminatory treatment). The 
third rule, which applies to both the first and second rule, is that forgoing taxation would not make sense from 
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a benefit perspective, since residents and non-residents that perform investment activities in the source State 
always benefit from public goods and services to some extent.  
 
Conceptually, the benefit principle could demand a source State to differentiate between different categories 
of income if it can be demonstrated that different asset classes benefit differently from public goods and 
services. However, from a practical point of view, not differentiating between different categories of income is 
understandable. The benefit principle could, in addition, demand a source State to differentiate between 
different categories of income in the case of dividends paid out, or capital gains relating to, profits that have 
been or will become subject to corporate tax in a source State. This corporate tax (effectively at the expense of 
the investor) can already be sufficient from a benefit perspective. 
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)1078 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors cannot be motivated by the benefit principle, because they could result in different tax treatment 
among foreign sovereign wealth investors, and between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-
resident investors, be it individuals or companies, that perform the same investment activities in a source 
State. On the other hand, Approach (1), under which source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors in 
the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors that perform the same investment activities in a 
source State, could be inspired by the benefit principle.  
  
8.3.3.2 Inter-nation equity 
 
Inter-nation equity is not about the allocation of revenue between States, but is concerned with the allocation 
of national gain (or loss) in the context of cross-border activities. This allocation is affected when the source 
State imposes tax on the income derived by non-residents; taxation in the residence State has no impact on 
this allocation (as it does not affect the gain accruing to that State). The central question of inter-nation equity 
is whether the source State has a legitimate claim to impose tax on the income derived by non-residents and, 
if so, how source taxation should be designed. Source States have a legitimate claim, based on the benefit 
principle, as well as the idea that source State should be entitled to (a share of) pure economic rents derived 
from activity within its territory. However, inter-nation equity provides little guidance as to how taxation vis-
à-vis non-resident investors should be designed. Nevertheless, the following general rule can be derived from 
it, in the author’s view: non-residents from the same State performing the same (investment) activities in a 
source State should be treated alike in that source State (i.e. horizontal non-discriminatory treatment); a 
different treatment of non-resident investors from different States can be justified on redistribution grounds 
only. 
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)1079 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors cannot be explained by inter-nation equity, at least as far as they result in different source taxation 
between foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors from the same State, be it 
individuals or companies. Approach (1), under which source States tax foreign sovereign wealth investors in 
the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors, could be motivated by inter-nation equity. 
 
 
  
                                                             
1078 As identified in Section 3.2.2.2. Approaches (2) to (5) are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
1079 Ibid.  
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8.3.4 International attractiveness 
 
Another attribute of international tax policy is the attractiveness of a tax regime in an international setting, i.e. 
the attractiveness of a State’s tax regime vis-à-vis tax regimes of other States. A State may want to use its tax 
system, including tax treaties, as an instrument to influence investment decisions and create an attractive 
investment location for foreign sovereign wealth investors in order to stimulate economic growth and to 
create jobs. However, such a State needs to be aware that a tax reduction does not necessarily have the 
desired effect (e.g. an increase of investments from these investors), and may often result in a loss of tax 
revenue for which compensating policy measures may need to be taken.  
 
Tax incentives are often aimed at attracting (foreign) direct investments, as opposed to (foreign) portfolio 
investments, because direct investments are believed to affect the location of business activity. However, as 
explained in Section 3.4.3.1, where portfolio capital is not widely available, portfolio investments could also 
influence the location of investment. Furthermore, some States, including the Netherlands, aim to attract 
foreign portfolio investments through tax incentives, without having regard to the availability of portfolio 
capital. 
 
In the author’s view, inter-taxpayer equity (benefit principle), as an expression of the fundamental value of 
fairness, should play a vital role in relation to international attractiveness in every democracy under the rule 
of law. When motivated by international attractiveness, source States should only differentiate between 
investors if they have valid (economic) reasons for doing so – i.e. a rationally defensible purpose. That is, they 
need be able to demonstrate the distinctiveness of one or more investors over other investors in terms of 
stimulating economic growth and creating jobs. In the context of international attractiveness, the 
distinctiveness must in particular lie in foreign sovereign wealth investors’ willingness to make an investment 
that no, or at least few, others are willing to make, and could, for instance, be found in the very long-term 
investment strategy of some foreign sovereign wealth investors, or their willingness to make risky 
investments.  
 
Considering the above, Approaches (2) to (5)1080 regarding the tax treatment of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors could promote a source State’s international attractiveness for foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
8.3.5 Conclusion 
 
Approaches (1) to (5)1081 regarding the taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors have been measured by 
their neutrality, equity and international attractiveness. The results, which are summarized in the table below, 
point out that each approach could satisfy, at least to some degree, at least two policy principles or objectives. 
In the absence of a clear theoretical hierarchy among these, often conflicting, international tax policy 
principles and objectives which applies to all States in all situations, no general judgment can be made about 
which approach is the ‘correct’ approach. Nevertheless, inter-taxpayer equity (benefit principle), as an 
expression of the fundamental value of fairness, should be an important international policy principle in every 
democracy under the rule of law. Ultimately, the tax legislator of each individual sovereign State, therefore, 
has to weigh and balance the principle of inter-taxpayer equity and any other conflicting tax policy principle 
or objective it wishes to implement. 
                                                             
1080 Ibid. 
1081 Ibid. 
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8.4. Sovereign immunity principle 
 
8.4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the elementary question whether the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of 
customary international law, actually requires source States to accord tax immunities to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors. The question to that answer indicates what impact the sovereign immunity principle, as a 
principle of customary international law, has on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy 
objectives, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors1082. For 
example, if the sovereign immunity principle would require source States to accord a general tax-exemption 
to foreign sovereign wealth investors, it would leave source States no option but to implement Approach (2). 
 
8.4.2 Main findings 
 
According to the customary international law principle of sovereign immunity, a foreign sovereign State (and 
its property) can be held immune from the jurisdiction of the courts (jurisdictional immunity) and from the 
enforcement power of another sovereign State (immunity from execution) in civil proceedings, and this 
principle may also apply to State entities.  
 
The findings of Chapter 4 indicate that there is currently no rule of customary international law requiring a 
source State to accord any immunity from income taxation to foreign States or foreign sovereign wealth 
investors. A rule of customary international law requires: (i) evidence of a general State practice, (ii) that is 
accepted as law (opinio juris). As already noted in the OECD Commentary on Art. 1, there is no extensive and 
virtually uniform State practice regarding source taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors; even among 
States which do apply sovereign immunity to direct taxation, significant differences exist between them. In 
addition, an examination of the tax immunity regimes and the rules on jurisdictional immunity in civil 
proceedings in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., strongly suggests that the tax-exemptions accorded to 
foreign sovereign wealth investors are not (or, at least, no longer) truly motivated by sovereignty, indicating 
                                                             
1082 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
(CEN) (CIN) (inter-nation) (inter-taxpayer)
√ X X X √
* Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
X
Approach (5)* 
Approach (4)* √
Approach (3)* √ X
X X
√
Approach (2)* √ X
International 
attractiveness
X √
X √
X
√
X
Neutrality Equity
√ √
X
Approach (1)* X
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the absence of opinio juris. Therefore, the principle of jurisdictional immunity has no (negative) impact on 
source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors1083. 
 
Rather than through immunity from taxation, absence of source State taxation could effectively also be 
achieved when (property of) foreign sovereign wealth investors would enjoy immunity from execution in tax 
cases and, therefore, immunity from the collection of taxes. Given that a source State may also seek 
enforcement measures to be taken against property situated in foreign jurisdictions, this effect may depend 
on how immunity from execution would apply to foreign sovereign wealth investors in one or more foreign 
jurisdictions. While foreign sovereign wealth investors may enjoy immunity from execution in private law 
cases in respect of property serving sovereign purposes, it is uncertain whether this would still apply in a tax 
case. Although the international law status of immunity from execution in tax cases is currently unclear, it can 
be argued that immunity from execution in tax cases should not apply any differently from immunity from 
execution in private law cases. This could mean that property of foreign sovereign wealth investors may also 
enjoy immunity from execution in tax cases. Be that as it may, it should be kept in mind that this delicate issue 
would only occur in rather exceptional circumstances; for example, if a foreign sovereign wealth investor 
refuses to pay income tax imposed on it by a source State, or if an SWE does not comply with withholding tax 
obligations under the laws of a source State. Immunity from execution in tax cases could (effectively) result in 
the absence of source State taxation, which would raise equity concerns since it results in preferential tax 
treatment of (some) foreign sovereign wealth investors over other investors. However, because of the 
uncertainty that surrounds it and because it may only occur in rather exceptional circumstances, immunity 
from execution in tax cases should neither influence investment decisions of investors, nor enhance a source 
State’s international attractiveness. Therefore, the (potential) overall impact of immunity from execution on 
source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors,1084 is negligible. 
 
8.4.3 Conclusion 
 
It was concluded in Chapter 4 that the sovereign immunity principle, as a principle of customary international 
law, has, at most, a very small impact on source States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives, 
and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors. 
 
8.5. Tax treaties 
 
8.5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 considers the (possible) implications of tax treaties for source State taxation of foreign sovereign 
wealth investors. Based on these implications, it examines what impact tax treaties could have on source 
States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international 
attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors1085. 
The focus in Chapter 5 is on the OECD and UN MTC, and their Commentaries. 
 
 
 
                                                             
1083 Ibid. 
1084 Ibid. 
1085 Ibid. 
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8.5.2 Main findings 
 
Qualifying as a resident of a Contracting State (Art. 4(1)) is of key importance for the entitlement to tax treaty 
benefits. Investors have access to a tax treaty and its benefits if they are ‘liable to tax’ – i.e. a comprehensive 
taxation (full tax liability). Many States choose not to tax their sovereign wealth investors. Many States also 
choose, for a number of reasons, not to tax certain private resident investors, such as pension funds and CIVs. 
However, the way this non-taxation of sovereign wealth investors and private resident investors is achieved 
in the legislation of the home State, can make a difference in the outcome of the ‘liable to tax’ test. The phrase 
State or any political subdivision or local authority thereof in Art. 4(1) of both the OECD and UN MTC offers 
sovereign wealth investors an additional possibility to get tax treaty access. Sovereign wealth investors 
constituted by a pool of assets can most likely be considered an integral part of the State. It is, however, 
unclear whether sovereign wealth investors with a separate legal identity are covered by this expression, and 
whether a further distinction should be made between legal persons of public law and legal persons of private 
law owned by a legal person of public law.  
 
Tax treaty benefits include reduced treaty rates on outbound dividends and interest payments. As indicated 
by the OECD Commentary on Arts. 10 (Dividends) and 11 (Interest), some source States even accord tax-
exemptions to foreign States and (some of) their wholly-owned entities. And these exemptions from source 
taxation might also be available to foreign sovereign wealth investors. Tax treaty benefits could also include 
the absence of source taxation on the listed categories of capital gains, including capital gains derived from 
non-immovable property companies. The non-discrimination article (Art. 24) has no impact on source 
taxation of sovereign wealth investors. 
 
Art. 4(1) creates distinctions between investors which entitle some investors to tax treaty benefits (e.g. 
reduced tax rates under Arts. 10 and 11), while excluding others. From a source State perspective, this could 
give rise to tax differences and different tax burdens:  
- between investors that perform the same level of investment activities in a source State; which would 
not promote CIN; 
- among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among non-resident private investors, as well as 
between foreign sovereign wealth investors and non-resident private investors, that perform the 
same investment activities in and earn the same level of income from a source State; which would be 
in conflict with inter-taxpayer equity; 
- among foreign sovereign wealth investors and among non-resident private investors from the same 
State, as well as between foreign sovereign wealth investors and non-resident private investors from 
the same State, that perform the same investment activities in a source State; which would be in 
conflict with inter-nation equity.  
 
Art. 24 (non-discrimination) does not change these outcomes.  
 
Tax treaties, including those based on the OECD or UN MTC, could not only result in tax differences and 
different tax burdens between investors that do and investors that do not have treaty access, but also among 
investors that do have tax treaty access (even though a tax treaty applies in the same way to all treaty 
residents in similar circumstances). These tax differences and different tax burdens could result from 
different source tax rates for the same category of income, different source tax rates for different categories of 
income, and different allocation rules for different categories of income, which would not promote CIN and 
might be in conflict with both inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity. 
 
Source States wishing to promote CIN by introducing equal treatment between investors could be required to 
reduce and/or increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other 
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investors). Source States wishing to promote inter-taxpayer equity would need to reduce the current level of 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other investors) paying too much tax from a benefit 
perspective, and increase the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other 
investors) paying too little. Source States wishing to promote inter-nation equity by introducing equal 
treatment between non-resident investors from the same State could be required to reduce and/or increase 
the current level of taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors). 
However, obligations under existing tax treaties – with respect to maximum tax rates and allocation rules – 
could restrict a source State to follow the second route (increase), as opposed to the first route (reduction), 
while the first route may not always be realistic from a revenue perspective. This would generally leave a 
State with the option to amend or terminate existing tax treaties. But tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or 
unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time. 
Thus, tax treaties could restrict source States’ ability to pursue CIN, inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation 
equity, and to implement Approach (1)1086. 
 
On the other hand, tax treaties have no (negative) impact, as such, on source States’ ability to promote CEN 
through Approaches (2) to (5)1087 by according exemptions from source taxation to tax-exempt foreign 
sovereign wealth investors (i.e. tax treaties do not impose restrictions on source States to do so).  
 
Finally, OECD and UN MTC based treaties, as such, have no (negative) impact on source States’ ability to 
pursue international attractiveness through Approaches (2) to (5)1088.  
 
8.5.3 Conclusion 
 
It was concluded in Chapter 5 that OECD and UN MTC based treaties could restrict source States’ ability to 
pursue CIN, inter-taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1)1089. However, they 
have no (negative) impact on the ability of source States to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors, nor on their ability to pursue international attractiveness through Approaches (2) to (5). 
 
8.6. European law 
 
8.6.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 considers the (possible) implications of European law for source State taxation of foreign sovereign 
wealth investors. Based on these implications, it examines what impact European law could have on source 
States’ ability to achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives (i.e. neutrality, equity and international 
attractiveness), and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors1090. 
 
From a source State perspective, the European law analysis is only relevant to EU Member States and (other) 
members to the EEA Agreement. Chapter 6 considers primary European law, notably the fundamental 
freedoms and State aid rules included in the TFEU and the EEA Agreement, which can all apply in (direct) tax 
                                                             
1086 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
1087 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
1088 Ibid.  
1089 Ibid.  
1090 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
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matters. An important reason for including the EEA Agreement is that Norway, a member to this agreement, 
hosts currently the largest sovereign wealth investor in the world in terms of assets under management (US$ 
1,032 billion as in February 2018).1091 As regards the fundamental freedoms, the freedom of capital 
movement, rather than the freedom of establishment, potentially has the most relevance in relation to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors. The first reason for this is that, although sovereign wealth investors increasingly 
operate as long-term, active investors, they are still predominantly (passive) portfolio investors (to which the 
free movement of capital has the most relevance). The second reason is that most sovereign wealth investors 
reside outside the EU. Importantly, the personal and territorial scope of the free movement of capital in the 
TFEU is not limited to EU Member States; it has universal personal and territorial scope. As a result, the free 
movement of capital in the TFEU, as opposed to its counterpart in the EEA Agreement, may be relevant in 
relation to sovereign wealth investors from so-called third countries. Nevertheless, because sovereign wealth 
investors are increasingly operating as active investors and may reside inside EU Member States and (other) 
members to the EEA Agreement, the freedom of establishment is considered as well. With respect to the State 
aid rules, the analysis is a first general analysis in the context of foreign sovereign wealth investors, aimed at 
identifying potential issues in this complex and rapidly developing area of European law. As regards 
secondary EU law, the focus is on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive. 
 
8.6.2 Main findings 
 
The (possible) key implications of European law for source State taxation of foreign sovereign wealth 
investors are the following:  
 
(1) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment do not prohibit reverse 
discrimination: a Member State is allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor more favourably 
than resident investors. However, the State aid rules could prohibit reverse discrimination, even if 
more favourable treatment of non-residents is achieved through a tax treaty. 
(2) The freedom of establishment in both the TFEU and EEA Agreement does not apply to foreign 
sovereign wealth investors not formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and not having 
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business in a Member State. The 
scope of the freedom of capital movement enshrined in the EEA Agreement is limited to residents of 
the EU Member States/EEA-EFTA States. However, importantly, the TFEU accords universal 
territorial and personal scope to the freedom of capital movement, although certain restrictions which 
already existed before 1994 in relation to third countries may be allowed under the grandfathering 
rule. The precise implications of this standstill provision for the taxation of inbound portfolio 
investments from third countries are currently uncertain. As noted, most sovereign wealth investors 
reside in third countries.    
(3) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment prohibit vertical discrimination: a 
Member State is not allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth investor less favourably than resident 
investors, but only if their situations are objectively comparable. Objective comparability is 
determined, unilaterally and rather strictly, in the light of the objective of the national tax measure at 
issue, and by the relevant conditions laid down in the national tax legislation of a State as imposed on 
its residents. A similar substantive approach regarding comparability is followed for State aid 
purposes (selectivity test); the State aid rules are, therefore, the ‘flip side’ of the fundamental 
freedoms. It was argued that State entities or regular corporate shareholders are likely the best 
candidates in terms of objective vertical comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. 
(4) The freedom of capital movement and freedom of establishment may also prohibit horizontal 
discrimination, in which case a Member State would not be allowed to tax a foreign sovereign wealth 
                                                             
1091 <http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/> 
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investor less favourably than an objectively comparable other foreign sovereign wealth investor or 
other non-resident investor. In the author’s view, the framework for vertical comparability should be 
applied as much as possible to assess horizontal comparability of investors in outbound situations. 
Importantly, the prohibition of horizontal discrimination under the freedoms seems to be limited to 
intra-EU/EEA situations (Haribo and Salinen and Sopora),1092 and should not apply in case of tax 
treaty benefits (D. and Riskin & Timmermans). The framework for horizontal comparability under the 
State aid rules and the freedoms seems similar, although horizontal comparability under the former is 
not limited to intra-EU/EEA situations and may or may not apply in case of tax treaty benefits. It was 
argued that other foreign sovereign wealth investors (and non-resident State entities) or non-resident 
regular corporate shareholders are likely the best candidates in terms of objective horizontal 
comparability with a foreign sovereign wealth investor. These outcomes are in line with the outcomes 
in the context of vertical comparability, because horizontal comparability is to a large extent 
influenced by vertical comparability. 
(5) Although uncertain in many situations, it cannot, in the author’s view, be excluded that preferential 
tax treatment accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor by a Member State could constitute 
(unlawful) State aid for such an investor, regardless of whether it resides inside or outside Member 
States. The three key elements involved are: (i) whether a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be 
regarded to perform an economic activity and therefore to conduct an undertaking, (ii) whether a tax 
benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be regarded as selective, and (iii) 
whether a tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be liable to affect trade 
between Member States.  
If the concept of economic activity would be similar for State aid and EU VAT purposes, and 
therefore encompass passive investment activities, such as the granting of interest bearing loans, or 
placements in bank deposits or securities, the investment activities of many foreign sovereign wealth 
investors would constitute economic activities. Otherwise, foreign sovereign wealth investors would 
seem to qualify as an undertaking when performing activities that go beyond the compass of the 
simple acquisition and sale of assets (i.e. active investors). This depends on the facts and 
circumstances. However, an investor that holds a controlling shareholding in an undertaking and 
actually exercises that control by involving itself (directly or indirectly) in the management of that 
company, must, in any case, be regarded as an active investor and therefore as an undertaking.  
A tax benefit can only be selective if it favours economic operators relative to other economic 
operators which are comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the reference system. The 
reference system is driven by the taxpayers that claim to be discriminated against. Although the State 
aid rules follow the comparability approach in free movement cases, the implications of tax treaty 
benefits are currently less clear. Therefore, it cannot be excluded that tax treaty benefits which favour 
a sovereign wealth investor over other investors, will be considered selective by the CJEU in a State 
aid context.  
The question whether a tax benefit accorded to a foreign sovereign wealth investor would be 
liable to affect trade between Member States arises in particular in relation to foreign sovereign 
wealth investors that are based outside the Member States. It could, for example, be argued that a 
selective tax benefit accorded to foreign sovereign wealth investors, whether located inside or outside 
the Member States, is still potentially liable to affect trade between Member States, as it could result in 
higher demand for assets (target companies) located in the respective Member State, increased 
liquidity and/or favourable financing conditions, and thus strengthening the position of domestic 
economic operators compared with economic operators of other Member States, or it could maintain 
or increase domestic activity.  
                                                             
1092 Which would mean that the freedom of capital movement in the TFEU has no universal scope when it comes to 
horizontal comparability. 
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Member States wishing to introduce new or change existing tax policy vis-à-vis foreign 
sovereign wealth investors could consider notifying the EC respectively the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority in case of doubt as regards to the application of the State aid rules. 
(6) In addition, a preferential tax measure accorded by a Member State to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors which are not undertakings could amount to State aid for external asset managers (as 
indirect beneficiaries). Although a preferential tax measure accorded to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors by Member States could also benefit EU/EEA investment targets through higher demand 
and liquidity, any such (indirect) benefit is not selective, and hence no State aid for such targets, if that 
measure applies to targets in general and not just to specific undertakings, sectors or industries. 
(7) Foreign sovereign wealth investors, in particular SWEs established under the laws of an EU Member 
State, could be entitled to the benefits of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties 
Directive. It is noted that these directives do not apply to EEA-EFTA States. 
 
These key implications could have the following impact on the ability of Member States (as source States) to 
achieve (or promote) tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors:  
 
Capital import neutrality  
 
Neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, prohibit a Member State from implementing a 
(territorial based) tax system that would promote CIN by adopting equal treatment of investors that perform 
the same level of investment activities in a source State, irrespective of their place of residence and 
characteristics. Thus, neither the fundamental freedoms, nor the State aid rules, have a (negative) impact on 
the ability of Member States to promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1)1093.  
 
However, its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could 
restrict an EU Member State to promote CIN and achieve equal taxation, by increasing the current level of 
taxation of EU based foreign sovereign wealth investors and other non-resident investors. Thus, secondary EU 
law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to promote CIN, and to implement Approach (1)1094. 
 
Inter-taxpayer equity 
 
The State aid rules, but not the fundamental freedoms, could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-
taxpayer equity, but only if the benefit principle would prescribe foreign sovereign wealth investors (and 
other non-resident investors) to be taxed more favourably than resident investors (i.e. reverse 
discrimination). This conclusion has no impact on Member States’ ability to implement Approach (1)1095 
though because this approach is concerned with the relationship among non-resident investors, rather than 
the relationship between non-resident and resident investors. 
 
Its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU 
Member State to promote inter-taxpayer equity and increase the current level of taxation of EU based foreign 
sovereign wealth investors (and other non-resident investors) paying too little from a benefit perspective. 
Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s ability to achieve inter-taxpayer equity, and to 
implement Approach (1). 
 
 
                                                             
1093 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 Ibid. 
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Inter-nation equity  
 
Both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules could restrict Member States’ ability to achieve inter-
nation equity, but only if inter-nation equity would require to treat non-resident investors from different 
States differently, based on redistribution grounds (i.e. horizontal discrimination). To limit the impact as 
much as possible, different treatment of non-resident investors from different States should still be achieved 
through tax treaties as much as possible. Whereas both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules 
could restrict Member States ability to achieve inter-nation equity, this conclusion has no impact on Member 
States’ ability to implement Approach (1) though because this approach implies equal treatment between 
non-resident investors from different States (as opposed to different treatment).  
 
Its obligations under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive could restrict an EU 
Member State to promote inter-nation equity and achieve equal taxation between non-resident investors from 
the same EU Member State, by increasing the current level of taxation of EU based foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and other non-resident investors. Thus, secondary EU law could restrict an EU Member State’s 
ability to achieve inter-nation equity, and to implement Approach (1)1096.  
 
Capital export neutrality & International attractiveness  
 
According tax-exemptions to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to resident investors – i.e. reverse 
discrimination – is not prohibited by the fundamental freedoms. It could, however, constitute (unlawful) State 
aid, even if different treatment is based on a tax treaty, but a State aid risk will probably be limited to active 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. Thus, the State aid rules could, under circumstances, restrict Member 
States’ ability to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors and to promote international 
attractiveness.  
 
According unilateral tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors, but not to 
comparable other non-resident investors – i.e. Approaches (2) and (3)1097 – could constitute horizontal 
discrimination under the freedoms in intra-EU/EEA situations (but unlikely in non-EU/EEA situations), as 
well as State aid, even in non-EU/EEA situations. However, the State aid risk will probably be limited to active 
foreign sovereign wealth investors. Thus, the freedoms as well as the State aid rules could, under 
circumstances, restrict Member States’ ability to promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors and to promote international attractiveness through Approaches (2) and (3)1098.  
 
In contrast, according tax-exemptions (or tax reductions) to foreign sovereign wealth investors through tax 
treaties but not to non-resident investors from other States, or from the same State – i.e. Approaches (4) and 
(5)1099 – should not constitute horizontal discrimination under the freedoms, not even in intra-EU/EEA 
situations, but it may constitute (unlawful) State aid under rather strict circumstances. Thus, primary 
European law may restrict Member States’ ability to promote CEN and international attractiveness through 
Approaches (4) and (5)1100.  
 
                                                             
1096 Ibid. 
1097 Approaches (2) and (3) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Approaches (4) and (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties 
1100 Ibid. 
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The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and Interest & Royalties Directive have no (negative) impact on an EU 
Member State’s ability to promote CEN or international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth 
investors through Approaches (2) to (5) (i.e. they do not impose restrictions on EU Member States to do so). 
 
8.7.  The framework applied to the Netherlands 
 
In Chapter 7, the conceptual framework as developed in Chapters 3 to 6 is applied to the Netherlands, as an 
illustration. The Netherlands has been selected for several reasons. First, the primacy of Dutch international 
tax policy in relation to sovereign wealth investors is international attractiveness. This policy has found its 
way into Dutch tax treaties; the Netherlands has concluded several tax treaties containing favourable 
provisions for sovereign wealth investors, and Dutch tax (treaty) policy, as well as Dutch tax treaties, are 
approved by Dutch parliament. Second, the Netherlands is an OECD Member State, as well as an EU Member 
State, which means that the international law analysis will have to be considered in full. Third, the application 
of the framework requires in-depth knowledge of a tax system and a certain level of information. The author 
is familiar with Dutch tax law, whereas political decision-making in the Netherlands happens in a transparent 
way, and tax policy information, legislative information and other relevant information is publicly available. 
 
After a review of Dutch international tax policy principles and objectives, it is concluded that the Netherlands 
largely adheres to the objective of international tax attractiveness vis-à-vis sovereign wealth investors. This 
policy appears particularly from Dutch tax treaties, which often provide extensive tax benefits to sovereign 
wealth investors of the other contracting State. Given the tension with inter-taxpayer equity, as an expression 
of the fundamental value of fairness, a separate, more detailed and in-depth analysis for each favourable tax 
treaty provision regarding sovereign wealth investors would have been appropriate, in the author’s view. 
 
Nonetheless, given the primacy of international attractiveness as a Dutch tax policy objective in relation to 
sovereign wealth investors, the conceptual framework is primarily used in Chapter 7 to answer the following 
question: What impact, if any, does international law have on the Netherlands’ ability to achieve (or promote) 
international tax attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors? In this respect, the impact of 
the sovereign immunity principle, OECD MTC based treaties and European law is considered.  
 
Based on Chapters 4 and 5, it is concluded that neither the sovereign immunity principle, nor OECD based 
treaties concluded by the Netherlands have (had) a (negative) impact on the ability of the Netherlands to 
pursue international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors.   
 
European law should not impose restrictions on the Netherlands to the extent that it currently pursues 
international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors through the DDWTA 1965 (or 
the DCITA 1969). However, the Netherlands mainly pursues international attractiveness through tax treaties. 
Tax treaty based benefits accorded by the Netherlands to sovereign wealth investors, in deviation from (non-
selective) entitlements under domestic law or from a generally accepted allocation of taxing rights, carry the 
risk of being selective, and may, therefore, constitute State aid. Thus, European law, notably the State aid 
rules, may, under rather strict circumstances, (have) impose(d) restrictions on the Netherlands’ ability to 
pursue international attractiveness in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors. Nonetheless, if the 
Netherlands wishes to grant (further) tax benefits to (other) foreign sovereign wealth investors in the future, 
but not to other (comparable) investors, it would probably still be best to continue to do so through tax 
treaties as much as possible. However, the downside of implementing a tax policy through tax treaties is that 
it may leave little leeway to give effect to a tax policy change. Tax treaties are rarely renegotiated, or 
unilaterally terminated. Once a tax treaty enters into force, it will generally apply for a long period of time.    
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8.8. Final conclusion and final remarks 
 
The impact the sovereign immunity principle, tax treaties and European law could have on source States’ 
ability to achieve (or promote) neutrality, equity and international attractiveness, and to freely implement an 
approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors,1101 is summarized in the table below. 
 
 
 
For non-EU/EEA-EFTA Member States, the impact international law could have on their ability to achieve (or 
promote) tax policy objectives in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors depends on the policy 
objective that is being pursued. The international law considered has no (negative) impact on their ability to 
                                                             
1101 See the five approaches identified in Section 3.2.2.2. 
(CEN) (CIN) (inter-taxpayer) (inter-nation)
fundamental freedoms
State aid rules
Directives
*
**
Approach (1): taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors.
Approach (2): according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (3): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice.
Approach (4): according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties.
Approach (5): according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties. 
But probably limited to active  foreign sovereign wealth investors.
(not applicable to EEA-
EFTA States)
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approach (1)*
Potentially underlying 
Approaches (2) to (5)*
No (negative) impact Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required, and 
limited to outbound 
dividend, interest and 
royalty payments in 
certain intra-EU 
situations)
No (negative) impact
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) to (5)**
No (negative) impact Could restrict inter-
taxpayer equity if it 
would be required to 
treat non-resident 
investors more 
favourably than resident 
investors, but do not 
restrict Approach (1) 
though
Could restrict inter-
nation equity if it would 
be required to treat non-
resident investors from 
different States 
differently based on 
redistribution grounds, 
but do not restrict 
Approach (1) though
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) to (5)**
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) and (3), 
but not Approaches (4) 
and (5)
OECD/UN MTC based 
treaties
No (negative) impact Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
Restrict Approach (1)
(but only where an 
increase in level of 
taxation is required)
No (negative) impact
European (Union) law
Could restrict 
Approaches (2) and (3), 
but not Approaches (4) 
and (5)
No (negative) impact No impact Could restrict inter-
nation equity if it would 
be required to treat non-
resident investors from 
different States 
differently based on 
redistribution grounds, 
but do not restrict 
Approach (1) though
Neutrality Equity International 
attractiveness
Sovereign immunity No (negative) impact No (negative) impact Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
Impact negligible
(i.e. only if immunity 
from execution would 
apply)
No (negative) impact
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enhance international attractiveness and promote CEN in relation to foreign sovereign wealth investors – 
both potentially underlying Approaches (2) to (5)1102. However, OECD and UN MTC based treaties could 
restrict the ability of non-Member States to promote CIN, inter-taxpayer equity and/or inter-nation equity – 
all three potentially underlying Approach (1)1103 – should it be required to increase the current level of 
taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors (and other investors). 
 
For EU Member States and EEA-EFTA States, the picture is more complicated. In general terms, due to the 
impact of European law, the ability of EU Member States and EEA-EFTA States to achieve (or promote) tax 
policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of foreign sovereign wealth investors, is 
more restricted than that of non-EU Member States/non-EEA-EFTA States, whereas the ability of EU Member 
States is restricted the most. The latter is due to the European tax directives, which do not apply to EEA-EFTA 
States, and the freedom of capital movement under the TFEU, which has universal scope unlike its 
counterpart in the EEA-Agreement. The actual impact of European law can vary depending on the policy 
objective that is being pursued, and may further depend on a number of other variables, most notably the type 
and size of investment, as well as the type of sovereign wealth investor and its place of residence. However, as 
demonstrated in this study, the implications of European law for foreign sovereign wealth investors are not 
always clear, in particular in the area of State aid, so that its exact impact on the ability to achieve (or 
promote) tax policy objectives, and to freely implement an approach to taxation of these investors, may be 
difficult to determine. The relevant European law issues have been discussed in this study, and EU Member 
States and EEA-EFTA States wishing to introduce new tax policy, or evaluate or reconsider existing tax policy 
vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors, could consider notifying the EC respectively the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority in case of doubt as regards to the application of the State aid rules. 
 
  
                                                             
1102 Approaches (2) to (5) have been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and are as follows: 
(2) according a general tax-exemption under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(3) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under domestic law or administrative practice. 
(4) according a general tax-exemption under one or more tax treaties. 
(5) according specific tax-exemptions or specific tax reductions under one or more tax treaties.  
1103 Approach (1) has been identified in Section 3.2.2.2 and is as follows: taxing foreign sovereign wealth investors in the 
same way as ‘regular’ non-resident corporate investors. 
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Appendix 
 
Dutch Tax Treaties 
 
 
A.1. Introduction 
 
Dutch international tax policy vis-à-vis foreign sovereign wealth investors is largely aimed at enhancing the 
attractiveness of the Netherlands as an investment location. The memorandum on Dutch tax treaty policy 
recognizes sovereign wealth investors as important capital providers in the global economy1104 and welcomes 
their investments into the Netherlands.1105 It even pronounces the ambition of the Netherlands to become a 
regional investment centre for sovereign wealth investors through its tax treaty policy and the existing Dutch 
financial and tax infrastructure.1106 In line with this policy, sovereign wealth investors of tax treaty partners of 
the Netherlands are very often entitled to an exemption or reduction of Dutch source taxation on dividends, in 
deviation from regular tax treaty policy. This appendix sets out and discusses selected tax treaties concluded 
between the Netherlands and States that are home to sovereign wealth investors. The focus will be on the 
dividend article, because the Netherlands does not levy interest or royalty withholding tax. Before doing so, it 
is noted that regular Dutch tax treaty policy aims to agree upon a tax rate of 0% in respect of dividends paid to 
companies resident of the other Contracting State in case of shareholdings of at least 10% (referred to as ‘non-
portfolio dividends’).1107 In all other cases (referred to as ‘portfolio dividends’), the Netherlands aims to agree 
upon a tax rate of 15% (equal to the current Dutch domestic withholding tax rate).1108 
 
A.2. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and Kuwait (2001)  
 
A.2.1 Resident article 
 
The tax treaty with Kuwait1109 is the oldest tax treaty in force between the Netherlands and a Persian Gulf 
State. KIA, the SWF of Kuwait, which has been established as a legal identity under public law,1110 will 
undoubtedly qualify as a resident under the tax treaty between the Netherlands and Kuwait, pursuant to Art. 
4(2), which states that a ‘resident of a Contracting State’ shall include: 
  
“(a) the Government of that Contracting State or any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof; and 
 (b) any governmental institution created in that Contracting State under public law such as a 
corporation, Central Bank, fund, authority, foundation, agency or other similar entity, 
                                                             
1104 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 33. 
1105 Ibid., p. 76. 
1106 Ibid. 
1107 Ibid., p. 45. Similarly, Uitgangspunten van het beleid op het terrein van het internationaal fiscaal (verdragen)recht, 
Tweede Kamer, 1997-1998, 25 087, No. 4, p. 41. 
1108 Notitie Fiscaal Verdragsbeleid 2011, Tweede Kamer, 2010-2011, 25 087, No. 7, p. 47. Similarly, Uitgangspunten van 
het beleid op het terrein van het internationaal fiscaal (verdragen)recht, Tweede Kamer, 1997-1998, 25 087, No. 4, p. 42.  
1109 Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the State of Kuwait for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (29 May 2001), 
Treaties IBFD. 
1110 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles 
and Practices “Santiago Principles” (October, 2008), Part II, GAPP 1, Explanation and commentary, p. 11. 
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provided that its capital is beneficially and exclusively owned by the Government of that 
Contracting State or any political subdivision or local authority thereof;”1111  
 
A.2.2 Dividend article 
 
Based on Art. 10(2)(a), companies resident of Kuwait are entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on 
dividends in case of shareholdings of at least 10% in Dutch resident companies. From Art. 5 of the Protocol, it 
can be derived that residents referred to in Art. 4(2), and companies resident in Kuwait and exclusively 
owned by a resident referred to in Art. 4(2), will also be entitled to this exemption from Dutch taxation. In all 
other cases, the Netherlands is allowed to tax dividends at a maximum rate of 10%, based on Art. 10(2)(b). 
The SWF of Kuwait will be entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on dividends in case of shareholdings 
of at least 10%. 
 
A.3. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and the U.A.E. (2007) 
 
A.3.1 Resident article 
 
The tax treaty between the Netherlands and the U.A.E.1112 contains both a separate definition of resident for 
each Contracting State and a general definition of resident that applies to both Contracting States. In the case 
of the U.A.E., the tax treaty with the Netherlands applies to companies that have their place of effective 
management in the U.A.E.1113 The general treaty definition of resident includes “that State and any political 
subdivision or local authority thereof”, as well as a ‘government institution’.1114 The treaty provides that any 
institution shall be deemed to be a government institution if (i) “created, wholly owned and controlled by the 
government of one of the Contracting States or of its political subdivisions, for the fulfilment of public 
functions” and if (ii) recognized as such by mutual agreement. The Dutch Minister of Finance has indicated 
that SWFs of the U.A.E., such as ADIA and the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, qualify as government institution 
under this tax treaty.1115 
 
A.3.2 Dividend article 
 
Based on Art. 10(2)(a), the tax rate on dividends paid by Dutch resident companies to companies resident of 
the U.A.E. is maximized at 5% in case of shareholdings of at least 10%. In all other cases, the Netherlands is, in 
principle, allowed to tax dividends at a maximum rate of 10%, based on Art. 10(2)(b). However, pursuant to 
Art. 10(3), the following shareholders are entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on dividends, 
regardless of the size of the shareholding: 
 
“(…) the beneficial owner is that State itself, a political subdivision, local government, or the Central 
Bank thereof, a pension fund, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi Investment Council or 
any other institution created by the Government of, a political subdivision, local authority of that 
other State which is recognised as an integral part of that Government as shall be agreed by mutual 
agreement of the competent authorities of the Contracting States.” (underline added) 
 
                                                             
1111 Art. 4(2). 
1112 Convention Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Arab Emirates for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (8 May 2007), Treaties IBFD. 
1113 Art. 4(1)b. 
1114 Art. 4(2). 
1115 Tweede Kamer, 2009-2010, 32 346, No. 3, p. 6. 
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The second largest SWF of the world, namely the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority,1116 has explicitly been 
named as a fund in relation to which the Netherlands in principle has no right to tax dividends paid by a Dutch 
resident company, regardless of the size of the shareholding, provided the application of Art. 10(3) has been 
settled by mutual agreement. The wording of Art. 10(3) leaves open the possibility to include in its scope 
those sovereign wealth investors of the U.A.E. which have not been explicitly mentioned, but which are 
nonetheless considered an integral part of an Emirate or the U.A.E.  
 
A.4. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and Bahrain (2008) 
 
A.4.1 Resident article 
 
The tax treaty between the Netherlands and Bahrain1117 follows the 1995 OECD MTC definition of resident. 
However, as explained in Section 5.3.4.4.3, for purposes of this tax treaty, the expression that State and any 
political subdivision or local authority thereof in Art. 4(2) is interpreted by the Netherlands as including “a 
governmental agency, national bank (which is a commercial bank and not a central bank) and a wholly owned 
company” of a State, a political subdivision or a local authority thereof.1118 This broad interpretation was 
motivated by the purpose of attracting investments from such sovereign wealth investors.1119 The SWF of 
Bahrain (Mumtalakat Holding Company) was established as an independent holding company1120 and should 
therefore qualify as a tax treaty resident of Bahrain. 
 
A.4.2 Dividend article 
 
Based on Art. 10(2)(a), companies resident of Bahrain with a capital divided into shares are entitled to an 
exemption from Dutch taxation on dividends in case of shareholdings of at least 10% in Dutch resident 
companies. From Art. 10(10), it can be derived that residents referred to in Art. 4(2), and companies resident 
in Bahrain and exclusively owned by a resident referred to in Art. 4(2), will also be entitled to this exemption 
from Dutch taxation. In all other cases, the Netherlands is allowed to tax dividends at a maximum rate of 10%, 
based on Art. 10(2)(b). The SWF of Bahrain will be entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on dividends 
in case of shareholdings of at least 10%. 
 
A.5. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and Oman (2009) 
 
A.5.1 Resident article 
 
The tax treaty between the Netherlands and Oman1121 replicates the OECD MTC definition of resident1122 and, 
based on the protocol, this definition is extended to “any statutory body of a Contracting State”.1123  
 
 
                                                             
1116 See Section 2.9.3. 
1117 Convention Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Bahrain for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (16 
April 2008), Treaties IBFD. 
1118 Tweede Kamer, 2008-2009, 31 591, No. A/1, p. 5. 
1119 Ibid. 
1120 <http://www.bmhc.bh/about/overview>   
1121 Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Sultanate of Oman for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (5 October 2009), Treaties IBFD. 
1122 Art. 4(1). 
1123 Art. III. 
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A.5.2 Dividend article 
 
Based on Art. 10(2)(a), companies resident of Oman are entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on 
dividends in case of shareholdings of at least 10% in Dutch resident companies. In all other cases, the 
Netherlands is, in principle, allowed to tax dividends at a maximum rate of 10%, based on Art. 10(2)(b). 
However, pursuant to Art. 10(4), the following entities are also entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation, 
regardless of the size of the shareholding: 
 
“(…) that other State, a political subdivision, local government, a pension fund, or the Central Bank of 
either Contracting State, the State General Reserve Fund of the Sultanate of Oman, the Omani 
Investment Fund, the Omani Development bank, and any other statutory body or institution wholly or 
mainly owned by the Government of the Sultanate of Oman as may be agreed from time to time 
between the competent authorities of the Contracting States.” (underline added) 
 
Therefore, dividends paid by a Dutch resident company to the two SWFs of Oman are exempt from Dutch tax, 
regardless of the size of the shareholding. The wording of Art. 10(4) leaves open the possibility to include in 
its scope any new sovereign wealth investors of Oman in the future. 
 
A.6. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and Norway (1990) and its new protocol (2013)  
 
A.6.1 Resident article 
 
The new protocol, concluded on 23 April 2013,1124 has introduced a number of changes to the tax treaty 
between the Netherlands and Norway (1990).1125 The resident article has been aligned with Art. 4(1) of the 
OECD MTC and now includes as a tax treaty resident the State and any political subdivision or local authority 
thereof. Furthermore, the new protocol deals with the application of the tax treaty to tax-exempt entities. A 
new article has been introduced in the protocol, which expresses the understanding of both States that a 
person (other than an individual) that is a subject of the tax laws of one of the States, is considered to be ‘liable 
to tax’ as meant in Art. 4(1), “even when all elements of income attributable to that person are exempted from 
tax where the person meets all the requirements for exemption specified in the domestic tax law”. However, 
whether and, if so, to which extent a resident that is subject to a preferential regime will be entitled to tax 
treaty benefits, shall be decided by mutual agreement. According to the Dutch Explanatory Note to the new 
protocol, the aim is to apply the tax treaty in principle to all persons that are treated as body corporates (i.e. 
separate entities) for Dutch corporate income tax purposes.1126   
 
A.6.2 Dividend article 
 
As a general rule, the Netherlands is allowed to tax outbound dividends at a maximum rate of 15%, based on 
Art. 10(2). However, companies resident of Norway are entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation on 
dividends in case of shareholdings of at least 10% in Dutch resident companies. Pursuant to the new Protocol, 
the following entities are also entitled to an exemption from Dutch taxation, regardless of the size of the 
shareholding: a pension fund, the central bank of Norway, Norway’s SWF (the Government Pension Fund 
                                                             
1124 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (23 
April 2013), Treaties IBFD. 
1125 Convention Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of the Netherlands for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (12 January 1990), 
Treaties IBFD. 
1126 Staten Generaal, 2012-2013, 33 731, No. 1, p. 6. 
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Global),1127 and any statutory body or any institution wholly or mainly owned by the government of Norway 
as may be agreed from time to time between the competent authorities.1128   
 
A.7. Tax treaty between the Netherlands and China (2013) 
 
A.7.1 Resident article 
 
Art. 4 of the tax treaty between the Netherlands and China (2013)1129 is almost an exact copy of the 1995 
version of Art. 4 of the OECD MTC. The Netherlands proposed to deviate from Art. 4(1) of the OECD MTC in 
line with Dutch tax treaty policy, but China’s model did not allow such deviation.1130 China recognized the 
difficulties that Art. 4(1) of the OECD MTC could give rise to, but did not expect interpretation differences 
between China and the Netherlands, because both States recognize (foreign) resident pension funds, not-for-
profit organizations and government institutions (overheidsinstellingen) as a resident for purposes of this tax 
treaty.1131  
 
A.7.2 Dividend article 
 
Based on Art. 10(2)(a), the maximum Dutch tax rate on dividends paid to companies resident of China is 5% 
in case of shareholdings of at least 25%. In all other cases, the maximum tax rate is, in principle, 10%, based 
on Art. 10(2)(b). However, pursuant to Art. 10(3), the following entities are entitled to an exemption from 
Dutch taxation on dividends, regardless of the size of the shareholding: the government of China, any of its 
institutions or any other entity the capital of which is wholly owned directly or indirectly by China. The two 
main SWFs of China, China Investment Corporation1132 and SAFE Investment Company, are established under 
company law and wholly-owned by the government of China. They should, therefore, be entitled to an 
exemption from Dutch taxation on dividends, regardless of the size of the shareholding. It is noted that, for 
purposes of Art. 11 (Interest), China Investment Corporation is explicitly mentioned as a financial institution 
wholly-owned by China. 
 
 
  
                                                             
1127 See Section 2.9.1. 
1128 Art. X of the Protocol. 
1129 Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the People's Republic 
of China for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income (31 
May 2013), Treaties IBFD. 
1130 Tweede Kamer, 2012-2013, 33 718, No. 3, p. 8. 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 See Section 2.9.4. 
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